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Political Affairs
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By Roy Medvedev

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[ZNAMYA No 1, Jan 89; pp 159-209]

[Text] The essays which I offer here to the attention of the readers have been the main concern of my life. I have been preparing for around 20 years in one form or another for this work, and then spent more than 25 years working on it directly, collecting facts and evidence piecemeal and sometimes in handfuls, reflecting on the past, discussing it with friends and like-thinkers and arguing with opponents. I met and spoke with Old Bolsheviks who went through the Stalin prisons and camps, including a few surviving supporters of various sorts of opposition as well as certain miraculously surviving former SRs, Mensheviks and anarchists, with nonparty technical specialists, with former military and priests, with party leaders and regular workers, with former "kulaks" and those who "dekulakized" them, with former Chekists, with emigrees returning to the USSR as well as those who were endeavoring to emigrate.

I began writing the book in 1962. The real threat of Stalin's rehabilitation which arose in 1969 led me to a decision to publish my work about him ("For the Court of History") abroad. The first edition came out in 1971-1972 in the United States, England and a majority of the European countries as well as in Japan; the second edition was in Russian in 1974 in the United States and in 1981, in Chinese in Beijing. I continued collecting materials. In the 1970's, there was an opportunity to become familiar with virtually all the books about Stalin and Stalinism published in various countries as well as accumulate facts and evidence. Thus, gradually a new more extensive book of around 80 printer's pages was prepared. It was published in the United States by Columbia University. Speaking frankly, with this I would have preferred ending my work on the subject "Stalin and Stalinism." However, since the end of 1986, our nation has begun a new stage of revelations and criticisms of Stalinism and Stalin's crimes were discussed at the Central Committee Plenums and at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. I was unable to remain indifferent from this important purgative work of restoring the historical truth, all the more as there was an opportunity to publish my articles and books in the Soviet press. I had to take up my pen.

In my essays the reader will find a number of facts and materials already known to him from other publications of the last 3 years. I cannot, however, fully exclude these materials in order not to violate the logic of exposition. These essays are a magazine version of the book based both on previous and new materials concerning Stalin and Stalinism. A separate work will appear on the accomplices of Stalin's crimes. I have also decided to make a separate book of the analysis of events of the Patriotic War and the postwar times.

I would like to take this occasion to voice my gratitude to all of those who helped me in the work.

These essays as, incidentally, my other books, are a private investigation, and I have not consulted with anyone on either the times of their completion, their conclusions or their ideas. I have not employed any archives, any "special repositories," any secret materials and am not acquainted with them. I have not resorted to any conspiracy, as this would have excluded the possibility of discussing the manuscript with friends. I have not requested nor received any assistance from officials institutions, nor have I encountered any major obstacles in my work.

Part 1: The Rise of Stalinism

Stalin at the Head of the VKP(b)

1

Stalin was born on 9 (21) December 1879 in the small Georgian town of Gori in the family of a poor cobbler Vissarion Ivanovich Dzhugashvili, an uneducated and rough man. Soon after the birth of Soso (Stalin's name in childhood), he abandoned the family and moved to Tiflis (Tbilisi) where for a certain time he worked at a shoe mill, he lived in poverty, took sick and died, when Stalin was still a juvenile.

Stalin's mother, Yekaterina Georgiyevna, nee Geladze, like her husband, came from a peasant family. She worked all her life as a seamstress and laundress. She had no time for raising her son and Soso spent a large part of the day out on the street. In childhood he contracted smallpox, leaving marks on his face. Among the various nicknames under which Stalin would later figure in the police documents was that of "pockface." In a road accident, the 12-year-old Stalin injured his left arm and in time this was shorter and weaker than the right one. Stalin carefully concealed his partial withering of the arm, he avoided undressing in front of others and rarely showed it even to physicians. He did not like to swim and did not learn how. When resting on the Black Sea, he usually walked along the beach without undressing.

From childhood Stalin stood out in his stubbornness and desire to surpass contemporaries and he read a good deal. Short and physically weak, he could not hope for success in boyish fights and was afraid of being beaten. From his adolescence he became secretive and vengeful and all his life disliked tall and physically strong persons. A desire for glory early on possessed the minds and feelings of Stalin. But he was poor, he was a "non-Russian" and realized that a poor Georgian youth from

a small provincial town could not achieve much in Tsarist Russia. The young Stalin was strongly impressed by the books of the Georgian writer A. Kazbegi, particularly the novel "Ottseubiytsa" [Patricide] dealing with the struggle of the peasant mountaineers for their independence and freedom. One of the heroes in the novel, the intrepid Koba, became a hero also for the young Stalin, and he even began to call himself Koba. This name was his party alias; the Old Bolsheviks in the 1930's (and Molotov and Mikoyan even later), in talking to Stalin, frequently called him Koba. Stalin had a number of party aliases such as "Ivanovich," "Vasiliy" and "Vasilyev." But the name Koba and the pseudonym last name of Stalin remained.

When the boy was 8 years old, his mother sent him to the Gori Parochial School. Stalin took 6 years for the 4-year course at the school. It was difficult for him, as instruction was predominantly in Russian. Stalin wrote Russian well, however he did not learn to speak it freely; he spoke Russian slowly, quietly and with a strong Georgian accent. In 1894, Stalin was admitted to the Tiflis Seminary. In the parochial school and particularly in the seminary there reigned a situation of obscurantism, hypocrisy, constant petty supervision and reciprocal denunciations. Here there were strict order and almost military discipline. It is not surprising that the seminaries in Russia produced not only faithful servants of the regime and the Church but also revolutionaries.

The seminary undoubtedly influenced Stalin in another regard as well: it also developed his previously inherent craftiness, cleverness and coarseness. Dogmatism and intolerance as well as a catechismic style inherent to his articles and speeches were also formed, indisputably, under the influence of a clerical education.

From early youth Stalin was completely devoid of a sense of humor. "That strange Georgian," his seminary friends were to say later. "He did not know how to joke at all. He did not understand jokes and responded with swearing and threats to the most innocent ones."

While a seminarist, Stalin came into contact not only with the first Marxist circles but also with the first worker groups who had organized at the Tiflis enterprises. He became a member of the Mesame-dasi, the first Georgian Social Democratic organization. He read many books of the Russian artistic classics and also took a liking for reading underground literature. It was at this time that he became familiar with the works of K. Marx and F. Engels. According to the official version, in May 1899, Stalin was expelled from the seminary precisely for reading banned literature and for establishing a Social Democratic circle. He was hired by the Tiflis Geophysics Observatory.

In 1900, Stalin became acquainted with the 32-year-old professional revolutionary Viktor Kurnatovskiy who had arrived in Tiflis and was later arrested here. Not long before his arrival in Georgia, the exiled Kurnatovskiy met Lenin in Minusinsk. Acquaintance with Kurnatovskiy, the reading of the works of V.I. Lenin and later the newspaper ISKRA which began appearing in the Transcaucasus in 1901 made the young Stalin a supporter of Lenin. After the split of the Russian Social Democratic Movement into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Stalin decisively took the side of the Bolsheviks. It should be pointed out, however, that the influence of the Menshevik faction was predominant precisely in Georgia.

In the spring of 1901, Stalin went underground. He took part in organizing strikes and demonstrations, including the well-known Batumi Demonstration in March 1902. Here, in Batumi, Stalin was arrested and exiled to Eastern Siberia where he spent around 2 years. Even then Stalin was not only a practicing revolutionary but also claimed the role of a theoretician, in any event on the level of the Transcaucasus. In 1900-1910, Stalin wrote many articles and pamphlets, virtually all in Georgian, and published them in the Georgian Social Democratic press. The works of this period make up the first two volumes in the complete collected works of Stalin, and a large portion of them was translated from Georgian only in 1945-1946. Of course, the publications by Stalin from the beginning of the century neither in terms of number nor quality can be put on the same footing as the creativity of many other leaders of Russian Social Democracy. But it would be wrong to speak about the creative sterility of the young Stalin.

The Revolution of 1905-1907 made it possible for Stalin to evidence certain other of his abilities. It was precisely he who was assigned to carry out several major terroristic acts or, as they were termed them, "exes," that is, expropriations. These were basically armed robberies of banks, postal coaches and steamships. At that time the Bolsheviks permitted this as a means for replenishing the party finances and purchasing weapons as well as for influencing the Tsarist Administration. The armed robbery of the Tiflis Treasury gained particularly great renown as this brought the Bolshevik cash reserves more than 300,000 rubles. This "ex" was conducted by a group of fighters including Kamo (S.A. Ter-Petrosyan), however participating in its organization and planning were Stalin and L.B. Krasin, the leader of the "fighting technical group under the Central Committee."

In 1907, Stalin went to work on the Baku organization of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party]. Involvement in the "exes" made his presence in Tiflis unsafe. Moreover, the Mensheviks prevailed in the Georgian Social Democratic Movement and they were decisive opponents of terror. Stalin participated in organizing the largest actions of the Baku working class in those times, attracting the attention of V.I. Lenin. Several times Stalin was arrested and exiled but each time he succeeded in escaping the resuming his illegal work in the Caucasus.

From Stalin's personal life during this period we must point out the death of his first wife, Yekaterina

Svanidze, after several years of marriage. Stalin was very attached to his young wife and her death did not contribute to a softening of his character. Stalin's son, Yakov, remained a ward of relatives, and his father was little concerned and thought little about him.

In 1911-1912, Stalin lived largely in St. Petersburg and Moskov. His articles frequently appeared in the St. Petersburg newspaper ZVEZDA and later in the newspapers PRAVDA and SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. At the Sixth (Prague) All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP held in January 1912, Stalin was coopted into the membership of the party Central Committee as well as included in the membership of the Central Committee Russian Buro.

The rather strong self-assurance and at the same time the independence of Stalin can be seen from the fact that he agreed with Lenin on far from everything, although he was part of the Bolshevik faction.

In 1910-1912, Stalin was not inclined, like Lenin, to heighten and deepen the struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Prior to the Prague Conference in a letter to M. Tskhakaya, he described Lenin's struggle to restore the party organization as a "tempest in a teacup." After the Prague Conference, he demanded, in contrast to Lenin, concessions for the so-called "liquidators." In Stalin's first article for PRAVDA, he spoke of the unity of the Social Democrats "at whatever the cost," and "without the difference of factions."

Stalin met Lenin for the first at the Tammerfors Conference of the Bolsheviks in 1905, and then met him at the Fourth and Fifth RSDRP Congresses. These meetings left a deep impression in his memory. A closer personal acquaintance came about only at the end of 1912, when Koba, who had taken an active part in the organization and editing of the first legal Bolshevik newspaper PRAVDA, traveled to Krakow to see Lenin at a Central Committee conference with party workers. Here, in Poland, Stalin wrote his work "Marxism and the Nationality Question" which was commented on positively by Lenin. At that time, Stalin made the best impression on Lenin. In one of the letters to Gorky, Lenin wrote, "we have a miraculous Georgian who came in and wrote a major article for PROSVESHCHENIYE, having collected all the Austrian and other materials."[1]

In line with the work of editing PRAVDA, Lenin several times wrote to Stalin himself then. However, these ties were so tentative that Lenin soon forgot Stalin's last name. "Do you remember of Koba?" Lenin asked G. Zinovyev in July 1915.[2] Zinovyev did not recall and in November 1915, Lenin wrote V.A. Karpinskiy: "A major favor: learn (from Stepko or Mikha and so forth) the last name of 'Koba' (Iosif D...?? We have forgotten). This is very important!!"[3] The problem was that Lenin had received a letter from Stalin from his Turukhansk exile and could not reply without remembering the last name.

Stalin spent 4 years in the remote Turukhansk area. In the small colony of exiles he behaved far from the best. For example, the wife of the Bolshevik Filipp Zakharov, R.G. Zakharova, in her memoirs about her husband related the following about Stalin's arrival in exile in 1913.

"Filipp told me about meeting with Stalin there, in Turukhansk.... According to an unwritten law it was accepted that each comrade newly arriving in exile would give information on the situation in Russia. From whom could one expect a more interesting, profound examination of all that was happening if not from a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee? The group of exiles which included Ya.M. Sverdlov and Filipp at this time was working in the village of Monastyrskoye.... Stalin was also to arrive there. Dubrovinskiy was no longer alive. Filipp who by nature was not inclined to set up idols for himself and in addition had heard from Dubrovinskiy a dispassionate assessment of all the then prominent leaders of the revolution, was awaiting Stalin's arrival without any particular anticipation. This was in contrast to Sverdlov who endeavored to do everything possible under those conditions to receive Stalin ceremoniously. A separate room was prepared for him and some comestibles were stored up from our very meager supplies. He had arrived!! He went into the room prepared for him and...was not seen anymore! He did not make any report on the situation in Russia. Sverdlov was very embarrassed.... Stalin was dispatched to the village assigned to him and soon thereafter it was learned that he had seized and taken with him all the books of Dubrovinskiy. At the same time the exiles before his arrival had decided upon general agreement that Dubrovinskiy's library, as a memorial to him, would be considered general property, like a traveling library. By what right had one man taken possession of it? Hotheaded Filipp set off for an explanation. Stalin "received" him like some Tsarist general would receive a rank-and-file soldier who dared report to him with some demand. Indignant Filipp (everyone was indignant!) for his entire life kept a feeling of resentment from this conversation and never altered his unflattering opinion of Stalin which he formed then...."

Stalin did not behave any better in the village of Kureyka which had been assigned for him to serve out his exile. He quarreled with virtually all the exiled Bolsheviks, including with Ya.M. Sverdlov. "There are two of us," Sverdlov wrote to his wife in 1913. "With me is the Georgian Dzhugashvili, an old acquaintance. A good fellow but too great an individualist in everyday life." Having lived next to Stalin for a certain time, Sverdlov commented about him in more critical terms. In May 1914, he wrote: "A comrade is with me (in Kureyka). But we know each other too well. And the most lamentable of all is that under the conditions of exile and prison, a person reveals himself to us and shows all his petty details.... The comrade now has a different apartment and we rarely see one another."

Exile, particularly exile to the Turukhansk area was a harsh punishment. But this still was not forced labor and

many of the "politicals" used the enforced idleness for adding to their knowledge, for creative work and for exchanging opinions. But Stalin as unable to work in captivity. His last work published in the second volume of the Collected Works is dated January-February 1913, while the first work in the third volume is March 1917. It cannot be said that Stalin took no part in party life. In the summer of 1915, he was present at a meeting of the members of the Central Committee Russian Buro and the Bolshevik faction of the State Duma and which had been deprived of its powers and exiled to Siberia. In 1916, together with a group of Bolsheviks, he signed a letter of request to the journal VOPROSY STRAKHOVANIYA. However, most of the time Stalin spent in idleness.

2

The beginning of 1917 found Stalin in Krasnoyarsk. Inducted together with a group of exiles into the army, he did not pass the medical commission as he was considered unfit for service because of his weak left arm. Exile was coming to an end and Stalin was permitted to serve the rest of it in Krasnoyarsk. He established contact with certain of the Krasnoyarsk Bolsheviks and spent a large portion of the evenings with L.B. Kamenev who also had been exiled to Siberia.

For a majority of the population and for the politicians, the revolution was a surprise, although many were expecting it. The complete and rapid collapse of the entire repressive system of Tsarism was one of the first results of the February Revolution. The policemen took off their uniforms and hid. The gates of the prisons were opened and the Tsarist forced labor and exile ceased functioning. Not only the political prisoners but also a predominant majority of the common criminals were given their freedom.

On 3 March 1917, a soviet was organized in Krasnoyarsk. It immediately assumed power and decreed the arrest of the Tsarist authorities. A special train was dispatched to return the exiles to Moscow and Petrograd. Stalin together with Kamenev and M.K. Muranov immediately set off for the capital.

During the very first days of March 1917, in Petrograd the Bolsheviks emerged from underground and took measures to publish PRAVDA as well as form a party leadership. All the member of the Central Committee Russian Buro which had been established at the Prague Conference during these days were either in exile or in emigration. For this reason, during the war years a new buro had been organized and of its membership A.G. Shlyapnikov, P.A. Zalutskiy and V.M. Molotov were in Petrograd. On 7-8 March, the Russian Buro coopted into its membership several persons including M.I. Kalinin, V.N. Zalezhskiy, M.I. Ulyanov and M.S. Olminskiy. The first issue of PRAVDA came out on 5 March and it was edited by K.S. Yeremeyev, M.I. Kalinin and V.M. Molotov.

Naturally, with the arrival of the Bolshevik exiles from Siberia, the question arose of including them as members of the new party centers. Difficulties and frictions were inevitable. For example, on 12 March 1917, on the day that Stalin, Kamenev and Muranov arrived in Petrograd, there was a session of the Central Committee Buro. The minutes of this session record the following:

"Then the question was settled of Comrades Muranov, Stalin and Kamenev. The first was invited unanimously. As for Stalin, it was reported that he had been a Central Committee agent in 1912 and for this reason it was desirable to have as a member of the BTsK [Central Committee Buro], but due to certain personal traits inherent to him, the BTsK was in favor of including him with a consultative vote."

We do not know the details of the clash between Stalin and the new BTsK members. The Bolsheviks returning from exile were more experienced and older. Stalin, in addition, had not merely been the "Central Committee agent," but the only Central Committee member in Petrograd and elected at the RSDRP Prague Conference. Naturally, on the next day he was included in the membership of the BTsK. On the same day, a new editorial staff of PRAVDA was approved including M.S. Olminskiy, I. Stalin, K.S. Yeremeyev, M.I. Kalinin and M.I. Ulyanov. But Stalin actually took control of the newspaper. Already on 15 March, issue No. 9 of PRAVDA stated that Stalin, Kamenev and Muranov were members of the editorial personnel. No mention was even made of the remaining editorial members approved by the BTsK. Stalin's conduct evoked a protest from the Petrograd Bolsheviks.

Here it was not merely a question of the membership of PRAVDA's editors but also its political and tactical concepts. In its very first issues, PRAVDA urged a struggle against the Provisional Government as well as against the policy of the Menshevik and SR parties which were endeavoring to come to terms with the bourgeois parties and the Provisional Government. This corresponded to those first recommendations which had arrived in Russia from Lenin. However, from issue No. 9 of the newspaper, both the tone and the content of the main articles changed. PRAVDA came out in support of the Provisional Government "to the degree that the actions of this government assist the development of the revolution." PRAVDA was quite definitely in favor of uniting with the Mensheviks into a single party within which both factions could overcome their differences. In favoring peace, PRAVDA urged the Russian soldiers to firmly hold the front until peace would be concluded.

The Petrograd Bolshevik organization could protest, however the articles in PRAVDA were a guide for all the party organizations in the nation. Before the appearance of Lenin in Petrograd, Stalin actually headed not only the editorial staff of PRAVDA but also for a short time the entire party.

Undoubtedly, Kamenev played the leading role in shaping the new line of PRAVDA. But Stalin fully supported him both as the actual editor of the newspaper and the author of a number of articles. Their line stemmed from the party slogans from the times of the 1905-1907 Revolution, when the question of stages of revolution was not linked to the question of war and actual dual power which had come into being in Russia in the spring of 1917. Kamenev and Stalin did not understand those new opportunities which had now opened up for the working class and the Bolsheviks. Only Lenin initially understood them and he had a difficult time persuading the party. It must be printed out that PRAVDA printed the first series of Lenin's founding letters in an abridged form, and the next three letters were not published at all. Stalin and Kamenev defended their position at the All-Russian Conference of Party Workers held in Petrograd on 27 March—2 April 1917. Even after Lenin's arrival, when his famous "April Theses" were published in PRAVDA, Kamenev, with Stalin's support, on the following day published an article with a harsh criticism of these theses. Only by the end of April after hot polemics did Lenin succeed in turning both the line of the Central Committee as well as the line of PRAVDA, having convinced a majority of the Central Committee of his rectitude. Stalin sided with Lenin while Kamenev did not agree with him on many questions concerning the development of the revolution.

Later on Stalin was repeatedly forced to admit the erroneousness of the position held by him in March 1917. "...This was a profoundly mistaken position," he said in one of the speeches, "for it fostered pacifist illusions, it played into the hands of defensism and impeded the revolutionary education of the masses. I shared this erroneous position then with other party comrades...."

At the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP (Bolshevik), a party Central Committee was elected consisting of just 12 members and candidate members. Both Stalin and Kamenev were included in this Central Committee.

In the spring and summer of 1917, infinite meetings were held throughout Russia. All parties and the Bolshevik party in particular were fighting for influence on the masses of people. For the Bolsheviks it was important not only to work out political slogans which were close to the feelings of the people but also send skillful agitators, orators and propagandists to the enterprises and troop units. Stalin was little suitable for this. From March through October 1917, he took the floor at public meetings only three times. He had no qualities for becoming a tribune of the revolution and even his later apologists recognized this. Not having any oratorial gifts, Stalin undoubtedly possessed an extraordinary organizational talent. The size of the Bolshevik party was growing month by month with unusual speed and Stalin along with Ya.M. Sverdlov reduced the party ranks to a military order. Precisely Stalin and Sverdlov carried out the main portion of the work involving the preparations and holding of the Sixth Bolshevik Party Congress. Precisely Stalin gave the political report on behalf of the Central Committee at this congress. We should note the insufficient clarity of Stalin's position on the question of the appearance of V.I. Lenin before the court of the Provisional Government. Stalin admitted the possibility of Lenin's appearance before the authorities with certain guarantees.

The Sixth Party Congress elected a larger and more representative Central Committee membership. For the first time, L.D. Trotsky was elected a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee. In the absence of Lenin and Zinovyev, Stalin's role in the leadership of the party organizations increased. During these months he was the actual leader of the party central newspaper which came out under various names. The opinions of Lenin leading the party from underground and Stalin who was in a legal position coincided far from always. In this instance Stalin subjected Lenin's articles to arbitrary editing and this caused dissatisfaction with Vladimir Ilich. He was in a hurry to overthrow the Provisional Government and was extremely dissatisfied with the Central Committee's slowness: "To slow down is a crime. To wait for the congress of soviets is a child's game of formalism, a disgraceful game of formalism and betrayal of the revolution." "There is no middle ground. We cannot wait. The revolution will perish." "The Bolsheviks have an incorrect attitude toward parliamentarianism at moments of revolutionary crises." "There can be no doubt that in the 'upper reaches' of the party there are vacillations which can become fatal." "Not everything is going alright in the 'parliamentary' upper reaches of the party." "In seeing that the Central Committee has left my urgings even unanswered..., and that the Central Organ is deleting from my articles instructions on such flagrant errors by the Bolsheviks as the disgraceful decision to participate in the parliament..., seeing this, I should view this 'delicate' hint...of shutting my mouth and as a proposal to remove me.

"I must submit a request to withdraw from the Central Committee and that I am doing and leave for myself the freedom of agitation in the grass roots of the party and at the party congress."[4]

The disagreements with the Central Committee led Lenin to a decision to return to Petrograd to take over preparations for the armed insurrection.

Stalin participated in the decisive sessions of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee on 10 (23) and 16 (29) October and at which upon Lenin's reports a decision was taken for an armed insurrection. Only L. Kamenev and G. Zinovyev voted against this decision and they in violation of all rules of conspiracy published their arguments in the non-Bolshevik newspaper NOVAYA ZHIZN. As is known, Lenin demanded that Zinovyev

and Kamenev be expelled from the party. Stalin was the only Central Committee member who argued against Lenin on this question.

What was Stalin doing on 24-26 October 1917, that is, during the crucial days and hours of the October Armed Insurrection in Petrograd?

Well known is the role in organizing and preparing this insurrection of the Petrograd Soviet which during these days was headed by L. Trotsky. Upon Lenin's proposal, under the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, in mid-October a Military Revolutionary Committee (VRK) was founded and this was put in charge of working out all the details of the insurrection. V. Antonov-Ovseyenko and N. Podvoyskiy carried out particularly extensive work in the leading Buro of the VRK. During these days, also very significant was the role of such Bolshevik party leaders as Ya. Sverdlov, P. Dybenko, V. Bolodarskiy, N. Krylenko, F. Raskolnikov, A. Bubnov, F. Dzerzhinskiy, G. Bokiy, V. Avanesov, K. Yeremeyev and others. As for Stalin, during this time he was chiefly concerned with publishing the newspaper RABOCHIY PUT. He did not directly lead the actions of the Red Guard, the sailors and soldiers on the streets of Petrograd.

In essence, the entire version of some particular role played by Stalin in organizing the October Armed Insurrection hangs on the very delicate thread, on the decision of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee of 16 October to organize a "Party Center" or "Military-Revolutionary Center" for leading the insurrection and with a membership of Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinskiy, Bubnov and Uritskiy. It was assumed that this center would exist under the VRK and direct its work. However, events in Petrograd developed so quickly that the formally established "Party Center" actually had not met and did not function as a special body for directing the insurrection. Also remaining just on paper was the decision of the Party Central Committee to organize a certain "Political Buro" consisting of seven men; this was adopted at a session on 10 October 1917. It is no surprise that in his book on the October Revolution, the American communist John Reed, an eyewitness to the events described by him, gave virtually no attention to Stalin.[5] In all the articles, pamphlets and letters written by V.I. Lenin and published in Vol. 34 of his Complete Collected Works (July-October 1917), Stalin's name is mentioned once and in the context of one of the errors made by Stalin, Sokolonikov and Dzerzhinskiy. From the minutes of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee we can learn that in the morning of 24 October, assembling at Smolnyy was a new session of the Central Committee at which duties were assigned to the Central Committee members for leading the insurrection. Stalin was not present at this session, and he was not given any assignment. As one can judge from other documents, Stalin spent 24 and 25 October at the editorial offices of the newspaper RABOCHIY PUT as well as among delegates of the Bolshevik faction of the Second Congress of Soviets.

A transition of power into the hands of the soviets was the result of the victorious armed insurrection in Petrograd. The Provisional Government was overthrown. It was replaced by a worker-peasant government, the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Republic, which had been elected by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. V.I. Lenin became the chairman of the Soviet government and 14 Bolsheviks became its members or people's commissars. I. Stalin was among these and he was entrusted to head the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs which was formed for the first time.

One of the most important slogans of the October Revolution was the slogan of the liberation and equal rights of all nations and nationalities in the former Tsarist Russia. This determined the importance of the new Commissariat for Nationality Affairs. Stalin became its first leader with good reason. He was not only one of the leading figures in the Bolshevik Party, but he was also a Georgian, that is, "non-Russian." The appointment hence should have increased confidence in the Council of People's Commissars in the nationality areas and regions of Russia. Moreover, after a series of articles on the nationality question published in 1913, Stalin began to be considered an expert in nationality problems within the party.

On 2 November 1917, Stalin along with Lenin signed the "Declaration of the Rights of the Russian Peoples." This declaration the draft of which had been written by Lenin proclaimed the basic principles of Soviet nationality policy: the lifting of all nationality and religious restrictions or privileges, equality of all peoples, free development of all nationality and ethnic groups, and the right to self-determination even including the separation and formation of independent states.

3

For a majority of the people's commissars making up the first Soviet government, the chief difficulty was to bring a halt to the sabotage by officials from virtually all the institutions inherited from the Provisional and Tsarist governments. Stalin had no such difficulties, as in Tsarist Russia there were no institutions analogous to the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs.

For this reason it was essential to set up some minimum apparatus. The Polish revolutionary S. Piestkowsky became one of the first figures of the Narkomnats [People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs] and the organizer of its miniscule apparatus. Stalin's entire commissariat was located in one of the rooms at Smolnyy, not far from the office of V.I. Lenin. Certainly there still was no well conceived work plan for the Narkomnats for an extended period. Questions, and often the most unexpected and difficult, arose spontaneously. For example, from November 1917 through January 1918, Stalin was participating in talks with the Central Rada, an association of several nationalistic petty bourgeois

parties organized in the Ukraine. At that time, S.V. Petlyura headed the Central Rada. Initially the Ukrainian People's Republic declared itself to be a federative part of Russia, but at the end of January 1918, it proclaimed the complete independence of the Ukraine. Talks with the Rada were broken off. As a counterweight to the Central Rada, the Bolsheviks and leftist SRs established the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kharkov and proclaimed the establishing of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. After the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets at Yekaterinoslav in March 1918, the Bolshevik N.A. Skrypnik became the head of the People's Secretariat of the Ukraine. At that time virtually the entire Ukraine was occupied by German troops and in Kiev they had organized a promonarchical government of Hetman Skoropadskiy. Nevertheless, Lenin, learning of the decisions of the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, drew up a letter of greetings from the RSFSR Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars] to the Soviet Ukraine. This letter expressed "ecstatic sympathy for the heroic struggle of the workers and exploited masses of the Ukraine who are at present one of the leading detachments of the world-wide social revolution." At the same time, Stalin on 4 April telegraphed the Soviet Government of the Ukraine: "Enough playing at government and republic, it seems enough, it is time to abandon the game." In response to this message which was inacceptable in tone and content, N.A. Skrypnik sent off a telegram to Moscow on 6 April:

"We would voice the most decisive protest against the action of People's Commissar Stalin. We should state that the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] of the Ukrainian Soviets and the People's Secretariat do not base their actions on one or another attitude by one or another people's commissar of the Russian Federation but rather on the will of the Ukrainian working masses.... Statements similar to the one made by People's Commissar Stalin are aimed at exploding Soviet power in the Ukraine....and contribute directly to the enemies of the working masses."

The Bolsheviks had come out in favor of self-determination of nations up to the point of their complete state separation from Russia. However, this in no way meant that the Bolsheviks themselves were ready to welcome the cession of the nationality areas from Russia and assist in this. They were working for the victory of a socialist revolution on all Russian territory and the formation of an union of free peoples and nations here. This would be, in their opinion, the first step toward developing a world proletarian revolution. It must also not be forgotten that the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] was not a Russian party but an all-Russian party. An exception was made only for Poland and Finland where there were independent Social Democratic parties which had been founded several years prior to the RSDRP. Moreover, the movement for independence from Russia in Finland and Poland had gained great scope and support long before 1917.

The elections held in October 1917 for the Finnish Parliament provided a majority for the bourgeois parties, and on 6 December, the Parliament declared Finland to be an independent state. On 31 December 1917, the RSFSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] recognized the independence of Finland. The SNK decree was signed by V.I. Lenin and I. Stalin. Several days later upon Stalin's report, this decree was also approved by the RSFSR VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee].

As the people's commissar for nationality affairs, Stalin made a number of statements and reports at the sessions of the SNK and the VTsIK concerning the situation in Turkestan, in the Caucasus, in the Urals area, on the Don, in Turkish Armenia as well as on the autonomy of the Tatars and the federative institutions of the RSFSR.

As a Central Committee member, Stalin participated in all its sessions where the question was discussed of concluding the Brest Peace and the withdrawal of Russia from the imperialist war. The minutes of the RSDRP (b) Central Committee clearly show that Stalin steadily supported the viewpoint of V.I. Lenin, although in the early stages of the discussion, Lenin was in the minority. Only at the session of 1 February, in urging an end to the differences, did Stalin state: "We must put an end to this.... The way out of the difficult situation has been provided for us by a middle way, the position of Trotsky." However, at the Central Committee Stalin always voted for Lenin's proposals. The acuteness of the struggle can be seen from the fact that the proposal for an immediate concluding of a peace with Germany was adopted by the Central Committee only on 18 February 1918 with a majority of one vote (voting "for" were: Lenin, Smilga, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Trotsky, Zinovyev; "against": Uritskiy, Ioffe, Lomov, Bukharin, Krestinskiy and Dzerzhinskiy).

4

Even by the end of the 1920's, Stalin was often called the "general of the revolution." Later on, when a large portion of the Civil War commanders and commissars had been destroyed, they began writing about Stalin as the "immediate inspirer and organizer of the most important victories of the Red Army" and whom the party sent "everywhere that the fate of the revolution was being decided on the fronts."

This myth was destroyed by Soviet historical science even at the beginning of the 1960's. Let us therefore take up only certain episodes in Stalin's military activities.

Even on 29 May 1918, in line with the aggrevated food situation in Moscow and in the central provinces of Russia, the RSFSR SNK appointed Stalin the overall leader of food affairs in the south of Russia, granting him extraordinary rights. In line with this, Stalin left for Tsaritsyn on 4 June. Here he found disorder and chaos

both on food and military matters, in the area of transport, finances and so forth. In employing his powers, Stalin assumed all authority in the Tsaritsyn area. There is no doubt that in Tsaritsyn he carried out extensive work to instill order in the rear and on the front and in supplying food to the industrial centers of Russia. However, Stalin even then chose mass terror as the basic means for instilling this order. He wrote to Lenin: "I drive and curse everyone who must be and I hope that I will soon restore [the situation]. You can be confident that we will spare no one, either ourselves or others, and we will provide the grain."

And Stalin actually did not spare anyone. He did not stop, not only from executing scores of actual enemies of Soviet power but even destroying all of those who were merely suspected of ties with the counterrevolution. At one time, K.Ye. Voroshilov wrote about this without any condemnation.

Gradually Stalin assumed all the main military functions in the Northern Caucasus.

One of his first victims was the military specialists whom he not only removed from their job but also executed. Stalin also showed extreme hostility and mistrust in the military leader of the Northern Caucasus Military District, A.Ye. Snesarev.

A general from the Tsarist Army and a prominent orientalist, A.Ye. Snesarev was one of the first to volunteer for the Red Army. In energetically leading the troops, he had helped organize the defense of Tsaritsyn and halt the White Cossacks. Nevertheless, precisely during this time, Stalin sent off a telegram to Moscow accusing Snesarev of sabotage. The plan for the defense of the city as proposed by Snesarev was considered by Stalin to be treachery. Ultimately, he arbitrarily not only removed but also arrested Snesarev. Upon Stalin's orders, virtually the entire military district staff made up of military specialists had been arrested. A floating prison was established on one of the barges in the Volga and this sank together with a majority of the prisoners under unclear circumstances.

Upon Stalin's insistence, a new plan for the defense of Tsaritsyn was worked out. A portion of the troops was removed from the northern sector of the front for an offensive to the west and south of Tsaritsyn. As military historians V. Dudnik and D. Smirnov have shown, "this disrupted the stability of the defenses organized with such difficulty.... On 1 August, this unsupported offensive began and by 4 August, contact with the south was broken and the city was cut off from the center. Immediately units had to be shifted to the northern combat sector." Stalin heaped the blame for the unsuccessful offensive on the former military leader Snesarev from whom he had supposedly inherited a completely disordered system.

The situation of Tsaritsyn in mid-August 1918 was particularly severe as the White Cossacks had reached the near-approaches to the city. However, the Red Army by the end of August was able to break the ring of encirclement and push the enemy behind the Don.

On 11 September 1918, the Southern Front was established (commander, P.P. Sytin, Military Council members I.V. Stalin, K.Ye. Voroshilov and K.A. Mekhonishin). Sharp differences of opinion arose between Stalin, Voroshilov and Minin as "old Tsaritsyners," on the one hand, and Sytin and Mekhonishin, on the other. The Tsaritsyn workers as before did not want to trust the military specialists and endeavored to introduce collective troop command which had been repudiated by the party. Upon Stalin's insistence, the RVS [Revolutionary-Military Council] of the Southern Front repealed the first operation orders of Sytin and then removed him from the command of the front. At precisely this time, the enemy began a new offensive against Tsaritsyn and squeezed the weakened Red Army units. The situation was saved by the Steel Division of D.B. Zhloba which had arrived from the Northern Caucasus and surprise attacked the enemy in the rear.

Stalin as before had not given too much consideration to the orders of the Narkomvoyenmor [People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs] and the Republic RVS. On one of the orders from Trotsky, he applied the resolution: "Do not take into account." The arising conflict told negatively upon the battleworthiness of the Southern Front. Upon the insistence of L. Trotsky, Stalin was removed from the RVS of the Southern Front and sent to Moscow, but, with the approval of Trotsky, he was appointed a member of the Republic RVS.

At the end of 1918, Stalin in Moscow as concerned chiefly with the affairs of the Narkomnats. He was present at the First Congress of Moslem Communists in Moscow, he drew up a draft decree on the independence of Estonia and participated in organizing the Belorussian Soviet Republic. On 1 January 1919, Stalin and F.E. Dzerzhinskiy were sent to the Eastern Front for studying the setbacks of the Red Army and the reasons for the surrender of Perm. After the situation on the Eastern Front had improved, Stalin and Dzerzhinskiy returned to Moscow.

At the Eighth Party Congress, Stalin was reelected to the membership of the RKP(b) Central Committee. Although the Party Central Committee at that time was too numerous, for taking day-to-day decisions on important political questions, it was decided to create a narrower leading body from it, the Politburo. The first membership of the Politburo included V.I. Lenin, L.B. Kamenev, M.M. Krestinskiy, I.V. Stalin and L.D. Trotsky. N.I. Bukharin, M.I. Kalinin and G.Ye. Zinovyev became Politburo candidate members. Also organized was the Orgburo [Organizational Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Committee for directing the current organizational work of the party. It also included five

men: A.G. Beloborodov, N.N. Krestinskiy, L.P. Serebryakov, I.V. Stalin and Ye.D. Stasova. Several days later, by a VTsIK decree, Stalin was also appointed people's commissar of state control.

We will not dwell on the various assignments which Stalin carried out as a representative of the RKP(b) Central Committee and the RVS on the Petrograd, Western and Southern Fronts. These assignments were not "third-rate," as A. Antonov-Ovseyenko assumes, however they were not as significant as was represented later by Stalin's apologists.

However, we must take up in greater detail the activities of Stalin in 1920 on the Southwestern Front where he had been sent at the end of May as a member of the Military Council. At this time the advancing Polish armies had already been halted; heavy fighting had broken out on the territory of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and as a result of this Kiev and Minsk had been liberated.

The basic portion of the reinforcements initially had been sent to the Southwestern Front. By the end of July a situation had developed which required an urgent regrouping of the forces. The Western Front which had a total of 60,000 soldiers was being opposed by twice the number of Poles. At the same time, just three Polish divisions and demoralized Petlyura units were operating opposite the Southwestern Front. At the same time, in the South a new threat had arisen to the Soviet republic: the troops of Gen Wrangel in June 1920 had broken out of the Crimea and had captured a significant part of Northern Tauria.

On 20 August 1920, the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo adopted a decision to unite all the armies fighting against Poland as the Western Front (commander, M. Tukhachevskiy). At the same time, it was decided to establish an independent Southern Front. Stalin was instructed to organize the new front's RVS and Lenin sent him the following telegram about this:

"Urgent, in code.

To Stalin: The Politburo has just split the fronts so that you can be exclusively concerned with Wrangel. In line with the uprisings, particularly in the Kuban and later in Siberia, the danger of Wrangel is becoming enormous and within the Central Committee there is a growing desire to immediately conclude a peace with bourgeois Poland. I would like you to discuss very closely the situation with Wrangel and submit your conclusion."[6]

At the same time, the Commander-in-Chief S. Kamenev, on the basis of the Central Committee directive, proposed that in the next few days the 1st Horse Army and the 12th Army of the Southwestern Front be put under the command of the Western Front in order to reinforce the troops on the main, Warsaw axis.

Stalin refused to carry out the instructions of Lenin and S. Kamenev. In the evening of the same day he telegraphed back:

"I received your note on the splitting of the fronts and the Politburo should not be concerned with minor details. I can work for the front the maximum of another 2 weeks before a vacation so search for a deputy. I do not believe the promises of the commander-in-chief for an instant and he only gives his promises. As for the attitude of the Central Committee in favor of a peace with Poland, one cannot help but notice that our diplomacy is being very successful in undermining the results of our military successes."

On 3 August, Lenin sent Stalin a new telegram, insisting on the splitting of the fronts:

"Our diplomacy is subordinate to the Central Committee and will never undermine our successes, if the danger of Wrangel does not cause hesitation with the Central Committee."[7]

Here Lenin did not argue against Stalin's leave but asked him to be concerned about a deputy.

On 5 August, the Central Committee affirmed the decision to split the fronts and ordered that the 14th Army also be transferred to the Western Front. The commander-in-chief issued the necessary orders for this. But Stalin and the commander of the Southwestern Front, A.I. Yegorov, who was under his influence, did not carry out this directive. The Commander-in-Chief S. Kamenev repeated his order.

"The Western Front," he wrote, "is beginning to launch a decisive thrust to defeat the enemy and capture the Warsaw area; because of this we must temporarily give up the immediate possession of the Lwow area on your sector." But Stalin and Yegorov did not obey. On the contrary, they issued an order to the 1st Horse Army "in the shortest period of time by a powerful thrust to destroy the enemy on the right bank of the Bug, to cross the river and on the heels of the fleeing remnants of the 3d and 6th Polish Armies to take the city of Lwow."

The 1st Horse Army was unable to carry out this order.

But the Western Front also suffered a setback in the offensive against Warsaw. Of course, the failure of the Warsaw Operation can also be explained by several factors. However, Stalin's arbitrariness certainly is not in last place among them. In possessing strong forces he did not want the laurels of victory to go to the Western Front. Clearly he himself was endeavoring to enter Warsaw from the rear after the taking of Lwow. "But who was marching on Warsaw via Lwow," commented Lenin on this matter when V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich reported on the setbacks on the Polish Front.[8]

Since Stalin had not obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief, the Central Committee Secretariat sent him the following telegram on 14 August:

"The friction between you and the commander-in-chief has reached such a point...that there must be an explanation by a joint discussion in a personal meeting and for this reason we request your quickest possible departure for Moscow."

On 17 August, Stalin left for Moscow and requested from the Politburo that he be released from military affairs. On 1 September his request was granted.

5

It might be asked: how could Stalin so easily get away with arbitrariness and coarseness? In the first place, in 1918-1920, Stalin was a rather strong figure in the party leadership and knew how to stand up for himself. Not only Stalin but also many other representatives of the Central Committee on the Civil War fronts at times acted with excessive harshness. There were numerous complaints about the RVS representative Trotsky. But Lenin usually came to his defense. In the struggle of the party groupings of those times, Stalin was on the side of Lenin and Lenin valued this. Under the conditions of the Civil War, in the critical situation Lenin had to consider and utilize any real force which was on the side of the revolution.

Frequently Lenin directly supported Stalin, as was the case in Krakow when the latter was writing articles on the nationality question, in being coopted into the membership of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee and in being appointed to the Central Committee Russian Buro. It was precisely upon Lenin's proposal that Stalin was appointed the people's commissar for nationality affairs and the people's commissar of state control which was later reorganized into the People's Commissariat of Worker-Peasant Inspection.

Trotsky repeatedly demanded that Stalin be removed from military work, however Lenin was in no hurry to do this and at times was more supportive of Stalin than Trotsky.

Stalin left military work almost at the very end of the Civil War. This was neither a reduction in rank nor retirement. He had to focus his attention on the work in the Narkomnats; Soviet power had been established in virtually all the nationality areas. Several times Stalin had traveled to the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and had received delegations from different nationalities. He gave much less attention to the People's Commissariat of Worker-Peasant Inspection. He also had to participate in the work of not only the Politburo and Orgburo but also several permanent commissions of the RKP(b) Central Committee as well as the VTsIK.

During the period when the party was beset by the so-called trade union debate, Stalin supported Lenin's platform and came out against the theses of Bukharin and Trotsky, but was not very active. At the Tenth RKP(b) Congress, Stalin gave a report on the nationality question. Soon after the Red Army entered Georgia and Menshevik power had been overthrown in this republic, Stalin traveled to Tiflis. With his participation, a Bolshevik leadership was organized for Georgia and the entire Transcaucasus. However, Stalin's attempt to speak to the workers ended lamentably: he was whistled down at a meeting of Georgian railroad workers. He left the meeting under the guard of Russian Chekists. Instead, the prominent Menshevik Isidor Ramishvili spoke and he was enthusiastically welcomed by the workers. This failure strengthened Stalin's distaste for Georgia and subsequently he almost never visited there.

At the 11th Party Congress, Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy proposed that Stalin's powers be somewhat curtailed. He said:

"Or, comrades, let us take, for example, Comrade Stalin, a Politburo member, who is at the same time the people's commissar of two people's commissariats. Is it conceivable that a person is able to be responsible for the work of two commissariats and, in addition, the work on the Politburo, the Orgburo and a score Central Committee commissions?"

To this Lenin replied:

"Here Preobrazhenskiy has flippantly remarked that Stalin has two commissariats. But who of us has not erred? Who has not taken several duties all at once? And how else could we do it? What could we now do to support the existing situation in the Narkomnats in order to work out all the Turkestan, Caucasian and other questions? Certainly these are political questions! And they must be solved, these are questions which have concerned European states for hundreds of years and which have been resolved only to a miniscule amount in the democratic republics. We are resolving them and we must have a man who could be approached by any of the representatives of the nations and told what the matter is. Where to find him? I feel that Preobrazhenskiy could not name another candidate aside from Comrade Stalin.

"As for the Rabkrin [Worker-Peasant Inspection]. The undertaking is gigantic. But in order to be able to handle the check, it is essential that at the head there be a man with authority, otherwise we become mired down and drown in petty intrigues."[9]

Lenin was so predisposed to Stalin in 1918-1921 that he himself was concerned for finding a peaceful apartment for Stalin in the Kremlin. He rebuked G. Ordzhonikidze for the fact that the latter had cut short Stalin's vacation in the Northern Caucasus. Lenin requested that they locate the physician who had treated Stalin and send him [Lenin] a report on the patient's state. Once, half-joking,

Lenin proposed that Stalin marry his younger sister Mariya Ilinichna. He was certain that Stalin was still a bachelor and was surprised when Stalin said that he was married and his wife was working on the Central Committee Secretariat. Later, however, Lenin's attitude toward Stalin changed.

6

The 11th RKP(b) Congress did not reduce Stalin's powers and he was again elected to membership of the Central Committee. At the Central Committee Plenum of 3 April 1922, Stalin was elected to the Politburo and Orgburo. The Plenum resolved to establish a new position of Central Committee General Secretary and appoint I.V. Stalin to this position. In Stalin's "Kratkaya biografiya" [Short Biography] one can read that the Plenum elected Stalin the Central Committee General Secretary precisely upon Lenin's proposal.

At the opening of the Central Committee Plenum, L.B. Kamenev was presiding and he proposed that a new membership be elected for the Central Committee Secretariat. It is impossible to assume that the membership of the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat had not been first approved by Lenin. In the "Biograficheskaya khronika" [Biographic Chronicle] of V.I. Lenin for 1922, we read:

"April 3d.

"Lenin participates in a session of the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, he is elected a member of the Central Committee Politburo and is approved as a candidate for the RKP(b) delegation to the Comintern.

"In the course of the session, Lenin examines the agenda, fills it out with a number of points and makes comments and emphases.... He introduces a draft decree written by him on organizing the work of the Central Committee Secretariat.

"The Plenum adopted a decision to institute the position of General Secretary and two Central Committee secretaries. I.V. Stalin was appointed the General Secretary with V.M. Molotov and V.V. Kuybyshev the secretaries."

I am not saying that all the personnel assignments were taken by open voting at the Central Committee Plenums and there are no data that Lenin or Trotsky himself refrained in approving the new Central Committee Secretariat.

Of course, it must be pointed out that the post of General Secretary was at that time in no way conceived of as the main or even very important post in the party hierarchy. The Secretariat was subordinate both to the Politburo and the Orgburo and the functions of the secretaries were limited. The Secretariat was basically concerned with technical and internal party matters and did not intervene into the main areas of state administration. The Army, the VChK—GPU [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage and State Political Directorate], the VSNKh [All-Russian Council of the National Economy], and public education were under the control of the Central Committee Secretariat. The main people's commissariats were headed by prominent Central Committee members and their activities were discussed at the Politburo and the Central Committee Plenums. The Secretariat was not concerned with the problems of foreign policy and the Comintern. In April 1922, Lenin was the recognized leader of the revolutionary masses of Russia and stood at the head of the party and the government.

For this reason the election of Stalin to the post of General Secretary did not have the character of promoting a new leader or a successor for Lenin.

The situation was changed, however, because of Lenin's illness and which kept him more and more frequently away from leadership. Stalin was not only the Central Committee General Secretary but was also a member of the Central Committee Orgburo and Politburo and was simultaneously the people's commissar for nationality affairs and the people's commissar of the Rabkrin. He had been turned into a key figure in the developing party apparatus the reelections of party committees on the spot were carried out under his supervision and this made it possible for him to implement a mass relocation of cadres in the gubkoms [provincial committees], obkoms and the central committees of the national communist parties. At the head of the most important sections of the RKP(b) Central Committee were Stalin's supporters of L. Kaganovich, S. Syrtsov and A. Bubnov and the members of the Central Committee Secretariat and Orgburo—V. Molotov, Ya. Rudzutak and A. Andreyev—were also subordinate to Stalin's influence. Stalin was also actively supported by the Central Committee members V. Kuybyshev, S. Ordzhonikidze and A. Mikoyan. I. Tovstukha, L. Mekhlis and G. Malenkov were part of Stalin's working "staff."

In the meanwhile, Lenin's illness was progressing and he could not help but think about his successor.

He could have had in mind one or another Central Committee member but only not Stalin about whom he began to respond more and more negatively precisely in 1922. Lenin was extremely dissatisfied with the attempt by Stalin, Bukharin and Sokolnikov to weaken the foreign trade monopoly. Lenin also sharply criticized Stalin's policy on the nationality question. The problem was that precisely during Lenin's illness Stalin through the Central Committee commissions carried out his proposal of "autonomization," that is, the incorporation of the national republics in the RSFSR on principles of autonomy. According to Stalin's plans, they would establish not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but

rather the Russian Federative Republic which would include all the other nationality formations.

Lenin had condemned these preliminary decisions and proposed something else: the creation of a new state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—on the basis of the equality of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and other republics. Precisely this decision was adopted by the party.

Stalin did not hold a correct position also on the conflict between Ordzhonikidze and the leadership of the Georgian CP(b) [Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee on the questions of economic policy of the Transcaucasus Kraykom and the rights of the Georgian Soviet Republic. Lenin was greatly alarmed by this conflict and under its impression he dictated at the end of 1922 his notes "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'." In these we read:

"That Georgian who is negligent to this aspect of the matter negligently bandies about the accusation of 'social nationalism' (while he himself is a real and true not only 'social national' but also a coarse great-Russian chauvinist), that Georgian, in essence, violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity.... Of course, Stalin and Dzerzhinskiy should be made politically responsible for this entire truly great-Russian nationalistic campaign."[10]

In January 1923, Lenin repeatedly returned to an evaluation of this conflict. As can be judged from the notes of his secretaries on duty, Stalin prevented the ailing Lenin from receiving materials requested by him.

Stalin so zealously was carrying out the instructions of the Politburo to supervise the conditions for the treatment of Lenin that he even wanted to remove N.K. Krupskaya from the patient. On 23 December 1922, Krupskaya turned to L.B. Kamenev with a complaint about Stalin's impoliteness. Lenin learned about this conflict only on 5 March, probably from Kamenev. Indignant to the depth of his soul, although more than 2 months had gone by since the conflict, Lenin summoned a secretary and dictated a note to Stalin with the demand that he apologize to N.K. Krupskaya.[11]

Of course, Stalin immediately, although reticently, apologized to Krupskaya and took his words back. He did not dare break with Lenin.

On the following day in the morning Lenin dictated one other letter:

"To Comrades Mdivani, Makharadze and others. Copy to Comrades Trotsky and Kamenev.

"Respected comrades!

"I am following your question with all my heart. I am indignant over the coarseness of Ordzhonikidze and the connivances of Stalin and Dzerzhinskiy. I am preparing notes and a speech for you. With respect, Lenin. 6 March 1923."[12]

The letters of 5 and 6 March 1923 were the last documents of Lenin. In the summer and autumn of 1923, Lenin's health again improved, he began to receive people and walked about, but he never met with Stalin again.

At the end of 1922 and in the first half of 1923, as General Secretary, Stalin was concerned with many matters, without forgetting here to strengthen his personal positions in the party. He had his own view of party construction and this he set out in a sketch for the pamphlet "On Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists" written in July 1921 and published for the first time only in 1952. This sketch is of a great deal of importance for understanding both the views and the claims of Stalin. Already the very words "the party is the command personnel and staff of the proletariat" can evoke a number of arguments as the concepts of "vanguard" and "command personnel" are far from identical. But Stalin went even farther:

"The Communist Party is a sort of an order of sword bearers within the Soviet state directing the bodies of the latter and inspiring their activities.

"The importance of the Old Guard within this mighty order. The replenishment of the Old Guard with new tempered...workers."

The comparison of the Communist Party with the clerical knightly order "Brotherhood of Christian Army" is no accident. Stalin was impressed by the strictly hierarchical structure of the order of sword bearers. The fact that his note was published only in 1952 indicates that the notion of turning the party into something like a religious order and then setting up within the party and state apparatus some secret elite order, a special caste of "initiates," never left Stalin.

7

In the broad sense, Lenin's "Testament" should be understood as all those letters, articles and notes which he dictated at the end of 1922 and the beginning of 1923. However, in the narrower sense, Lenin's "Testament" includes only several letters in which Vladimir Ilich speaks about the work of the Central Committee and provides personal descriptions for certain Central Committee members.

The basic portion of Lenin's "Testament," including the personal characteristics of the Central Committee members, was not promulgated. The next, 12th Party Congress did not discuss the question of shifting Stalin from the post of General Secretary. The membership of the Central Committee was increased, however among the 17 new members and 13 candidate members of the

Central Committee, there was not a single peasant or worker as Lenin had insisted. They were all leaders of major soviet and party institutions. Why did they not read the letter from Lenin directed to the congress? Here there was no foul play. The sealed and strictly secret documents could be opened only by Lenin himself and he was paralyzed and unable to speak. N. Krupskaya could open these letters only after Lenin's death. Thus, a situation developed which had not been envisaged by Vladimir Ilich.

Why did Lenin restrict himself to describing only six of the Central Committee members and said nothing about A. Rykov, M. Kalinin and others? I feel that Lenin was perfectly aware that in the event of his death, precisely these six persons would comprise the nucleus of the party leadership and the struggle within it could threaten a split in the party. A particular feature of Lenin's document was that he pointed out not only the positive qualities of the Central Committee leaders but also their essential shortcomings. In his letter Lenin proposed that Stalin be removed from the post of General Secretary but did not doubt the possibility and necessity of keeping Stalin in the leadership. Hence the use of the word "transfer" and not "remove." Lenin also did not propose any new candidate for the post of General Secretary.

Among the party leaders listed by him, Lenin did not see anyone who could replace him in the post of party and state leader. In endeavoring to allocate all of the main posts more evenly between these persons (and hence the proposal to transfer Stalin), Lenin assumed that only together and under the strong supervision of the Central Committee and the TsKK [Central Control Commission] could they further lead the party under the difficult conditions of those times. This is the true sense of Lenin's document. In his "Testament," Lenin in fact carefully weighed each word. Here there is not his customary sharpness in assessments. However, with the externally mild phrases, the seemingly innocent expressions contain a sharp political thought. Lenin said something extremely flattering about each of his associates. Stalin is an "outstanding leader of today's Central Committee." Trotsky is "the most capable person on the current Central Committee." Bukharin is "the most valuable and most important party theorist." Pyatakov is "a person of undoubtedly outstanding willpower and outstanding abilities." But at the same time, for each of these, Lenin also provides a political description which is belittling in sense but not in form. Could one really entrust the sole leadership of the party to the impolite, impatient, unloyal and capricious Stalin or to Trotsky who is extremely self-confident and excessively involved with the purely administrative side of things with Lenin considering somewhat accidental Trotsky's non-Bolshevism, like the "October episode" of Kamenev and Zinovyev? Of course, one could not entrust leadership of the party to Bukharin whose theoretical views "only with a great deal of doubt could be considered as completely Marxist" or to Pyatakov on whom it is generally difficult to rely in a "serious political question."

Lenin realized the importance of his judgments. He understood that these could help the party hold the political ambitions and desires of its most prominent leaders within definite limits.

It was felt that Lenin's description of the party leaders became known only in May 1924, when N.K. Krupskaya turned over Lenin's papers to the Central Committee commission. However recently, one of the leading associates at the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, V.P. Naumov, in PRAVDA published a major documented article from which one can see that Lenin's secretary L. Fotiyeva had informed Stalin and certain other Politburo members about the basic content of Lenin's notes.

On the statement concerning the turning over of Lenin's documents to the Central Committee commission, N.K. Krupskaya wrote: "Vladimir Ilich expressed the firm desire that these notes of his after his death be made public at the next party congress." Kamenev, Zinovyev and Stalin, however, resolved not to read Lenin's letter at the official congress sessions. It was initially read at a meeting of the "elders." Here Kamenev proposed that no notes be made. Only at this meeting did Trotsky and his supporters on the RKP(b) Central Committee learn about Lenin's "Testament." Later, Lenin's document was read at closed sessions for the individual delegations and no one was to take notes and refer to this document at the congress sessions. In the largest delegations, Zinovyev and Kamenev provided explanations on the question of Lenin's letter. The information on these closed meetings and Lenin's letter were not included in the congress minutes.

In the forming of the leading party bodies after the congress, Stalin, referring to Lenin's "Testament," pretended to give up the post of General Secretary. But Zinovyev and Kamenev and then a majority of the other Central Committee members persuaded him to take back his retirement. Most probably, before the congress there had been an unique agreement between Zinovyev and Stalin. Stalin approved the promotion of Zinovyev as the main speaker at the 13th Congress and thus seemingly promoted this ambitious and unprincipled man to the role of party leader. In turn, Zinovyev and Kamenev were to defend the post of General Secretary for Stalin at the congress. At that time, Stalin was still unable to act independently of the opinion of other VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee members, and this excluded, seemingly, the possibility of any tyranny. There could be no question of a personal dictatorship of stalin as, on the contrary, Stalin was the herald of "collective leadership." He accused Trotsky of a desire for one-man leadership and defended Zinovyev and Kamenev against Trotsky's attacks. Under the conditions of the fierce struggle against Trotsky and his numerous supporters, the question of Stalin's coarseness and capriciousness, with Stalin actively working against Trotsky, seemed a

minor detail to many Central Committee members. They did not see what Lenin had seen.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 48, p 162.

2. Ibid., Vol 49, p 101.

3. Ibid., p 161.

4. Ibid., Vol 34, pp 280-282.

5. Lenin wrote a foreword to the book by John Reed "Ten Days That Shook the World." He had high praise for this book and recommended that it be published in millions of copies in all the languages of the world. Stalin actually banned it. In the 1930's it was removed from libraries. Numerous instances are known when party members were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment "for keeping and disseminating the book of John Reed."

6. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 51, p 247.

7. Ibid., p 248.

8. V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, "Na boyevykh postakh" [At Battle Posts], Moscow, 1930, p 283. (In the republishing of this book, Lenin's comment was excluded.)

9. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p 122.

10. Ibid., Vol 45, pp 360-361.

11. See ibid., Vol 54, pp 329-330. (Lenin kept this note all his life. He displayed it on his desk.)

12. V.I. Lenin, ibid., Vol 45, p 330.

This letter, like the letters to Trotsky, in no way means that Lenin completely agreed with the position of B. Mdivani and the Georgian Central Committee. He demanded caution and attention to the nationalism of the previously suppressed nations and considered great-power chauvinism as a much greater danger.

The Struggle Against the Opposition

1

It is impossible to understand the history of the rise and development of Stalinism without becoming acquainted at least briefly with the history of the internal party struggle in 1923-1930. It must be said that few such questions in our history have been subjected to such outright falsification as the question of the opposition. Even in the publications of the 1920's, many episodes, facts and the very direction of the occurring struggle were set out in an extremely tendentious manner. Here each of the parties endeavored to show up his opponents in the most unattractive light, various statements were distorted while errors and inaccuracies were exaggerated. Crudeness and a lack of loyalty were not only not thwarted but were encouraged by either side and this from the very outset gave the internal party struggle an extremely sharp nature. In the 1930's, the leaders of the opposition began to be depicted as traitors and spies of foreign states recruited by imperialist intelligence agents from the very first years of Soviet power.

As is known, all the active participants in the opposition movements were later physically exterminated by Stalin. Only a few of the rank-and-file participants of these oppositions returned after the 20th CPSU Congress to their families. Some of them in their memoirs wrote apologetically about the various leaders of the opposition. It is possible to understand them but not agree with them. From the fact that Stalin, ending up the winner in the struggle against the opposition, then usurped all power in the nation and in the party, it no way follows that precisely Stalin in his fight against the opposition was completely in the wrong while his opponents were totally correct.

It would also be wrong to depict the struggle of the various groupings in the party after Lenin's death merely as an unprecedented fight for power concealed for appearance's sake by various sorts of theoretical arguments. No, in the 1920s, there were serious theoretical and practical differences in the party, and there was an ideological struggle particularly over the question of the possibilities, ways and methods of building socialism in the Soviet Union. However, it is correct that for Stalin the main thing in this struggle was precisely the question of power. In skillfully maneuvering between all sorts of currents and platforms, Stalin used the struggle of various factions in the party to weaken all his competitors and increase his own power and influence.

A characteristic trait of Lenin was the complete absence of any personal motives in the internal party struggle. Completely alien to him was a feeling of vengeance and even insult. For him the main thing was to persuade the party, the workers and, if possible, also his opponents of his correctness. And when agreement was reached in views, any sharpness disappeared in being replaced by benevolence, attention and friendly support. This can be seen from the example of the relations between Lenin and Trotsky in 1912-1913 and 1917-1919. Also generally known is the harshness with which Lenin attacked Zinovyev and Kamenev in October 1917 when these members of the Bolshevik Central Committee came out against armed insurrection. But immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, when Zinovyev and Kamenev had admitted their error, they assumed prominent posts in the Soviet bodies.

It would be possible to give many examples of Lenin's similar attitude toward recent opponents. Thus, in 1921, at the 10th Party Congress, Lenin said that the accomplishments of the "worker opposition" in the struggle

against bureaucracy had been recognized in the resolution on unity, and proposed including its leader, A.G. Shlyapnikov, in the Central Committee membership. "When the Central Committee," said Lenin, "includes a comrade from the 'worker opposition,' this is an expression of comradely trust.... This is a manifestation of the higher trust and which cannot be greater in the party."[1]

"As a special assignment for the Control Commission," Lenin wrote in October 1920 in a draft Politburo decree, "we must recommend an attentive individualizing attitude, often even a direct sort of treatment for the representatives of the so-called opposition who have undergone a psychological crisis because of the setbacks in their soviet or party career. We must endeavor to pacify them, to explain things to them in a comradely manner, seek out for them (without any sense of punishment) work suitable for their psychological features, at this point give them advice and instructions from the Central Committee Orgburo and so forth."[2]

Stalin took a different attitude toward his opponents. Even during the period of the internal party struggle of 1918-1923, he stood out in excessive harshness, crudeness and lack of loyalty. Stalin was little concerned with persuading his opponents and involving them in joint work. He endeavored to subordinate them to his will and break their resistance. Moreover, Stalin was extremely unforgiving and vengeful. For him his opponents remained personal enemies even when the matter of the dispute had disappeared and the need had arisen of joint close work. In truth, Stalin was able to conceal his feelings well.

2

During the first months of 1923, the political and economic situation in the young Soviet Republic was still very difficult. Industry and transport had taken only their first steps, in breaking out of the harsh clutches of chaos. Agriculture was slowly recovering from the consequences of the two wars and the drought. The material situation of the workers and peasants was extremely difficult. Particularly tragic was the plight of the millions of orphaned children and juveniles and the millions of unemployed proletarians and white collar personnel. But during this time, NEP [New Economic Policy] was coming into its own. Private trade was developing both in the city and in the countryside, private industrial enterprises, stores, printing plants, restaurants, middleman offices and so forth had begun to appear. Small entrepreneurs, craftsmen, tradesmen and rich peasants had begun to recover from the shock caused by the revolution, by the food requisitioning and by the policy of "war communism." The development of private entrepreneurship helped to improve the overall economic situation and facilitated the solving of immediate economic problems. But this also created many political complications and difficulties for the party.

In January and February 1923, Lenin, already severely ill, continued to dictate his last articles and letters and asked that literature be read to him on international relations, on cooperation and on the scientific organization of labor.

Reading with alarm the government announcement on the significant deterioration in Lenin's health, the party functionaries and activists realized perfectly well that there was no and could not be any replacement for Lenin as the creator and leader of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state. However, as an army during a military campaign needs a new commander, if the previous one is seriously wounded, as the Church needs a new high priest if the former has gone to his Maker, so a political party, particularly under difficult conditions, needs not only a collective of leaders but also a new single leader.

Only three persons could contend for the role of the new party leader: Stalin, Trotsky and Zinovyev who was supported by Kamenev. In truth, Stalin was carefully concealing his claims and kept humbly in the shadow of Zinovyev and Kamenev within the formed triumvirate, or "troyka" of Zinovyev, Kamenev and Stalin. Zinovyev's claims were based upon his old closeness to Lenin as the leader of the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky's claims were based on an awareness of his accomplishments in preparing and conducting the October Armed Insurrection, during the leadership of the Red Army during the years of the Civil War and on his seemingly obvious popularity for all. Foreign observers usually gave preference to precisely Trotsky in their forecasts. However, on the Politburo, Trotsky was alone and he did not have so many supporters in crucial posts in the party apparatus. This greatly weakened his positions and made it impossible to move automatically into the role of party leader. A struggle for power was looming and this struggle actually began at the start of 1923. On 14 March 1923, PRAVDA published an article by K. Radek titled "Lev Trotsky—Organizer of Victory." But at the same time, anonymous pamphlets against Trotsky began to be disseminated among the party members and these recalled above all his "non-Bolshevik" past. A. Lunacharskiy was one of the first to begin increasing Zinovyev's authority. Ye. Yaroslavskiy in a number of publications emphasized Stalin's important role in the revolution and Civil War. All these literary doings were the external manifestation of that behind-the-scenes struggle which was going on in the party apparatus.

At the end of April 1923, the regular 10th Party Congress should have been held. Lenin had been recovering with difficulty from the consequences of the attack and it was obvious that he would be unable to participate in the work of the congress. The question arose of who should give the political report from the RKP(b) Central Committee at the congress. Trotsky still remained the most authoritative figure in the Central Committee. For this reason it was quite natural that at a Politburo session, Stalin proposed that Trotsky take over the preparations of this report. Stalin was supported by Kalinin, Rykov

and even Kamenev. But Trotsky refused, resorting to confused arguments that "the party would not be itself (?), if one of us endeavored to somehow personally replace the ailing Lenin." He proposed that the party congress be held completely without a political accountability report. This silly proposal was, of course, rejected. At one of the next sessions, the Politburo adopted a decision to assign the preparation of the political report to G. Zinovyev who had just returned from vacation. Trotsky took on the report on industry.

In explaining his conduct and position in the first half of 1923, Trotsky later wrote:

"Until the very last opportunity I avoided the struggle, since in its first stages it had the nature of an unprecedented conspiracy aimed against me personally. It was clear to me that such a struggle, having once burst out, would inevitably assume exceptional acuteness and under the conditions of a revolutionary dictatorship could lead to threatening consequences."

These arguments are not persuasive for a politician. A struggle for power and influence is not something disgraceful for a professional politician, for this is a part of his life and his profession. In the struggle in the Politburo in the spring of 1923 and which was unnoticed for the outside observer, Trotsky showed a complete passivity and thereby doomed himself to defeat. This defeat actually opened up new paths and prospects but for...the elevation of Stalin who was not only less punctilious but also clearer, smarter and more adroit than it had seemed to Trotsky.

The 12th RKP(b) Congress went off relatively calmly. The congress delegates were acquainted with certain of Lenin's documents, including his letter "On the Question of Nationalities and on 'Autonomization'" only on a confidential basis. The attempt by B. Mdivani to quote individual points of this letter was stopped by the presiding L.B. Kamenev.

The congress, of course, could satisfy Trotsky's vain glory. The delegates gave him the most extended ovation and in many greetings to the congress, Trotsky's name was mentioned next to the name of Lenin. However, from the political and organizational viewpoint, the congress strengthened the position of the "troyka" headed by Zinovyev. Stalin was reelected the General Secretary of the RKP(b) Central Committee.

The report on industry which was given by Trotsky before the 12th Party Congress was probably the most interesting of all the reports although not indisputable. However, during the first months after the congress, Trotsky spent most of his time involved with questions which were not too pressing. He suddenly published a series of articles on the standards of conduct of a "educated man," the article "Vodka, the Church and the Cinematographer," as well as several articles on the Russian language and its degradation in the press. In other words, he demonstrated his erudition in every possible way but nothing more.

At the same time, the economic situation in the country had been improving very slowly. The peasants were dissatisfied with the high prices for industrial goods, while the workers complained of low wages and which were not always paid too regularly. In July and August 1923, in many of the major industrial centers (Moscow, Kharkov, Sormovo and elsewhere) there was a wave of worker strikes which greatly disconcerted the party leadership. It was essential to thoroughly discuss the economic situation and the party's economic policy. However, the lack of internal party democracy and the dominance of the bureaucratic apparatus greatly impeded a broad and profound discussion. The question of democracy, of course, not in its citizen-wide but still in its narrow party significance was in the forefront.

F.E. Dzerzhinskiy was one of the first to very decisively pose this question in a number of his speeches. In September 1923, in line with the worker disturbances and the activities of the opposition "Worker Group" which had formed in the party and trade unions and was headed by G.I. Myasnikov, the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum was convened. In his speech at this Plenum, Dzerzhinskiy pointed to the stagnation in internal party life. He also said that the replacing of the elective principal by the "appointing" of party secretaries was becoming a politically dangerous and paralyzing the party. The Central Committee Plenum established a commission headed by Dzerzhinskiy to examine the situation within the party.

Trotsky and his supporter Ye. Preobrazhenskiy refused to become a member of Dzerzhinskiy's commission.

By the autumn of 1923, several still semilegal opposition groups basically favoring leftist viewpoints had formed in the party, including in its leading circles. There was an intensive exchange of opinions between these groups and a single platform was worked out. The only thing missing was an authoritative leader. Trotsky was to become the leader of the forming leftist opposition. He finally abandoned his months-long hesitations and decided to head an opposition against Stalin and the entire "troyka." Undoubtedly, Trotsky's decision was influenced not only by the pressure of many of his friends and supporters. Trotsky was certain that he was gradually being squeezed out of power. Even in the military commissariat where he considered himself the complete master, his positions had been weakened. The membership of the Republic RVS and the Defense Council now included two old opponents of Trotsky, K.Ye. Voroshilov and M.M. Lashevich, upon the decision of the Politburo.

On 8 October 1923, Trotsky sent a letter to the members of the Central Committee and the TsKK with a harsh criticism of the party leadership. A majority of Trotsky's comments on the bureaucratization of the party apparatus and the curtailing of party democracy was completely

valid. However, the letter contained a number of exaggerations, if one bears in mind the situation in 1923.

"That regime," wrote Trotsky, "which basically had come into being prior to the 12th Congress and after it gained its complete reinforcement and shaping is much farther from worker democracy than the regime of the harshest periods of war communism."

Trotsky's letter contained numerous hints of the need for changes in the party leadership. Nevertheless he stated that he aimed merely at changing the erroneous policy and not "attacking" the existing leadership. He also emphasized that he considered this letter an internal document of the Central Committee and the TsKK and did not propose to set out his views before the entire party. The letter, however, became known in copies to many of Trotsky's supporters and was published in 1924 by the Menshevik emigree newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKIY VESTNIK. Even sharper comments were to be found in the "Statement" received by the RKP(b) Central Committee on 15 October and which was signed by 46 prominent party members. Undoubtedly, Trotsky had been acquainted ahead of time with its content.

"The regime established in the party," stated this Statement, "is completely intolerable. It has killed party independence, replacing the party by a hand-picked official apparatus which operates without problem in normal times but which inevitably produces hitches at moments of crisis and threatens to become completely unworkable when confronted by the approaching serious events."

The activities of the RKP(b) Central Committee were criticized just as sharply in the economic area and it was asserted that precisely because of incompetence, unsystematicness and the arbitrariness of the Central Committee decisions, instead of successes and accomplishments the economy had arrived at a major crisis. This "Statement" also was not published but was disseminated to party members in many party organizations.

The fact that precisely Trotsky was at the center of the struggle for party democracy might seem even more strange to many party activists than the concern for internal party democracy shown by the head of the VChK and OGPU [United State Political Administration], Dzerzhinskiy. Trotsky had never been known in party and state circles as a democrat, and his work methods, for example, in the army and in transportation had been marked by extreme authoritarianism. It was precisely Trotsky who recently had insisted upon the militarizing of labor at the enterprises and the "shaking up" of the trade unions and their complete subordination to the state. Combined with this authoritarianism was Trotsky's extreme individualism and conceit and this provided grounds for even his closest associates to call him a "lord."

In one way or another it was finally Trotsky who headed the leftist opposition in the party and this subsequently determined both many of its successes and setbacks.

Trotsky's letter to the Central Committee and the "Statement of 46" were documents which the party leadership could not overlook. On 25-27 October 1923, in Moscow, a joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the TsKK was convened together with representatives from ten party organizations. The Plenum condemned these documents as a step toward the splitting of the party and as an example of fractional activity. However, the Plenum's resolution was published only several months later. The party leadership realized that it was now impossible to avoid a new major discussion. But it did not want to base the discussion on Trotsky's letter of the "Statement of 46." The Politburo was endeavoring to take the initiative of the discussion in its own hands. On 7 November 1923, PRAVDA published a major article by G. Zinovyev "New Tasks of the Party" and which was restrained in its critical and self-critical spirit. Zinovyev, in particular, asserted that "in intra-party life recently one can note an excessive calm, and in places even outright stagnation.... Our main misfortune is often that all the most important questions for us are predetermined from the top downward. This restricts the creativity of the entire mass of party members and reduces the independence of the low-level party cells...."

PRAVDA urged the party members to initiate an extensive debate about Zinovyev's article both in the press and in the party organizations. From 13 November PRAVDA began to regularly print as a point of departure for debate diverse materials and articles on the problems of internal party democracy. This debate evoked enormous interest in the party. Articles were published both by the supporters and opponents of Trotsky. However, in many ways these articles did not differ excessively. Both sides recognized the abnormality of the situation existing in the party and urged an all-out development of internal party democracy. Here a number of intelligent proposals and considerations was voiced and many of these have not lost their pertinence even now. As a whole, the debate was of a constructive nature and this opened up the possibility of a compromise. And, such a compromise was reached. On 5 December 1923, a joint session was held of the Central Committee Politburo and the TsKK Presidium. Here after protracted and difficult disputes, a resolution was approved unanimously and this was published by PRAVDA on 7 December. The resolution stated:

"Only a constant, alive ideological life can keep the party as it has developed before and during the revolution, with a constant critical study of its past, with the rectification of its errors and collective discussion of major questions. Only these work methods are capable of providing effective guarantees against the turning of the sporadic differences of opinion into fractional groupings. For preventing this, it is essential that the leading party bodies heed the voice of the broad party masses,

that they do not consider any criticism as a manifestation of factionalism and do not thereby impel conscientious and disciplined party members into a path of exclusiveness and factionalism.... It is essential to broaden the network of party debating clubs, not to resort to incorrect references to "party discipline," when it is a question of the rights and duties of party members to discuss questions of interest to them and to submit decisions...."

Voting in favor of the resolution, among others, were Trotsky, Stalin, Zinovyev and Kamenev. But the unanimity was not too strong. For Stalin and Zinovyev, the resolution of 5 December was a certain concession to pressure from the opposition. In any event, they did have to recognize the presence of essential elements of bureaucracy in the party apparatus and even urge the party to decisively eradicate this. But this was purely a "paper" concession, a concession in words and not in fact. For after 5 December, the Politburo did not initiate any substantial struggle to broaden internal party democracy or expand the debating clubs. Quite on the contrary, many workers of the apparatus perceived the resolution of 5 December as a signal to terminate the debates and they began in fact to reduce the opportunities for "conscientious and disciplined party workers" to engage "in a constant critical study of our past, in rectifying our errors and in a collective discussion of the most important questions."

But the "leftist" opposition did not intend to retreat. It had not secured any changes in the party leadership and this, contrary to the assurances of Trotsky, had been its most important task. For this reason, it decided to employ its partial victory for putting stronger pressure on the Politburo.

In the evening of 8 December at a meeting of the party aktiv in Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon of Moscow, a letter was read from Trotsky to the party meetings and entitled "The New Course." In form these were personal commentaries by Trotsky on the just-published resolution of the Central Committee Politburo and the TsKK Presidium. Trotsky stated that the resolution was a turning point in party life and that it was directed primarily at the rank-and-file party members and that they should utilize the opportunities which were opening up for them.

Trotsky's letter was greeted with hostility not only by the "troyka" but also by a majority of the party apparatus. Nevertheless, it was published on 11 December in PRAVDA with a number of additions and comments by Trotsky himself. He had too great influence in order to prevent this publication. To the reproaches of certain activists Stalin replied:

"They say that the Central Committee should ban the printing of Trotsky's articles. This is wrong, comrades. This would be a very dangerous step by the Central Committee. Just try to ban Trotsky's article which has already been publicized in the rayons of Moscow! The Central Committee could not take such a rash step."

Trotsky's action provided the grounds for a new outburst of debate. Everywhere both general meetings of the party organizations were held as well as the factional meetings for supporters of the "leftist" opposition. Some organizations adopted resolutions in support of the line of the Central Committee majority while others supported the opposition line. Trotsky's supporters obtained the strongest support among the student youth, the employees of soviet institutions and many military organizations. At enterprises they were more often in the minority.

Because of illness Trotsky was unable to take a direct part in the meetings and conferences going on everywhere and this, undoubtedly, weakened the ranks of the "leftist" opposition. In order to develop and continue his letter of 8 December, he wrote two other major articles which were published on 28 and 29 December 1934 in PRAVDA. Together with the other materials and articles, these publications were brought together in the pamphlet "Novyy kurs" [The New Course] published at the beginning of January 1924. In this pamphlet Trotsky widened the scope of the debate. He not only hinted at the possibility of the degeneration of the Old Party Guard but also urged a focusing on the youth, and primarily the student youth which, in his words, should be "the most reliable barometer of the party." This thesis was enthusiastically received in many student organizations, but it was not supported even among those who had signed the "Statement of 46."

Among Trotsky's opponents, there was no argument against the critical comments by the "leftist" opposition over the question of the bureaucratization of the party apparatus. But they accused Trotsky of attempting to set this apparatus in opposition to the entire party and endeavoring to create his own faction in it and this supposedly could lead to a split. They decisively rejected the hints on the possibility of the degeneration of the Old Party Guard. Here it was constantly pointed out that Trotsky himself could in no way be termed an "Old Bolshevik" for he had joined the Bolshevik Party only in the summer of 1917.

In reply Trotsky rather haughtily let it be known that precisely he and his closest supporters were true Leninists and authentic supporters of Leninism and that the correct line must not be sought out in "materials of a biographic nature."

The results of the first stage of the debate were summed up at the 13th Party Conference held in January 1924. The party meetings which preceded it in the cells showed the still significant influence of the "leftist" opposition. Even in the rayon party conferences in Moscow, 36 percent of the votes went for the Troskyite opposition. No subsequent opposition ever collected so many votes from the rank-and-file party members. But as a whole, the "leftist" opposition was defeated. At the 13th

RKP(b) Conference, this opposition was condemned as a "petty bourgeois deviation" in the party. The conference decisions were approved by the 13th RKP(b) Congress held at the end of May 1924. The congress resolved to append the resolution of the 13th Party Conference to its decrees.

At the very end of 1924, Stalin published a collection of his articles and speeches for this year. In the foreword, he for the first time proposed a new formula for him concerning the possibility of building socialism in the USSR even under the conditions of capitalist encirclement. At the same time, he was harshly critical of Trotsky's views on the given question. But Trotsky at that time did not respond to Stalin and the main disputes developed in other stages of the internal party struggle.

Serious differences of opinion arose between the opposition and a majority of the party leadership in assessing the economic situation of the USSR and the prospects of its economic development. The "leftist" opposition was inclined to exaggerate the economic difficulties and the shortcomings in economic leadership and did not see real opportunities for socialist construction in the countryside. Lenin's cooperative plan, like the plan for the construction of socialism, was perceived by the opposition as rather an utopian illusion. The opposition accused the party of a "kulak deviation" and demanded that greater pressure be put on the capitalist elements in the city and countryside. This contradicted the main principles of the NEP. In clearly demagogic aims, the "leftist" opposition excessively exaggerated the amount of private capital in the USSR.

The "leftist" opposition linked the proposal for the accelerated development of industry with the proposal for a more massive confiscation of assets from the countryside, from the still not completely recovered agriculture. Precisely in 1924, in one of the articles Ye. Preobrazhenskiy asserted that for socialist accumulation it was essential to resort to the "exploitation of presocialist forms of the economy by the proletariat."

There was an acute outburst of debate late in the autumn of 1924 over the discussion of certain party history problems. By this time, the next volume of collected works of L. Trotsky had been prepared and this contained articles and speeches for 1917. Trotsky had not only decided to publish these as a separate collection (as Stalin had done), but also had written an extensive introduction under the title "Lessons of October" which soon thereafter came out as a pamphlet. The publication was aimed chiefly at political goals. By the end of 1924, only a small portion of the party was made up of those who had joined it before the October Revolution. A majority of the party member had little knowledge of party history and the biography of its leaders. In publishing "Lessons of October," Trotsky was planning to deal a crushing blow against the reputations of Zinovyev and Kamenev who had come out, as is known, against the October Armed Insurrection and further had demanded the establishing of a general "socialist government" together with the Mensheviks and SRs. At the same time, Trotsky emphasized his outstanding role in preparing and carrying out the October Revolution.

It cannot be said that "Lessons of October" was a falsification although a definite tendentiousness is obvious in this work. But the more precise facts contained in Trotsky's pamphlet, the greater anger it caused in Zinovyev and Kamenev. A flood of new articles and speeches was unleashed against Trotsky and "Trotskyism." Trotsky was not reminded of all his actions against Lenin and the Bolsheviks during the period between 1903 and 1916. At the same time, the harsh comments by Lenin about Trotsky dating to the same period were published. The authors of many publications did not deny Trotsky's accomplishments in October 1917. But they recalled that Trotsky had come to the Bolsheviks only in the summer of 1917, when basically all the work of preparing the October Revolution had already been done. Thus, the legend began to develop that the important role in the organizing of the October Armed Insurrection belonged not to the Military Revolutionary Committee Under the Petrograd Soviet which had been headed by Trotsky but rather to the so-called practical or party center for organizational leadership of the insurrection and of which Trotsky was not a member.

Resolutions aimed against Trotsky and the "leftist" opposition were approved in virtually all the party organizations. The Leningrad Gubkom which was headed by Zinovyev proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the party. Many party cells, including those in the Army and Navy, proposed removing Trotsky from the post of people's commissar for military and naval affairs. This question was to be discussed at the Central Committee Plenum which had been set for 17 January 1925. Without waiting for the Plenum, Trotsky forwarded to the Central Committee an extensive statement in which he asked to be released from the duties of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. He also wrote that he would be ready in the future "to carry out any work upon the assignment of the Central Committee in any post and outside any post and, certainly, under conditions of any party control."

The RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum was held on 17-20 January 1925. It condemned the "aggregate of actions by Trotsky against the party" and recognized as "impossible the further work of Comrade Trotsky on the USSR RVS." At the same time, the Plenum decreed the debate to be over. Trotsky was, however, left as a member of the Politburo. Some time later, he was given a new assignment as a member of the Presidium of the VSNKh, chief of the electrical engineering administration, the chairman of the Scientific-Technical Section of the VSNKh and chairman of the Main Concession Committee.

3

Almost immediately after the defeat of the Trotskyite opposition in the party, a "new" or "Leningrad" opposition arose headed by G. Zinovyev and L. Kamenev.

After Lenin's death, N.I. Bukharin had been elected to the Politburo. At the end of 1924, seven persons became full members of the Politburo: Bukharin, Zinovyev, Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Tomskiy and Trotsky. On the basic questions of domestic and foreign policy, Rykov, Tomskiy and Bukharin supported Stalin and this provided an opportunity for him to escape from the interference of Zinovyev and Kamenev. In essence, immediately after the 13th Party Congress, Stalin began squeezing Zinovyev and Kamenev from the leading position in the "troyka." The recent friendship had come to an end. Several weeks after the Congress, PRAVDA published a report by Stalin "On the Results of the 13th RKP(b) Congress" and this had been given by him at the courses for the secretaries of the party ukoms [district committee] under the Central Committee. In this report Stalin accused Kamenev of "ordinary lack of concern for questions of theory and precise theoretical definitions." The pretext for this had been the distortion in Kamenev's report of Lenin's quote on turning "NEP Russia into socialist Russia." Instead of the word "NEP" PRAVDA had printed "NEP-man." Stalin joined the argument by saying that Russia was not and could not be "NEP-man." In actuality, this distortion had occurred due to the inattentiveness of the stenographer and proofreader as was announced several days later by PRAVDA.

In the same report by Stalin, attacks were also found against Zinovyev, although his name was not mentioned.

Zinovyev and Kamenev responded very painfully. Upon their demand, a meeting was held at the Central Committee for the leading party nucleus and this was attended by 25 Central Committee members and all the Politburo members. By a majority of votes, Stalin's attacks were repudiated and at the same time approval was given for Zinovyev's article published in PRAVDA as an editorial. On 23 August 1924, Stalin submitted his resignation but this was refused. A decision was adopted that all the superior leaders in the party should coordinate their actions and speeches with one another.

In the autumn of 1924, Stalin cautiously carried out several moves in the apparatus which weakened the Zinovyev—Kamenev bloc. Their supporter I.A. Zelenskiy was sent as the secretary of the Central Asian Buro of the RKP(b) Central Committee. Prior to this for several years he had headed the Moscow party organization and from 1924 had also been a member of the Central Committee Orgburo and Secretariat. His place in Moscow was taken by N.A. Uglanov who was in no way fully inclined to support Kamenev and Zinovyev. Molotov, Kaganovich and Andreyev who unconditionally accepted Stalin's leadership were elected Central Committee secretaries after the 13th RKP(b) Congress.

The differences of opinion in the Politburo concerned chiefly secondary questions. Little by little, however, fundamental differences began to emerge. Precisely in 1924-1925 there began a major change in party policy in the countryside. The essence of this came down to eliminating the vestiges of war communism and to developing agricultural production within the context of the more consistent execution of the new economic policy. The hiring of day laborers was legalized, the leasing of land was made easier, and many administrative restrictions on the kulak farm were repealed. In addition, the agricultural tax was reduced and prices for industrial goods were lowered. The main aim of these measures was to revitalize the economic activities of the middle peasant, the central figure in the countryside. Here the prosperous peasants also gained but as a whole so did the entire nation, for it was a matter of increasing the production of food and raw materials for light industry. Gross agricultural product had almost reached the 1913 level and was continuing to increase.

The new Central Committee decisions on the problems of the countryside were correct and kept completely within the framework of the NEP. One can merely speak of a prematureness of certain decisions. For example, the reduction in prices for industrial goods under the condition of maintaining commodity shortages and a reduction in the agricultural tax led to an increase in the amount of money in the countryside, that is, to a greater unsatisfied demand.

The main role in the theoretical shaping of the new course for agricultural policy was played by N.I. Bukharin with A.I. Rykov seconding virtually everything. But here they often formulated their proposals with consistency and frankness which shocked many of the orthodox Bolsheviks who had grown accustomed to considering such concepts as "kulak," "merchant" and "rich peasant" as synonymous with the concept of "enemy of the proletariat."

Although Bukharin did speak about the need to assist production cooperatives in every possible way, that is, kolkhozes, he did not consider it possible to develop them quickly due to the attachment of the peasants to their own property. Initially, it was essential to develop all the possibilities of small-scale peasant farming to the limit and then it would be easier to switch the peasantry to production cooperatives, certainly, with material support from the state.

Also dating to this time is Bukharin's slogan of "enrich yourselves" which caused so many fierce debates. In speaking at a meeting of the Moscow party aktiv, Bukharin had said:

"Our policy in relation to the countryside should develop in such a direction as to open up and destroy many restrictions impeding the growth of the prosperous and kulak farm. To the peasantry, to all the peasantry,

we should say: enrich yourselves, develop your farm and don't fear that you will be suppressed."

Bukharin very quickly abandoned this idea but he did emphasize that this was "an incorrect formulation, an erroneous formulation...of a completely correct idea...." The issue was that we "do not obstruct the kulak's accumulation and we will not endeavor to organize the poor peasantry for a repeat expropriation of the kulak."

Neither the views and statements of Bukharin nor the views and statements of Rykov contradicted the main ideas of scientific socialism, the views and statements of Lenin. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Zinovyev and Kamenev from attacking Bukharin's platform which at that time was supported by a majority of the Politburo. Here both sides relied on statements by Lenin. For example, Lenin had said that the NEP is the policy of a "strategic retreat of the proletarian state" and Zinovyev recalled and commented on these words by Lenin. But Lenin had also said that the NEP was to be introduced in our country in a serious manner and for an extended time and was a specific form in the development of socialism, that is, not only a retreat but also an advance of socialism. Bukharin referred to these words of Lenin and commented on them. Stalin basically supported Bukharin although he did not side with him completely. But Stalin decisively repudiated Zinovyev and Kamenev who accused the Central Committee majority of a "kulak deviation." They had demanded not a weakening but rather a strengthening of the administrative pressure on the kulak as well as a significant increase in taxes. Zinovyev had proposed increasing the taxes on the prosperous strata in the countryside by 100-200 million rubles a year as well as carry out a one-shot confiscation of 1 billion rubles from the countryside for the needs of industrialization. Zinovyev and Kamenev clearly exaggerated the proportional amount and influence of the kulakry in the postrevolutionary countryside. By the mid-1920's, the kulak farms comprised just 4-5 percent of the total number of peasant farms in comparison with 20 percent in 1917. For this reason, the concern of the opposition on the kulak danger was clearly exaggerated. The country needed bread for sale and for this reason Kamenev's proposal on the partial restoration of the policy of "war communism" was not only incorrect but also dangerous.

It must be assumed that Stalin watched with satisfaction as the polemics developed, keeping for himself a definite freedom of action. He clearly set himself off from the Bukharin appeal to "enrich yourselves" and forced Bukharin to admit his error. But at Stalin's insistence, the party Central Committee also did not permit the publishing of an article by N.K. Krupskaya criticizing this Bukharin slogan. Stalin also decisively repudiated Zinovyev's assertion on the presence of a "kulak deviation" in the party leadership. Without going deeply into the economic debate, Stalin in the struggle against the Zinovyev opposition was primarily a defender of the thesis of the possibility of building socialism in a separate country, that is, in the USSR.

We have already spoken about Stalin's position on this question. Here the views of Zinovyev and Kamenev ran closer to those of Trotsky, although they voiced them with many stipulations and more cautiously. Nevertheless, at one of the Politburo sessions, they criticized Stalin, accusing him of underestimating the world revolution and also of national restrictiveness. A majority of the Politburo did not support Zinovyev and Kamenev. However, they continued to defend their viewpoint, chiefly in the Leningrad press.

The 14th VKP(b) Congress was held at the end of December 1925. In the main political report at the congress, Stalin said virtually nothing about the differences with the Zinovyev—Kamenev opposition. Thus, Stalin immediately put himself in a better position. He gave Zinovyev the opportunity to take the first step in initiating an internal party struggle, having left for himself the right to sum up the debate.

The co-report by Zinovyev was, however, very weak, boring and unpersuasive. An experienced orator and polemicist, in the given instance he was unable to win over the congress delegates and only the Leningrad delegation applauded him. The position of the "new" opposition was complicated by the circumstance that on many theoretical questions its prominent leaders differed substantially between themselves. This was reflected in their speeches at the congress.

Of course, the speeches of the opposition delegates also contained valid comments. Nor was their criticism of certain Central Committee measures in the agriculture area devoid of justification. Also valid were their pointing out of the hardening of internal party conditions concealed by a slogan of party unity.

One must recognize now the validity of the warnings by certain opposition members on the danger of the growing cult of the individual leaders and above all the cult of Stalin. L. Kamenev was most decisive on this score:

"We are against creating the theory of a 'leader' and we are against making a 'leader.' We are against having the Secretariat, in actually uniting both policy and organization, stand over the political body.... I personally feel that our General Secretary is not the figure who can unite around himself the Old Bolshevik staff.... Precisely because I have repeatedly said this to Comrade Stalin personally and because I have repeatedly said this to a group of Leninist comrades, I repeat this at the congress: I am persuaded that Comrade Stalin cannot carry out the role of unifier of the Bolshevik staff."

If these words had been said at the previous 13th Party Congress in the context of the just revealed "Testament" by Lenin, then Stalin would certainly not have kept his post of Central Committee General Secretary. But at the

14th VKP(b) Congress, these words were interrupted by disagreeing shouts from a majority of the delegates. Precisely after this party congress, Stalin began to particularly stand out among the other Politburo members.

As might be expected, the "new" opposition suffered a complete rout at the congress. The resolution on the report of the VKP(b) Central Committee was adopted by 559 votes to 65. In 1925, the party repudiated the claims of Zinovyev and Kamenev to leadership in the Central Committee, as in 1924, it had repudiated analogous claims by Trotsky.

Immediately after the congress, a large group of delegates headed by Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Andreyev, Kirov, Mikoyan, Ordzhonikidze and others traveled to Leningrad to explain the congress decisions and resolutions. Zinovyev and his supporters in Leningrad accepted the challenge and defended their position at the meetings held. But they lost this uneven political clash. Even at the party meeting of the Putilov Plant, a resolution was adopted in support of the congress decisions. Then analogous resolutions were approved at a majority of the meetings of the primary party organizations, at the rayon party conferences and ultimately at an oblast party conference. Some 96.3 percent of the participants in the party meetings voted against the opposition. Just 3.2 percent voted in favor of the opposition and 0.5 percent of the meeting participants abstained from voting. A new membership of the Leningrad Gubkom and the Northwestern Buro of the Central Committee was elected headed by S.M. Kirov, and all the buros of the party raykoms and the Komsomol were reelected.

Changes also occurred in the hither echelon of the party leadership. G. Zinovyev was called back from the post of chairman of the Comintern Executive Committee. This post was completed eliminated. N.I. Bukharin headed the Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee. Zinovyev was left on the Politburo, however L. Kamenev was moved from a candidate member to a member of the Politburo. He was also released from the posts of the chairman of the STO [Labor and Defense Council] and also deputy chairman of the USSR SNK. For a short time, Kamenev was appointed to the post of people's commissar of domestic and foreign trade. Voroshilov, Molotov and Kalinin became full members of the Politburo. Thereby, Stalin ensured himself with a decisive majority not only on the Secretariat but also in the Politburo.

4

In 1925, Trotsky and his not too numerous supporters had not participated in that struggle which had developed between the majority of the Central Committee and the "new" opposition. Although Zinovyev and Kamenev had attacked Stalin and Bukharin basically from "leftist" positions, in repeating often arguments similar to the theses of the Trotskyites, Trotsky viewed Zinovyev and Kamenev more as the "rightist" wing in the party and as his personal enemies. Being a Politburo member, Trotsky clearly kept on the sidelines of those acute disputes which more and more frequently from the end of 1924 arose between Stalin and his supporters, on the one hand, and Zinovyev and Kamenev, on the other. At times Trotsky arrived at a Politburo session with a French novel in hand and became absorbed in reading, not paying attention to the debate. However, being a politician, after the 14th VKP(b) Congress, he, of course, was unable to maintain the position of an outside observer and remain outside the struggle. He received various advice from his closest supporters. Karl Radek—one of the most capable party writers—advised Trotsky to form a bloc with Stalin against Zinovyev and Kamenev. The Old Bolshevik L.P. Serebryakov, who at that time held prominent posts in the rail transport system recommended that Trotsky form a coalition with Zinovyev and Kamenev. S.V. Mrachkovskiy an old revolutionary who had distinguished himself on the Civil War fronts, warned Trotsky against both "blocs." Trotsky determined to follow Serebryakov's advice.

Even before a formal agreement, Zinovyev, Kamenev and Trotsky and their supporters began supporting one another at the sessions of the Politburo and Central Committee. Finally, and not without hesitation on both sides, a secret meeting was organized between Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev, the first outside an official situation since the beginning of 1923. This was followed by others which were held either in apartments in the Kremlin or at Radek's apartment.

The tenacious initiative for the talks derived from Zinovyev and Kamenev. They tried to expose Stalin, considering him not too dangerous an opponent. They were full of optimism and confident that once the party had learned about the agreement between them and Trotsky a majority would immediately be on their side. Kamenev once even exclaimed, turning to Trotsky: "As soon as you appear on the rostrum hand in hand with Zinovyev, the party will say: 'There is the Central Committee! There is the government!'"

And Trotsky gave in to the blandishments. He was ready to fight for power in the bloc with Zinovyev. He did not say now that the notion of a fight for power was "unendurable" for him. In truth, he later asserted repeatedly that he never had shared the illusions of Zinovyev and Kamenev. But one can doubt this if one traces the entire history of the "united" opposition. In assuming its leadership, Trotsky was counting on success. He merely urged his allies not to hope on a quick success.

The first joint action of the Trotskyites and Zinovyevites occurred at the April 1926 Central Committee Plenum, when they demanded the elaboration of plans for more intensive industrialization of the nation. Some 3 months later, the "united" opposition sent off to the Central Committee and the TsKK an extensive document which criticized the activities of the party leadership.

Naturally, the uniting of the two groupings in the party was accompanied by the mutual remission of sins.

How many harsh words had Zinovyev and Kamenev said in 1923-1924 against Trotsky and his platform! Precisely Zinovyev had rejected as "slander" the warnings from Trotsky on bureaucratization and the degeneration of the soviet and party apparatus. It was namely Zinovyev in his speeches had demanded that the party "against the petty bourgeois influence of Trotsky maintain the trenches in full order." Even having organized a "new" opposition, Zinovyev and Kamenev accused the Central Committee majority of appeasement toward Trotskyism and declared the Central Committee's policy "semi-Trotskyite." The leaders of the oppositions in 1926 began giving completely different speeches.

"It was such a lamentable time," said Zinovyev, for example. "...Instead of us—our two groups of real proletarian revolutionaries—joining forces against the crawling Stalin and his friends, we, due to a number of obscurities in the state of affairs in the party, for a couple of years beat each other on the heads and this we greatly regret and we are hopeful will never happen again."

"Undoubtedly, in the 'Lessons of October'," stated Trotsky in turn, "I linked the opportunistic shifts in policy to the names of Comrades Zinovyev and Kamenev. As the experience of the ideological struggle within the Central Committee shows, this was a major error. An explanation to this mistake can be found in the fact that I did not have an opportunity to follow the ideological struggle within the seven and promptly establish that the opportunistic changes had been brought about by the group headed by Comrade Stalin against Comrades Zinovyev and Kamenev."

The unexpected alliance of Zinovyev, Kamenev and Trotsky promised a new exacerbation of the internal party struggle. But this alliance did not increase the opportunities of the opposition. If it had been concluded in 1923 or even in 1924, Stalin most probably could not have overcome it. However, now the struggle of the opposition for power in the party and nation was doomed to defeat.

In the spring and the start of the summer, the opposition leaders initiated very active work a significant portion of which was carried out as a conspiracy. Opposition representatives were sent out to scores of cities in order to acquaint their supporters with the elaborated platform. Illegal meetings were conducted on the spot and new members of the opposition faction recruited. One of the illegal meetings was held in a forest near Moscow in observing all rules of conspiracy.

A new clash of the opposition with the Central Committee majority occurred at the Plenum of the Central Committee and TsKK of the VKP(b) in July 1926. Trotsky spoke on behalf of the opposition bloc. The party saw Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev together but there were few who shouted: "There is the government!" A predominant majority of the Central Committee condemned the opposition. Zinovyev was removed from membership on the Politburo and now of the opposition leaders only Trotsky remained on it.

Undoubtedly, many critical statements by the opposition were correct. For example, the far reaching bureaucratization of both the soviet and party apparatus was certainly no myth. There was much that was valid also in the criticism of certain aspects of the party leadership's economic policy. In 1925-1926 industrial production was increasing at a very rapid pace (up to 30-35 percent a year), however precisely then certain dangerous disproportions were noted in the national economy. Regardless of the increased industrial production, the hunger for commodities had grown stronger in the nation, as solvent demand was growing more rapidly both in the city and in the countryside. The shortage of goods made it difficult for the peasants to sell their surplus grain. Exports and primarily the export of grain declined sharply. The import plan also had to be cut back. Reduced cotton purchases created difficulties for the textile industry. The negative balance of Soviet foreign trade rose as well as the indebtedness to foreign firms. In order to maintain confidence in the USSR as a trade partner, gold exports were increased and so forth.

Also completely just was the opposition's demand to condemn the theory of "social fascism." This concept was employed at that time in assessing the activities of social democracy. The theory of "social fascism" the founding of which had involved not only Stalin but also Zinovyev had compromised the communists in the eyes of the leftist Social Democracy, it aided its rightist leaders and prevented a unity of actions by the working class against the advance of fascism.

However, regardless of the many valid comments, the overall focus in the political platform of the opposition was wrong.

The opposition as before was defending a thesis on the impossibility of building socialism in just one individual country as the USSR without the aid of the victorious Western proletariat.

The opposition leaders in the ardor of their polemics extremely exaggerated the shortcomings of party policy and this evoked protest in the party cadres. A trend was depicted as an already commenced process; the degeneration which had involved only a portion of the party apparatus was portrayed as degeneration of virtually the entire apparatus. For this reason the opposition's slogan on the need for a "revolution in the party regime" was perceived by a majority in the party as "ultra-leftist." The party's course was depicted by the opposition as an ongoing retreat. From the fact of a certain increase in the kulakry and the NEP-man bourgeoisie, which was quite natural under the NEP, the opposition concluded that Stalin, Rykov and Bukharin were restoring capitalism.

Also wrong was the opposition's assertion that the private sector was accumulating at a more rapid pace than the public one. For clearly demagogic purposes the opposition was exaggerating the scale of capitalist development in the country and the ensuing dangers.

Soviet industry had actually begun to receive more and more raw materials and export resources from the countryside and this was beneficial not only to the prosperous portion of the countryside but also to all of society.

Contrary to Trotsky's assertions, in 1926 there had been no growing together of the party upper circles with the upper circles of the NEP-man bourgeoisie. For this reason, the threat of a transfer of power into the hands of the bourgeoisie or the kulakry was miniscule. The degeneration of individual elements in the party had a different, much more complex nature.

In correctly criticizing the policy of lowering wholesale and retail prices when carried out under conditions of an acute shortage of goods, certain of the opposition leaders proposed increasing the prices for industrial goods by 20-30 percent and this also would have been wrong. Although a certain rise in prices for the scarcest commodities was essential in that period (private merchants profited in the reselling of these goods at higher prices), a general rise in the prices for industrial goods would have been undesirable.

The opposition's economic program was worked out chiefly by Ye. Preobrazhenskiy and he was opposed by Bukharin and his students on behalf of the Central Committee majority.

In the opinion of Bukharin and his school, neither taxes on the private economy nor prices for the products of socialist enterprises should be so great as to impede the development of the private sector and the individual peasant farms. In other words, not only the socialist sector should develop but—albeit at a slower pace—the private one too, for expanded reproduction in this sector would be beneficial to all society and would provide additional funds for accelerated expanded reproduction of the socialist economy.

The scheme which Preobrazhenskiy developed was a different one. He felt that the extended coexistence of the socialist system and private commodity production would be impossible. Within mincing expressions, Preobrazhenskiy wrote that one of these systems would inevitably "devour" the other. For this reason, Preobrazhenskiy was in favor not merely of "pumping" assets into the socialist sector from the other sectors but also this would be a pumping which would gradually lead to the elimination of all the nonsocialist sectors from economic life and to their liquidation. He employed the terms "exploitation" and "expropriation" and even compared the "pumping" of funds from the countryside into the city with the transfer of funds from the colonies of the capitalist nations to the home countries. The use by the proletarian state of surplus product from the nonsocialist forms of the economy for the requirements of socialist development was termed by Preobrazhenskiy "primary socialist accumulation" and was considered by him to be the basic law of the Soviet economy.

Stalin endeavored not to become involved in the economic debates with the opposition leaders, turning this over to Bukharin and his students. In skillfully and adroitly manipulating the situation which was disadvantageous for the "united" opposition, Stalin first of all accused the leaders of this opposition of a lack of principles. It was not difficult to establish this accusation in giving extensive quotes from the recent abrupt attacks by the opposition leaders on one another. Moreover, Stalin brought together in a single row all the previous errors of Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev. And this was a rather heavy political ballast for any opposition. Stalin shifted the basic thrust in the struggle to the problem of party unity and he accused the "united" opposition of initiating a fractional struggle. Stalin was able to pick up on the mood of not only the party apparatus but also the party masses who were tired of the infinite debates, particularly under the conditions of a comparatively difficult material situation.

By autumn, that is in just several months after the founding of the "united" opposition, it has become obvious that it was unable to win over the party masses and had suffered a political defeat.

Being victorious over the opposition, Stalin hurried to reinforce it in organizational terms. At the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the TsKK held on 23-26 October, the decision was taken to expel Trotsky from the Politburo membership and Kamenev from Politburo candidate membership.

Stalin closely followed the activities of the opposition leaders. Where information received by him through party channels was insufficient, he without hesitation employed the GPU bodies and their new leader Menzhinskiy usually did his bidding. Stalin did not like the truce with Trotsky. In recognizing his superiority and being the master of the situation, Stalin endeavored to completely defeat his political rivals and establish complete control over the party. In urging the opposition to be sincere and condemning it for hypocrisy, Stalin even then himself was being hypocritical and deceived the party, concealing his true aims even from persons close to him.

One of the grounds for the breaking up of the opposition was the discovery by the GPU bodies of an illegal printing plant of the opposition. Its workers as well as the leader of the printing plant Mrachkovskiy were arrested. One of those arrested who in the past had been a White Guard officer was also a secret GPU co-worker and later this was admitted by Menzhinskiy himself. The affair of the underground printing plant and the "White Guard officer" was made maximum use of for compromising

Trotsky and the opposition. The Plenum of the Central Committee and TsKK held at the end of October 1927 adopted a resolution to expel Trotsky and Zinovyev from membership on the Central Committee, keeping them, however, in the party ranks.

On 2 November 1927, PRAVDA published Trotsky's speech at the October Plenum, his last political speech before a session of the VKP(b) Central Committee. It showed rather clearly the entire unrealisticness of the platform of the "leftist" opposition and Trotsky himself. Such a platform in which criticism of the shortcomings of the party leadership was presented in a maximally heightened form and with elements of demagoguery could not be successful not only among the leaders but also among a majority of the ruling party's members. On the other hand, a lamentable impression is also left by the rudeness of Trotsky's opponents such as Petrovskiy, Skrypnik, Unshlikht, Voroshilov, Goloshchekin, Chubar, Lomov and Kalinin. They interrupted Trotsky's speech with loud shouts and did not let him finish it. Zinovyev also left the plenum rostrum to shouts of "Down!" and "Get Out!"

In response to the decision to expel the opposition leaders from the Central Committee, the opposition attempted to hold its own, separate demonstration in honor of the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution. However, this was a demonstration not so much of strength as weakness. There were virtually no workers in its ranks and the student youth and employees from certain institutions predominated. They carried slogans: "We will carry out Lenin's Testament," "We attack the right, the kulak, the NEP-man and the bureaucrat," "Down with Stalin!" "Long live Trotsky!" "Against opportunism and splitting and for unity of Lenin's party!" and "Long live the leaders of the world revolution Zinovyev and Trotsky!" In a song which they sang, there were the words: "Long live Trotsky—the leader of the Red Army!" During this demonstration, the opposition leaders gave speeches from the balcony of one of the houses at the corner of Vozdvizhenka and Mokhovaya Streets.

In comparison with the holiday demonstration of the Moscow workers, the "opposition" one made a paltry impression. It was easily dispersed by the worker militias which were quickly organized for this as well as by police subunits. The first arrests occurred here on the street. The slogans and the portraits of Trotsky were ripped from the hands of the demonstrators. Many of the students were beaten. The attempt to organize an opposition parade in Leningrad was even less successful. Zinovyev who had clearly overestimated his influence in the city scarcely escaped a beating.

On 14 November, for the organizing of the opposition demonstrations, the Plenum of the Central Committee and the TsKK expelled Trotsky and Zinovyev from the party. The Central Committee and TsKK also removed any active opposition figures who remained members of these bodies.

The 15th VKP(b) Congress was held in December. The Congress confirmed the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinovyev from the party. At the same time, the Congress decreed the expulsion from the party of 75 active opposition figures including Kamenev, Pyatakov, Radek, Rakovskiy, Safarov, Smilga, I. Smirnov and Lashevich and also proposed that the party organizations "purge their ranks of all clearly incorrigible elements of the Trotskyite opposition." The Congress concluded the organizational defeat of the opposition. An atmosphere of intolerance reigned at it, the speeches by representatives of the opposition were rudely interrupted and harsh and insulting shouts resounded everywhere. Many congress delegates demanded that even harsher measures be taken against the opposition supporters and restrict any debates in the party. There were appeals to further harden the party regime.

The SNK Chairman A. Rykov even said:

"For the situation which the opposition has endeavored to create, it is very little even to serve time in prison. I feel that there can be no guarantee that the prison population will have to be somewhat increased in the near future" (voices: "Right!").

A delegate from Moscow, G. Mikhaylovskiy, in distorting historical facts, was completely against discussions in the party.

At the Congress certain prominent representatives of the Zinovyev opposition stated their abandonment of opposition activities and requested that they be returned to the party. The Congress adopted a decree to review such requests only on an individual basis and act on them only after 6 months.

After the 15th Congress, Kamenev, Bakayev, Yevdokimov and certain other "Zinovyevites" announced that they would obey the Congress decisions. Soon thereafter Zinovyev also capitulated. In mid-1928, Zinovyev, Kamenev and many of their supporters were restored to the party and they were granted various positions in the soviet and economic apparatus. As for the active Trotskyites, they intended to continue the struggle against the "Stalinist faction." The party Central Committee decided therefore to strengthen the repressions against the Trotskyites. Virtually all of the Trotskyites who did not submit a written statement on the condemnation of their views were arrested and placed in political isolation wards or exiled to remote regions of the nation. One of the first to be exiled was Trotsky. He was notified of his exile 4 days before. Many of his supporters arrived to escort Trotsky to the station and it was apparent that he was still popular. From the evidence of M.A. Solntseva, some of those escorting him lay down on the tracks. Trotsky's departure was put off until 18

January. However, on 17 January, workers from the OGU and the Central Committee apparatus arrived at his apartment and demanded that he depart immediately. Trotsky refused and he was forcibly carried out and shoved into a car standing by the entrance. Then he was taken to the station and put in a train leaving for Alma-Ata. Trotsky's son, Sedov, began to shout, turning to the railroad workers: "Look, they are taking Trotsky away!" But no one intervened and the train left the platform.

For a year, Trotsky lived with his family in Alma-Ata, continuing to maintain legal and illegal ties with his supporters and carrying out an extensive correspondence. His mood was very optimistic.

In January 1929, the decision was taken to exile Trotsky abroad. Together with his family, he was secretly moved to Odessa and then on the steamship "Ilich" sent out of the USSR. By agreement with Turkey which during those years maintained good relations with the USSR, Trotsky was offered to settle on one of the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmara. He spent over 4 years here, being engaged chiefly in literary activities. Aside from several books and many articles which were published in the West, Trotsky also wrote a large portion of the materials for the BYULLETEN OPPOZITSII which had been founded by him. He was still full of hope for success of his movement and asserted that the "leftist opposition, contrary to the false announcements of the officious press, is growing stronger ideologically and increasing numerically throughout the world. It has made its major advances last year."

These illusions very soon began to be dispelled. The exiling of Trotsky from the USSR, the harsh repressions against the opposition members, the insipient struggle against the "rightist" deviation, the evermore active antikulak and anti-NEP-man policy, the acceleration of industrialization and the start of complete collectivization which marked an obvious turning of Stalin to the "left"—all of this brought about a rapid collapse of the Trotskyite opposition. The will to fight Stalin had been shattered in a majority of the prominent opposition figures and under various pretexts they began going over to Stalin's side.

"The Stalinists," wrote Radek in one of the letters, "were more dignified than the opposition thought." Radek and Preobrazhenskiy decisively distanced themselves from the theory of "permanent revolution" which they previously had supported. They were also to distance themselves from Trotsky. Returning from exile to Moscow under escort, K. Radek at one of the stations in his speech directed to the exiled Trotskyites assembled here called for them to capitulate to the Central Committee. He spoke of the difficult situation in the country, about the grain shortage, the dissatisfaction of the workers and the threat of peasant uprisings. In such a situation the opposition should recognize its incorrectness and join up with the party. "We brought ourselves to expulsion and prison.... I have broken with Trotsky and we are now political enemies." Then I.T. Smilga, L.P. Serebryakov and I.N. Smirnov abandoned Trotsky.

Kh.G. Rakovskiy resisted longer than the others. However, by the end of 1929, he and his group (Sosnovskiy, Muralov, Mdivini and others) sent an "open letter to the Central Committee in which, although criticizing Stalin's policy and also demanding Trotsky's return to the USSR, at the same time was an appeal for a truce. Soon thereafter a majority of the members from this group capitulated completely and they were permitted to return to Moscow, where many of them assumed places and positions which prior to this had been occupied by participants in the Bukharin opposition. Kh. Rakovskiy was, possibly, the last of the most prominent supporters of Trotsky who stubbornly stood his ground but at the beginning of the 1930's, he also capitulated.

In fact, only Trotsky alone of all the leaders of the "united" opposition endeavored to continue the struggle against Stalin. He conducted an enormous correspondence with his supporters in other countries, endeavoring to establish Trotskyite factions or groups and endeavoring to organize the delivery of Trotskyite literature and the BYULLETEN OPPOZITSSI to the USSR. However, he had virtually no supporters in the USSR, even secret ones. Subjectively, Trotsky now remained a revolutionary and not a "fascistizing counterrevolutionary" as Stalin claimed. Due to the dogmatism and tendentiousness inherent to Trotsky as well as to a lack of information, he was unable to understand and evaluate those complex processes which were occurring in the 1930's in the USSR and in the world communist movement. For this reason he was unable not only to formulate any alternative Marxist program but even understand the reasons for his defeat.

5

The sharp clashes with the "leftist" opposition had not even died out when the struggle against a "rightist" deviation began to gain force. In the course of this struggle the label of a "rightist deviationist" was fastened to many senior and prominent party leaders. The leading figure in this new group of Stalin's opponents was Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin and his most consistent followers A.I. Rykov and M.P. Tomskiy. The victory over the Zinovyev opposition brought Bukharin up among the most prestigious members of the party leadership, he became the official party theorist and also headed the Comintern.

In 1925-1927, regardless of the attacks of the "leftist" opposition, a policy was carried out of general development for the productive forces in the countryside, including also the development, in employing the terminology of M.I. Kalinin, of "powerful labor farms." This policy produced good results as in terms of total gross product agricultural production rather quickly surpassed

the prewar level. However, the overall economic situation in the nation remained difficult and complex. The rebuilding period had ended but still the enterprises were operating in not the best manner, their equipment was worn out and the products excelled in frequently high cost and poor quality. Significant unemployment survived, foreign trade was developing slowly, as the state did not possess a sufficient number of goods for export. The party had already proclaimed a course of industrialization, but it lacked the funds to carry it out. A lack of funds also impeded both the modernization and equipping of the Red Army, although the international situation of the USSR during this period was still unstable and caused numerous fears. Thought had to be given to broadening the sources of "initial socialist accumulation" also at the expense of the "capitalist elements" in the city and countryside. Bukharin himself came out with the initiative of revising a number of provisions in the "general line." For example, at the Eighth Moscow Trade Union Conference he stated:

"The carrying out of the line of the 14th Conference and the 14th Congress has strengthened the union with the middle peasantry and has improved the position of the proletariat in the countryside. Now, together with the middle peasantry and relying on the poor peasantry, on the increased economic and political forces of our Union and the party, it is possible and necessary to switch to a more rapid offensive against the capitalist elements and primarily the kulakry."

With Bukharin's participation, the 15th VKP(b) Congress adopted a series of decisions aimed at restricting the "capitalist elements" of the city and countryside. However, in spite of the demands of the "leftists" this restriction was to be carried out chiefly by economic means, that is, within the framework of the NEP and not at all by the methods of "war communism." Moreover, the restricting of the capitalist elements and an offensive against them in no way meant their "expulsion" or "liquidation." For this reason, the 15th VKP(b) Congress was decisively against the forced confiscation of grain from the prosperous strata in the countryside as had been proposed by the "leftists." The Congress also argued against a hasty mass collectivization which was not backed up either by subjective or objective factors.

The agricultural policy proclaimed by the 15th Congress was not, however, to be carried out. Even before the Congress, late in the autumn of 1927, serious difficulties arose with grain procurement. Although the harvest had been good, the peasantry and particularly the prosperous groups was in no hurry to sell grain to the state. They still had surpluses remaining from 1925-1926 and many wanted to wait until spring in order to sell the grain at a higher price. A portion of the peasantry was demanding not money but rather industrially produced goods. These difficulties in relations with the peasantry had not been overcome by the beginning of winter. The peasantry met its obligations for the agricultural tax which was not too burdensome and was now collected not in products but in money, but refused to sell grain to the state at the comparatively low autumn purchasing prices. At the same time, the state did not have any grain reserves as grain was at that time also an important export item. A great shortage developed and this could tell seriously on the supply of the cities, the supply of the Red Army and on export deliveries.

In endeavoring to head off the consequences of this deficit in the grain balance of the nation, the VKP(b) Central Committee issued a series of directives on employing extraordinary measures against the kulakry and the prosperous portion of the countryside, including the forced confiscation of grain surpluses. Although the directives also spoke about the temporary nature of these measures, it was a question in reality of a sharp and unexpected change for the local workers in all previous party policy in the countryside and ran contrary not only to the adopted decisions of the 15th VKP(b) Congress and corresponded more to the proposals of the just defeated "united" opposition than to all previous policy.

The new Central Committee directives were adopted with the approval of the entire Politburo, including Rykov, Bukharin and Tomskiy. In order to accelerate grain procurement, thousands of communists were dispatched to aid the rural party organizations. Many Central Committee members were sent to various regions of the nation. Stalin himself left his office in the Kremlin and on 15 January 1928 left for Siberia where, according to the data of the grain procurement bodies, particularly large grain surpluses had built up. He visited Novosibirsk, Barnaul and Omsk. In conducting meetings of the party and state aktiv, he rudely and harshly condemned the local workers for indecisiveness in applying the extraordinary measures against the rich peasants.

Pressure on the rich peasants led to a certain increase in grain procurement. But in April 1928, grain deliveries to the grain procurement stations again declined and Stalin issued orders for the even wider employment of the extraordinary measures which now also involved the basic mass of middle peasantry. Simultaneously, the VSNKh under the leadership of V. Kuybyshev worked out measures aimed at accelerated industrialization and broadening capital construction and this would require significant state outlays.

One could foresee that the new and abrupt turn in Stalin's economic policy would cause differences of opinion on the VKP(b) Politburo and the Central Committee. And this is what happened. The debates on the Politburo in the spring of 1928 became evermore acute. Bukharin supported by Rykov and Tomskiy acted as the opponent. Two other Politburo members—Kalinin and Voroshilov—held a moderate position. Voroshilov, as the people's commissar of defense, was afraid that a falling out with the peasantry would be reflected in the battleworthiness of the Red Army. Through secret channels he had learned of "unhealthy" attitudes in certain troop units. Kalinin, as the chairman of the USSR TsIK

[Central Executive Committee], was concerned about the alliance with the peasantry. He valued his reputation as an "all-Union elder" and as the defender and expresser of the interests of the working peasantry. Two other Politburo members—Ordzhonikidze and Rudzutak—vacillated. In essence, of all the Politburo members who were members after the 15th Congress, Stalin had the unconditional support of only V. Kuybyshev and V. Molotov. Stalin did not have sufficient support either in the Central Committee as well as in a number of important regional party organizations. This forced him to maneuver and delay. The leadership of the Moscow party organization headed by the candidate member of the Politburo N.A. Uglanov was decisively on Bukharin's side. The apparatus of the USSR SNK and Gosplan was also on the side of the "moderates." While the new chairman of the GPU, V. Menzhinskiy, supported Stalin, his two deputies M. Trilisser and G. Yagoda were in favor of a more moderate policy.

Bukharin was the theorist and ideologue and he was not afraid to engage either Lenin or Stalin in a dispute. But he was too mild a person who was poorly adapted for hard political fighting. He was not seeking, like Trotsky of Zinovyev, to have power in the party. The recollections of the just ended acute struggle against the "leftist" opposition did not permit Bukharin even of thinking of initiating a party-wide debate under the new conditions or turning to the entire party with an appeal to support him in the disputes with Stalin. Bukharin did not want to establish a new faction and work out an opposition platform. Moreover, the balance of forces inside the Central Committee allowed Bukharin to hope that he would be able to gain the upper hand in keeping the discussion within the Central Committee and Politburo. Needless to say how much such a position by Bukharin favored Stalin.

In May and June 1928, Bukharin forwarded to the Politburo two notes which were supported by Rykov and Tomskiy. In these notes, he pointed out that many Central Committee measures had developed into a new line which was distinct from the line of the 15th Congress and that all of this was ideologically misleading the party. Bukharin asserted, and not without grounds, that the party leadership did not have either a general opinion or an integrated plan and demanded that a free and general debate be held at the Central Committee Plenum which had been set for 4 July. In contrast to the letters which Trotsky had sent the Politburo, Bukharin's notes were not "open" and were not disseminated in the party organizations. Stalinists stated that he accepted Bukharin's recommendations. However, he did not want to leave initiative to Bukharin in the dispute and by his speeches and letters provoked a new outburst of debate. At the end of June, a new Politburo session was convened and at it Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy released a declaration which spoke of the threat to the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. They demanded the immediate halt to the extraordinary measures and the restoring of markets and proposed deferring from establishing kolkhozes and sovkhozes which the state could not immediately provide with material support. The encouraging of the small and middle peasant farms should be, they felt, at the center of the party's attention. V. Molotov termed this declaration "antiparty." Stalin was more cautious. For overcoming the arising differences of opinion, a commission was established with a membership of K.Ya. Bauman, Bukharin, Mikoyan, Rykov and Stalin. The commission prepared compromise theses on the grain procurement policy and this was approved by the Politburo at a session on 2 July. It was decided to repeal the extraordinary measures, increase purchasing prices for grain and restore the rural markets.

Several days later, the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum opened in Moscow. Rykov gave the main report at the Plenum. He assessed the situation in the nation as very bad and even voiced fears about the possibility of a new Civil War against the peasantry. He repeated the demands to give up the extraordinary measures, to increase purchasing prices, to maintain the principles of the NEP, as well as support the small and middle peasantry.

Stalin had no intention of retreating. He was certain of the support of a majority of the party obkom secretaries and for this reason devoted his speeches at the Plenum to justifying the policy being carried out by him. At the center of the argument was the question on the need for a more rapid pace in industrialization. But just as Rykov had not accused Stalin, so Stalin in his speeches before the Plenum did not level any accusations against Bukharin or Rykov. He came out only against certain theses of Trotsky, Preobrazhenskiy and Frumkin. At the July Central Committee Plenum, Stalin for the first time proposed his own thesis on exacerbating the class struggle in the USSR.

"...The advance of the working class to socialism-...cannot help but lead to the resistance by exploiting elements...it cannot help but lead to an inevitable exacerbation of the class struggle."

Stalin urged not only the "excluding of the need to employ any extraordinary measures whatsoever," he stated: "people who envisage the turning of the extraordinary measures into a permanent or protracted course for our party are dangerous people, for they are playing with fire and threatening the 'smychka' [alliance between workers and peasantry]."

In this same speech he noted that one could not renounce the employment of extraordinary or "kombed" [committee of poor peasants] measures in the countryside in the future, if "extraordinary conditions" were to occur there.

Compromise resolutions were adopted at the July Central Committee Plenum and these were closer to the position of the "rightists" than to Stalin's position. But these resolutions were not victory for Bukharin, as Stalin

was able to win over a majority of the Central Committee and attract Kalinin and Voroshilov to his side. He now had a firm majority within the Politburo and this was more important than any resolutions of the Central Committee Plenum. Bukharin also understood this.

Stalin immediately took a number of measures aimed at weakening Bukharin's positions. The struggle initiated in the Comintern against the "rightist tendencies" in the communist movement indirectly affected both Bukharin and his supporters. Bukharin's positions were also weakened in the press organs. The faithful Stalinist Yem. Yaroslavskiy was becoming evermore active on the editorial board of PRAVDA. Another loyal Stalinist L. Kaganovich was included on the Presidium of the AUCCTU. Petr Petrovskiy was removed from the position of editor-in-chief of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA; Slepkov, Astrov, Maretskiy, Zaytsev and Tseytlin were removed from the editorial staffs of PRAVDA and BOLSHEVIK. Bukharin still remained the editor-in-chief of PRAVDA but it was now difficult for him to define the position of the party press.

Stalin's supporters became active in the Moscow party organization. They were able to secure the reelection of several secretaries of the party raykoms. In mid-October 1928, when Bukharin was vacationing in Kislovodsk, a Plenum of the Moscow Obkom and Party Gorkom was convened. Uglanov with his supporters was in the minority. Stalin himself spoke at the Plenum and accused Uglanov of a rightist deviation. Uglanov and his supporters were not elected to the leadership of the Moscow party organization. It was to be headed by the Central Committee Secretary V.M. Molotov. This was almost the decisive defeat for the Bukharin group. It was demoralized and even Rykov made concessions in the debates which were now carried on in the Politburo. Only now did Bukharin interrupt his vacation and return to Moscow where he could see for himself that his positions in the upper reaches of the party had been significantly weakened. Moreover, the situation in the nation had again become more acute. Grain procurement was going badly and again the question had been raised of employing extraordinary measures. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy were against this and when the Politburo rejected their protest, they submitted a collective statement of retirement. But Stalin was still not fully confident of his superiority. Kalinin and Voroshilov again began to show signs of vacillation. For this reason Stalin proposed a compromise and this was accepted by Bukharin. Stalin promised, in particular, to halt the persecution of Bukharin's followers and reduce capital investments into industry. Rykov was confirmed as the speaker at the forthcoming VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum. At the end of January 1929, it was Bukharin who was assigned to give the report at the morning session devoted to the fifth anniversary of Lenin's death. In this report entitled "The Political Testament of Lenin," Bukharin, relying on an analysis of the articles and speeches by Lenin in 1921-1923, set out in detail Lenin's views on the prospects for building socialism in the USSR. For any attentive listener or reader of this report it was obvious that Stalin's political and economic line was very far removed from Lenin's plans of socialist construction. But this indirect attack against Stalin was not too effective.

The struggle which did not actually go outside the confines of the Central Committee and various bureaucratic clashes was approaching its denouement. Stalin no longer needed compromises. Bukharin had accepted the challenge and sharp polemics between them developed at the Politburo sessions in January and February 1929. At this time, Bukharin together with Tomskiy and Rykov drew up a detailed document, a sort of platform of "rightists" ("the platform of the three") and which contained criticism of Stalin's policy and offered an alternative program for the nation's economic and political development. This document was read by Rykov at one of the Politburo sessions, but was not brought up for discussion for the entire party or even its Central Committee. It was precisely in it that Bukharin accused Stalin of a "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry." The Politburo rejected these accusations as "slander" and censured Bukharin. A new compromise was no longer possible. The situation was becoming heated and there were vacillations among Bukharin's closest supporters. Rykov took back his announcement of retirement and returned to work in the SNK. One of Bukharin's students, Stetskiy, suddenly denounced him.

The denouement came in April, when the joint Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee and TsKK met. The Bukharinites were in a clear minority. Stalin made an extensive criticism of the "group of Bukharin, Tomskiy and Rykov" with no one supposedly knowing before of its existence and which had just been discovered in the Politburo. Stalin's report was sharp, harsh and tendentious. He spoke about all the errors of Bukharin virtually from the first days of his political career. Bukharin's works of 1925-1927 were declared erroneous. In his ordinary harsh manner, Stalin termed Tomskiy a "trade unionist politician." Bukharin, as Stalin declared, "sings the same song as Mister Milyukov [leader of opposition Cadet Party] and tags along with the enemies of the people," he "recently was still among Trotsky's students" and was a man "with inflated pretentiousness." Bukharin's theory was "rubbish" and the declaration by Bukharin's group was "outright and harsh slander" and so forth and so forth.

The attempts by Bukharin, Tomskiy and Uglanov to mitigate the harshness of these statements and views by referring to their recent personal friendship with Stalin were decisively rejected by the latter having said that "all these complaints and outpourings are not worth a plug nickel."

Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy and Uglanov did not repent before the Plenum but rather came to the defense of their

views and criticized Stalin's policy. Bukharin, in particular, accused Stalin of undermining the NEP and establishing "monstrously one-sided" relations with the peasantry and which were destroying the "smychka" of the working class and the peasantry." He stated that such a policy meant a complete capitulation to Trotskyism. Bukharin supported the plans for rapid industrialization but warned that without the simultaneous development of agriculture, these would be doomed to failure. Bukharin accused Stalin of establishing a bureaucratic state and of plundering the peasantry; here he condemned Stalin's thesis concerning a continuous exacerbation of the class struggle as the USSR advanced toward socialism:

"This strange theory elevates the very fact of the current exacerbation of the class struggle to some inexorable law of our development. According to this strange theory it turns out that the farther we advance toward socialism the more difficulties there are, the more the class struggle is exacerbated and at the very gates of socialism we obviously will either begin a civil war or perish from hunger and fall in the field of battle."

Bukharin's speech, like a large portion of the minutes of the April VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, was not published either in 1929 or later. At the Plenum, Stalin had a firm majority but he was afraid that in the broad circles of the party and particularly among the rural communists, Bukharin's program would encounter much more sympathy than among the members of the Central Committee and the TsKK. There can be no doubt that among the peasantry, many workers and the nonparty intelligentsia, Bukharin during that period was significantly more popular than Stalin. Even Stalin's speech at that time was not printed in its entirety and much was deleted from it chiefly concerning the criticism of Bukharin and his platform. This speech saw the light of day in its entirety only 20 years later in the 12th volume of Stalin's Collected Works.

Stalin's fear of publicizing the polemics with Bukharin reflected his uncertainty as to the strength of his ideological and political platform. And actually we can see now that a large portion of the critical comments made by the "rightists" against Stalin's policy of 1928-1929 was completely correct. The "rightists" were against turning the extraordinary measures into a permanent party policy in the countryside. They argued reasonably against the accelerated and compulsory collectivization, feeling that this could only lead to a decline in agricultural production, to a deterioration of supply of the cities and to a failure of the export plans. The "rightists," not without justification, argued against gigantomania in industrial construction, and against excessive and in many instances economically unjustified capital outlays. Also reasonable were the proposals by the "rightists" to raise the purchasing prices for grain as this would impel the peasants to increase its sales to the state.

Bukharin and his political supporters proposed in 1928 not to reapply the extraordinary measures but rather instead of this purchase overseas light industry goods and even grain. Possibly, under those conditions this would have been a lesser evil. The "rightists" pointed completely correctly to the underestimation of development for light industry. In maintaining the priority of heavy industry, light industry should have developed more rapidly, as it produced a large portion of the goods for sale both in the city and in the countryside and supposedly would provide the required means for financing all of the state projects and needs. Without observing proper proportions in the nation, there inevitably would be ongoing inflation, commodity hunger, and economic incentives would be replaced by administrative pressure.

In 1928-1929, Bukharin was certain that the NEP, as the basic line of the party's economic policy, had still not exhausted itself and that in the USSR there was still sufficient scope for the development of not only socialist enterprises, including cooperatives, but also definite capitalist elements. Only in the more distant future should the development of socialism lead to the elimination of the NEP-man bourgeois sector and the kulak exploiting farm. Bukharin felt, however (and Stalin supported him on this up to 1928), that the elimination of the capitalist elements in the city and countryside should basically be carried out under economic and not administrative pressure, that is, as a result of competition whereby the socialist sector would win out over the capitalist one. Such a viewpoint could be disputed by the "leftists" who were urging a new "revolution" as well as new expropriation, but it did have a full right to existence and to actual testing.

In his policy vis-a-vis the peasantry, it was precisely Stalin who took up (and here significantly deepened and broadened) the Trotskyite notions of "primary socialist accumulation" and the Zinovyev-Kamenev proposals on an extraordinary taxation of the prosperous strata in the countryside. It is logical, hence, that Stalin attracted many prominent leaders of the recent "leftist" opposition in carrying out his new policy.

From a clearly "ultraleftist" and sectarian stance, Stalin criticized also Bukharin's activities as the Comintern leader. Undoubtedly, in the mid-1920's Bukharin shared the erroneous position of the Comintern vis-a-vis Social Democracy and the erroneous formula of "social fascism." However, at the end of the 1920's, as the fascist danger was growing in Europe, Bukharin began to review this position and found it possible to also come to terms with the grass-roots Social Democratic organizations and the Social Democratic trade unions against fascism.

Stalin, on the contrary, demanded a stronger fight against social democracy. Moreover, he proposed intensifying the struggle also against the leftist currents in

Social Democracy, although precisely they were potentially the most probable allies for the communist parties.

The erroneousness of Stalin's position is obvious. It not only would obstruct a united front with the leftist forces in the worker movement of the West. It led to a situation where not only in the VKP(b) but also in many Western parties honest communists were arbitrarily put among the "agents of rightist deviation."

In coming out against Bukharin and his group, Stalin and his supporters often employed in the polemics the method of vulgar sociologism which is alien to Marxism. In particular, any phenomena in the cultural area or political statements were directly linked to the position and political attitudes of one or another class.

Since in 1928-1929, Bukharin's platform not only for the broad masses of workers but also for the capitalist elements in the city and countryside was preferrable to Stalin's platform, the latter immediately stuck to Bukharin the tag of "protector of capitalist elements," "proponent of the ideology of kulakry," "proponent of kulak influences in the VKP(b)" and so forth. Someone added here the word "objectively," however subsequently this was more often than not dispensed with.

It must be pointed out that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy had never established any strictly definite faction within the party. This was recognized by Stalin himself. Thus, the "rightists" did not even formally violate the resolution of the Tenth Congress concerning party unity. Having come out with repression against the "rightists," having commenced an organized struggle against them and having declared defense of "rightist" views incompatible with presence in the party, Stalin greatly narrowed, if not completely destroyed, the rights guaranteed by the VKP(b) Bylaws for each party member to freely discuss the questions of party policy.

Only after the April (1929) Central Committee Plenum at party meetings and in the press did there begin an extremely intense campaign against the "rightist" deviation, and the criticism was directed specifically at Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy. All Bukharin's works starting with his political activities came under tendentious analysis. At the same time, the very leaders of the "rightists" were forced to keep silent although they still remained Politburo members and Rykov as before headed the SNK. Stalin wanted their public capitulation and which he had not secured at the April Plenum. And he got his way. In November 1929 at the next Central Committee Plenum, A. Rykov read a written statement from himself, Bukharin and Tomskiy. It stated that the "troyka" unconditionally stood behind the party's general line, differing from the Central Committee majority only on certain methods of carrying this out. At the same time it was noted that "generally great positive results have been achieved by following the specific method adopted by the party of carrying out the general line." For this reason Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy stated that "the differences of opinion between them and the Central Committee majority had been eliminated." But even this statement was judged "unsatisfactory." The November Central Committee Plenum removed Bukharin from the Politburo. Rykov, Tomskiy and Uglanov were warned.

Immediately after the Plenum, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy submitted a new statement to the Politburo recognizing their "errors." The will to fight had been shattered among the leaders of the "rightist" opposition, as it had amongst a majority of the leaders of the "leftist" opposition. The story is told that during the night of 1 January 1930, there was a surprise knock on the door of Stalin's apartment where he was celebrating New Year with friends. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy stood on the threshold carrying bottles of wine. They had come for a friendly reconciliation. And although a reconciliation externally did come about, none of the "rightist" leaders recovered his former position in the party. After the 16th VKP(b) Congress, Tomskiy was expelled from the Politburo, as was Rykov at the December Central Committee Plenum in 1930. In 1931, Rykov was removed from the post of SNK chairman (Molotov assumed this position) and was appointed people's commissar of the post and telegraph. Bukharin became the leader of the scientific-technical administration in the USSR VSNKh, and several years later, also the editor-in-chief of the newspaper IZVESTIYA. The 16th VKP(b) Congress still elected Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy to the VKP(b) Central Committee. However, after the 17th Party Congress they were shifted to the category of candidate members of the VKP(b) Central Committee. And when, at the beginning of the 1930's, new dramatic events occurred, neither Bukharin, Rykov nor Tomskiy voted in protest.

Regardless of the humility of the former "rightists," the newspapers and journals during the entire First Five-Year Plan continued to revile them. Even in 1935, the journal BOLSHEVIK as before called Bukharin a "rightist capitulator" who supposedly had proposed abandoning the industrialization of the USSR and the collectivization of agriculture and had proposed unlimited freedom for private capitalist elements. Here it was said, certainly, that the "kulak essence" of this program had been unmasked by the party under Stalin's leadership and so forth. All of this was in Stalin's style. He continued evermore strongly to even revile conquered opponents.

The question arises of whether the "rightist" opposition could have won out over Stalin? While in terms of the "leftist" opposition the reply to such a question would be negative, in terms of the "rightist" such a categorical reply would be incorrect. The "rightist" opposition had very many chances for victory over Stalin. Under certain conditions its platform could have obtained a majority both on the Politburo, in the Central Committee as well as in broad party circles, in addition to support from a

majority of the peasants, workers and white collar personnel. But the leaders of the "rightist" opposition were incapable of utilizing these opportunities. They were not sufficiently firm and tenacious politicians, they lacked the willpower to fight for power in the party and the nation and they actually rejected the struggle.

By the end of 1929, it seemed as though Stalin no longer had any opponents and enemies in the party Central Committee. But his victory over the oppositions was not a victory for Leninism. This was a victory of Stalinism which for a long time to come had established its dominance over the nation and the party.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 43, pp 110-111.

2. Ibid., Vol 41, p 394.

Methods of Carrying Out Collectivization and Industrialization

1

After the introduction of the NEP, there was a significant revitalization of economic activity in all sectors and within all the economic systems existing in the nation. Industrial production was restored and expanded. Handicraft production also was developing. The situation was improving and production increasing in scores of millions of small peasant farms. State and private trade were expanding. The larger peasant farms, those of the kulaks, were growing stronger and developing and these employed sporadically or constantly hired labor. Small- and medium-sized capitalist enterprises were springing up everywhere, like mushrooms after a rain. Production based on foreign credits—either concession or state capitalist—was developing all the same but to a lesser degree than Lenin had planned. The volume of foreign trade was also increasing. In all of this there still was a significant element of accident and it is not surprising that in the economy various disproportions constantly arose and these were overcome, sometimes easily and sometimes with great difficulty.

By 1926-1927, the greatest disproportion had formed between the development of agriculture and the development of industry. With a shortage of credits and in the absence of any foreign aid, the Soviet economy could develop only on a basis of internal accumulation. But industry was providing too little of this. Basic hopes were placed on the development of agriculture and primarily on increasing commodity production, particularly market grain. And precisely in this regard the successes were slight. The total volume of gross agricultural product by 1927 had increased by 21 percent in comparison with the best (before the revolution) year of 1913. The increase was, however, at the expense of livestock raising and industrial crops. As for cereals, they did not reach the prewar level either in terms of planted area or gross production. The production of market grain declined significantly. This was explained by several factors. Procurement prices did not greatly encourage grain raising. While the procurement price index for livestock products in 1926-1927 was 178 percent (with 1913 as 100 percent), and 146 percent for industrial crops, for grain it was only 89 percent. The discrepancy was not caused by the erroneous actions of the procurement bodies. Certainly higher procurement prices for grain would have required increased deliveries of various commodities to the countryside. The peasants did not need paper money but rather goods and machines which could be acquired with this money. At the same time, industrial production was still unable to eliminate the commodity hunger both in the city and in the countryside.

The agricultural structure which developed after the revolution also impeded the production of market grain. The landowner estates which in the recent past had been the main supplier of market grain had been destroyed. During the years of "war communism" a severe blow was dealt to the kulak farms which also delivered a good deal of grain to the markets in the prewar years. The main grain producers were now the middle and poor peasant farms. By the end of the 1920's, they produced up to 4 billion poods of grain (2.5 billion before the revolution), however only 400-440 billion poods were of market grain (a marketability factor of 10-11 percent).

In explaining the reasons for the NEP, Lenin rather clearly indicated the ways for surmounting the difficulties on the "grain front." First of all, it was essential to aid in every possible way the small individual farms. Precisely support for the middle and poor peasant was the main aim of the New Economic Policy in the countryside during the first stage.

Nor should one discard the prosperous farms. A certain development of kulak production during the first years of the NEP did not spell any danger for the dictatorship of the proletariat. For that reason those alarmist statements which were made in this context by the "leftist" opposition were not valid. The countryside, as Lenin repeatedly said, at that time was suffering not so much from capitalism as it was from the insufficient development of capitalism. From the very first months of the NEP, Lenin proposed supporting in every possible way the economic initiative of all "industrious" peasants and felt it possible even to award them for increasing production by providing personal consumer and household goods. Of course, no one proposed building any long-term agricultural development plans on the basis of kulak production. Bearing in mind the party's tasks in the countryside over the longer period, Lenin proposed aiding in every possible way all types and forms of cooperatives, including production cooperatives. He said that precisely the development of cooperatives under the proletarian state is identical to the development of socialism in the Russian countryside.

The cooperative plan proposed by Lenin was still a rough sketch. Lenin, however, was already well aware that the forming of cooperatives in the countryside would be impossible without many years of hard work, without developing literacy and culture, without the mechanizing of agriculture and gradually acquainting the peasant with collective management of the economy.

"But in order to achieve the involvement of literally the entire population in cooperatives through the NEP," Lenin wrote in 1923, "an entire historical era would be needed for this. It may take a decade or two to bring this era to a good end. But still this will be a separate historical era and without this historical era, without universal literacy, without a sufficient degree of intelligence, without a sufficient degree of teaching the population to use books, without a material base for this, without a certain guarantee, for instance, against crop failure, against famine and so forth—without this we will not achieve our goal."[1]

The rebuilding of the economy which had been devastated by two wars began with agriculture. However, already in 1923, serious difficulties had arisen here. The peasantry had virtually no accumulation and industrial goods were expensive. For this reason, regardless of the weakness of industry, there was an overstocking of goods and a crisis in marketing. Certain plants and factories had to be shut down and the paying of wages to employees was held up; in certain areas there were strikes. In endeavoring to prevent the development of a crisis, the state lowered prices for many industrial goods and increased purchasing prices for a portion of the agricultural products. A system of cheap credit was developed in the countryside. Formally, the obtaining of credits and machinery was to be made available for the peasant farms "in second place," however actually both machinery and credits were used primarily by the most prosperous. In 1925, upon the proposal of the 14th All-Union Party Conference "in the aims of developing the productive forces of the countryside," a law was passed on widening the right to hire agricultural workers and lease state and peasant lands. This law was advantageous for the prosperous portion of the countryside. But it was also beneficial for the state and to some degree for the poor peasantry, as it legalized the hiring of day workers which had been practices rather widely prior to 1925 and made it possible to control the hiring conditions.

A monetary reform was successfully carried out and the Soviet ruble assumed a previously unknown stability.

Equilibrium did not last long. Already in 1925-1926 new disproportions began to arise. Industrial production was developing more slowly than the solvent demand of the countryside was rising; now it was not a question of the oversupply of goods but rather a commodity hunger. At the same time, the state continued to carry out a series of measures aimed at encouraging accumulation in the countryside. For example, the agricultural tax was reduced in 1926 from 312.9 to 244.8 million rubles. Taxation for the middle peasant was reduced by approximately 60 million rubles. With the good crops of 1926 and 1927, all the prosperous peasantry benefited from the reduction in taxes and they increased the amount of surplus product.

Both wholesale and retail prices for industrial goods were again reduced regardless of the fact that the increased production of goods needed in the countryside did not correspond to the rapid growth of the purchasing power of the peasants. under the conditions of commodity hunger, this reduction did not completely reach the consumer but rather enriched the middlemen who possessed 40 percent of the retail commodity turnover. At the same time, the profit of industrial enterprises declined. But the need of industry for accumulation rose sharply, since in 1925-1926, the reconstruction of the old enterprises was basically completed and new construction had begun to get underway.

In 1927, the prosperous portion of the countryside had accumulated a significant amount of paper money with which it was impossible to purchase the required goods. For this reason a majority of the peasants did not hurry to sell grain to the state, particularly at the low procurement prices; they had no interest in the rapid selling of the grain surpluses. The countryside could cover the comparatively low agricultural tax by selling secondary products and industrial crops. The peasantry had enough money for purchasing the goods which were for sale. Hence the grain could remain in the granaries until spring, when the selling price would rise. And so in the autumn of 1927, the procurement of flax, sunflower, hemp, beets, cotton, oils, eggs, leather, wool and meat were much more than in 1926. There was a completely different situation with the procurement of grain.

2

The year 1927 was a bounteous one but grain procurement was worse than before. In the state granaries there were not sufficient emergency supplies of grain. While by January 1927 they had purchased 428 million poods of grain, by January 1928, figure was less than 300 million poods. A threat arose to the supply of grain for the cities and the army.

Numerous proposals were made on how to surmount the difficulties. Thus, the "leftist" opposition felt that the time had come, in employing the entire force of the state apparatus, to launch a decisive offensive against the kulakry and confiscate by force at least 150 million poods of grain from the prosperous portion of the countryside. Such proposals were rejected.

"The Central Committee and the TsKK feel," as was pointed out in the Plenum decision of 9 August 1927, "that these proposals are aimed, in essence, at nullifying the new economic policy established by the party under Lenin's leadership...." The Central Committee and the TsKK "reject the foolish, demagogic proposals of the

opposition which are aimed at creating additional difficulties in the development of the national economy on the compulsory confiscation of in-kind grain surpluses."

The opposition's proposals were decisively rejected also at the 15th VKP(b) Congress held in December 1927. Thus, for example, Molotov said in a report:

"The person who is now proposing this policy for us...of the compulsory confiscation of 150-200 million poods of grain...is an enemy of the workers and the peasants (at this point of the report, according to the verbatim record, Stalin exclaimed "Correct!"), an enemy of the alliance of workers and peasants; this person is carrying out a line of destroying the Soviet state."

However, just several days after the Congress which had expelled the leaders of the "leftist" opposition from the party, Stalin made an abrupt about-face to the "left" and began to carry out those very proposals on the compulsory confiscation of grain from the prosperous strata of the countryside and which had just been repudiated as adventuristic. At the end of December, he sent out to the spot a directive on the employment of extraordinary measures against the kulakry. The local workers who had just become acquainted with the congress decisions and the texts of the speeches by Stalin, Molotov and Mikoyan, were in no hurry to carry it out and on 6 January, Stalin issued a new directive which was extremely harsh in both tone and demands, with threats leveled against the local party organizations. A wave of confiscations and violence against the rich peasants swept across the entire nation.

At present, it can be said with certainty that the decision to apply extraordinary measures in the countryside in the winter and spring of 1927-1928 was extremely hurried and erroneous. The economic policy of 1925-1927 had left little room for political and economic maneuvers, however for overcoming the difficulties there were opportunities by following the NEP but not by following "war communism." But "grand" policy has its own laws and its own logic and if one leaves one road here it is most often impossible to regain it. And this was the case with the employing of extraordinary measures against the kulakry.

Undoubtedly, Stalin initially did not intend to make the extraordinary measures the basis of policy in the countryside for an extended time. By his directives he evidently merely wanted to frighten the kulakry so that they would become more amenable. It is possible to say this from the fact that in the summer of 1928, completely different directives were sent out to the field: not to employ more extraordinary measures, to increase purchasing prices by 15-20 percent, to increase commodity deliveries to the countryside, to immediately halt the practice of inspecting courtyards, illegal searches and all sorts of violations of revolutionary legality and reopen the just closed local markets.

"The honest and systematic execution of these measures under the conditions of the current good harvest should create a situation which would exclude the need to apply any extraordinary measures whatsoever in the forthcoming grain procurement campaign," said Stalin in July 1928. However, he was unable to bring off this new about-face for the employment of extraordinary measures in the winter of 1927-1928 was an actual declaration of war against the rich peasant and an ending of the NEP in the countryside. And it is difficult to end a war with a one-sided cease-fire. Even in the spring of 1928, hundreds of thousands of prosperous peasants had begun to reduce the planted areas in response to the extraordinary measures. Many of the kulaks "self-liquidated," that is, they sold their machinery which they had and hid their money and valuables. The middle peasants did not have any incentive to expand production, as they were afraid of falling into the category of kulaks which the party had openly threatened to liquidate. So in the autumn of 1928, regardless of the concessions, grain procurements were again threatened. The deliveries of a number of industrial crops to the state also declined and this led to a disruption in the textile industry, it disrupted the raw material balance of the nation and reduced the export possibilities and hence the obtaining of foreign exchange. Having forgotten his July promises, Stalin at the end of 1928 sent out directives on the employment of even harsher administrative measures than before against the prosperous peasants.

The second employment of extraordinary measures provided an opportunity to increase grain deliveries for several months. However, in February and March 1929, procurement was going poorly and as a whole by April, less grain had been procured than in the same months of 1928. There were interruptions in the sale of baked bread everywhere, even in Moscow. Grain speculation was on the increase. In addition, the new pressure on the prosperous peasants caused a new decline in the planted area in this sector and a new wave of the "self-liquidation" of the kulakry. In truth, measures were taken aimed at expanding the planted area on the poor and middle peasant farms, but this did not increase the commodity production of grain by much. The crop was good in 1929. Nevertheless, rationing had to be introduced for bread and many other food products in the cities and worker settlements.

Thus, by mid-1929, a dangerous situation had arisen. The actual war against the prosperous portion of the countryside threatened to disrupt the entire national economy and even create starvation. Here Stalin's policy left even less space than before for political and economic maneuvers. Three possible solutions remained. It would be possible to recognize one's errors and make concessions to the kulakry and the prosperous middle peasant. But now very significant concessions would be needed, for the prosperous portion of the countryside ceased believing in the NEP. This path was, however, unacceptable for Stalin and for a majority of the Central Committee. It was also possible to make significant

purchases overseas. But this would mean a cutback in the plans for industrial construction and a revision of the quotas in the First Five-Year Plan. This path was also rejected. Finally, one could accelerate the formation of production cooperatives in the countryside for establishing a significant kolkhoz sector and for eliminating the monopoly of the prosperous peasants on market grain. We know that it was precisely this also very difficult path which was chosen.

3

In the 1920's, the cooperative movement had developed very slowly. The main emphasis was put on encouraging supply and marketing cooperation. Even by mid-1928, less than 2 percent of all the peasant households were in kolkhozes and these were responsible for not more than 2.5 percent of all the planted area and 2.1 percent of the grain plantings.

The 15th VKP(b) Congress decreed an accelerating of production cooperatives. The Congress resolution stated: "The task of uniting and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collectives should be posed as the party's main task in the countryside."

However, all the Congress delegates who spoke about work in the countryside pointed out that caution and gradualism were essential on the question of collectivization. For example, Molotov in his report said:

"It will take many years to move from the individual to the socialized (collective) farm.... It must be realized that the 7-year experience of the NEP taught us well enough what Lenin had said even in 1919: no rush, no hurry on the part of the party and Soviet power vis-a-vis the middle peasantry.... In carrying out new tasks in the countryside, we find very useful that we learned so much over the first 7 years of the NEP and namely: the habits of circumspection, caution, leisureliness, gradualism and so forth which are important in socialist contruction in the countryside."

Many delegates spoke of the state's lack of material means for supporting the kolkhozes, on the lack of agricultural equipment, and on the weakness of the rural party organizations. Considering all of this, the Congress pointed out that the development of kolkhozes should be combined with the greatest-possible aid to the individual poor and middle peasant farm, since "the private property farm...for a significant time to come will be the basis of all agriculture." Stalin said the same thing repeatedly in 1928.

According to the First Five-Year Plan (optimum version) adopted at the 16th All-Union Party Conference, over the 5 years some 20 percent of the peasant farms were to be collectivized; these possessed 17.5 percent of the entire planted area and were capable of producing up to 43 percent of the market cereals. Here for the first year of the five-year plan (July 1928—July 1929), the collectivization plans were very meager and the level of collectivization in the nation was to rise only to 2.2 percent.

The acuteness of the situation and the problems arising in the countryside by the beginning of 1929 required a revising of these plans. Certain successes in kolkhoz construction had been noted by mid-1929: at the beginning of June, the kolkhozes brought together more than a million peasant farms (with a plan of 560,000). The successes, in truth, were very meager, since as a total in the nation there were around 25 million peasant farms. In 1929, less than 10 percent of the planted area was worked with the aid of tractors; combines numbered several hundred and there still were neither collective livestock yards nor silage towers.

Stalin was unable to correctly assess the situation in the countryside. In seeking to obtain compensation for previous setbacks and amaze the world with great successes, he again sharply and abruptly turned the cumbersome ship of his economy, without bothering to reconnoiter ahead for all sorts of submerged reefs and shoals. With no consideration to objective opportunities, Stalin, with the support of Molotov, Kaganovich and certain other Politburo members, set a policy of extremely high rates of collectivization, in spurring on the obkoms and raykoms. By the beginning of November 1929, already 70,000 kolkhozes had been set up (predominantly small ones) and these brought together around 2 million peasant farms or 7.6 percent of their total number. In their predominant majority these were poor peasant farms and only in individual regions did a portion of the middle peasants join the kolkhozes. However, Stalin hurried to generalize these facts and announced the start of a fundamental change in the kolkhoz movement. His article on the results of the year was entitled "A Year of the Great Turning Point." Moreover, in the autumn of 1929, Stalin proposed the slogan of complete collectivization which at that time was obviously premature. The basic mass of the middle peasants continued to vacillate, the surviving kulaks had not been neutralized and the prosperous middle peasants were against the kolkhozes. In such a situation the slogan of complete collectivization inevitably would lead to distortions in kolkhoz construction, to administrative pressure and to violence against the middle peasant. This is precisely what happened at the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930.

At the end of 1929, a special commission of the VKP(b) Central Committee was set up to prepare decisions on kolkhoz construction. Many Central Committee members were against unnecessary hurry as neither the objective nor the subjective prerequisites existed for this. Stalin harshly criticized the plan worked out by this commission. The comments and corrections were focused on accelerating the kolkhoz movement. Stalin demanded the excluding from the draft of instructions on such questions as: the degree of collectivizing peasant livestock and farm tools, the procedure for forming

nondivisible funds and working capital on the kolkhozes. In the final version of the decree the times for collectivization were significantly shortened for the Northern Caucasus and the Middle Volga, and provisions had been excluded on the procedure for collectivizing the means of production and livestock and on the keeping of small livestock, tools and poultry by the peasants. Also excluded were provisions on the methods to eliminate the kulakry and on using kulaks on the kolkhozes, if they would obey and voluntarily carry out all the duties of kolkhoz members. The decree stipulated that collectivization would be completed in the main grain growing regions by the autumn of 1930 or by the spring of 1931 and in the remaining regions, by the autumn of 1931 or by the spring of 1932.

The Central Committee Decree "On the Pace of Collectivization and Measures of State Aid to Kolkhoz Construction" was adopted on 5 January 1930. Immediately after its publishing, many oblast and republic party organizations resolved to overfulfill the designated plans and complete collectivization not in the autumn but in the spring of 1930. In January and February the newspapers were full of announcements about this. Neither the local party and soviet bodies nor the peasants themselves had been prepared for such a rapid campaign. For carrying out the written and more frequent verbal directives coming from above, the party and soviet bodies on the spot were forced to resort to pressuring not only the peasants but also the grass-roots party and soviet workers. Everywhere the role of the GPU increased. Actually a state of emergency was introduced in the rural localities.

Even Marx had spoken about voluntariness and gradualism in converting from private ownership of land to collective property. V.I. Lenin had repeatedly voiced these ideas and they had been reinforced in special decisions of the party congresses. Stalin himself had said many right words on this question. However, under the pressure from Stalin and his immediate associates the principle of voluntariness was almost ubiquitously violated in kolkhoz-cooperative construction. Explanatory work was replaced by rude administration and violence against the middle peasants and a portion of the poor peasants who were in no hurry to join the kolkhozes. They were forced to do this under the threat of "dekulakization." In many oblasts the slogan was proposed of "those who do not join the kolkhozes are the enemy of Soviet power." Various sorts of unrealistic promises were also resorted to including tractors, other equipment and great credits. "They will give you everything, join the kolkhozes." Often not kolkhozes were established but rather communes in which small livestock, domestic poultry and farmstead plots were forcibly collectivized. Simultaneously with the promises, in certain oblasts they endeavored to "squeeze" as much as possible out of the individual farmers. Before joining the kolkhoz they were forced to pay up all their debts including credit, seed loans and membership dues.

In the countryside the enthusiasm of a few was combined with the dissatisfaction of the majority, particularly of the middle peasants. Before joining the kolkhoz the peasants slaughtered the cows, sheep, pigs and even domestic poultry. In just 2 months—February and March 1930—some 14 million head of cattle were slaughtered, one-third of all the pigs and a quarter of all the sheep and goats. Although the percentage of collectivization increased rapidly, political pressure in the countryside also was rising. In some places there were antikolkhoz actions by the peasantry.

The situation began to cool off only in March 1930 after the publishing of the article "Dizziness From Success" and which Stalin had written upon the demand of the VKP(b) Central Committee. The article criticized many "extremes" in kolkhoz construction. Stalin assigned responsibility for this to the local bodies, accusing them of "bungling." The accusation caused confusion in the local authorities who had been acting chiefly upon directives from the center and the oblast leadership. Summaries on collectivization were sent out every 7-10 days to all Politburo members. Precisely Stalin insisted upon a high degree of collectivization in the kolkhozes, including small farm tools, small livestock, and dairy cows. All the press was full of announcements on the successful and rapid course of collectivization.

Soon after the publishing of Stalin's article, the VKP(b) Central Committee adopted the Decree "On the Struggle Against Distortions of the Party Line in the Kolkhoz Movement." They proposed condemning the practice of compulsory methods of collectivization and the peasants were to be permitted to withdraw from the kolkhozes if they so desired. Immediately a mass outflow started from the kolkhozes. Quite recently there had been over 10 million farms in them and by 1 July 1930 only 6 million remained. In certain oblasts and rayons, virtually all the kolkhozes were broken up. However, by autumn pressure on the peasants was resumed. Those who had left the kolkhoz were merely not returned their livestock and land. So the figures in the collectivization summaries again began to increase.

It was assumed that the establishing of kolkhozes would immediately lead to an increase in the gross agricultural product. The directives of the First Five-Year Plan envisage its rise from 16.6 billion rubles in 1927-1928 to 25.8 billion rubles in 1932-1933, that is, by 52 percent. In actuality, agricultural production over the entire First Five-Year Plan declined. If one takes agricultural production in 1928 as 100 percent, in 1929, it was 98 percent; in 1930, 94.4; in 1931, 92; in 1932, 86; and in 1933, 81.5. Production of livestock products declined particularly to 65 percent of the 1913 level. The number of head of cattle was reduced in 1928-1933 from 60.1 to 33.5 million head.

The number of horses, as well as sheep, goats and pigs was more than cut in half. Because of this, the resources of organic fertilizer were sharply reduced. As a whole,

gross agricultural product in 1933 was just 13.1 billion rubles. The severe consequences of the Stalinist version of collectivization were felt not only in the Second but also the Third Five-Year Plan. For example, average annual grain production in the second half of the 1930's was lower than in 1913 (within the limits up to 17 September 1939). Meat production also did not reach the 1913 level. But the size of the population grew.

4

Collectivization exacerbated relations between Soviet power and the kulakry. Even prior to the revolution it was a strong force in the countryside and during the first months after the October Revolution it had even strengthened its positions by dividing up the landowner estates. At that time, kulaks were 20 percent of all the peasants and possessed 40 percent of the aerable land.[2]

The first clash between Soviet power and the kulakry occurred in the spring and summer of 1918, when forced confiscation began for surplus agricultural products (food requisitioning) and power in the countryside began to be turned over to the poor peasantry committees ("kombeds"). During this period Lenin had demanded a decisive fight against the kulakry. It is important to point out, however, that even in urging the merciless suppression of kulak uprisings in 1918 and later, Lenin never spoke about the complete expropriation of the entire kulakry, or even more about the physical extermination or resettling of all the kulaks and their families. Thus, on 12 March 1919, Lenin said:

"...We are in favor of brute force against the kulak, but we do not favor his complete expropriation, because he runs his farm and a portion of his labor is accumulated. This difference must be firmly learned. For the landowner and capitalist there is complete expropriation but we must not take away all the property from the kulaks, there never was such a decree...."[3]

During the years of the Civil War, a large portion of the prerevolutionary kulakry was defeated both politically and economically. Almost 50 million hectares of aerable land shifted from the kulakry into the hands of the poor and middle peasants; some four-fifths of the kulak farms either ceased to exist or were turned into ordinary middle peasant farms. The disappearance of not only the landowner estates but also the kulak farms seriously weakened the productive forces in the countryside and reduced its opportunities for supplying the cities with food products. Under the conditions of the NEP, a layer of prosperous peasants began to reappear but only one-fifth of this consisted of kulaks of "prerevolutionary origin." In their majority the new layer of prosperous peasants who even employed the legally permitted hiring of day laborers was made up of former middle peasants or even poor peasants many of whom had served 2 or 3 years in the Red Army and now, returning to their village and trusting the new economic policy, energetically set to farming. The question of eliminating these new "kulaks" had been raised in 1926-1927 only by the most extreme figures in the "leftist" opposition. However, this continued to be discussed in the party press in 1928-1929. Here no one mentioned the violent expropriation and uprooting of the kulakry. It was merely a question of under what conditions one could admit the kulaks to the sovkhoz or whether this should be done at all. Opinions diverged and on the spot they acted differently. In Siberia and the Northern Caucasus it was decided not to admit kulaks to the kolkhozes. The Middle Volga VKP(b) Kraykom with certain stipulations favored admitting a kulak to the kolkhozes. A comparatively moderate position was also assumed by such Politburo members as Voroshilov and Kalinin who in no way belonged to the "rightist" deviation.

In December 1929, under the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo, a special commission was founded on collectivization as well as a subcommission on the kulak. But Stalin did not wait for its recommendations. At the end of December 1929, in a speech at a conference of Marxist agrarians, he proposed the slogan of eliminating the kulakry as a class and stated that dekulakization should become a component part in the forming of the kolkhozes in carrying out complete collectivization.

After Stalin's speech, a campaign of dekulakization began to get underway almost everywhere. All the subsequent decisions and telegrams from the Politburo were merely an attempt to introduce a certain "order" into this harsh action.

In its first recommendations the Politburo commission proposed dividing the kulak farms into three groups, with a larger portion of the farms in the third group the representatives of which were considered possible for admission to the kolkhozes but with the loss of their electoral rights for 3-5 years.

Stalin argued decisively against these recommendations, particularly against the admission of kulaks from any group to the kolkhozes. Under his pressure in the Instructions of the USSR TsIK and SNK of 4 February 1930, the grouping of the kulaks was set out in a completely different wording.

In the first category were the counterrevolutionary kulak aktiv and the organizers of terror and revolts. These were to be immediately isolated, without stopping short of the use of the severest measure of execution and all the members of their families were to be resettled in remote areas. It was felt that in this category there could be around 60,000 farms. In the second category was the remaining portion of the aktiv of the richest kulaks. They, together with their families, were to be resettled in remote areas of the nation or in remote localities within the given kray. It was indicated that there were around 150,000 such farms.

In the third category was the possessors of smaller farms. It was proposed that these be left in those areas where

they lived, but resettled beyond the collectivized settlements, giving them new plots of land outside the kolkhoz fields. According to the instructions, certain quotas and obligations were to be assigned to these farms. It was felt that in this third category there would be a majority of the kulak farms, around 800,000.

In the instructions and decrees at that time there was no mention of any "subkulaks" or prosperous middle peasants.

Unfortunately, even these very harsh recommendations were not carried out in a majority of the oblasts. Even in 1930, many more kulaks were arrested, executed or resettled in the northern regions of the nation than "had been planned." In 1931, the repressions were even broader. It is hard to establish the overall scale of this harsh action. Even at the January VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum in 1933, it was reported that from the beginning of 1930 until the end of 1932, 240,757 kulak families had been relocated in remote regions of the nation. The data are clearly understated. Different figures can be found in later research. It was stated that the liquidation of the kulakry was carried out in two stages. During the first stage—from October 1930—some 115,231 families were resettled in the northern regions of the nation. In February 1931, a decision was taken on the second stage of relocating the kulakry. During the year, another 265,795 kulak families were resettled. Thus, the total number of resettled families reached 381,000. These are the official data. They were not reported in 1933 to the Central Committee Plenum but were based upon information from the GPU bodies which carried out the resettlement as well as on materials from a check by members of the VKP(b) TsKK Presidium in the autumn of 1931. However, these data cannot be considered exhaustive and accurate. They do not include those who were resettled in areas of complete collectivization as well as hundreds of thousands of middle and poor peasants relocated as "subkulaks." Moreover, mass relocations of peasant and Cossack families to the northern regions were also carried out in 1932, that is, after the check by the TsKK Presidium. In all probability, the total number of "dekulakized" is around 1 million families at least one-half of which were relocated into the northern and eastern regions of the nation.

The mass resettlement was explained usually by the exacerbation of the class struggle in the countryside, and a majority of researchers has placed all the blame for this solely on the kulaks themselves. The class struggle in the countryside actually began to become aggravated already in 1928, but this was due to the application of the extraordinary measures and the mass violating of legality by the local authorities. The class struggle was also exacerbated as a result of those excesses and distortions in kolkhoz construction and which were made in 1929-1930 and gave rise to dissatisfaction also among the basic mass of middle peasants. Thus, the kulak portion of the countryside was not isolated and neutralized and this facilitated and encouraged its resistance. But in and of itself the relocating of the kulaks was an act of civil war which, naturally, aroused active resistance in a portion of the rich peasantry. Terror was unleashed not only against the "counterrevolutionary kulak aktiv" but also against significant masses of prosperous middle peasants who only sporadically employed hired labor or did not employ it at all. Moreover, the unproductive private property of the rich families was distributed among the poor peasantry and this contributed to the entering of the prosperous middle peasants on the lists for "dekulakization."

In many oblasts and rayons, the authorities also attacked the "less well off" middle peasants, the poor peasants and even the day-laborers who for various reasons refused to join the kolkhozes. For convenience of repression they were considered as "subkulaks."

The harsh directive on the resettlement of the entire family of the expropriated kulak was due primarily to the fact that in 1930-1931, the state did not possess the material and financial resources for aiding the kolkhozes which were being established. For this reason, the decision was taken to turn over virtually all the property of the kulak farms to the kolkhozes. Already by May 1930, on one-half of the kolkhozes kulak property made up 34 percent of the nondivided funds. Thus, the forcing of collectivization impelled maximum harsh methods of dekulakization. In cold, unheated railway cars hundreds of thousands of men, women, elderly and children were sent to the East, to the remote regions of the Urals, Kazakhstan and Siberia. Thousands of them perished along the way from hunger, cold and sickness. The old party member E.M. Landau in 1930 met one of these prisoner groups in Siberia. In the winter, in a heavy frost, a large group of kulaks with their families in carts were being transported 300 km into the interior of an oblast. The children were shouting and crying from hunger. One of the peasants could not stand the shouting of the young child who was suckling the empty breast of his mother. He seized the child out of the woman's hands and shattered his head on a tree.

In many instances they arrested and then exiled to camps, placed in prison or executed the kulak himself. The family and farm were not touched, only the property was inventoried. So the relatives were considered as taking the farm over for safekeeping. The families were relocated several months later.

Many former kulaks and members of their families perished during the first years of life in the uninhabited areas of the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and the European Northeast of the USSR, where thousands of kulak special settlements were established. The situation of the exiles changed only in 1942, when the youth began to be inducted into the army from the special settlements. By the end of the war the commandant offices were eliminated here and the inhabitants of the former special settlements gained relative freedom of movement.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p 372.

2. The kulaks included rich peasants who had resorted to systematic hiring of day-laborers and poor peasants as well as employed other forms of exploitation (usury, grain loans, payment for the use of machines, mills).

3. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 19.

[ZNAMYA No 2, Feb 89, pp 174-222]

[Text]

5

The decline of agricultural production in the years of the First Five- Year Plan led to a worsening of the food supply to the quickly growing number of city dwellers. Stalin, with his propensity for administration by injunction and for abuse of power, could find no solution other than to once again assume the road of forcible confiscation of all surplus (and not only surplus) agricultural products from the countryside. Despite the decrease in gross agricultural production, state procurements grew continually, attaining 40 percent of the harvested grain by 1934. In this case the procurement prices were very low—several times lower than the production cost of the procured food, and this elicited the displeasure of kolkhoz farmers.

State procurements essentially acquired the nature of a system of compulsory appropriation of surplus. This led to a decline of labor discipline in the just recently created kolkhozes, and to massive plunder of grain. Antikolkhoz and anti-Soviet moods grew stronger in many regions of the country. Under their influence, unique "bread strikes" began in regions of relatively abundant grain, such as in the Southern Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Don region: Not only private farmers but also kolkhoz farmers reduced the planting area, refused to surrender grain to the state, and buried it in the ground. Rather than correcting the mistakes or raising the procurement prices, Stalin once again assumed the road of violence. Draconian measures were implemented against plunder in the kolkhozes. Peasants convicted of stealing grain they had themselves grown were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, or even execution by firing squad. Mass terror was resumed in certain regions. Deliveries of goods to regions that had not fulfilled the grain procurement plan were halted, and both state and cooperative stores were closed.

In certain cases the brutal measure of moving entire farmsteads and villages to remote areas was even employed in certain cases. Thus for example in fall 1932, in connection with difficulties in procurements, a commission of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee headed by L. M. Kaganovich was sent to the Northern Caucasus with practically unlimited powers. With the participation of Kaganovich, the buro of the Northern Caucasian Kray party committee came to a decision: "In view of the especially shameful failure of grain procurements and winter planting in the Kuban region, party organizations in the Kuban are hereby given a combat mission—crushing the sabotage of grain procurements and planting organized by kulak counterrevolutionary elements, annihilating resistance of the faction of rural communists who have assumed actual leadership of the sabotage, and eliminating the passiveness and tolerance of saboteurs that are so incompatible with the name of party member."

Sixteen Cossack villages of the Northern Caucasus, including Poltavskaya, Medvedovskaya, Urupskaya and Bagayevskaya, were moved to northern regions on the basis of this decision. All were evicted down to the man, including the poor and the middle peasants, the private farmers and the kolkhoz farmers. Peasants from nonchernozem regions were moved into the "vacated" places. Mass repressions were conducted against peasants under the guidance of V. M. Molotov and Kaganovich in the Ukraine, as well as in Belorussia. A letter written by M. A. Sholokhov about the scandalous actions of grain procurers in Veshenskiy and other rayons of the Don is indicative. He wrote on 16 April 1933 to Stalin that loathsome methods of torture, slaughter and outrage were employed against kolkhoz farmers in connection with grain procurements. "These examples could be multiplied indefinitely. These are not isolated cases of deviations, this is a grain procurement 'method' that has been legalized on a regional scale. I have heard these things either from communists or from the kolkhoz farmers themselves, who experienced all of the 'methods' and subsequently came to me asking me to 'write about this in the newspaper'."

Stalin maintained a deaf ear to all such warning signals.

6

The First Five-Year Plan came to its conclusion in the countryside not only with mass collectivization but also with a terrible famine that took away millions of lives. The increasingly more acute food shortage began to be felt as early as in 1930-1931, since gross agricultural production decreased while state procurements grew. In late fall 1932, vast regions of the country, especially the Southern Ukraine, the central Volga region, the Northern Caucasus and Kazakhstan, were engulfed by a brutal famine. By its scale it significantly surpassed the famine in the Volga region and in other regions in 1921. At that time, in 1921, all of the newspapers wrote about the famine, collection of money was organized throughout the entire country, special organizations to provide assistance to starving provinces were established, and international assistance was organized. Things were different in 1932-1933. A ban was imposed on all reports of the famine. No campaigns to help the starving were carried

out either in the Soviet Union or abroad. On the contrary the fact itself of mass starvation was officially rejected. Hundreds of thousands and even millions of starving individuals tried to flee to the cities and the more-fortunate regions, but few were able to do so, because military posts set up on roads and at railroad stations would not allow peasants to leave the regions engulfed by famine. But even those who did make it to the cities could not obtain assistance there: Without food coupons, the stores would not sell them bread. In Kiev, and in many other southern cities as well, the bodies of peasants were collected, piled onto carts and driven beyond the city to be buried in unmarked graves.

Nor was anything said about the famine in the First All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Shock Workers in February 1933—that is, at the very peak of this terrible disaster. It was precisely then that Stalin proclaimed the slogan: "Make all kolkhoz farmers prosperous." He refused to discuss the famine issue even at meetings of the Politburo. Thus for example, when R. Terekhov, one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), reporting on the grave situation in the towns of Kharkov Oblast in connection with the crop failure, asked that grain be allocated to it, Stalin abruptly broke him off: "We have been told that you, Comrade Terekhov, are a good orator, but it turns out that you are a good storyteller—you've made up a story about a famine, thinking to frighten us, but it won't work! Perhaps it would be better for you to leave your post as secretary of the oblast committee and of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and go join the Writers Union: There you can write your stories, and idiots will read them...."

It would be pertinent to note that such "stories" about the famine of 1932-1933 could not be found in the creative literature of the 1930s. Any mention of it was banned, and many were arrested for "counterrevolutionary agitation" if they used the words "famine in the south." Only after the 22d Congress did it become possible to publish works on this previously banned topic.

"Following in the kulak's footsteps," wrote Mikhail Alekseyev about the terrible winter of 1932-1933 for example, "the middle peasant moved out of the countryside, only voluntarily this time. All grain and all forage was removed on someone's instructions. A mass die-off of horses began, and in'33, a terrible famine: Entire families died, houses crumbled, the streets emptied, and more and more windows went blind as people leaving for the city covered them with boards and half-logs.... Akimushka's face became darker than a forging furnace. From it shone white-hot eyes, into which fellow villagers often looked, and seemed to ask: 'What's going on? How can this be, Akimushka? Didn't we choose to follow you? You are a party member, after all!' He answered as best as he could. He said that they'll work things out up there, at the top. Stalin will send his man to Vyselki, he'll take a look around, punish the guilty, and everything will be all right."

It is only now, more than half a century later, that we are learning the details of this terrible page in our uneasy history.

"I was 19 years old in 1932...," writes I. M. Khmilkovskiy in the journal OGONEK. "I visited the fields of Kirovograd and Kiev oblasts, where a high harvest was ripening, and I dare to assert now that there was no severe drought in the Ukraine in 1932. However, because of gross violations of Leninist principles of collectivization, and in view of other causes, the peasants refused to enter the kolkhozes. Nonetheless their land was collectivized, and left unworked. I am deeply certain that Stalin attempted to use the bony arm of famine to force the peasant to join the kolkhoz and work for almost no pay at all.

"A preplanned famine, and artificial manipulation of the censuses of the 1930s in order to conceal the number dying and register the dead souls as the living—such was one of the tragic consequences of Stalinism....

"Grain was confiscated down to the last kilogram. Moreover this savagery was covered over by a slogan born under entirely different historical conditions: 'A struggle for bread is a struggle for socialism.' Millions of dispossessed and starving quietly died. And if anyone expressed indignation, he was immediately subjected to repression!"

Despite the terrible famine, Stalin insisted on continuing exports of grain to European countries. While less than 1 million centners of grain were exported abroad from the 1928 harvest, 13 million centners were exported in 1929, 48.3 million were exported in 1930, 51.8 million were exported in 1931, and 18.1 million centners were exported in 1932. Even in the worst year of the famine, 1933, around 10 million centners of grain were exported to West Europe. In this case Soviet grain was sold for practically nothing in the conditions of the economic crisis in European countries. But just half of the grain exported in 1932-1933 would have been enough to rescue all of the southern regions from the famine.

And in West Europe they ate, with a clear conscience, Soviet bread taken away from peasants who were starving and dying of hunger. All rumors of a famine in Russia were decisively refuted. Even George Bernard Shaw, who went on a tour of inspection in the USSR right in the early 1930s, wrote that rumors of a famine in Russia were a fabrication, and he became persuaded that Russia had never been supplied so well with food as during the time of his visit.

To this date, no one knows how many people died from the famine of 1932- 1933. Many researchers agree on 5 million. Others suggest 8 million, and they are probably

closer to the truth. More perished than in 1921 and in China during the terrible famine of 1877-1878. There is indirect evidence of this. The following information is presented in the book "Narodonaseleniye SSSR" [The Population of the USSR] by A. Gozulov and M. Grigoryants published in 1969. According to the 1926 census there were 31.2 million Ukrainians, while according to the 1939 census there were 28.1 million. This was an absolute decrease of 3.1 million persons in 13 years. Between 1926 and 1939 the number of Kazakhs decreased by 860,000. There could be only one explanation for all of this—the famine of the early 1930s.

For 6 years (1933-1938) reference books of the State Statistical Administration repeated the same data on the USSR population—that there were 165.7 million persons as of 1 January 1933. Speaking in December 1935 at a meeting of leading combine operators, Stalin noted:

"Everyone is now saying that the material position of the laborers has improved significantly, that life has become better and more joyful. This is of course true. But the result of this has been that the population is multiplying much faster than in the old days. Mortality has decreased, the birthrate has increased, and the net growth is much greater. This is of course good, and we welcome it. Today in our country the net growth of the population is about 3 million souls each year. This means that each year we experience a population increase equivalent to all of Finland."

But Stalin was too hasty in his conclusion that the population was growing at an increasing rate and with the assertion that life had become more joyful. According to the population census of 1939 there were 170.4 million persons in the country. The net increase was thus less than 1 million per year. And as far as a more "joyful" life is concerned, more about this later.

The only purpose of the passport system introduced in 1932-1933 was to tie the peasants down to kolkhoz farms. Far from all residents of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and some other major cities received passports. Thousands of former capitalists, landowners and other "disenfranchized" (that is, people deprived of their voting rights) were forced to move to provincial cities, where they usually became minor office workers in local institutions.

7

Much has been written about the mistakes and power abuses during collectivization. Less is known about the mistakes and power abuses during industrialization.

The country attained great successes in the First Five-Year Plan. Just between 1928 and 1933, 1,500 major enterprises were built and the foundations were laid for industrial sectors unknown to czarist Russia—machine tool building, motor vehicle building, tractor building, chemical and aviation industry. Production of powerful turbines and generators, high quality steel, ferroalloys, synthetic rubber, nitrogen, synthetic fibers and so on was organized. Thousands of kilometers of new railroads and canals were placed into operation. Huge industrial centers were created in former national districts of Russia—in Central Asia and in the Transcaucasus, in Kazakhstan, Tataria and Buryat- Mongolia. An increase occurred in the industrial potential of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, where a second industrial fuel and metallurgical base began to develop. Defense industry was created. Hundreds of new cities and workers' settlements arose throughout the entire country. Stalin contributed a great deal of effort to the enormous work associated with creating modern industry. But even in this area he often acted not as a wise state official but as a schemer and a voluntarist, creating additional difficulties for the country and the party.

Thus for example, the five-year plan of 1922/29-1932/33 was drawn up in two variants—"starting" and "optimum," with the starting plan being about 20 percent below the optimum plan. By as early as in the first 2 years of the five-year plan it became clear that the conditions for fulfilling the optimum plan were nonexistent. Western loans were too few. The USSR's export resources were insufficient. Due to the world economic crisis the prices on raw materials dropped sharply in Western markets. Every machine had to be paid for by 2-2.5 times larger a quantity of raw materials than planned. Moreover gross agricultural production decreased as well. While it was believed earlier that agricultural production would begin to grow, and that accumulations from this sector could be used more extensively to create industry, now the calculations had to be reexamined. The starving countryside could do little to help development of industry by the end of the First Five-Year Plan.

Therefore despite the enormous effort, the start of the First Five-Year Plan was not very successful. In 1929 for example, pig iron and steel production increased by only 600,000-800,000 tons, and only 3,300 tractors were produced. Production in light and food industry increased more slowly than planned. Rail transportation worked poorly. A need arose for reducing many of the targets and control figures of the five- year plan, and changing the orientation to its starting variant. But Stalin instead insisted on significantly increasing many of the targets.

"The work of the Central Committee...," he said at the 16th VKP(b) Congress in June 1930, "proceeded chiefly along the lines of correcting and updating the five-year plan in the sense of increasing the rates and moving up the deadlines....

"In ferrous metallurgy: The five-year plan foresees raising pig iron production in the last year of the five-year plan to 10 million tons; the decision of the central committee finds this norm insufficient, and believes that

pig iron production must be raised in the last year of the five-year plan to 17 million tons.

"In tractor building: The five-year plan foresees increasing tractor production in the last year of the five-year plan to 55,000 units; the decision of the central committee finds this target insufficient, and believes that tractor production must be raised in the last year of the five-year plan to 170,000 units.

"The same must be said for motor vehicle building, where in place of production of 100,000 units of motor vehicles (trucks and passenger cars) foreseen for the last year of the five-year period by the five- year plan, a decision was made to raise motor vehicle production to 200,000 units.

"The same is also true in relation to nonferrous metallurgy, in which the targets of the five-year plan have been increased by over 100 percent, and in agricultural machine building, in which the targets of the five-year plan have also been increased by over 100 percent.

"This is not considering construction of combines, which was not addressed at all in the five-year plan, and production of which must be increased in the last year of the five-year plan by a minimum of 40,000 units."

Such adventurism in planning was met by serious and justified objections from both specialists not in the party and many Bolshevik administrators. Stalin had no desire to reckon with their conclusions. However, repressions and threats could not hasten the rate of industrial development. While in 1930 the plan was to increase industrial production by 31-32 percent, the actual increment was 22 percent. A pledge to increase industrial production by 45 percent was adopted in 1931, but the actual growth was 20 percent. It decreased to 15 percent in 1932, and to 5 percent in 1933. By as early as 1932 the slogan "For 17 million tons of pig iron" was abandoned, and the plans for development of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and machine building were significantly reduced.

Nonetheless in January 1933 Stalin announced that the First Five-Year Plan had been completed ahead of schedule—in 4 years and 3 months, and that industrial production had reached the control figures planned for 1933 by as early as 1932.

A noisy propaganda campaign was initiated. With its help Stalin wanted to conceal the grave situation that had evolved in the country, especially due to the acute shortage of food, and the famine in the principal agricultural regions.

Industry did of course make a noticeable stride forward in the First Five-Year Plan. But this forward movement was not at all as significant and rapid as was proclaimed at the January VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum. The figures cited by Stalin were based on deliberate falsification.

Growth of gross industrial production was planned by the Supreme Council of the National Economy and Gosplan at a factor of 2.8 for the five-year plan of 1928/29-1932/33, to include by a factor of 3.3 in group "A" industry. All industrial production actually increased during the 5 years by a factor of 2, while production of the implements of production increased by a factor of 2.7, which was significantly below the planned targets. Production of consumer goods increased by 56 percent, and not by the planned factor of 2.4.

However, in a number of cases even this increment was purely "statistical." In connection with the specialization of production going on at that time, the cost of some intermediate products was accounted for in the reports twice: first in the evaluation of the work of the enterprise producing the intermediate product, and then in the evaluation of the work of the enterprise making the finished article.

Analysis of the First Five-Year Plan's fulfillment not only in relation to gross production but also in relation to natural indicators persuades us that the overall results were much more modest than was communicated. By the end of the five-year plan not only most of the control targets of the optimum variant of the plan but also many targets of the starting plan were not met. Moreover, the unrealistic targets Stalin talked about at the 16th Party Congress remained unfulfilled.

Stalin announced that the target for pig iron production in the last year of the five-year plan would increase from 10 million tons to 17 million tons. But in 1932, 6.16 million tons were actually smelted. Even in 1940 the pig iron smelting volume was 15 million tons, and it was not until 1950 that it exceeded 17 million tons. Instead of the planned 10.4 million tons of steel, 6 million tons were smelted in 1932, while 4.4 million tons of rolled metal were produced instead of the planned 8 million tons.

Electric power production in the last year of the five-year plan was to increase to 22 billion kilowatt-hours. The amount actually obtained in 1932 was 13.4 billion kilowatt-hours. Coal and peat production lagged 10-15 percent behind the control targets in 1932. Matters stood better with oil extraction—22.4 million tons of it were extracted by as early as 1931—that is, more than was planned for 1932-1933. But in the subsequent 2 years extraction once again declined.

Nor were the targets of the optimum variant of the five-year plan satisfied in relation to production of construction materials. Thus for example instead of the 9.3 billion units of brick planned for 1932, 4.9 billion units were produced. Things were still worse with production of mineral fertilizers—instead of 8-8.5 million

tons, 920,000 tons were produced in 1932, and 1,033,000 tons were produced in 1933.

Many important targets were not met in machine building (including agricultural). Motor vehicle production was to increase in 1932 to 100,000 units (to 200,000 in Stalin's plan). What was actually produced was 23,900 motor vehicles in 1932, and 49,700 in 1933. Only in 1936 were more than 100,000 motor vehicles produced. Forty-nine thousand tractors were produced in 1932. As far as the 170,000 tractors per year announced by Stalin are concerned, this figure was not attained either before the war or in the first decade after it. Nor was Stalin's unrealistic target of producing 40,000 combines met.

In many cases there was no production growth at all in light and food industry. In 1928, 2.68 million meters of cotton fabric were produced, while in 1932 production was 2.69 million. Compare this with the plan, which foresaw 4.6 million meters. The quantity of woolen fabrics manufactured was 86.8 million meters in 1928 and 86.7 million in 1932. The plan foresaw production of 270-300 million meters, but there was not enough raw material to meet the plan, since the sheep herds had decreased significantly. Linen fabric production declined over the five-year period. Sugar production decreased by 30 percent, and production of meat and milk dropped noticeably in comparison with 1928. The control figures for production of footwear and paper, for the freight turnover of the railroads and for many other items were not met in 1932.

The resettlement of millions of people, chiefly poor peasants, from the countryside to the city improved their living conditions. The material status of millions of urban dwellers, chiefly the unemployed, also improved, because a use for all could now be found. But the standard of living of regular workers declined over the First Five-Year Plan. The 15th VKP(b) Congress's directive calling for continuous growth of the wages of blue and white collar workers "in their real expression" was not fulfilled. By as early as 1930 the real wages of Leningrad's workers were lower than in 1927-1928 in all sectors. This trend persisted into 1931-1932 as well. It was not until 1940 that the real wages of the workers attained the 1928 level.

Aggravation of the Domestic and Foreign Situation in the Early 1930s

1

Serious mistakes in economic and social policy in 1928-1932 led to a worsening of the material status of most of the country's population, and to introduction of strict standardization in supply and trade. This elicited the displeasure of a significant part of the laborers. Stalin once again found a scapegoat—this time specialists of the old Russian (and Ukrainian) intelligentsia, formed back before the revolution.

Part of the Russian intelligentsia actively opposed the Bolsheviks during the civil war. Many of the intelligentsia were deported from Soviet Russia in the first years of the NEP [New Economic Policy]. But in the same way that the experience and knowledge of many thousands of former czarist officers were utilized for the construction of the Red Army, Lenin felt it not only possible but also necessary to utilize the experience and knowledge of the old "bourgeois" intelligentsia, which was ready to cooperate loyally with the new government within the area of its professional competency, in the construction of the Soviet economy and science. And so it was in the first period of the NEP. In the administrative apparatus, at industrial enterprises, in scientific and educational institutions, in land organs, in the USSR Gosplan and in the statistical administrations, there worked many "bourgeois" specialists, representatives of the old intelligentsia and of exploiting classes overthrown by the October Revolution, and former Mensheviks and socialist-revolutionaries who had abandoned oppositional political activity. Aggravation of the internal contradictions in the country, especially between the Soviet government and the peasantry, and the incompetency displayed in interference in the economy, which generated numerous losses and difficulties, could not but have an effect on their mood. And naturally most of the old intelligentsia was sympathetic to that grouping of the party leadership which came to be called "right- leaning." Other specialists also found themselves drawn into anti- Soviet activity, including of conspiratorial nature. In the early 1930s several counterrevolutionary organizations and groups arose not only among emigrants but also within the USSR (some, such as the subsequently famous "Trust" organization, were created by the State Political Administration itself). But there were negligibly few counterrevolutionaries among the old intelligentsia and specialists. The overwhelming majority worked honorably, striving to help, with their advice and actions, party officials in charge of different administrative organizations. Many were sincerely impressed by the enormous scope of the first five-year plans.

Many words can be found in the speeches, articles and statements Stalin made during this period in appeals for all-out concern for the old "bourgeois" intelligentsia. But Stalin's actions diverged decisively from his words.

First of all he demanded more than just loyalty toward the Soviet government with increasing persistence. Purges were often conducted of people for their noncommunist or non-Marxist views, or their prerevolutionary activities. Second, striving to lay responsibility for all mistakes in industrialization and planning upon "bourgeois specialists," Stalin and some of his closest assistants began a campaign of compromising and destroying a significant faction of specialists who were not party members.

The political trials of the late 1920s and early 1930s occupied a special place in this campaign.

2

The first such trial, which had significant consequences in that it aggravated the foreign political situation, was the so-called "Shakhty case." This "case" involved the trial of chiefly engineers and technicians of the Donets Basin accused of deliberate sabotage, of organizing explosions in the mines, of maintaining criminal ties with their former owners, and of purchasing unnecessary imported equipment, violating labor and industrial safety laws, incorrectly planning new mines and so on. Special hearings of the USSR Supreme Court on the Shakhty case were held in summer 1928 in Moscow under the chairmanship of A. Ya. Vyshinskiy. A former Menshevik, a lawyer, a member of the board of the Peoples Commissariat of Education and rector of Moscow State University, Vyshinskiy had the job was of ensuring, in the opinion of the trial's organizers, the appearance of objectivity in the court inquiry. The trial was clearly political in nature. Besides specialists and some workers of the Donets Basin, certain executives of Ukrainian industry who made up the alleged "Kharkov center" for the leadership of sabotage, and representatives of the "Moscow center" ended up on the dock. They were accused of maintaining ties not only with various emigrant organizations of Russian entrepreneurs, but also with Belgian, French and Polish capitalists who were financing sabotage organizations and actions in the Donets Basin.

Most of the defendants confessed to only some of the accusations, or they rejected them altogether, while some admitted guilt in relation to all charges. The court acquitted four of the 53 defendants, gave out suspended sentences to four, and sentenced nine to imprisonment for a term of from 1 to 3 years. Most were sentenced to a longer prison term- -from 4 to 10 years. Eleven persons were sentenced to execution; five of them were executed, and the USSR Central Executive Committee deemed it possible to lighten the sentence of six.

The "Shakhty case" was discussed at two VKP(b) Central Committee plenums and served as the grounds for a lengthy propaganda campaign. The concept "Shakhtians" became a common term synonymous in some respect with "sabotage." But on acquainting oneself with the materials of the trial, which was covered extensively in the press, one unwittingly asks this question: How justified were the indictment and, consequently, the sentences in the "Shakhty case"?

According to the testimony of S. O. Gazaryan, a former *chekist* who worked for a long time in the economic division of the Transcaucasian NKVD [Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs] (and who was arrested in 1937), the enemies of our state employed sabotage in addition to other forms and methods of anti-Soviet struggle. But this method was not widespread. As a conscious policy carried out supposedly by an entire stratum of "bourgeois" specialists, sabotage never existed. Gazaryan traveled to the Donets Basin in 1928 to "exchange experience" in the work of economic departments of the NKVD. Serious accidents accompanied by human losses (floods and explosions in mines, and so on) often occurred in the Donets Basin at that time due to criminal mismanagement. The soviet and administrative apparatus had not yet been perfected either in the center or locally, and it contained numerous incidental and unconscientious people, such that bribery and plunder flourished in some organizations, not to mention neglect of the interests of the laborers. Of course, there had to be punishment for all of these crimes. During the trial, charges of sabotage and of ties with various sorts of "centers" and foreign counterrevolutionary organizations were added to charges of a criminal nature (thievery, bribe-taking, mismanagement etc.). The investigators promised to ease the fate of prisoners in exchange for "lacking" evidence. They resorted to a forgery of "ideological" considerations in order to "mobilize the masses," "raise them in anger against imperialism" and "increase vigilance." But in reality these forgeries pursued one goal: Diverting the displeasure of the broad masses of laborers away from the party leadership, which was encouraging a race for maximum indicators in industrialization.

Stalin had no desire at that time to sort out the fine points of the position and behavior of the "bourgeois" intelligentsia. It was advantageous to him to uphold the version of deliberate sabotage by it. This is why he hastened to "generalize" the lessons of the "Shakhty case" and urged party members to seek out "Shakhtians" in all units of the soviet and administrative apparatus.

Terror against the "bourgeois" specialists intensified dramatically. Thus for example in spring 1930 an "open" political trial was held in the Ukraine in the SVU ("Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine"). S. A. Yefremov, one of the most prominent scientists and vice president of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN), was declared to be the leader of this mythical organization. Besides himself, over 40 persons were put on the dock—scientists, teachers, clergymen, officials of the cooperative movement, medical workers. Almost all of them were accused of "bourgeois nationalism," of "sabotage," of fulfilling directives of foreign Ukrainian nationalistic organizations, of "espionage on the assignment of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of several states." The SVU was also charged with preparing some terrorist acts, and even concluding a secret alliance with Poland with the purpose of separating the Ukraine from Russia.

According to testimony of A. V. Snegov, an old Bolshevik who was a party official in the Ukraine at that time, nationalistic sentiments were extremely strong among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. But all of the principal charges against the SVU were false, and even the SVU itself did not exist as an organization. This was confirmed to me by two convicts who lived in the Ukraine in the 1970s after 25 years of imprisonment—philology professor V. Gantsov and engineer B. F. Matushevskiy.

Incidentally, the same conclusion can be arrived at upon inspection of the materials of the trial. Real proof and persuasive evidence as to the fault of the defendants cannot be found in them.

One other counterrevolutionary organization—the so-called "Labor Peasants Party" (TKP)—was exposed in 1930. The well known economist N. D. Kondratyev, the famous economist L. N. Yurovskiy who in 1917 was a "friend" of the Provisionary Government's minister of food, the economist and writer A. V. Chayanov, the highly prominent scientist and agronomist A. G. Doyarenko and some others were declared to be the leaders of this party. During this time they had all been working honorably in various soviet and administrative institutions. It was reported that the TKP contained nine basic underground groups just in Moscow alone, and that it had a total membership of from 100,000 to 200,000.

It was not until 16 July 1987, in response to a protest from the USSR general procurator, that the USSR Supreme Court reversed all of the sentences of 1931, 1932 and 1935 pertaining to the "Kondratyev-Chayanov kulak and socialist-revolutionary group" and rehabilitated all of the defendants. It was reported concurrently that the "Labor Peasants Party" never existed. Chayanov's scientific works have now been published, and the works of Kondratyev, Yurovskiy, Doyarenko and other highly prominent economists of the 1920s who had become the victims of tyranny and purges are being prepared for publication. Most of their works are still important today. The 100th anniversary of A. V. Chayanov's birthday was widely celebrated.

3

A new, this time "open" political trial—the so-called "Industrial Party" trial, was conducted in Moscow from 25 November to 7 December 1930. The chairman of the court was A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, and one of the state prosecutors was N. V. Krylenko. L. K. Ramzin—director of the Thermal Engineering Institute and a highly prominent specialist in thermal engineering and boiler building, as well as notable specialists in engineering and planning—V. A. Larichev, I. A. Kalinnikov, N. F. Charnovskiy, A. A. Fedotov, S. V. Kupriyanov, V. I. Ochkin and K. V. Sitnik—were charged with sabotage and counterrevolutionary activity.

According to the indictment these eight persons made up the steering committee of the underground "Industrial Party," which was allegedly created back in the late 1920s and which had as its objectives organization of sabotage, diversion and espionage, as well as assistance to preparations for intervention by Western powers with the goal of overthrowing the Soviet government. It was announced that the total number of members in the "Industrial Party," together with peripheral groups, was about 2,000—principally representatives of the highly skilled technical intelligentsia.

All of the defendants pled guilty in the trial and eagerly offered the most improbable and detailed evidence of their espionage and sabotage activities and of their ties with the emigrant "Torgprom" organization, with foreign organizations and embassies, and even with the head of the French government, Poincare. A wave of meetings and assemblies, the participants of which demanded execution of the defendants, rolled through during the trial. And they were sentenced to execution, but the sentence was amended by a decision of the USSR Central Executive Committee: The convicts received lengthy prison terms.

A wave of indignation also rolled over the Western countries: The public protested the trial in Moscow. Even Poincare published a special declaration. It is indicative that its complete text (as well as many other declarations of this sort) was published in PRAVDA, made public in the trial and attached to the case. This was supposedly a demonstration of the objectivity of the court proceeding. Trust in the courts had not yet been shaken much in 1930. Therefore the declaration of Poincare, a well known enemy of communism, was perceived more as evidence of the existence of a conspiracy.

A few months after the "Industrial Party" trial another formally open political trial was held in Moscow on the case of the so-called "Union Bureau" of the Central Committee of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] (of Mensheviks). Fourteen persons were accused: V. G. Groman, a member of the Presidium of the USSR Gosplan; V. V. Sher, a member of the board of the State Bank; N. N. Sukhanov, a writer; A. M. Ginzburg, an economist; M. P. Yakubovich, an official of the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Trade; V. K. Ikov, a writer; I. I. Rubin, a professor of political economics, and others. This time the chairman of the court was N. M. Shvernik, and one of the state prosecutors was N. V. Krylenko. The defendants were defended by I. D. Braude and N. V. Kommodov. The overwhelming majority of the defendants had in fact been in the Menshevik party in the past, but namely in the past. According to the indictment, however, in the 1920s they had all secretly joined this party, forming its underground center in the USSR.

The defendants were charged with sabotage, especially in drawing up state plans: They deliberately reduced the targets in order to retard development of industry and agriculture. According to the indictment a secret agreement on organizing intervention and armed rebellion existed between the "Union Bureau," the "Industrial Party" and the "TKP." Some of the articles of the indictment specifically charged D. B. Ryazanov, who was the director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in the early 1930s. A major Marxist theoretician and historian, D. B. Ryazanov was known for his negative and even scornful attitude toward Stalin.

All defendants pled guilty and provided detailed testimony on their sabotage activities. The court sentenced them to imprisonment for a term of from 5 to 10 years.

4

After repealing all of the false accusations and unjust sentences in the "Labor Peasants Party" case, the USSR Procuracy began preparing similar decisions in the "Industrial Party," "Union Bureau" and some other similar though not as notorious falsified trials. It is entirely possible that the decisions of the Supreme Court will be made before this journal is published. Nonetheless it should be noted that many inconsistencies and blatant falsifications jump out at you upon attentive reading of the materials of these trials published in newspapers and subsequently in individual collections.

The inconsistencies in the "Industrial Party" case begin with the indictment. There it says that its leadership consisted of former prominent industrialists or people who had occupied highly paid command positions in prerevolutionary industry. But as it became clear in court, not one of the eight defendants was either a capitalist or the son of a capitalist. They all had their origins in the families of craftsmen, peasants, white collar workers and middle landowners. Only three worked in private industry prior to the revolution, in which case Larichev worked only 3 years.

"One of the primary reasons for creating the counterrevolutionary organization," the indictment stated, "was the political convictions of the old-guard engineers, who usually vacillated between Constitutional Democratic and right-wing monarchical convictions." But out of the eight defendants, only Fedotov formerly associated with Constitutional Democrats. Some had previously been members of the RSDRP, while the rest generally showed little interest in politics.

Many absurdities and contradictions can also be revealed in the testimony of the defendants. Thus for example Ramzin said that White emigrant organizations set up a meeting for him with leaders of the French general staff, and the latter acquainted him not only with France's general decisions for an impending intervention but also with the operational plans of the French command. Ramzin was allegedly told the directions of the main strikes by the French Expeditionary Corps and the Allies, the landing place of the assault forces, the schedule for invasion of the USSR and so on. But it is clear that no general staff would ever have acquainted Ramzin with its concrete plans for intervention, even if they did exist.

Incidentally, in all of the trials the investigating organs openly declared to the court that they did not possess any material evidence and documents. Much was said about all kinds of directives, appeals, instructions, resolutions and minutes of meetings of the leaderships of the underground parties during the trials, but not a single document was submitted to the court and the public. The investigative organs declared that the defendants had been able to destroy all documents prior to their arrest. "Let's analyze further the question as to what evidence there might be," said N. Krylenko in his concluding remarks at the trial. "Are there any documents, for example? I asked about this. Where they had existed, it turns out, the documents were destroyed. I then asked: But could any one document have survived by chance? Any hopes in this regard were in vain."

It was asserted in the indictment that the "Industrial Party" planned to appoint P. P. Ryabushinskiy, a prominent Russian capitalist, to the post of minister of industry and trade in the future Russian government, and that Ramzin and Larichev conducted negotiations with him about this in October 1928. Following publication of the indictment, many foreign newspapers reported that Ryabushinskiy had died prior to 1928, and that only his sons were living abroad.

An inconsistency also occurred in relation to the well known historian Ye. V. Tarle. He was arrested, and members of the "Industrial Party" testified that he was to be appointed minister of foreign affairs in the White Guard government. But soon after, Stalin found a need for Tarle, and he was quietly released.

There were also numerous absurdities in the "Union Bureau" trial. The weakest article in the indictment in this new case was the relationship between the "Union Bureau" and the "Industrial Party." It was discussed in detail both in the indictment and in the testimony of the defendants. Ramzin was an important witness in the new trial, and he said many things about the relationships existing between the "Industrial Party," the "TKP" and the "Union Bureau." But the "Union Bureau" had not been mentioned a single time in the still-recent "Industrial Party" trial, even though the "Union Bureau," which appeared in court in early 1931, had already been arrested by the time of this trial. In order to somehow explain the conflict, it was announced that "open-hearted confessions" were not obtained from members of the "Union Bureau" until December 1930, and that members of the "Industrial Party" had not been sufficiently sincere during their trial. And yet it was completely obvious that the idea itself of organizing a trial of the "Union Bureau" did not come to Stalin and his assistants until after the "success" of the "Industrial Party" trial. Legends explaining the new trial began to be prepared correspondingly. Many inconsistencies slipped through in the haste. While members of the "Industrial Party" admitted that they amplified the plan's targets for the purposes of sabotage, members of the "Union Bureau" were accused of the reverse, of reducing the plans. Statements of extremely persuasive content made by the defendants at Gosplan meetings, in which they objected to the excessively high new targets of the five-year plan received from the Politburo, were cited in

this case. In general, reading the materials of the trials of 1930- 1931, one might think that the five-year plans were drawn up by members of the "Union Bureau" and the "Industrial Party," and that their details were not discussed at party conferences and congresses. In precisely the same way, acquainting oneself with the testimony of the defendants concerning their deliberate disruption of the supply of food and industrial goods to the cities and towns, one might think that the "saboteurs" were masters of the situation in all of the economic peoples commissariats and in the Peoples Commissariat of Trade. And yet the main problems of supply were resolved not at all in the peoples commissariats but in meetings of the Politburo.

Also rather strange was the subsequent fate of some of the defendants. Thus for example, "Industrial Party" leader L. K. Ramzin, a "candidate of dictatorship," a "spy" and an "organizer of sabotage and assassinations," was pardoned. Even during his confinement he was allowed to pursue scientific research. Ramzin was freed just 5 years after the trial, and awarded the Order of Lenin for services in boiler building. Later on he received the Stalin Prize, and he died in 1948 while occupying that same position of director of the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute which he occupied prior to the "Industrial Party" trial.

5

Not only did Stalin try to explain away all of his mistakes in the first years of collectivization and industrialization by the "sabotage" of bourgeois specialists. He also wanted to ascribe to himself nonexistent accomplishments in preventing foreign intervention and in defeating underground counterrevolutionary parties. In other words to gain perhaps fictitious political capital, but capital important to him. Moreover, organizing the political trials, Stalin consciously created tension in the country in order to force his critics to keep quiet, and once again cast a shadow upon the leaders of the opposition groups of the 1920s.

But a question does arise: How was it possible to force defendants to publicly slander themselves and many others, and fabricate nonexistent organizations and uncommitted crimes? The answer: through torture and other means of unlawful pressure on prisoners. But Stalin was unable to destroy all witnesses of his crimes. Despite the burdens of 24 years of confinement, M. P. Yakubovich, one of the main defendants of the "Union Bureau" trial, remained alive. After his release he remained in Karaganda—in a home for the disabled, but he did visit Moscow on occasion prior to his death in 1980, he spoke several times with me, and he gave details on the methods by which the trials of the early 1930s were prepared. Yakubovich did not limit himself to oral testimony alone. In May 1967 he sent a letter to the USSR Procuracy, copies of which he gave to some of his friends. Here are a few passages from this letter.

"...Examining magistrates of the OGPU [United State Political Administration under the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars] never tried in any way to reveal actual political ties or the actual political position of any of the defendants. They had a ready-made picture of the "sabotage" organization, which could have been devised only with the participation of prominent and influential workers of the state apparatus, while real underground Mensheviks did not occupy such a position, and therefore such a picture was inappropriate to them....

" 'Extraction of confessions' began. Some, like Groman and Petunin, yielded to the promise of future blessings. Others who attempted to resist were 'persuaded' by physical methods of influence—they were beaten (beaten about the face and head and the sex organs, forced to the floor and trampled, those lying on the floor were choked until their faces became engorged with blood, and so on), kept on a 'conveyer' without sleep, put into isolation cells (partially stripped and barefoot in the cold, or kept in an intolerably hot and stuffy cell without windows), and so on. The threat alone of such influence and a corresponding demonstration were enough for some. In relation to others it was employed to varying degrees—strictly on an individual basis, depending on the resistance of each. A. M. Ginzburg and I were the most stubborn of all in our resistance. We did not know anything about each other, and we were held in different prisons—I in the North Tower of Butyrskaya Prison, and Ginzburg in an internal prison of the OGPU. But we arrived at the same conclusion: We did not have the strength to endure the influence employed, and it was better for us to die. We slashed our wrists. But we were not allowed to die. Following my attempted suicide I was no longer beaten, but for a long time I was not allowed to sleep. I reached such a state of cerebral fatigue that nothing mattered in the world—I was ready for any disgrace, for any slander of myself and others, just so that I could fall asleep. In this mental state I consented to offer any kind of evidence. I was still held back by the notion that I alone had succumbed to such cowardice, and I was ashamed of my weakness. But I was allowed a confrontation with my old friend V. V. Sher, whom I knew as a person who had joined the workers revolutionary movement long before the victory of the revolution, and as one from a rich bourgeois environment—that is, as an unconditionally idealistic person. When I heard from Sher's own lips that he admitted to being a participant of a Menshevik sabotage organization—the "Union Bureau"—and that he named me as one of its members, I surrendered conclusively on the spot, during the confrontation. After that I no longer resisted, and I wrote whatever testimony investigators D. Z. Apresyan, A. A. Nasedkin and D. M. Dmitriyev suggested to me.

"...Several days before the start of the trial the first 'organizing meeting' of the 'Union Bureau' was held in the office of chief investigator D. M. Dmitriyev and under his chairmanship. Besides the 14 defendants, Apresyan, Nasedkin and Radishchev took part in this meeting. In the meeting the defendants were introduced

to one another, and their behavior in court was coordinated—rehearsed. This work was not finished in the first meeting, and so it was repeated.

"I was in confusion. How was I to behave in court? Was I to deny the testimony given during the inquiry? Was I to attempt to wreck the trial? Create a world scandal? Whom would that benefit? Would this not be a blow to the back of the Soviet government? The Communist Party? I had not joined it, having left the Mensheviks in 1920, but you see, I was with it politically and morally, and I remained with it. No matter what crimes the OGPU apparatus might commit, I could not betray the party and state. I will not hide the fact that another thought went through my mind as well. If I denied previously given testimony at the trial, what would the butcher-interrogators do to me? It was terrible to even think about it. If only death would come. I wanted death. I sought it, and I tried to die. But they wouldn't let me die, they would torture me slowly, torture me for an infinitely long time. They would keep me from sleeping until I died. And when would death due to lack of sleep occur? Insanity would probably come first. What would compel me to decide to do this? In behalf of what would I do it? If I were an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, I may have found moral support for my courage in my hatred of it. But I was not an enemy, you see. What could motivate me to behave so desperately in court?

"When we were being led out of the courtroom after the sentence was passed, I bumped into A. Yu. Finn-Yenotayevskiy at the door. He was older than all of the defendants, and 20 years older than me. He said to me: 'I will not live long enough to be able to tell the truth about your trial. You are younger than the rest—you have a greater chance than all the others to live long enough. I charge you to tell the truth.'

"In fulfillment of this charge of my senior comrade, I wrote these explanations, and I gave oral testimony in the USSR Procuracy.

"Mikhail Yakubovich

5 May 1967"

6

The political trials of the late 1920s and early 1930s served as an excuse for mass purges of the old "bourgeois" intelligentsia, the representatives of which worked in various peoples commissariats and educational institutions, in the Academy of Sciences, in museums and cooperative organizations, and in the army. Among them there were many former members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, and even moderate monarchists and participants of nationalistic movements, as well as former Mensheviks, socialist-revolutionaries and peoples socialists. Only a very few of them joined the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. But most of them did not involve themselves in politics at all. There is something else that is more important: On the whole, all of the old specialists were fully loyal to the Soviet government, and they benefited it considerably with their knowledge and experience.

The punitive organs dealt their main blow in 1929-1932 against the technical intelligentsia—the "specialists." The newspapers wrote that sabotage under the leadership of "specialists" had penetrated throughout, and that only the "tip" of the sabotage organizations, and not the wide strata of their participants, had been uncovered in the trials. It was also asserted that "the old engineer corps must be treated unconditionally as being 90-95 percent counterrevolutionary in its sentiments."

Recalling this time, chemical engineer D. Vitkovskiy wrote the following in his autobiographical novel "Polzhizni" [Half a Life]:

"In January 1931 a wave of arrests swept me into prison. The prisons were filled to the breaking point. I was placed in a cell obviously adapted in haste out of a small basement room looking out on Malaya Lubyanka through a solitary tiny air vent.... The explanations came quickly and vigorously, like in a detective story. As it turned out, I was a participant of a far-reaching anti-Soviet conspiracy..., I invented poisons by which to destroy members of the government..., military people were involved in the conspiracy..., invisible sleuths had been following their footsteps..., everything was now revealed, and all that was lacking was our confession.

"Alas! There was nothing I could help the investigation with, and I simply asserted that I knew of no conspiracy and did not communicate with conspirators.... The interrogations were conducted only at night. Many went the whole night. To complete exhaustion. But at least I was allowed to sit.

"A month later I was moved like waste to Butyrka.... Some of the prisoners slept right on the cement floor; some of them had no bedding at all. I shared my cell with from 60 to 80 persons; among them were several professors, predominantly of technical specialties, no less than 50 engineers, and a few military people, writers and actors. There was good reason why the prisons were called 'engineer and technician rest homes' by the wits of those days."

Among the "bourgeois" specialists arrested in 1929-1931 there were prominent scientists and engineers such as N. I. Ladyzhenskiy, chief engineer of the Izhevsk Small Arms Plant; A. F. Velichko, a highly prominent specialist in railroad construction and transport, formerly a general in the czarist army; A. G. Lorkh, one of the most prominent specialists in potato selection. The highly prominent Russian physicist Academician P. P. Lazarev was arrested and exiled. A large number of honorable and distinguished military commanders and specialists were arrested on the basis of a slanderous

accusation that they had created a monarchical counter-revolutionary organization. Among them were notable officials of military science such as N. Ye. Kakurin and the previously mentioned A. Ye. Snesarev, former chief of the Academy of the General Staff, to whom the USSR Central Executive Committee had just awarded the Hero of Labor title.

Twenty prisoners were accommodated on the territory of a Moscow plant in a wooden one-story shed adapted as living quarters. These were basically elderly engineers—aircraft designers D. P. Grigorovich and N. N. Polikarpov, airplane armament designer A. V. Nadashkevich, static testing engineer P. M. Kreyson, aerodynamic specialist B. F. Goncharov, and production organizer I. M. Kostkin. They were allowed to go out only within the territory of the plant, the workers of which referred to them between themselves as "engineer-saboteurs."

The wave of arrests did not spare the humanitarian scientists either. Academicians S. F. Platonov, Ye. V. Tarle, N. P. Likhachev, S. V. Bakhrushin, S. I. Tkhorzhevskiy and V. V. Vinogradov, V. V. Talanov, one of the founders of the USSR's strain-testing system, and Professor B. Ye. Raykov, a prominent specialist in natural history ended up in prison. Philosopher A. A. Meyer, historian V. V. Bakhtin, historian I. M. Grevs, literary critic M. M. Bakhtin and dozens of other recognized scientists of those days were arrested or exiled.

These people subsequently experienced different fates. Many of them were released after several years to pursue a brilliant scientific career—for example Ye. V. Tarle, A. G. Lorkh, V. V. Vinogradov and V. V. Talanov. In the 1940s-1950s they headed the most important scientific institutions, enjoyed respect, and received orders and titles. Others—N. Ye. Kakurin, A. Ye. Snesarev, P. P. Lazarev and S. F. Platonov—died in confinement and were rehabilitated only posthumously. Brief references to them can be found in modern encyclopedias, and some of their works have been republished. But many scientists arrested in 1929-1931 have still not been rehabilitated, and some of them have simply been forgotten.

7

In the countryside, elimination of the kulaks as a class and blanket collectivization put both a formal and an actual end to the new economic policy proclaimed by Lenin in 1921. The premature and violent "revolution from above," as Stalin himself defined it, naturally reflected upon the situation in the cities as well. Introduction of rationing, disturbance of the financial equilibrium in the national economy and the fall of the exchange value of the ruble to rock-bottom created difficulties in carrying out the NEP in industrial centers, even though the possibilities of the NEP had not been exhausted in either the countryside or the city from either an economic or political point of view.

By the way, Stalin no longer even thought about pursuing the NEP in the cities in the early 1930s. There was a severe shortage of assets with which to finish many of the largest industrial projects. An additional tax on all private enterprises in the cities became an important source of financing industrialization, among others. Even prior to this the tax had been high—up to 50-60 percent of the profit of a private entrepreneur. But now the additional levy forced private entrepreneurs and merchants to liquidate their enterprises. While it is true that Stalin did not call for the arrest and exile of former NEP businessmen and their families, an unpublicized decision to partially confiscate their property was adopted. Especially noteworthy in this respect was the so-called "gold campaign" carried out throughout the entire country. What happened was that in liquidating their "businesses," most NEP businessmen, who were wary of banknotes, made an effort to convert them into gold and precious gems. This was not a violation of the RSFSR Civil Code at that time. Financial organs, which were not too concerned with legality, demanded the surrender of all gold coins and gold possessed by the recent private entrepreneurs to the state at an arbitrarily set price. Those who delayed were arrested by OGPU organs and detained in prison until relatives of the prisoners surrendered the valuables. In general, finding himself in a difficult position and attempting to increase the flow of gold and currency into his treasury, Stalin was not shy about what means he employed. For example he insisted on selling many famous canvases exhibited or stored in the Hermitage, in the Pushkin Museum in Moscow and in some other museums to interests abroad. Paintings by Titian, Rafael, Rubens, Velazquez, Rembrandt and Watteau as well as part of the furniture and furnishings of the czarist palaces were sold to wealthy collectors, chiefly in the USA.

It should be noted that Stalin's liquidation of the NEP without sufficient economic grounds in turn slowed down the country's overall economic development, rather than accelerating it. Validly speaking out against the claims of the "left-wing" opposition, the VKP(b) Central Committee asserted many times that the NEP was introduced in the USSR "in seriousness and for a long time to come," and that until state industry, state trade and cooperation are able to completely satisfy the needs of the national economy, a place would remain not only for the private peasant worker and craftsman, but also for the private capitalist (under certain conditions and under vigilant state control). However, neither state industry, nor state trade nor cooperation were completely satisfying the needs of the national economy in 1932-1937.

8

Brutalization of the regime in the country and the mass purges of prosperous peasants, NEP businessmen and "bourgeois" intelligentsia were accompanied by brutalization of the regime within the party as well. Thus for example, soon after the "Union Bureau" trial D. B.

Ryazanov, the organizer and first director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, was expelled from the party, and then arrested. He had begun publication of the collected works of Marx and Engels back before the revolution on a commission from the German Social Democratic Party. He continued this work in Moscow. The party did not have a better expert of the history of Marxism in the 1920s. In his references to Stalin he employed irony and even sarcasm openly. It is thus not by chance that Ryazanov's name was announced in the falsified testimony of the "Union Bureau" trial.

In 1931-1933, former Trotskyites who had not publicly declared their complete break with Trotskyism by this time were once again subjected to repressions. Among others, I. N. Smirnov, who was a highly prominent official of the Bolshevik Party in the past, one of the leaders of the armed rebellion in Moscow in 1905, chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee in 1919, and peoples commissar of postal and telegraphic service in the 1920s, was arrested.

A rather extensive repressive campaign was also initiated against "national deviants." It would of course be wrong to deny presence of nationalistic sentiments even among communists working in the Ukraine, in the Transcaucasus and in Central Asia. But Lenin himself appealed for great caution in dealing with such sentiments, and for eliminating them gradually, by political means, and not by repressions. In the first decade following formation of the USSR, the union republics possessed considerable autonomy in dealing with their internal problems. Under the excuse of fighting nationalism, Stalin began systematically restricting the rights of the union republics. This elicited protest among many local communists, who were then labeled "national deviants"; in this case Stalin exaggerated certain mistakes made by party executives who were in his disfavor, imparting inordinately greater significance to them. It was precisely to such rough and unjustified criticism that N. Skrypnik, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian SSR, a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee and a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, was subjected in the early 1930s.

No effort at all was made to openly discuss the problems of national development in the Ukraine. Stalin and P. P. Postyshev, who was elected secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee in 1930, accused Skrypnik of "objectively" supporting "class enemies" on the cultural front, and of other mortal sins. The campaign of slander ended in tragedy. Many valuable workers and officials of Ukrainian national culture were compromised and removed from their posts, and many were arrested. In July 1933 Skrypnik committed suicide.

In Armenia, Peoples Commissar of Education N. Stepanyan, who was highly popular in the republic, was deposed for "nationalism" in the early 1930s. It was then that the outstanding poet Ye. Charents and the writer A. Bakunts were subjected to unjust persecution. Many workers of the soviet and party apparatus in Uzbekistan were arrested for "nationalism" in the early 1930s.

Severe repressions were also imposed upon members of small opposition groups in the party itself. Dissatisfaction with the extremely grave material position of the popular masses and with the social conflicts permeated its ranks. V. V. Lominadze, who was first secretary of the Transcaucasian Kray Party Committee at the start of 1930, was one of the spokesmen of this dissatisfaction. He expressed his opposition to the negligent attitude toward the needs of the workers and peasants, to the deception and to what he called the "feudal-lordly degeneration" of certain party workers of the Transcaucasus.

S. I. Syrtsov, a notable party worker, a candidate member of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Peoples Commissars, protested together with others of like mind against excessive expansion of capital construction, and turned attention to the grave position in agriculture, especially in livestock breeding. Syrtsov felt that it was too early to talk about the victory of socialism in the countryside and the imminent completion of construction of the foundation of socialist society.

In 1930, when Lominadze visited Moscow, he invited Syrtsov, and they spent several hours discussing party and state affairs eye to eye. By this time Stalin was already making extensive use of the services of informers, and he made an effort to keep them close to all major state officials. He learned of the discussion between Syrtsov and Lominadze and was extremely angered, because he had helped to advance the careers of both of them, and provided protection to them. An emergency joint meeting of the Politburo and Presidium of the Central Control Commission was convened, during which Stalin accused Syrtsov and Lominadze of creating some sort of "right-left bloc." They were expelled from the Central Committee and removed from their posts. The press began a rough campaign of criticism against this nonexistent "bloc" and its supposed members.

M. N. Ryutin's anti-Stalinist opposition group came into being within the party in the early 1930s. Ryutin worked in the apparatus of the VKP(b) Central Committee, and for several years he was the head of the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon Party Committee in Moscow. Dissatisfied with the failures of collectivization and industrialization, as well as with brutalization of the regime in the party, Ryutin and his friend P. A. Galkin created an underground group. This group, which consisted of around 15 persons, drew up an extensive document, which came to be called "Ryutin's platform." Only a small circle of people were acquainted with it—the conditions for disseminating documents of this sort to any extent were lacking. The existence of Ryutin's group was known to some of Bukharin's friends and students—N. A. Uglanov, P. G. Petrovskiy, A. N. Slepkov and D. P. Maretskiy, and to the well known philosopher Ya. E.

Sten. Zinovyev and Kamenev were acquainted with fragments of "Ryutin's platform." Ryutin and his group demanded decisive change in the party's economic course and relaxation of pressure on the countryside, as well as cessation of oppression within the party, and greater democracy within it. However, Ryutin's chief demand was to remove Stalin from party leadership. Almost a fourth of the text of the "platform" was a criticism of Stalin.

A party member since 1914, Ryutin knew its leaders well. According to the testimony of this friends, Ryutin always had a bad opinion of Stalin, and he criticized the Politburo for recommending his election as committee general secretary. R. G. Alikhanova, the wife of a notable Comintern official and an acquaintance of Ryutin, notes in her manuscript memoirs that on several occasions he said to his closest confederates that Stalin's assassination was not only possible but also the sole means of getting rid of him. But no preparations for assassination or its attempts were ever made.

When Stalin learned of the existence of the Ryutin-Galkin group through his informers or the GPU, he demanded immediate and severe reprisals. Accusing Ryutin of creating a "kulak and counterrevolutionary" organization and attempting "to restore capitalism," Stalin insisted not only on the arrest of all of the group's members but also execution of its leaders. But the majority of the Politburo did not support Stalin. An unwritten rule still existed at that time—not employing severe punishments against recent party activists. A decision was made to exile almost all "Ryutinites" to remote regions of the country, after first expelling them from the party. Ryutin was the first to be arrested and expelled from the party.

9

Stalin's letter "On Some Problems of the History of Bolshevism," which was extremely rough in form and far from undisputable in content, was published in the journal PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, No 6, 1931. This letter elicited the first wave of repressions against Marxist historians. Many of them were fired from their jobs, and some were expelled from the party. It was precisely from this moment on that all open discussion of problems in party history in the press was halted—Stalin assumed the sole monopoly on interpretation of party history.

A savage struggle was also waged on the "philosophical front," mainly between so-called "mechanists," primarily I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, A. Timiryazev and A. Varyash, and "dialecticians"—A. Deborin, Ya. Sten, N. Karev and others. A group of young philosophers, predominantly students of the Communist Academy and the Philosophy Institute, were gradually drawn into the debate as well. This "youth" group was headed by M. Mitin, P. Yudin and V. Raltsevich, who made up the majority of the Philosophy Institute's party cell buro, and it was supported by F. V. Konstantinov, M. Iovchuk and others. On 9 December 1930 Stalin met with members of the buro of the party cell of the Philosophy Institute (it was part of the Institute of Red Professorship). There is neither a detailed transcript nor even a brief description of this discussion. It is known, however, that this was when Stalin labeled the views of A. Deborin and his group with the absurd term "Menshevik idealism." This was taken to mean "enemy of Marxism-Leninism." By the way, Stalin also condemned the "mechanists," thus challenging the "young" philosophers to fight "on two fronts." And this is what they proceeded to do with diligence, deadening all living and fresh seedlings of philosophical thought. Demagoguery and schematicism, simplification and the most vulgar mechanism, incompetence and hypocritical suspicion of all that was new and creative confirmed themselves in philosophical literature for a little over two decades.

Imagine the sort of struggle that was waged in science in the early 1930s! In economics—against "counterrevolutionary Rubinism." In biological methods—against "Raykovism." In literary criticism—against "Voronism" and "Pereverzevism." In pedagogics—against "the theory of withering away of the school." And in all of these "battles" on the different ideological fronts, insignificant inaccuracies or mistakes or ones naturally made in any science, and even correct premises were elevated to the rank of "distortions of Marxism-Leninism." And this meant expulsion from the party and dismissal from one's job, if not arrest. "Hostile influences" were sought in the slightest mistakes in wordings, and sectarian restrictiveness, intolerance and coarseness were cultivated under the guise of revolutionary vigilance. It was precisely in 1930-1933 that the fast-paced careers of T. D. Lysenko and some other less prominent adventurers of science began.

An ideological struggle was also waged in literature and art. Stalin called M. Bulgakov's play "Flight" an anti-Soviet phenomenon, an attempt "to justify or partially justify the doings of the White Guards," and the Moscow Chamber Theater, founded by the prominent producer A. Ya. Tairov, a bourgeois chamber theater. The atmosphere in literature continued to heat up even in 1931-1932, until the decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee, which was a surprise to many, to disband the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers and form the single Union of Soviet Writers. But this was only a short outburst of liberalism and hope—perhaps the First Congress of Soviet Writers was also permeated by their spirit.

10

Brutalization of policy in the Soviet state and in the VKP(b) inevitably led to brutalization of policy in the Comintern and to intensification of the struggle against "rightist" and "leftist" leanings in the individual communist parties. The forms and slogans of struggle employed by the VKP(b) were often copied in this case,

even though they were not very consistent with the situation in foreign communist parties or with the political situation in the countries in which these communist parties were functioning. Foreign communist parties were supposed to automatically approve everything that occurred in the USSR and in the VKP(b). In the rigid structure of the Comintern, they were deprived of political independence, and transformed into partially independent sections of a kind of world communist organization.

The first arrests of Western communists working in the USSR were made in the early 1930s. The small communist parties of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia were dealt a heavy blow—their leaders were slanderously accused of treachery, and arrested.

The economic and financial crisis of 1929-1933, which deeply shook the entire capitalist system, evoked profound political and social changes. These changes differed in the USA and in West Europe. In the USA the crisis resulted in the victory of F. Roosevelt and his "new deal." In West European countries, dramatic worsening of the material status of laborers and the petty bourgeoisie led to a certain increase in the strength of left-wing revolutionary parties and groups. But right-wing nationalistic mass movements gained even greater strength—they now began to be lumped together in our country under the concept of "fascism."

Among the factors which assisted the victory of fascism in Germany, those associated with USSR policy played a major role as well. Thus for example, the Nazis competently capitalized on the disenchantment of the laborers and petty bourgeoisie of West Europe with socialist Russia, which was experiencing not only economic difficulties but also the convulsions of mass purges. It is completely obvious that the wave of violence that occurred in the countryside in the late 1920s and early 1930s, elimination of the NEP and of NEP businessmen, mass confiscation of small enterprises, the "gold campaign," the terror against the intelligentsia and other "excesses" assisted Western propaganda in its efforts to weaken the revolutionary movement. Why did the unprecedented crisis of capitalism of 1929-1933 strengthen the communist movement in the West only insignificantly, why did it not evoke revolutionary situations? Why did sizable masses of petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry and even the working class turned not to the left in the years of crisis, but to the right, becoming the massive foundation of the fascist movement in a number of countries? It could hardly be doubted that news coming from the Soviet Union at that time promoted this to a considerable degree.

But Stalin's divisive policy in the international workers movement promoted the development of fascism most of all.

It was wrong to refer to the Social Democrats as "social fascists," "fascism's moderate wing," "the main social support of fascism" and so on as early as in the 1920s, though definitions of this sort could be seen even in the Comintern's Program, adopted by its Sixth Congress in 1928. Stalin's political extremism became especially dangerous in 1929- 1931. The advent of fascism in Western countries made a turn in the policy of the communist parties necessary. The main political task became fighting for a united front of the working class and the all- peoples antifascist movement, and not fighting against social democracy. In other words a policy of rapprochement and unity of actions with social democratic parties, which were the dominant force in the workers movement of the Western countries, was required. But Stalin continued to insist chiefly on a struggle against social democracy. In the early 1930s he attacked left-wing Social Democrats, which had significant influence in the ranks of the working class, with special zeal. Stalin called left-wing Social Democrats the most dangerous and harmful trend in social democracy, because in his opinion they concealed their opportunism "by sham revolutionism" and thus distracted laborers away from communists. Stalin all too quickly forgot that left-wing trends in social democracy were precisely the foundation for creation of communist parties. While Lenin called Rosa Luxemburg a "great communist," and a "representative of the proletariat and unfalsified Marxism," Stalin initiated a struggle against "Luxemburgism" in the early 1930s.

His position did the most significant damage to Germany, in which the threat of fascism was especially significant. The Nazi Party collected 6.4 million votes in the 1930 Reichstag elections, which was an eightfold increase over 1928. But over 8.5 million voters voted for Social Democrats, and 4.5 million did so for communists. In the 1932 Reichstag elections the Nazi Party received as many as 13,750,000 votes, the Communist Party received 5.3 million votes, and the Social Democrats received around 8 million. Had the communists and Social Democrats created a united front, they doubtlessly would have been able to halt Hitler's advancing power in 1930 and even in 1932. But a united front did not exist—on the contrary the leaderships of both workers parties waged a savage struggle between each other. Even after the victory of fascism in Germany, the sectarian disposition of the Comintern's leadership was so strong that when in October 1934 Maurice Thorez turned to the radical party with a proposal to form the Popular Front, the leadership of the Comintern deemed this to be opportunism and asked Thorez to abandon his proposal. However, the French Communist Party declined the request, and this was one of the reasons why fascism could not win in France.

11

Some historians feel that Stalin's cult arose in 1926-1927. Even in that time protests against the cult of Stalin that was developing in the party began to be heard in many statements by leaders of the "leftist" opposition. But this was only the beginning of his ascension. On the

outside he maintained the appearance of emphatic democracy, apparently as a juxtaposition to Trotsky's "aristocracy." Stalin was relatively accessible, coarse and simple. He strolled freely through the building occupied by the Central Committee and the Kremlin, and he wandered about it almost without security. Sometimes he simply walked into the Institute of Red Professorship to talk with students. While in the early 1920s portraits of Lenin and Trotsky could be seen in most official institutions (of course, after 1924 Trotsky's portrait was removed almost everywhere), Stalin's portraits were nowhere to be seen yet—it was not until 1930, after his 50th birthday was celebrated in December 1929 with pompousness unprecedented for that time, that they began to be hung in all places. In salutations, Stalin was referred to not only as "remarkable" and "outstanding," but also in a number of cases as "great" and "brilliant" as well. A collection of articles and memoirs on Stalin published in 1929 contained many exaggerations and distortions. The idea was persistently repeated that "...while Lenin was alive, Comrade Stalin, being one of his students, was however **his sole and most dependable assistant**, who in distinction from the others, in all of the most important stages of the revolution, at all major turning points accomplished by the party under the leadership of Vladimir Ilich, walked hand in hand with him without vacillation."

Some of the authors of this collection tried to prove that although Stalin was known in the party more as a practical man, he was also actually a most prominent theoretician of Marxism-Leninism. In his article "Stalin and the Red Army" K. Ye. Voroshilov ascribed to Stalin accomplishments in the civil war that had never occurred.

As early as in 1931, in the foreword to the six-volume collection of Lenin's works, V. V. Adoratskiy, the editor of this publication, wrote that the works of Lenin must be studied by way of the works of Stalin. In new editions of their books on the history of the VKP(b), Yem. Yaroslavskiy and A. Bubnov introduced pages on Stalin's "accomplishments."

It may be supposed that there was much that was sincere in all of this praise, which intensified significantly following the January 1933 Central Committee Plenum. But carefully nurtured fawning was in even greater abundance. The fact that Politburo members, especially Molotov and Kaganovich, were the first to resort to immoderate praise of Stalin immediately imparted to this praise the nature of an official political course, which also had to be followed by those who never felt Stalin to be sinless.

Former leaders of the opposition also joined the general chorus of praise to Stalin; moreover their voices were often louder than others. The newspapers perpetually carried articles by Pyatakov, Zinovyev and Kamenev, who again and again admitted their mistakes and the righteousness of "the great leader of laborers of the whole world—Comrade Stalin." An article of enormous proportions by K. Radek, in which he virtually choked from delight in his descriptions of Stalin, was carried in the first issue of PRAVDA for 1934. A few days later this article was printed as a separate pamphlet in 225,000 copies.

Stalin's cult served not only his immoderate vanity but also his just as immoderate craving for power; it placed him in a special position, raising him above the party to unreachable heights, and completely isolated him from any kind of criticism. This manifested itself as early as in the 17th VKP(b) Congress, where almost every speaker talked of Stalin's "grandeur" and "brilliance." One might have thought that the congress was convened only to pay him honor.

Naturally the cult of Stalin immediately began to be transplanted by way of the Comintern into all foreign communist parties, and this could not but influence the style and methods of their work. The example of the VKP(b) was an encouragement to create a cult of their own leaders, and to distort the democratic principles of intraparty life.

The recent "rightist" opposition also gradually began to be drawn into the eulogization of Stalin. Bukharin conclusively surrendered before Stalin at the 17th Party Congress.

Trotsky continued a decisive struggle against Stalin and his cult, but his voice was harder to be heard even among his followers. Trotsky's critical remarks were valid in most cases. He proposed halting "blanket" collectivization, substituting it by cautious cooperation on a strictly voluntary basis and in correspondence with the country's real resources. Halting administrative dispossession of the kulaks and returning to a policy of a limited kulak economy. Reducing the unrealistic plans for superindustrialization.

At the same time Trotsky accepted the falsified trials against "saboteurs" among the "bourgeois" intelligentsia on faith, and he even spoke out against the sentences of the leaders of the "Industrial Party" as being too "mild." He also believed in the existence of the "Labor Peasants Party." When in 1931 another falsified trial of the "Union Bureau" was organized in Moscow, even this time Trotsky believed in the unpersuasive arguments of the foreign Menshevik center, and in the unproven arguments of USSR Procurator N. V. Krylenko. Trotsky believed in the guilt of D. B. Ryazanov, who allegedly maintained the underground archives of the "Union Bureau," and even though not a single sheet of these "underground archives" was presented in court, he wrote that the guilt of the defendants had been "irrefutably established."

Trotsky reacted extremely uniquely to the successive surrender of his former followers to Stalin. He wrote: "The succession of political generations is a very big and

very complex issue, one that faces every class, every party in a special way, but invariably faces them. Lenin derided the so-called 'old Bolsheviks' on several occasions, and he even said that on reaching 50 years of age, revolutionaries should be let out to eternal rest. There was a serious political idea in this not very funny joke. At a certain point, every revolutionary generation becomes an obstacle to further development of the idea which it carried forth on its shoulders. Politics in general quickly wears out people, while revolution does so even more. Exceptions are rare, but they do exist: Without them, there would be no ideological continuity. Theoretical education of the younger generation is now the first and foremost task. This could be the only meaning behind the struggle against the Epigoni who, despite their apparent might, are already ideologically spent."

Trotsky was not an "old Bolshevik," and most probably he distorted Lenin's statements. Incidentally he was writing in exile, and to him these were only words, since he was no longer able to dispatch people "into eternal rest." But Stalin, who read Trotsky's articles and books, heeded his words on occasion. Knowing that in 1936-1939 Stalin dispatched, to "eternal rest," all of the main part of Lenin's Party Guard—that is, that entire generation of "old Bolsheviks" who were nearing an age of 50 years, one might think that he followed Trotsky's advice. But this was not so. Stalin was totally independent, and he annihilated an entire generation of Bolsheviks not because its "nerves were frayed" and it was "exhausted spiritually." These people were a hindrance not "to further development of the idea which they carried forth on their shoulders," but to the development and deepening of Stalin's autocratic power. This is what brought him to the idea of dispatching all of the "old Bolsheviks," toward whom he felt such enmity, as did Trotsky, "to eternal rest," and placing his reliance on the younger generation of party workers, who had not undergone the full school of revolution but who had already undergone a rather substantial part of Stalin's school of falsification.

The Assassination of S. M. Kirov. The Trials of Former Leaders of the Opposition

1

Despite the extremely grave position of the country, there was no serious opposition to Stalin's leadership in the party in 1931-1933. The fact that almost no one challenged Stalin's role as party leader was explained by several factors. First of all Stalin's personal power was extremely great in those years. He administered the quickly growing centralized party apparatus practically uncontrolled. Owing to K. Voroshilov he maintained control over the Red Army, and owing to G. Yagoda and Ya. Agranov he maintained control over GPU. Opposition was becoming extremely dangerous to Stalin, and most of those who had been extremely critical of him on occasion in the past were constrained by fear. Second, a significant part of the gross errors and crimes Stalin committed in the early 1930s did not reveal themselves more distinctly until many years later, while some did not surface until after his death. Thus for example, very few people shared the secret of falsification of the political trials of 1930-1931. Certain wrong and even criminal actions by Stalin were portrayed as great accomplishments by propaganda. It is also important to note that the unusual situation that evolved in the early 1930s itself promoted reinforcement of Stalin's power. In the face of unprecedented difficulties, most party executives, even those dissatisfied with Stalin, felt it impossible to initiate any kind of new internal party struggle, since this might complicate the situation even more. Moreover many party leaders had changed considerably by 1933-1934, since Stalin was able not only to subordinate them to himself but also corrupt them.

Concurrently with the growth of the cult of Stalin, a certain sense of alienation arose and continued to grow between Stalin and a sizable faction of party cadres. I am referring not to former leaders of the opposition but to the party's basic core of leadership. Sensing this, Stalin began promoting relatively young party workers more and more and treating the veterans, who in his opinion had already played out their role, with disregard. Gradually a more moderately predisposed group evolved in the Politburo—S. M. Kirov, M. I. Kalinin, S. V. Kosior, G. K. Ordzhonikidze and V. V. Kuybyshev. They were also supported by many candidate members of the Politburo and members of the VKP(b) Central Committee.

During the famine of 1933 in the Ukraine and in the Northern Caucasus, Stalin insisted on intensifying repression of peasants fleeing the towns and farms while Kirov appealed for restraint. In one of the Politburo meetings he voiced support to "restoration of Soviet power" in the countryside, where a state of emergency had been in existence back since the times of collectivization, and in most regions power belonged to political departments of the MTS [machine and tractor station]. These political departments were abolished soon after by a decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee. The power of the soviets was restored in most of the rural areas. The position of deputy director for political work was established in the MTS.

Kirov spoke out several times during 1933 in meetings of the Politburo for a more flexible policy, for some "liberalization" of the regime, and his statements elicited a response from the leading party workers. It was not without Kirov's influence that Kamenev and Zinovyev were once again rehabilitated by the party in 1933. In Leningrad, Kirov expressed opposition to the repressions against former members of the opposition. The latter, who adopted a "general line," were returned to party ranks. Kirov favored improving relations between the party and writers, as well as other groups of the creative intelligentsia. It was not without his participation that a decision was adopted to abolish the RAPP and make preparations for convocation of the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers.

In the early 1930s, dissatisfaction, disenchantment and protests against Stalin's policy were characteristic of not only some of the old Bolsheviks but also some of the young party and Komsomol members.

Certain events associated with the 17th Party Congress, which was held in January-February 1934, acquire special significance in this connection. On the surface, the congress was a demonstration of love and devotion to Stalin. But if we were to compare the scant testimony of some of the old Bolsheviks, we would confidently reach the conclusion that a bloc consisting chiefly of secretaries of oblast committees and of the national communist party central committees, who sensed and understood the erroneousness of Stalin's policy more than anyone else, formed at the 17th Congress. One of the active members of this bloc was I. M. Vareykis, then the secretary of the party committee of Central Chernozem Oblast. Discussions occurred in the Moscow apartments of some officials; G. Ordzhonikidze, G. Petrovskiy, M. Orakhelashvili and A. Mikoyan participated in them. Proposals to move Stalin to the post of chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars or the USSR Central Executive Committee, and to elect S. M. Kirov to the post of general secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee were made. A group of congressional delegates spoke to Kirov on this account, but he decisively refused, and without his agreement all of the plans were unrealistic. Very little mention was made of these meetings held in the lobbies of the 17th Congress even in the CPSU history textbook published in 1962 under the editorship of CPSU Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev: "The abnormal situation evolving in the party raised the concern of some communists, especially the old Leninists. Many congressional delegates, chiefly those who were familiar with Lenin's will, believed that the time had come to move Stalin from the post of general secretary to other work."

Dissatisfaction with Stalin reflected upon the results of the vote taken in the VKP(b) Central Committee elections, which were held during an evening meeting of the Congress on 9 February. Ukrainian SSR Peoples Commissar of Education V. P. Zatonskiy was elected chairman of the ballot-counting commission, and V. M. Verkhovykh, an old Bolshevik, was elected as his deputy. When in the night of 9-10 February the ballot- counting commission opened up the ballot boxes, it found that Stalin had received the fewest votes. Three congressional delegates voted against Kirov, while 270 voted against Stalin. But Stalin carried the election simply because the number of nominated candidates was exactly equal to the number of Central Committee members that had to be elected. However, the ballot-counting commission decided not to make the results public even to the congressional delegates. According to Verkhovykh, who miraculously survived all of the terrors of Stalin's "purges" and camps, Zatonskiy immediately reported the voting results to L. M. Kaganovich, the administrator of the congress's organizational work. Kaganovich gave orders to remove almost all of the ballots on which Stalin's name had been crossed off. It was announced at a meeting of the congress on 10 February that only three votes had been cast against Stalin—as many as against Kirov. No mention at all was made of the number of votes accumulated by either candidate in either the newpapers or in the congressional record published soon after. However, Stalin was aware of the actual election results. He was also aware of the meetings of congressional delegates at which the issue of moving him to a lesser responsible post was discussed.

It must be said that in 1957 a special commission of the CPSU Central Committee examined materials of the 17th Congress in the party archives, including special sealed files in which the ballots were stored in order to verify what Verkhovykh said. This commission included O. G. Shatunovskaya, an old communist and a member of the Committee of Party Control. According to her, these files, which were opened in the presence of officials of the party archives and P. N. Pospelov, who was director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at that time, 267 ballots were missing. Verkhovykh believed that these ballots were simply destroyed. It may be supposed, however, that they were removed for thorough study in the GPU.

The composition of the VKP(b) Central Committee was significantly altered at the 17th Congress. Several persons of the former Central Committee in Stalin's disfavor were not elected to the new one—F. I. Goloshchekin, E. I. Kviring, N. N. Kolotilov, V. V. Lominazde, G. I. Lomov, M. D. Orakhelashvili, L. Kartvelishvili, K. A. Rumyantsev and others. On the other hand *chekists* V. A. Balitskiy and Ye. G. Yevdokimov were (skipping a tenure as candidate members of the Central Committee). L. P. Beria, N. I. Yezhov, and even N. S. Khrushchev joined the Central Committee without serving as candidates—all of them were Stalin's favorites. L. Z. Mekhlis and A. N. Poskrebyshev, who had not even been delegates to the 16th Congress but were now in Stalin's personal cabinet, were elected Central Committee candidate members. G. G. Yagoda also became a member of the Central Committee, while M. D. Bagirov was elected a candidate member. Following the congress Yezhov and Mekhlis assumed important posts in the apparatus of the VKP(b) Central Committee. The OGPU was reorganized as the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs [NKVD], which combined several former organizations. This was perceived then as a sign of a certain degree of liberalization.

S. M. Kirov was elected VKP(b) Central Committee secretary at the congress, but although Stalin insisted that he move to Moscow, he did not wish to leave Leningrad. Stalin agreed to allow Kirov to remain temporarily at the head of the Leningrad party organization, but several times in the course of the year he demanded that Kirov carry out instructions far outside the responsibilities of the secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Committee (for example, he helped with the grain harvest in Kazakhstan).

Following the congress, a noticeable estrangement occurred between Stalin and Kirov, who were felt to be close friends. Stalin almost stopped telephoning Kirov in Leningrad, even though previously he had telephoned him frequently. Kirov continued to work actively, and rather independently. For example he gave D. Ryazanov, an "undisarmed" opponent of Stalin's policy who, moreover, had been expelled from the party, permission to move to Leningrad. When disagreements arose in the Comintern concerning relations with Social Democracy, Kirov invariably took the side of those who demanded that the Comintern turn in the direction of the united front.

Growing mistrust in Stalin manifested itself among wide circles of active party members during the 17th Party Congress. Stalin was very sensitive to such "warning signals." He sensed the danger of his position and of his power, and this danger was personified for him in the face of Kirov and many of the delegates to the 17th Congress.

2

On 1 December 1934, at 0430 hours, Politburo member, VKP(b) Central Committee secretary, and first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee S. M. Kirov was killed in Smolnyy by a shot in the back of the head. Some details of this crime can be learned from biographical books on Kirov. But the real motives and circumstances of the assassination, which became the first link in a long chain of tragic events that continued for several years, are still not fully clear.

It was stated in the report of Kirov's assassination that Leonid Nikolayev, the young party member who had shot him, was arrested while attempting to flee. One would think that this would have created a possibility for carefully investigating all threads of the crime. But the entire course of the initial investigation, which was carried out in December 1934, contradicted law and common sense. Nor was the truth established as a result of an investigation carried out by NKVD organs in 1936 and in 1937-1938.

During the 20th Party Congress N. S. Khrushchev described to the delegates some of the doubtful circumstances associated with the investigation of Kirov's assassination. In 1956 a special commission was created in the CPSU Central Committee; it conducted a new examination of this terrorist act for several years. Although more than 20 years had passed since the time of the events, the commission was able to gather together considerable information. Testimony was obtained from over 3,000 persons. Naturally much of it was inaccurate, contradictory and doubtful. But there were also evidence and testimony which could not be doubted and which allowed the commission to compile a summary document on the work done. However, this document was not published. Commission member O. G. Shatunovskaya, who was awarded the Order of Lenin for this work and then retired, communicated that after acquainting himself with the summary document, N. S. Khrushchev himself hid it in his safe, and said: "As long as imperialism exists in the world, we will be unable to publish such a document."

Let me present some of the testimony and hypotheses associated with Kirov's assassination.

In the morning of 2 December, rumors of a visit by Stalin spread through Leningrad. He arrived by special train together with V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, N. Yezhov, G. Yagoda, A. Zhdanov, Ya. Agranov and L. Zakovskiy. He was met at the station by the leaders of the Leningrad party organization headed by M. S. Chudov, and by executives of the Leningrad administration of the NKVD headed by F. D. Medved. On stepping out of the car, Stalin did not shake hands with any of the greeters, and he struck Medved in the face without removing his gloves. Immediately after his arrival Stalin took command of the investigation.

There is no doubt that Nikolayev alone could not be blamed for Kirov's assassination. As Petr Chagin, a party worker and a close friend of Kirov related to me, there had been several attempts on his life in 1934, clearly directed by someone's strong hand. Such an attempt was made for example during Kirov's trip to Kazakhstan. As far as Nikolayev is concerned, all sources agree that this mentally unbalanced person initially acted on his own initiative. An embittered and vain loser, he imagined himself to be a new Zhelyabov, and prepared for Kirov's assassination as for an important political act.

Kirov liked to take walks through the city, and Nikolayev learned the routes of his walks. Kirov was carefully guarded, of course, and a group of plain-clothes bodyguards headed by NKVD associate Borisov escorted him, walking staggered in front of and behind him. During one of these walks the security guard detained a person who attempted to come up to Kirov. This was Nikolayev. A hole was cut through his briefcase through which a revolver hidden in it could be removed without unlatching the clasp. The briefcase also contained a drawing of the routes of Kirov's walks. Nikolayev was immediately arrested. He was interrogated by the deputy chief of the oblast NKVD administration I. Zaporozhets, an agent of G. Yagoda who had just recently arrived in Leningrad. He did not report the arrest to his immediate chief F. Medved, who was close to Kirov; instead, he telephoned Peoples Commissar of Internal Affairs Yagoda in Moscow. A few hours later Yagoda gave instructions to release Nikolayev. With whom had he taken counsel? In 1938, during a trial of members of the "rightist Trotskyite bloc," defendant Yagoda confirmed that this is the way everything really happened, but concurrently he asserted that he allegedly received all of his main orders from A. Yenukidze and A. Rykov. This version has now been completely refuted. There can be no doubt that Yagoda received his orders from persons of greater influence.

Nikolayev was released, and after a certain while he was again detained at a bridge by Kirov's bodyguards, which once again confiscated that same loaded revolver from him. The strange liberalism of the Leningrad administration of the NKVD raised the suspicions of the people protecting Kirov, but they were told that this was none of their business, and they were threatened with expulsion from the party. Nonetheless Borisov told Kirov the entire story.

Nikolayev was once again released, and soon after he was able to kill Kirov. Stalin decided to personally interrogate Nikolayev—in the presence of both his own confederates and Leningrad *chekists* at that. The interrogation was conducted unprofessionally, and it was accompanied by such brutal beating of Nikolayev that he had to be left in the prison hospital for a long time to regain consciousness.

After this, bodyguard chief Borisov, who was arrested immediately after the assassination, was to be interrogated. All prisoners were delivered to the place of interrogation in passenger cars, but a covered-bed truck carrying several *chekists* armed with crowbars was sent for Borisov. One of them sat in the driver's cab. On Voinov Street, as the vehicle drove by a blank warehouse wall, the person sitting next to the driver suddenly grabbed the steering wheel. The driver was nonetheless able to avoid a head-on collision, and the vehicle, which had glanced the wall, was able to make it to its destination on its own power. But Borisov was already dead. A medical expert commission issued a false death certificate for Borisov stating death owing to a motor vehicle collision. But some physicians who had been on the expert commission remained alive, and provided written testimony to the Central Committee commission that the expert commission had been forced to arrive at this conclusion, and that Borisov actually died from blows on the head by heavy metallic objects. N. S. Khrushchev felt it necessary to describe this incident at the 22d Party Congress.

After the 20th and 22d party congresses, hundreds of communists and nonmembers wrote the CPSU Central Committee about their doubts concerning the official version of S. M. Kirov's assassination, and they concurrently communicated some facts and evidence which in their opinion could shed some new light on this crime. I have copies of some of these letters in my own archives.

Soon after Kirov's assassination Leningrad NKVD administration executives F. Medved, I. Zaporozhets and some others accused of criminal negligence were dismissed and sent to work in NKVD organs in the Far East. They were all executed in 1937. "It may be thought," N. S. Khrushchev declared at the 20th CPSU Congress, "that they were executed subsequently in order to sweep away the traces of the organizers of Kirov's assassination."

Also worthy of mention is the fact that by as early as the evening of 1 December 1934 USSR Central Executive Committee Secretary A. Yenukidze drew up and published the USSR Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples Commissars decree "On Introducing Changes in the Existing Criminal Procedure Codes of the Union Republics" on instructions telephoned by Stalin. It was made public immediately. The consent of members of the Politburo and the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars and Central Executive Committee was not formally obtained until two days later.

This was in actuality a decree on terror, unprecedented in peacetime conditions, since it opened up a broad avenue for unlawful actions. After all, any "political case" could be portrayed as preparations for a terrorist act when so desired. The accelerated investigation procedures encouraged superficial examination of cases and direct falsifications, and they were a hindrance to determining whether or not the subject was guilty.

On the basis of this decree, dozens of cases which were at various levels of resolution as of 1 December 1934 and which were not associated in any way with Kirov's assassination, but which fell within the broadly interpreted concept of "counterrevolution," were hastily handed over to the Supreme Court's Military Board and just as hastily examined by traveling sessions of this fearsome board. Almost all of the defendants were condemned to execution, as was announced on 6 December, the day of S. M. Kirov's funeral. Thirty-nine were executed in Leningrad and 29 persons were executed in Moscow. On the following days the arrest of 12 persons in Minsk (9 of them were executed) and 37 persons in Kiev (28 were executed) was reported.

The investigation of Kirov's assassination was carried out with unusual haste as well. It was announced as early as on 22 December that Nikolayev was a member of a terrorist organization formed out of members of the former Zinovyev opposition, and that the "Leningrad center" of the opposition had made the decision to assassinate Kirov, with whom Zinovyevites had their own special scores to settle. The members of the "Leningrad center" were also named, most of them actually having been Zinovyevites in the past. On 27 December the newspapers published the "Indictment," signed by USSR Procurator A. Vyshinskiy and investigator L. Sheynin. It asserted that Kirov's assassination was only part of a far-reaching plan including the assassination of Stalin and other members of the Politburo.

The "Indictment" contains many contradictions and inconsistencies. Only three, including Nikolayev, confessed their guilt. But Nikolayev's testimony, which was the basis of the entire indictment, was not consistent with the testimony of other defendants. Nor did material evidence—Nikolayev's diary, his notebooks and so on—uphold the version of the "Leningrad center." These materials were referred to in the "Indictment" as "forged documents" drawn up to mislead the investigation. Most

of the defendants did not admit guilt, and declared that they had never met Nikolayev before. But this was not an obstacle to condemning all defendants to execution and immediately carrying out the sentence.

Back during the investigation Stalin demanded lists of "undisarmed" Zinovyevites from the NKVD, and he himself drew up the lists for the "Moscow" and "Leningrad" centers. According to testimony of former Party Control Committee member O. G. Shatunovskaya both of these lists were stored in the archives, photocopies were made of them, and they were subjected to handwriting analysis. It is indicative that Stalin at first put the names of some former members of the opposition on the "Moscow center" list, and then transferred them to the "Leningrad" list, and vice versa. All persons named by Stalin were arrested.

It must be said that in 1934, Stalin's version suggesting that Zinovyev's followers were the ones who organized Kirov's assassination might have appeared plausible, since Leningrad was the center of Zinovyevite opposition at that time. But is precisely this "plausibility" that compels us to doubt this version. None of the former Zinovyevites could have gained politically in any way from Kirov's assassination. And yet the entire nature of the investigation led by Stalin, and the chain of subsequent events, permit the hypothesis that Kirov was killed not without Stalin's awareness.

Let me note that the part of the USSR Central Executive Committee decree which pertained to accelerated conduct of investigations—in not more than 10 days—was never subsequently employed. It was probably only in the case of Kirov's assassination that it was important for Stalin to ensure fast court action, so as to conceal all loose ends. (The rest of the clauses of the "1 December Law" remained in force, and terrorist activity was the most favorite charge in 1937-1938, since it relieved any concern for unlawfulness at court and during the investigation.)

Although he possessed many traits typical of the people around Stalin, as an individual Kirov differed in many ways from him. He was simple and accessible, he was close to the workers, he often visited the enterprises, he possessed enormous energy, he was a highly talented speaker, and he had reasonably good theoretical training. Kirov's influence in the country increased, and in 1934 he was doubtlessly the party's number two man in authority. When in summer 1934 Stalin fell seriously ill for the first time and the question as to his possible successor to the post of general secretary arose, the Politburo expressed unanimity in Kirov's candidacy.

Coarse, power-hungry, suspicious and cruel, Stalin had a difficult time bearing people about himself who were bright and independent. Kirov's growing popularity and influence could not but elicit envy and suspicion of him. Kirov's assassination became an important link in the chain of events which led ultimately to Stalin's usurpation of all power in the country. This is why the version of his complicity in Kirov's assassination, which might have seemed improbable in 1934-1935, now seems highly plausible from both a political and a logical point of view.

3

Immediately after S. M. Kirov's assassination, meetings were held in all of the country's enterprises and institutions. The assassination was reported in Moscow in the Central Union of Consumers' Societies by G. Zinovyev, who was then a member of that organization's board, and in the Main Administration of Dairy Industry by G. Yevdokimov, the chief of this administration. It was not before long, in a few days, that Zinovyev, Yevdokimov, Kamenev and many other leaders of the former "new" opposition were arrested. P. A. Zalutskiy, formerly a prominent Bolshevik, one of the organizers of the Central Committee's Russian Buro and then the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee, an active participant of the civil war, and a secretary and member of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, was arrested as well. Zalutskiy associated himself with the "left-wing" opposition, for which he was expelled from the party for a year. However, participation in the internal party debates of the 1920s could not spoil Zalutskiy's faultless revolutionary biography.

Following a short investigation, the first political trial of former leaders of the "new" opposition was held in January 1935. G. Ye. Zinovyev, L. B. Kamenev, G. Ye. Yevdokimov, A. M. Gertik, I. P. Bakayev, A. S. Kuklin, Ya. V. Sharov and others—12 persons in all—were on the dock. During the short trial, meetings were held everywhere, and demands to execute the defendants by firing squad were raised. The investigation was apparently conducted without the use of torture; moreover the names of the defendants were well known at that time. Attempts to prove any kind of relationship between the "Moscow center" and Kirov's assassination failed. The decision of the court noted: "The investigation did not establish facts which would provide the grounds for qualifying the crimes of the Zinovyevites as incitement to Kirov's assassination." Therefore Zinovyev was sentenced "just" to 10 years' confinement, and Kamenev to 5. The other defendants were also sentenced to different terms of confinement.

A closed letter of the Central Committee demanding mobilization of all forces to dig out the "counterrevolutionary nests" of enemies of the party and people was sent to all party organizations on 18 January 1935. The first wave of mass arrests—they were subsequently called the "Kirov current" in the camps—rolled across all of the oblasts, and especially Leningrad, in spring 1935. Mass eviction of ex-noblemen and their families from Leningrad was carried out simultaneously, even though

they had not engaged in any kind of underground activity, or even political activity in general. Anna Akhmatova begins her "Requiem" with a description of this tragic page in the long-suffering history of Leningrad.

Such eviction of "ex's" was also carried out on a lesser scale in Moscow. Reports of the exile of several hundred families or, on the other hand, that almost a quarter of the population had been evicted from Leningrad in 1935, could be encountered later on in the Western press. This was not true. Precise data never were reported, but it may be hypothesized that a few tens of thousands had been evicted from Leningrad, and several thousand from Moscow.

Political tension continually grew in the country and in the party. A campaign of "repentance" and "confession of mistakes" went on in all party organizations during these months.

The legislation gradually grew more cruel. The Law on Punishing the Families of the Motherland's Traitors was adopted on 30 March 1935. All close relatives of the motherland's traitors had to be exiled into remote regions of the country, even if they had no relationship to the crime committed. The system of hostage-taking thus became a part of the law. On 7 April 1935 the USSR Central Executive Committee adopted a ukase permitting children 12 years or older to be tried in criminal courts. In this case, according to the spirit of the ukase, all punishments foreseen by the Criminal Code could be applied to them, including the death penalty.

The "selective" repressions did not cease throughout all of 1935 and the first half of 1936. Concurrently party members were severely punished for "ties with hostile elements" or "insufficient vigilance." The party "purge" that began back in 1933 was continued not to the end of 1934, as had been planned, but to the end of 1935. Party admissions were curtailed until mid-1936. However, most former leaders and active members of the "rightist" and "leftist" oppositions continued to remain at liberty until fall 1936; they continued to occupy important posts in the peoples commissariats, in press organs and in educational institutions.

V. I. Nevskiy, a prominent party historian, the director of the Lenin Library and formerly one of the leaders of the Military Organization under the RSDRP(b) Central Committee, was arrested in 1935. He was felt to be a major ideological worker of the party, and in this role he maintained a certain degree of independence. According to M. A. Solntseva, Nevskiy was arrested after he prohibited the removal of a significant part of the "objectionable" political literature from the library's holdings, and he would not yield even when NKVD workers presented him with written instructions from Stalin. "I'm not just a security guard," Nevskiy declared. "The party instructed me to protect all of this."

At that same time, in 1935, V. V. Lominadze, secretary of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee, died. In that period Stalin introduced the following custom: Copies of NKVD interrogation records were regularly sent to members of the Politburo and some prominent party workers. These records were also often sent to persons whose names were mentioned during the interrogations. Thus for example, Lominadze received a copy of Kamenev's interrogation, during which the latter testified to a talk with Lominadze in summer, during a vacation. During a grand reception in the Kremlin honoring metallurgists, Stalin walked past Lominadze without greeting him, even though Lominadze was the head of a large delegation from Magnitogorsk. Upon returning home, Lominadze received instructions to go to Chelyabinsk immediately. While en route he shot himself in his car, and died in a Chelyabinsk hospital.

Apparently the only member of the VKP(b) Central Committee that suffered was USSR Central Executive Committee Secretary Avel Yenukidze, who was expelled from the Central Committee and from the party, but who was not arrested then. He was felt to be one of Stalin's few personal friends, and not without grounds. Their friendship began back at the start of the century—in the years of joint work in the Transcaucasus. Nonetheless Yenukidze was accused of losing vigilance and of moral degeneracy. The grounds for this were the fact that some former noblemen, Mensheviks and socialist-revolutionaries were "discovered" in the apparatus of the USSR Central Executive Committee. Thus for example, former Menshevik E. E. Pontovich worked as a legal consultant to the Central Executive Committee. However, in the past they had all been active participants of the Russian revolutionary movement, and now they were working honorably in the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee, complying with directives of the VKP(b) Central Committee. Former noblemen, Mensheviks or socialist-revolutionaries could also be encountered then in the apparatus of the USSR Procuracy, and in Gosplan, and even in the NKVD itself. This was no secret to Stalin. The real reason for dismissing Yenukidze was his indignation with L. Beria's counterfeit book "Iz istorii bolshevistskikh organizatsiy v Zakavkazye" [From the History of Bolshevik Organizations in the Transcaucasus], in which nonexistent accomplishments, including those of A. Yenukidze, were ascribed to Stalin. Stalin remained silent during the meeting of the Central Committee plenum, creating the appearance that all of this matter was being resolved without his participation. Yenukidze also remained silent, by the way, offering neither repentance nor objections. Only after detailed and blatantly false testimony of arrested workers of the apparatus of the USSR Central Executive Committee were read did Yenukidze shout from his seat: "If I had Yagoda's power, I could have read even more absurd testimony!"

After all of the tragedies of the past years, the situation began to improve in the economy. The ration book system was repealed in the cities. Industry developed.

The gross production increment was 19 percent in 1934, 23 percent in 1935 and 29 percent in 1936. In 1935-1936 most peoples commissars and oblast committee secretaries were awarded the Order of Lenin—at that time not only the highest but also a rare award; in 1936 there were not more than 200-300 persons who had been awarded the Order of Lenin. The rank of marshal was introduced into the army, and awarded to K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. M. Budennyy, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. I. Yegorov and V. K. Blyukher.

After several years of stagnation, agricultural production began to increase as well; in comparison with 1933, in 1935 the countryside produced 20 percent more, and this growth continued. Following repeal of the ration book system, the sale of agricultural products at kolkhoz markets was permitted. This increased the material interest of kolkhoz farmers in the development of production, since the state procurement system was unable to create such interest due to the very low procurement prices. The acute food crisis of the early 1930s seemed to have been left behind. It was precisely in this time that during one of his receptions Stalin uttered: "Life has become better, comrades, life has become more joyful." Life did in fact become somewhat better both in the cities and in the countryside. All economic successes were ascribed to the "wise leadership" of Stalin, the cult of whose personality continually grew. This was of course not only the result of the spontaneous enthusiasm of the masses. Stalin himself supported and encouraged immoderate eulogies in his direction. His close associates Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov zealously promoted the cult of Stalin as well.

4

The first atrocious performance—the so-called "open trial" of leaders of the opposition—began on 19 August 1936 in October Hall of Moscow's Palace of Unions. The dock was populated chiefly by former leaders of the "new" opposition—G. Ye. Zinovyev, L. B. Kamenev, G. Ye. Yevdokimov, I. N. Smirnov, I. P. Bakayev, V. A. Ter-Vaganyan, S. D. Mrachkovskiy and others, with many of them appearing on this dock for the second time in 2 years. Sixteen persons were charged in all—in the indictment they were referred to as the "Trotskyite-Zinovyevite terrorist center."

During the "court examination," which lasted until 24 August, the defendants described the details of their role in Kirov's assassination and their plans for assassinating Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Chubar, Kosior and Eykh. In Zinovyev's words, Stalin's assassination was planned during the 7th Comintern Congress—that is, in 1935. This act, they allegedly hoped, would not only cause confusion in the party but also bring about a powerful movement for the return of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinovyev to power.

I. N. Smirnov alone, proclaimed to be the leader of the Trotskyite underground at the trial, attempted to refute the greater part of the charges against him. However, he was "convicted" by the testimony of other defendants.

The trial was said to be open. But there were only a few dozen preselected "representatives of the public" in the hall, which was filled by NKVD associates. Other elementary norms of due process were violated as well. USSR Procurator A. Ya. Vyshinskiy did not present any kind of material evidence or documents, and the board of the Supreme Court, which was headed by V. V. Ulrikh, never demanded them. The entire indictment was based on the testimony and confessions of the defendants themselves. Defenders did not participate in the court proceedings; offers by a number of foreign lawyers to take up the defense of the defendants were rejected. The statements of the defendants were all the same, listing various crimes, or more frequently the plans of crimes, prepared for by the "center" and its "affiliates."

G. Zinovyev, L. Kamenev and other defendants have now been rehabilitated, and there is no need to go into the details of the numerous violations of the law during the trial of August 1936, or into the falsifications. But it must be noted that both the trial itself and the sentence of all of the defendants to execution evoked a new wave of repressions that rolled across the entire country. Former members of the "leftist" oppositions were arrested primarily. Each day all of the newspapers reported exposure of concealed Trotskyites, most of whom had never intended to hide their past. "Secret Trotskyite," "Protector of Trotskyites," "Trotskyites on the Ideological Front," "Trotskyite Sabotage in Science," "Serebryakova's Trotskyite Writers Salon," "The Traces of Trotskyism in the Uzbekistan Peoples Commissariat of Agriculture"—articles with such headlines were printed everywhere in those days.

Some of the defendants in the "Trotskyite-Zinovyevite center" case unexpectedly began adding new evidence to their testimony in the preliminary investigation—of their criminal ties with Bukharin, Rykov, Radek, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Uglanov, Shlyapnikov and other as yet not arrested former dissenters of various orientations. In this connection the newspapers published Vyshinskiy's instructions to conduct an investigation in the case on the complicity of all of them in a counterrevolutionary conspiracy on 21 August 1936. Meetings were held in the enterprises and institutions, and demands were made "to investigate the ties of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy and others with suspected terrorists to the end." Without waiting for the results of the investigation, M. P. Tomskiy committed suicide. Radek, Pyatakov and other former members of "leftist" opposition groups were arrested soon after. "Right-leaning" participants were not yet touched.

On 25 September 1936 Stalin and Zhdanov sent a telegram from Sochi to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Politburo: "We feel it absolutely necessary and urgent to appoint Comrade Yezhov to the post

of people's commissar of internal affairs. Yagoda has clearly been found to be incapable of his task in the matter of exposing the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite bloc. **The OGPU is 4 years late in this matter.** This is what all party workers and most oblast representatives of the NKVD are saying."

By as early as on the following day Yagoda was dismissed from his post as peoples commissar of internal affairs and appointed peoples commissar of communications. The central newspapers came out that day with large pictures of the two new peoples commissars—of Yezhov, the leader of punitive organs, and of Yagoda. Yagoda did not head the peoples commissariat of communications very long: He was arrested in early 1937.

It was no accident that N. I. Yezhov, who was destined to play one of the short but terrifying roles in the history of our country, wound up at the post of peoples commissar of internal affairs. According to those who knew him well through Komsomol and party work in one of the oblasts of Kazakhstan or from his brief period of work in the Peoples Commissariat of Agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s, he was not at all some sort of demonic personality. Born to a poor working family, in his youth Yezhov was not distinguished by insidiousness, or maliciousness, or any other noticeable faults, so typical for example of the young Beria. In those days he was a most ordinary, not at all cruel, and even not a bad person. But from his first meeting with Stalin, which apparently occurred during Stalin's trip into Siberia in 1928, Yezhov fell beneath his total, unshared, almost hypnotic influence. Stalin took notice of him, and he began to quickly advance Yezhov through the party and state hierarchy. In 1929 he was appointed USSR deputy peoples commissar of agriculture, but he attended the 16th VKP(b) Congress only as a delegate with a deliberative vote. In 1930 Yezhov became director of the Central Committee's distribution and personnel departments. Not even being a member of the Central Committee, he acquired enormous influence in the party apparatus, since many important appointments and promotions depended on the departments in his charge.

Following the 27th Party Congress, at which Yezhov was elected as a Central Committee member for the first time, his career climbed even faster: a member of the Central Committee's Organizing Buro, director of the Central Committee's Industrial Department, and deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee. For unknown services to the international workers movement, Yezhov was also elected as a member of the Comintern Executive Committee. In 1935 he was already one of the secretaries of the VKP(b) Central Committee and chairman of the Party Control Committee. In 1935-1936 Stalin put Yezhov in control of the activities of the NKVD, which was not very much to the liking of Yagoda. Yezhov not only maintained general control over the trial of Zinovyev and Kamenev, but he also actively participated in preparations for it, he attended the interrogations, and he issued instructions to NKVD officials.

Following Yezhov's appointment as peoples commissar, changes occurred in the apparatus of the NKVD. Together with Yagoda, many of his deputies and former associates, as well as chiefs of oblast administrations were removed from it, and later arrested. Probably not less than 10 or 15 prominent NKVD workers committed suicide. Yezhov brought several hundred new people into the "organs" with him, chiefly from among middle-level party workers. However, many of the colleagues fostered by Yagoda remained in their positions. Yezhov and "his people" had a poor knowledge of the mechanics of the work of punitive organs, and they were diligently aided in assimilating them by L. Zakovskiy, S. Redens, M. Frinovskiy, G. Lyushkov and some others.

With Yezhov's arrival, the apparatus of NKVD organs was significantly expanded.

5

A new major political trial began in 1937. This time Yu. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, L. P. Serebryakov, Ya. S. Livshits, N. I. Muralov, Ya. N. Drobnis, M. S. Boguslavskiy and others—17 persons in all—appeared before the Military Board of the Supreme Court. In their majority, the defendants were known party officials, and active participants of the revolution and the civil war. Almost all belonged in 1924-1928 to the "united" opposition, but then they openly declared their break with Trotsky, and were rehabilitated by the party. Prior to their arrest in fall 1936, these people as a rule occupied important posts in the administrative and party apparatus, in press organs and so on. Now all of them were accused of membership in the so-called "parallel center," of preparing terrorist acts, of espionage, of a desire to achieve the USSR's defeat in the war with fascist Germany, and of planning the USSR's division and restoration of capitalism.

Some legal rules that had been ignored in prior court proceedings were now observed in the "parallel center" trial. Thus the defendants were provided defenders who, by the way, did not even attempt to defend them against unjust and unjustified charges. Having persuaded himself of the dependability of the "investigative" machine, Stalin gave permission to invite a large number of foreign correspondents and some diplomats to the trial. But even this time the indictment offered no documents or material evidence. As soon as Vyshinskiy reported that documents of a certain secret service were to be presented, the open session was immediately terminated and a closed one was scheduled. Once again the testimony of the defendants was the sole evidence.

Statements as to the "espionage-terrorist activity of Bukharin and Rykov" were already quite distinct in the time of this trial. Not only Radek but also some other

defendants described in detail their counterrevolutionary ties with the Bukharin-Rykov group.

Testimony given at the "parallel center" trial sealed the fate of almost all who had formerly maintained "right-wing" sentiments. On 17 January 1937 IZVESTIYA was released without the signature of its editor-in- chief—N. I. Bukharin. A. I. Rykov was also dismissed from all of his posts. However, although Bukharin and Rykov were declared to be "enemies of the people," Stalin was in no hurry to arrest them.

The "parallel center" trial ended on 30 January. Thirteen persons were sentenced to be executed by firing squad, Radek, Sokolnikov and Arnold were sentenced to 10 years' confinement, Stroilov to 8. *Chekists* and representatives of the public present in the hall, and citizens of Moscow who had gathered by the Palace of Unions, met the sentence with exclamations of approval. Next day the Moscow City Party Committee, which was led by N. S. Khrushchev, convened a grandiose meeting on Red Square during which hundreds of thousands of blue and white collar workers approved the "severe but just" sentence.

Soon after, plans were made to carry out a VKP(b) Central Committee plenum to discuss two issues: 1. On Bukharin and Rykov. 2. On preparing the party organizations for the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Central Committee members were informed of this ahead of time. The plenum was opened on 25 February 1937. Yezhov reported on the "criminal activity" of Bukharin and Rykov, and on the "espionage- sabotage activity" of a certain new "counterrevolutionary center." The discussion proceeded in a rough and coarse tone. The legend exists that some Central Committee members defended Bukharin and Rykov, and objected to the mass repressions that had begun. But this did not occur. No one condemned the policy of Stalin and the NKVD; everyone accused Bukharin and Rykov, demanded their punishment, and presented numerous examples of the poor work of enterprises and institutions due to sabotage by former dissidents. Of course, not all speakers were unanimous. Thus Peoples Commissar of Light Industry I. Ye. Lyubimov attempted to minimize the scale of sabotage in his sector, and was subjected to attacks by I. Vareykis. Peoples Commissar of Public Health G. N. Kaminskiy expressed not only doubt as to the rightfulness of some repressions in the Transcaucasus, but also political mistrust in L. Beria, who was for practical purposes Stalin's representative in Georgia and the Transcaucasus. P. Postyshev expressed doubt as to the rightfulness of the arrest of one of his closest assistants who had never participated in any kind of opposition.

The situation had already attained a rather high pitch when Bukharin was given the floor for a response. He rejected the accusations against him. When he said: "I am not Zinovyev, and I am not Kamenev, and I am not about to lie about myself," Molotov shouted: "By not confessing, you will prove that you are a fascist hireling, they are writing in their press that our trials are provocations. You'll be arrested—confess!" Bukharin read a joint statement by himself and Rykov that the testimony against them given by defendants in the Pyatakov-Radek trial and by other prisoners was slanderous. They accused the NKVD of fabricating false testimony and proposed creating a commission to investigate the activities of the NKVD. "We'll just send you there, and you can take a look for yourself!" Stalin exclaimed.

The plenum created a commission of approximately 30 persons to prepare its decision, interrupting its work for 2 days. Bukharin spent these 2 days at home. He no longer had any hope. He wrote the letter "To the Future Generation of Party Leaders," and before destroying it, he asked his wife to commit it to memory. "You are young," he said, "and you'll live to a time when other people will be at the head of the party." This letter was recently published. It attests not only to Bukharin's personal tragedy but also to the fact that to the very end he never did understand the terrible meaning of what was happening. He defended only himself; there were no words about Zinovyev, Kamenev, Pyatakov and other prominent party officials already annihilated by Stalin. He justifies all prior repressions against the "enemies of the party," and the mercilessness and even the brutality of the former ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage]. He writes that he knew nothing of Ryutin's and Uglanov's secret counterrevolutionary groups, while expressing no doubt as to their counterrevolutionary sentiments. He writes that it was now already 7 years that he had been "without a shadow of disagreement with the party," and that "he had never organized anything against Stalin." Bukharin's letter was not of course the testament of an experience- wizened state official, and it was not a profound political document—it was a cry of despair. Nonetheless it was a very important human document. Nor should we forget that Bukharin wrote not only for "future leaders" but also for his young wife, who might be frightened by other words.

The commission which the plenum instructed to resolve the issue of Bukharin and Rykov met under the chairmanship of A. I. Mikoyan. It contained almost all of the highest party leaders, many of whom themselves fell victim to the cruelest repressions of the next 2 years. They voted name-by-name, in alphabetical order. The Central Committee members rose to their feet one after the other—Andreyev, Bubnov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov—and uttered: "Arrest them, judge them, execute them!" When it reached Stalin's turn, he said: "Transfer the matter to the NKVD." A few persons subsequently repeated these words, which of course differed little essentially from the former. Only Mikoyan as commission chairman did not express his opinion, and it was not written down in the minutes.

Two days later the plenum resumed its work. Bukharin and Rykov were summoned to a meeting to hear the decision.

Bukharin lived with his family in the Kremlin. Leaving his quarters, he walked over to the building in which the plenum was meeting. The cloakroom was empty. Rykov entered simultaneously with Bukharin. As they handed their coats over to the cloakroom attendant they were surrounded by eight persons, arrested and sent to Lubyanka. NKVD workers searched their quarters. Bukharin's and Rykov's families had not even been evicted from the Kremlin yet: The investigation required them as a means of pressure upon the prisoners.

At the time that the plenum was listening to the decision of the commission on Bukharin and Rykov, and a resolution expelling them from the VKP(b) Central Committee and from the party was being adopted, both were already being subjected to their first interrogation in the NKVD.

Giving a long speech in one of the concluding sessions of the February- March plenum, Stalin demanded intensification of the struggle against the enemies of the people, no matter what banner they followed—"Trotskyite or Bukharinist."

6

The trial of the "rightist-Trotskyite bloc" case began on 2 March 1938. The chairman of the Military Board was still the same V. V. Ulrikh, and the state prosecutor was still the same A. Ya. Vyshinskiy. This was a very "important" trial: It allegedly exposed the most secret and largest of all "anti-Soviet centers." The composition of the defendants was rather varied: Besides Bukharin, the main defendant, there were A. I. Rykov, who headed the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars for a long time, recent USSR peoples commissars A. P. Rozengolts, M. A. Chernov, G. F. Grinko and V. I. Ivanov, and G. G. Yagoda, who was the all-powerful head of the NKVD but 2 years previously; N. N. Krestinskiy, a highly prominent Soviet diplomat; Kh. G. Rakovskiy, an official of the Russian and international workers movement; Uzbek SSR executives A. Ikramov and F. Khodzhayev; M. Gorkiy's secretary P. P. Kryuchkov, notable physicians D. D. Pletnev and I. N. Kazakov, and some others.

The charges of assassinating A. M. Gorkiy, V. V. Kuybyshev and V. R. Menzhinskiy, of attempted assassination of Lenin in 1918, and of desiring to give the imperialists not only the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Far East, but also the Transcaucasus and Central Asia were added to the charges which were made in the trials of 1936 and 1937 and which were now simply repeated in application to the new ones (Kirov's assassination, preparations for Stalin's assassination and so on).

During the first court session Chairman Ulrikh read the extensive indictment and asked each of the defendants: "Do you confess your guilt?" Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda replied: "Yes, I do." When the turn came to Krestinskiy, he unexpectedly replied: "I do not admit guilt. I am not a Trotskyite. I was never a member of a 'rightist- Trotskyite bloc,' which I never knew existed. Nor did I commit any of the crimes with which I personally have been charged; in particular, I do not admit guilt in maintaining ties with the German secret service."

Confused, Ulrikh repeated the question, but he received the same firm answer. But when Ulrikh turned to the other defendants, they all confessed their guilt.

Following a short break of 20 minutes, during which a decision was doubtlessly made to change the order of questioning the defendants, the morning session was resumed. Bessonov was questioned. When he spoke about his efforts to get the Trotskyites and Zinovyevites together with the "rightists," Vyshinskiy asked Bukharin whether he could confirm this testimony. Bukharin said that "rightists" conducted talks with Pyatakov and other Trotskyites back before their meeting with Bessonov. "Did you conduct negotiations on joint actions against the Soviet government?" Vyshinskiy asked. "Yes," was Bukharin's short reply.

However, when Vyshinskiy turned to Krestinskiy to confirm Bessonov's testimony, he denied it. As is evident from the stenographer's report, back during the investigation Krestinskiy quickly signed everything he was required to sign. He probably understood that preparations were being made for a new trial, and he decided to preserve his strength, so that he could tell the truth during this trial. Now, in response to a new question from Vyshinskiy, Krestinskiy declared roughly, and even piercingly and loudly, that he had never spoken anywhere with Bessonov about ties with Trotskyites, and that Bessonov was lying. When Vyshinskiy, who was confused by this, asked about the testimony Krestinskiy offered in the preliminary investigation, the latter replied that it was false. "Why did you not speak the truth during the preliminary investigation?" Vyshinskiy asked. Krestinskiy was slow in responding, and Vyshinskiy hastily uttered: "The defendant does not respond, and I have no further questions," and once again began questioning Bessonov. After a little while the prosecutor had to once again turn to Krestinskiy, and the latter once again denied Bessonov's testimony. In this case Krestinskiy stated directly that he could not and did not wish to say the truth during the preliminary investigation, because he was certain that "prior to a court hearing, if one were to occur," he would be unable to deflect false accusations away from himself. "Why did you mislead the investigation and the procurator?" Vyshinskiy asked. "I simply felt," Krestinskiy replied, "that if I were to tell what I am saying today, that this does not correspond to reality, then my statement would not reach the leaders of the party and government." Vyshinskiy then asked several questions of Bessonov and declared the morning session of the court to be finished. The break between the morning and evening sessions lasted 2 hours.

Krestinskiy's new testimony did in fact reach party and government leaders quickly. The defendants gave their

testimony into a microphone, the wires from which led to amplifiers not only in the hall itself but also in the Kremlin. There were concealed microphones in different places on the stage and in the hall, not far from the chairman of the court and the state prosecutor, to permit "control" of the course of this complex performance. In addition the entire trial was filmed from beginning to end.

Inasmuch as the trial was a great performance, there were both an experienced director and a group of director's assistants. Space was set up for this "staff" not far from October Hall of the Palace of Unions; moreover the meticulously concealed entrance was known only to the most anointed, and it was well protected.[1]

Following the break, during which the "staff" met, Vyshinskiy conducted an interrogation of Rozengolts and Grinko. They gave all of the "necessary" testimony, including that convicting Krestinskiy. But the latter once again insisted on his blamelessness.

During the morning session of 3 March Vyshinskiy questioned the other defendants. And then in the evening session, while questioning Rakovskiy, he turned to Krestinskiy:

"You have heard Rakovskiy's detailed explanation of your so-called departure from Trotskyism. Do you feel that these explanations offered by Rakovskiy are correct?"

Krestinskiy: "That which he said was correct."

Vyshinskiy: "If what Rakovskiy said here was true, will you continue to deceive the court and reject the correctness of the testimony given by you during the preliminary investigation?"

Krestinskiy: "I completely confirm all testimony given in the preliminary investigation."

Of course, it is even difficult to suppose what happened in the night of 2-3 March, and why Krestinskiy reversed his testimony so abruptly. In one of the stages of her years of confinement, S. I. Berdichevskaya, a party member since 1919, met the physician of Lefortovskaya Prison with whom she had been acquainted before the civil war. This woman physician said that on the second day of the trial of the "rightists" she had seen Krestinskiy in Lefortovskaya Prison—he had been brutally beaten and bloodied. Berdichevskaya hypothesizes that after 2 March the dock was occupied not by Krestinskiy but by a double. Ye. A. Gnedin, who had carried out a number of important instructions associated with organizing the trial, believes this hypothesis to be quite allowable. Kamil Ikramov, A. Ikramov's son, once met a person in camp who had attended the trial and who knew Krestinskiy well from before 1937. This person said: "You know, Kamil, they must have done something terrible with Krestinskiy, because I simply did not recognize Nikolay Nikolayevich on the second day."

N. I. Bukharin's testimony also provides food for thought. It is evident from his testimony that it was the enemies of Stalin and the enemies of the Soviet government that were being judged. However, a thoughtful researcher will find numerous hints in this testimony that cast doubt upon the entire version of the court and the investigation. Admitting his membership in the counterrevolutionary "rightist- Trotskyite bloc," Bukharin concurrently said that this organization was not sufficiently sure of its goals and did not dot all of its "i's". Admitting his leadership in the "bloc," Bukharin concurrently noted that for the very fact that he was the leader he could not know what specific members of the "bloc" did. Declaring that the "bloc" strove for restoration of capitalism in the USSR and that "we all transformed into hardened counterrevolutionaries, into traitors, into spies, terrorists..., we transformed into an insurrectionist detachment," and so on, Bukharin concurrently resolutely denied the charges of specific crimes such as the assassination of Kirov, Menzhinskiy, Gorkiy and Kuybyshev. He also denied his complicity in preparing for Lenin's assassination in 1918, when he headed the faction of "leftist communists," just as categorically. Throughout the entire trial Bukharin asserted that he never engaged in any espionage activities and that he was unaware of acts of espionage. Having described his ties with Trotsky and preparations for a revolution in detail, Bukharin doubtlessly deliberately inserted numerous contradictions into this testimony and, in addition, resolutely denied all ties of his "bloc" with White Guard and fascist organizations and with the English secret service.

Following his admissions to the most unimaginable crimes, Bukharin clearly said in his final statement: "Confessions of defendants are not binding, confessions of defendants are a legal principle of the Middle Ages." All of these qualifications elicited unconcealed irritation in the prosecutor and the judges. During one of the sessions Ulrikh lost his temper and exclaimed: "You're still beating about the bush, you're saying nothing about the crimes!"

The day of 12 March, when the defendants made their final statements, was not free of incidents either. A. P. Rozengolts, who had just recently confessed to the most atrocious crimes against the USSR, talked of his services to the country and the revolution. And then: "I earned the death penalty, but this does not mean that my parting with the fabulous Soviet land is not without pain. We are experiencing an ascension in the Soviet Union which can be observed nowhere else in the world.... For the first time we are living a full life shining with joy and color," and he began singing "Wide is my country..." Most of the audience in the hall—both guests and *chekists*—snapped to attention, not knowing how to behave themselves. Sobbing, Rozengolts collapsed back into his seat without finishing the song.

In a short speech Yagoda still tried to deny that he belonged to the leadership of the "bloc" and that he was an organizer of Kirov's assassination, though he did admit to his other crimes. Toward the end he spoke directly into the microphone with a loud, breaking voice: "Comrade Stalin, comrade *chekists*, have mercy if you can."

Bukharin did not ask for mercy.

Late in the evening of 12 March the court retired for deliberation, which went on for 6 hours. At 0400 hours on 13 March the session was resumed, and the extremely tired spectators, guards and defendants took their places. Moscow was deserted, and there was no one in front of the Palace of Unions. It took around 30 minutes for Ulrikh to read the sentence, which everyone listened to on their feet. Most of the defendants were sentenced to "the highest measure of criminal punishment—execution by firing squad"; Pletnev was sentenced to 25 years' confinement, and Rakovskiy and Bessonov were sentenced to 20 and 15 years.

In the night of 15 March 1938, N. I. Bukharin, whom Lenin called the party's favorite, A. I. Rykov, former chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars, and their comrades in misfortune were executed. It is known that Stalin would almost always have the *chekists* in charge of executions describe what happened if persons whom he knew personally and whom he openly or secretly disliked were concerned. I will not dwell on how the many prominent Bolsheviks behaved prior to the execution. Far from all held their nerve. Bukharin maintained himself calmly. However, he did ask for a pencil and a sheet of paper in order to write Stalin. His request was satisfied. The short letter began with these words: "Koba, why was my death necessary to you?" Stalin kept this letter all his life in one of the drawers of his desk, together with a terse note from Lenin written for his rough handling of Krupskaya.

7

In 1936-1938 the overwhelming majority of Soviet people had no doubt that real enemies of the people were being judged in the Palace of Unions. Even 12-13 year old schoolchildren, such as I, and people such as Ye. A. Gnedin believed this.

Today, now that the USSR Supreme Court has finally rehabilitated practically all defendants of the Moscow "open" trials and declared that no "parallel" or "rightist-Trotskyite" centers had ever existed, it would not make any sense to provide detailed proof that these trials were falsified, or to cite the inconsistencies and contradictions contained in the indictments. We can only express regret that this rehabilitation did not occur until 50 years after the death of the defendants, even though insistent demands to reexamine the gross court falsifications had been voiced both in the CPSU and in the international communist movement back since 1956.

But one question does arise: What methods did Yezhov and Yagoda use in preparing the falsified trials, how were they able to get the "testimony" Stalin needed from the defendants?

The hypothesis has been suggested that well made-up and specially prepared NKVD agents acted as the defendants at court. This hypothesis has been decisively refuted by people who were present at the trial and who knew many of the defendants well—Ye. A. Gnedin, I. G. Erenburg and some others whom I talked to in the 1960s.

Listening to the testimony of the defendants he knew well, Erenburg thought that they were speaking under the influence of some kind of medical preparations—the ways and means of transforming, for a time, an extremely resolute person into an obedient puppet were already known in those days. It may also be possible that the investigators employed hypnosis and suggestion.

Some Western authors suggest, not without grounds, that the prisoners were subjected to various ideological and psychological methods. This is the version maintained by Artur Kestler in his 1940 novel "Slepyashchaya tma" [Blinding Darkness], a translation of which was recently published in the journal NEVA. Investigators Ivanov and Gletkin psychologically prepare the novel's hero Rubashov, one of the most prominent leaders of the party and the Comintern, for participation in a show trial during his confinement in prison. Kestler admitted that Bukharin was the chief prototype for Rubashov, but he also possesses traits of Radek and Pyatakov as well.

The methods about which Kestler wrote were doubtlessly employed against some defendants. Most probably this was precisely the way Radek was made to not only talk but also actively help the investigation in composing the scenarios for the trials. It would have been difficult to persuade Bukharin by such primitive means. There is much evidence that Bukharin was blackmailed, chiefly by threats of reprisals against his young wife and his sick and elderly father, and by the threat of giving his tiny son over to a children's home. During the first months of the investigation Bukharin's family continued to live in its Kremlin quarters, and notes from his wife, books from his home library and photographs of his son were passed to him. It all ended when Bukharin was broken, and he began providing the "needed" testimony. His wife was arrested before the beginning of the trial.

However, torture was the principal implement of influence upon the majority of the participants of court proceedings. In 1938 VKP(b) member N. K. Ilyukhov found himself in Butyrskaya Prison, in the same cell with Bessonov, who had been convicted in the "rightist-Trotskyite bloc" trial. Bessonov told Ilyukhov, whom he knew well from their work together, that before the trial he was first forced to stand before the investigators for almost 17 days without being allowed to sleep or sit down—this was the infamous "conveyer." Then they

began beating him methodically, they ruptured his kidneys, and they transformed a formerly healthy, strong person into an emaciated invalid. Prisoners were warned that they would also be tortured subsequently if in court they denied testimony beaten out of them.

Some were promised not only their lives but also partial freedom, and party, administrative or soviet work in Siberia and the Far East. They were assured that the sentence would be a simple formality, and that they would be rehabilitated by the party, though possibly they would have to work for a few years under an assumed name. According to Ya. Drobnis's wife this was precisely the sort of promise made to her husband during preparations for the "parallel center" trial. Drobnis managed to communicate this to his relatives, and told them "not to worry."

8

Speaking on 5 March 1937 at a Central Committee plenum, Stalin said that only active Trotskyites—those who maintained their faith in Trotsky—should be purged. "There are among our comrades," he declared, "a few former Trotskyites who broke with Trotskyism long ago and are now fighting against it. It would be stupid to discredit these comrades."[2]

Following publication of this statement in the newspapers, some NKVD organs even began scaling back actions that were already "in the plans." But "explanations" followed very soon after, and the mass repressions resumed with unprecedented intensity. In fact, by the end of 1937 almost all former members of oppositions were arrested, irrespective of their current views.

Indicative in this respect was the fate of a former Bolshevik, a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee in October 1917, one of the leaders of the storm of the Winter Palace, a person arrested by the Provisionary Government—V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko. This hero of October, who subsequently commanded not only armies but also fronts of the civil war, was executed in 1938.

The same fate was also suffered by the prominent revolutionary Ye. Eshba, who led the workers rebellion in the Abkhazia in 1921. For a short time in 1926 he associated himself with the opposition, and later on he openly broke with it; he held important posts in heavy industry. In 1937 Eshba was charged with Trotskyite activity and arrested, and he perished.

Both Eshba and Antonov-Ovseyenko have now been fully rehabilitated, as is also true of A. K. Voronskiy, a literary critic and publicist. Voronskiy participated in the opposition in the mid-1920s, but he broke with it.

Revolutionary G. F. Fedorov, who was elected a member of the RSDRP Central Committee at the April party conference, and who was the holder of the first party ticket issued by the RSDRP's Petrograd Committee, perished together with other former members of the opposition. At the time of his arrest in 1937 he was the administrator of the All-Union Cartographic Trust.

NKVD organs annihilated members of not only Trotskyite, Zinovyevite and Bukharinist oppositions, but also of early ones. As an example almost all members of the "democratic centralism" group (1920-1921) were arrested. Known party officials such as N. Osinskiy (in 1937 he was in charge of the State Statistical Administration), I. Stukov and I. K. Dashkovskiy were purged. Most members of the "workers opposition" (1920-1922) perished. A. G. Shlyapnikov, one of the most prominent leaders of the Petrograd party organization in the days of the February revolution who headed the Russian Buro's Central Committee in the difficult time of emigrations and exile in 1916, was shot. Shlyapnikov joined the first Soviet government as peoples commissar of labor, after which he served as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern and Caucasian fronts. Prior to his arrest he was chairman of one of the oblast executive committees, and a member of the USSR Central Executive Committee. Y. N. Ignatov, a prominent leader of Moscow Bolsheviks in the days of October, also perished. In the "workers opposition" he headed a special group of "Ingatovites," but he broke from all opposition back in the 1920s; in the mid-1930s he worked as the director of Higher Courses of Soviet Construction under the USSR All- Union Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee. NKVD organs also physically destroyed A. S. Kiselev, a professional revolutionary since 1898 who served as a member of the RSDRP Central Committee prior to the revolution and as secretary of the All-Union Central Executive Committee from 1924 to 1938. The same fate was also suffered by former member of the "workers opposition" N. A. Kubyak, who served as secretary of the VKP(b), as peoples commissar of agriculture and as chairman of the All-Union Council for Municipal Management Affairs in the 1920s-1930s.

All participants of the Syrtsov-Lominadze group, and all the more so of the Ryutin group, were arrested, and most were annihilated. In the union republics, mass repressions were directed against those party members who had been accused at one time of "nationalistic leanings." It stands to reason that Stalin did not fail to deal with P. G. Mdivani, his personal enemy and one of the most prominent Georgian Bolsheviks, either: In 1936 he was arrested and shot. In the 1930s Mdivani was deputy chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Peoples Commissars.

Concurrently with the arrests of former members of intraparty opposition groups, in 1935-1937 NKVD organs made mass arrests of former members of other parties who were still alive. Only a handful of former socialist- revolutionaries, Bundists, Mensheviks, Constitutional Democrats, Dashnaks, Musavatists and anarchists were spared confinement in 1920- 1930. Many

worked in small cities as exiles in the mid-1930s as well. While they maintained friendly ties or correspondence between each other, they did not engage in any kind of political or, all the more so, anti-Soviet activity (I am not referring in this case to former Mensheviks such as A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, who served Stalin out of both fear and conscience).

Former leaders of the leftist socialist-revolutionary party M. A. Spiridonova, B. Kamkov, I. A. Mayorov, A. A. Izmailovich and I. K. Kakhovskaya, A. Gots, one of the leaders of the rightist socialist- revolutionary party, socialist-revolutionary K. Gogua and others were arrested.

Nor were many elderly members of "Narodnaya Volya" ["Peoples Freedom"] spared. The Society of Former Political Convicts and Deportees was abolished and this society's journal, KATORGA I SSYLKA, was shut down immediately after Kirov's assassination. Those who were associated with terrorist activity prior to the revolution were taken first. A. V. Pribylov and N. M. Salova were arrested in 1935. Members of "Narodnaya Volya" who had never been involved in terrorist activities were purged as well. Ye. N. Kovalskaya, an official of the "Southern Russian Workers Union" and a permanent member of the editorial board KATORGA I SSYLKA, wound up in prison. A number of other members of "Narodnaya Volya" (V. I. Sukhomlin, A. I. Pribylova-Korba) were arrested later. Almost all of them perished. Among those rehabilitated in 1956-1957, I had the fortune to meet only one former Menshevik, whose name I have forgotten, one former anarchist—Z. B. Gandlevskaya, and a leftist social-revolutionary, I. K. Kakhovskaya, who not long before her death left her friends her brief memoirs of the terrible years she spent in Stalin's prisons and camps.

N. V. Ustryalov, one of the leaders of the Constitutional Democratic Party, an ideologist of the so-called "smenovekhovstvo" [translation unknown] and a prominent publicist and Russian political official, was arrested and shot. In the 1920s Ustryalov lived in Harbin, and in 1921- 1922 he publicized the idea of returning to the motherland among emigrants. He worked for the Chinese Eastern Railroad as director of the Soviet library. After Japan seized Manchuria, many associates of the Chinese Eastern Railroad returned to the Soviet Union. And Ustryalov returned as well.

Many representatives of other parties arrested in those times by NKVD organs had not only changed their former views long ago, but also joined the VKP(b), they participated in the civil war on the side of the Bolsheviks, and they subsequently worked at responsible posts in the state and party apparatus and in the Comintern (V. F. Malkin, G. Zaks, A. P. Kolegayev, F. Yu. Svetlov, Ye. Yarchuk, G. B. Sandomirskiy, V. Shatov and others). Open trials were no longer held; the arrests of former members of all anti-Bolshevik parties were almost never reported in the press.

This question naturally arises: What motivated Stalin to physically destroy all former members of the opposition and members of others parties who were of no danger to the Soviet government?

The destruction of former opponents was not dictated by the fear that a new and more dangerous opposition would form. To some extent this was simply an act of political revenge. In the 1920s Stalin did not have sufficient influence and power to deal with his opponents, who often spoke and wrote about him extremely harshly. Patiently waiting for his moment, he only formally accepted the surrender of most of the members of the opposition, while clearly double-dealing: He said one thing, but he made ready to do something else. And as soon as he felt himself sufficiently strong to do so, he immediately annihilated all former members of the opposition. In turn, the defeat and physical annihilation of former members of the opposition accused of espionage, betrayal of the motherland and sabotage allowed Stalin to consolidate his power and influence even more. But of course, Stalin's vengefulness was not the main thing.

Organizing political trials of former members of the opposition, of people who had been partially compromised before the party, of people whose guilt seemed easy to believe, of people who had lost their ties with the party and the people and who were therefore defenseless before Stalin, he strove to create the atmosphere of a state of emergency in the country, to frighten the people and the party, to force everyone to believe in the existence of a branching network of enemies and spies, and on this basis obtain extraordinary powers as the "savior" of the Soviet government.

His desire to blame all political and economic difficulties on "enemies of the people" also had considerable significance. Any despot imposing a cult of his personality requires a scapegoat. While in 1928-1932 the kulaks and the "bourgeois intelligentsia" were such a scapegoat, in the mid-1930s it was the former members of various opposition groups.

The logic of the struggle for power in the country and in the party, the logic of crime led Stalin to the destruction of the principal party and state workers, of all officials of science and culture in his disfavor under the cover of the political trials of the 1930s, irrespective of whether or not they had taken part in any particular opposition groups. Everything that happened prior to this was but a prologue and a screen concealing an even more terrifying and massive terrorist campaign.

As would be easy to understand, Trotsky was one of those whom Stalin tried especially persistently to destroy.

During the very first Moscow "open" trial in August 1936, Trotsky was condemned to death in absentia. At this time he was living in Norway, where he was formally barred from political activity. But on learning of the first details of the Moscow trial, Trotsky immediately violated this prohibition: He made statements for the press, he sent telegrams to the League of Nations, and he sent appeals to various meetings. The Norwegian government immediately asked Trotsky to leave the country. But no Western country wished to admit him. It was only in late December that Mexico consented to provide Trotsky political asylum. Trotsky and his wife sailed for Mexico under deep secrecy, under guard, not on a passenger ship but on a tanker chartered by the Norwegian government. He arrived there on 9 January, and 2 weeks later the "parallel center" trial, in which the defendants were predominantly former Trotskyites, began in Moscow.

Trotsky began a flurry of activity in Moscow, but it was covered very weakly in the world press, because he was not popular with either the bourgeois, or the liberal, or the social democratic, or all the more so the communist circles. Moreover Trotsky did not fully understand what was going on in Moscow, and in his assessments he often substituted wishful thinking for reality.

The last great "open" trial had barely finished in Moscow when Stalin gave the NKVD the job of annihilating Trotsky. A special department was created in the NKVD to assassinate Trotsky and for reprisals against certain diplomats and espionage agents who remained abroad in 1936-1938. In early 1938 Trotsky's son Lev Sedov died under mysterious circumstances in a French hospital after a successful appendectomy. His second son Sergey, who avoided politics and who refused to go abroad with his father, was arrested, and died soon after. In that same period mass executions of Trotskyites occurred in all of the camps—both former Trotskyites and those who remained faithful to Trotsky and had been confined since the early 1920s. Almost no one was left alive.

Trotsky spent the winter of 1938-1939 organizing the new Fourth International. His followers managed to convene a constitutional congress, but this was actually an extremely narrow gathering of Trotskyites—only 20 persons representing a few countries. Trotsky was unable to attend this meeting, which was held in secret not far from Paris, and which lasted only 1 day—from morning until evening without a break.

The fate of Trotsky himself was tragic. The hunt for him continued, with some prominent Mexican communists taking part in it. Trotsky's home in Coyoacan, which had been transformed into a veritable fortress, was constantly guarded. Once he was subjected to machinegun fire and then attacked by a group headed by Sikeyros [transliteration], a Mexican artist and communist. The attackers managed to disarm the guards and capture the house in 20 minutes. Trotsky and his wife hid in a dark room. The attack was fended off, the house began to be protected more carefully, and new fortifications were erected all around. At this time Ramon Mercader, a young Spanish communist who posed as an American businessman, had already been introduced into Trotsky's nearest circle. On 20 August 1940 Mercader mortally wounded Trotsky with a blow from an ice axe which he carried into Trotsky's office under his coat. The assassin was seized, and sentenced to 20 years' confinement following a lengthy trial. The NKVD colonel who led the operation and the assassin's mother, who also took part in preparations for this terrorist act, were able to get away.

Ramon Mercader was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title, his mother was awarded the Order of Lenin, and she was received personally by Beria. The leader of the operation was promoted to general, and Stalin said that not one hair would fall from the head of this *chekist* as long as he was alive. In this case Stalin broke his rule of destroying all "who knew too much."

Attack on the Principal Party and State Workers (1937-1938)

1

The flow of repressions continually swelled in the course of 1937 and 1938, assuming an evermore massive and malignant nature, even though most of the former "leftists" and "rightists," of whom there were apparently 50,000-60,000, were already in confinement by the first months of 1937, and many of them had been shot.

No longer making any distinction between members of particular opposition groups and their former opponents, or between people who had once opposed Stalin's policy and people who actively promoted his advancement and themselves participated in political terror, NKVD organs led and guided by Stalin began an organized and planned effort of extermination of the principal party and state workers.

A heavy blow was dealt chiefly upon the VKP(b) Central Committee. As of the beginning of 1939, 110 out of 139 Central Committee members and candidates elected by the 17th Party Congress had been arrested on the basis of all kinds of slanderous charges. They were all soon physically destroyed.

Thus for example, V. Ya. Chubar, a highly prominent party official, was removed from the Politburo and dismissed from all important posts. He was sent to Solikamsk for work at a minor post, and a few months later he was arrested and shot. Politburo member S. V. Kosior was the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee. Following mass repressions in this republic he was accused of insufficient vigilance and dismissed from work in the Ukraine. Appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars, he was soon arrested, and on 26 February 1938 he was shot. P. P. Postyshev, a

popular party official, a candidate member of the Politburo and second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee was also shot. R. Eykhe, a Politburo candidate member and the first secretary of the Western Siberian Kray Party Committee who was appointed USSR Peoples Commissar of Agriculture in 1937, perished as well. Politburo candidate member and USSR Council of Peoples Commissars deputy chairman Ya. Rudzutak was arrested and shot in May 1937.

Many officials of the Central Committee apparatus were executed—K. Ya. Bauman, director of the science department and formerly the secretary and member of the Central Committee Organizing Buro; Ya. A. Yakovlev, director of the agricultural department and formerly peoples commissar of agriculture; B. M. Tal, director of the department of the press and publishing houses; A. I. Stetskiy, director of the Central Committee's agitation and propaganda department, and others.

The well known communist A. M. Nazaretyan, who was appointed assistant to Stalin on Lenin's advice in 1922 and who worked in the 1930s in the Commission of Soviet Control and in the Complaints Bureau under the VKP(b) Central Committee, died.

The apparatus of the Committee of Party Control [KPK] was destroyed together with the apparatus of the party Central Committee. The bulk of the members of the KPK elected at the 17th Party Congress were arrested (I. M. Bekker, N. S. Berezin, V. S. Bogushevskiy, S. K. Brikke, Ye. B. Genkin, M. L. Granovskiy, V. Ya. Grossman, F. I. Zaytsev, N. N. Zimin, M. I. Kokhiani, A. A. Levin, I. A. Lychev, Zh. I. Meyerzon, K. F. Pshenitsyn, N. N. Rubenov, A. A. Frenkel and others). None of them survived.

Concurrently with members of the Central Committee, the KPK and the Central Committee's Inspection Commission, most instructors of the Central Committee and the KPK and technical workers of central party institutions were arrested as well.

Severe repressions came down upon central soviet and administrative organs. The larger part of the members of the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee and the All-Union Central Executive Committee were arrested. The fate of USSR Central Executive Committee and All-Union Central Executive Committee secretary Avel Yenukidze, who had fallen into disgrace, was already described. Expelled from the VKP(b) Central Committee and assigned a minor post in the administration of the country's health resorts, Yenukidze was arrested in 1937, and executed after a brief closed trial. The arrests of members of the USSR Central Executive Committee were sanctioned as a rule by M. I. Kalinin himself, the "all-union elder" and chairman of the Central Executive Committee, and subsequently of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. During one of the meetings of the Central Executive Committee in 1937, Kalinin's secretary summoned four members of the Central Executive Committee out of his office one at a time, and Kalinin, sobbing, signed the warrant for their arrest, which was made by an NKVD operations group in the neighboring room.[3]

The apparatus of the USSR Gosplan was destroyed. V. I. Mezhlauk, an experienced party and administrative executive who headed the USSR Gosplan for a long time, died. His successor G. I. Smirnov, who was only 34 years old in 1937, was also arrested. USSR Gosplan deputy chairman E. I. Kviring was executed, as was G. I. Lomov (Oppokov), the oldest party official who had worked for a long time in Gosplan.

USSR Council of Peoples Commissars deputy chairmen V. Shmidt and N. K. Antipov, RSFSR Council of Peoples Commissars chairman D. Ye. Sulimov and his deputies D. Z. Lebed, S. B. Zoznochenko and T. Ryskulov were arrested and executed.

The following USSR peoples commissars were arrested and executed: defense industry—M. L. Rukhimovich, light industry—I. Ye. Lyubimov, timber industry—S. S. Lobov, domestic trade—I. Ya. Veytser, public health—G. N. Kaminskiy, grain and livestock-breeding sovkhozes—M. I. Kalmanovich and N. N. Demchenko, water transport—N. I. Pakhomov, machine building—A. Bruskin, and procurements—N. Popov; S. L. Lukashin, chairman of the Construction Committee, and L. Ye. Maryasin, board chairman of the USSR Gosbank.

The list of those executed included B. Z. Shumyatskiy, a well known party worker and the chairman of the Committee for Cinematography; N. V. Krylenko, RSFSR and USSR peoples commissar of justice, and an active participant of the October Revolution; A. S. Bubnov, RSFSR peoples commissar of education from 1929 to 1937, an outstanding party official, and one of the leaders of the armed rebellion in Petrograd. Most other RSFSR peoples commissars perished as well.

Peoples commissariats that were headed by arrested officials were subjected to utter destruction—all leading workers were purged. Acting on information about an "espionage-sabotage group" in the Peoples Commissariat of Heavy Industry allegedly led by Deputy Peoples Commissar Pyatakov, NKVD organs arrested other deputy peoples commissars as well—A. P. Serebrovskiy, A. I. Gurevich and O. P. Osipov-Shmidt; chiefs of administrations and departments, and board members K. A. Neyman, A. F. Tolokontsev, I. V. Kosior, A. I. Zykov, Yu. P. Figatner, S. S. Dybets, Ye. L. Brodov and others. The same also happened in all of the other USSR and RSFSR peoples commissariats. Known and authoritative officials of the party and state also perished, to include Sh. Z. Eliava, N. P. Bryukhanov, A. M. Lezhava, A. B. Khalatov, Paul Oras, V. P. Milyutin, K. P. Soms, V. I. Polonskiy, V. Naneyshvili, M. V. Barinov, I. I.

Todorskiy, V. A. Kangelari, S. S. Odintsov, V. A. Trifonov, I. I. Radchenko, M. M. Mayorov, G. I. Blagonravov and A. I. Muralov. These were all active participants of the revolutionary struggle in Russia, "generals" of Soviet industry and the main officials of the first and second five-year plans.

The apparatus of the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs was also subjected to a brutal purge in 1937-1939. Deputy peoples commissars Levon Karakhan and B. S. Stomonyakov perished, and department directors A. V. Sabinin, A. F. Neyman, M. A. Plotkin, A. V. Fikhner, Ye. A. Gnedin and others were arrested. Many USSR ambassadors and attaches in various countries were summoned to Moscow and arrested—K. Yurenev, M. A. Karskiy, Ye. V. Girshfeld, V. Kh. Tairov, Bogomolov, G. A. Astakhov, I. S. Yakubovich and others.

M. Rozenberg, a diplomat who did much for Franco-Soviet rapprochement, found himself in prison. Diplomats V. V. Yegoryev and B. Mironov-Kornev perished. The USSR's ambassador to Bulgaria F. F. Raskolnikov and the USSR's ambassador to Greece A. G. Barmin, who refused to return to certain death in Moscow, were declared outlaws. The repressions also touched many correspondents of TASS and Soviet newspapers abroad.

1937-1938 was a time not only of mass arrests but also suicides. Thus, feeling himself to be doomed, N. N. Rabichev, deputy director of the Central Committee's agitation and propaganda department, committed suicide.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, one of the most popular party leaders, ceased to exist in February 1937. A prominent underground revolutionary and an active participant of the October Revolution and the civil war, in 1937 Ordzhonikidze was a member of the Politburo and the peoples commissar of heavy industry.

A government communique published on 19 February of that year stated that Ordzhonikidze met an untimely death at 1750 hours on 18 February in his apartment due to paralysis of the heart. A detailed medical conclusion was published as well. It was not until the 20th CPSU Congress that it was officially announced that Ordzhonikidze had ended his life by suicide. Stalin, Yezhov and Beria were chiefly to blame for this tragedy.

Unable to confront Ordzhonikidze directly with any kind of charges, Stalin strove to demoralize him. Sergo's older brother Papuliya was arrested. The brother's falsified testimony was communicated to Ordzhonikidze on his birthday. Almost daily he learned of the execution of particular friends and good acquaintances of his. The mass arrests also rolled through the administration of heavy industry; this time the NKVD organs proceeded without the sanction of the peoples commissar, which Sergo refused to give but which Stalin or Molotov gave. After this Stalin shamed Ordzhonikidze by sending false testimony extracted under torture to him. "Comrade Sergo," he wrote in the cover note, "read what they are writing about you."

However, Ordzhonikidze did not believe all of this testimony very much, and he hotly protested the arrests in the administration of heavy industry. In some cases he ordered inspectors in his peoples commissariat to check locally on the grounds of specific charges. Nonetheless, at Stalin's request it was precisely Ordzhonikidze that the Politburo ordered to provide a report on sabotage in industry at the next Central Committee plenum. Stalin even went so far in his provocations as to have Ordzhonikidze's Kremlin apartment searched. I. Dubinskiy-Mukhadze wrote in his book about Ordzhonikidze that on learning about the search, Sergo, who was insulted and angered by this, began telephoning Stalin. He telephoned all night. He did not get through until morning, when he heard this reply: "This organization is the kind where even I could be searched. It's nothing special...." In the morning of 17 February Ordzhonikidze spoke eye to eye with Stalin for several hours. There was one more discussion, unrestrainedly angry, laced with mutual insults and abusive language in Russian and in Georgian.

Some of the old Bolsheviks later suggested the possibility that rather than having committed suicide, Sergo was assassinated. I think that this version could not be thought of as being persuasive.

According to Ordzhonikidze's wife Zinaida Gavrilovna, he was working in the peoples commissariat in the evening of 17 February. On the following day he did not come out for breakfast, he did not even dress, and he asked that no one come into his rooms. He was busy writing something all the while. G. Gvakhariya, a friend of Sergo's, came to the apartment in the afternoon, but Sergo did not receive him, giving orders only to feed him in the dining room, while himself refusing lunch. Troubled, Zinaida Gavrilovna asked her sister, Vera Gavrilovna, to come over. Darkness began to set in. Deciding to once again check on her husband, Zinaida Gavrilovna turned on the light as she walked through the living room. At that moment she heard a shot in the bedroom. On running in, Zinaida Gavrilovna saw her husband lying on the bed in blood-stained underclothes. He was dead.

Besides the "back" entrance which everyone used, the apartment also had a main entrance, which was not only shut but also blocked by bookshelves. It opened into the living room, such that no one could have passed through it unnoticed—Zinaida Gavrilovna was in the living room at the moment the shot was fired.

She immediately telephoned Stalin, who lived in the opposite apartment. He did not come right away—he gathered the members of the Politburo together first. Vera Gavrilovna also ran into the bedroom. On noticing sheets of paper on the desk bearing writing in Sergo's minute handwriting, she grabbed them and clutched

them in her hand—there was of course no time to read them. When Stalin entered the bedroom accompanied by Molotov, Voroshilov and other members of the Politburo, he immediately tore these sheets out of Vera Gavrilovna's hand. Sobbing, Zinaida Gavrilovna exclaimed: "You couldn't safeguard Sergo for either me or the party!" "Shut up, stupid woman," Stalin interrupted her.

Recollections of this tragic day by Konstantin Ordzhonikidze, Sergo's younger brother, who survived 16 years of confinement, are presented below. Konstantin was summoned immediately after Sergo's death.

"I hurried to the bedroom, but they blocked my way and would not let me approach the deceased. I returned to the office stunned, unable to understand what had happened. Then Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov came in. They went to the dining room first. There was a black bandage across Zhdanov's forehead. Suddenly they led Gvakhariy out of Sergo's office, through the bathroom for some reason. After this, Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov went into the bedroom. They stood there by the deceased for a while, and then all of them returned together to the dining room. I could hear Zinaida Gavrilovna saying: 'This will have to be reported in the press.' Stalin replied: 'We'll report that he died of heart failure.' 'No one would believe that,' Zinaida Gavrilovna objected. Then she added: 'Sergo loved the truth, and we need to report the truth.' 'Why wouldn't they believe it? Everyone knew that he had a bad heart, and everyone will believe it.' Stalin ended this exchange with that....

"Some time later the Politburo members and a number of other highly placed persons convened in the dining room. Beria also appeared. Zinaida Gavrilovna called Beria a scoundrel. She went toward Beria and attempted to slap him in the face. Beria disappeared immediately following this, and did not appear in Sergo's apartment any more after that....

"Zinaida Gavrilovna turned to Yezhov and Pauker and asked them to communicate with relatives in Georgia, and to have the older brother, Papuliya attend the funeral. Yezhov said in response: 'Papuliya Ordzhonikidze is in prison, and we believe him to be an enemy of the people; let him serve out his punishment. He could be assisted with some warm clothing and food. We will inform all of the other relatives, just give us their addresses.'

"I gave them addresses of brother Ivan and sister Yuliya, as well as of Papuliya's wife Nina.

"Yemelyan Yaroslavskiy arrived late in the evening. On seeing the deceased, he collapsed. He was moved to the couch with difficulty. When Yaroslavskiy came to, he was driven home. Semushkin arrived after that. This was a day off, and he was vacationing at a dacha in Tarasovk. On seeing the terrible picture, Semushkin became violent. He almost had to be tied up as he was forcibly sent home.

"I remember what Sergo's secretary Makhover said as he looked on in grief: 'They killed him, the villains!'....

"After a little while the arrests began in earnest.... Semushkin and his wife and many workers of the Peoples Commissariat of Heavy Industry who were closely associated with Sergo were arrested. Nina Ordzhonikidze—the wife of our older brother Papuliya (Pavel) Ordzhonikidze—was arrested. Another of our relatives—G. A. Ordzhonikidze—was arrested together with her. Finally on 6 May 1941 I was arrested as well."

N. K. Krupskaya tried several times to protect many party members well known to her from the repressions. Thus during the June 1937 VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum she protested the arrest of Central Committee member I. Pyatnitskiy, who was denounced by the NKVD as a provocateur of the czarist secret police. She said that Pyatnitskiy had been a member of the Bolshevik underground, that he was responsible for the communication hardware supporting Russia's contact with the outside, and not a single failure had ever occurred within the area under his responsibility. The protest was left unheeded.

Only in some cases was Krupskaya able to gain the release of certain party workers. It was precisely as a result of her energetic intervention that I. D. Chugurin, who had presented V. I. Lenin his party ticket on 3 April 1917, was released.

Soon after, however, NKVD organs stopped paying attention to Krupskaya's protests. When during an annual Lenin commemorative meeting she asked Yezhov about the fate of a number of comrades known to her, he walked away without answering. Krupskaya died at the very start of 1939. Her funeral was conducted with honors, and an urn bearing her ashes was carried by members of the Politburo headed by Stalin. On the following day Krupskaya's apartment and dacha were meticulously searched, and a large part of her archives were confiscated. The publishing house of the Peoples Commissariat of Education received a directive: "Do not print even a single word about Krupskaya any more." Her name was cast into almost total oblivion. Krupskaya's books were removed from library shelves under various excuses. In displays at an exhibition devoted to the founding of ISKRA, not even a mention was made of Krupskaya's work in this newspaper.

It must be said that many of the oldest party members who had worked long years with Lenin, and in many cases families friendly with him, were not subjected to repressions. However, they were all barred from participation in party leadership, they were terrorized, and of course, they did not have any influence on the course of events. Most of them were forgotten altogether. Among

them were G. M. Krzhizhanovskiy, F. Ya. Kon, P. A. Krasikova, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevicha, N. I. Podvoyskogo, A. Ye. Balayeva, D. Z. Manuilskiy, M. K. Muranov, F. I. Samoylov, N. A. Semashko, N. I. Shvarts, A. M. Kollontay, Ye. D. Stasova and L. A. Fotiyeva.

Take for example the fate of G. I. Petrovskiy, a close associate of Lenin, a Bolshevik deputy to the State Duma, chairman of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the very first chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee.[4] His older son Petr, a hero of the civil war and recently the editor of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, was arrested. His younger son Leonid was expelled from the party and dismissed from his position as commander of the Moscow Proletarian Division. His daughter's husband S. A. Zeger, chairman of the Chernigov Executive Committee, was ruined. In late 1938 G. I. Petrovskiy was suddenly summoned to Moscow to see Stalin. The latter scolded Petrovskiy roughly, who was then charged with maintaining ties with "enemies of the people" and dismissed from all of his posts. Petrovskiy was not elected to the Central Committee at the 18th Party Congress. For a long time he was unable to find any kind of work at all, and it was not until just prior to the war that he obtained a position as deputy director of the Museum of the Revolution for administrative affairs.

Another example is the fate of Demyan Bednyy, a Bolshevik poet and a close associate of Lenin. Printing of his works was halted in the 1930s. Stalin wrote a note on an antifascist pamphlet written by Demyan Bednyy intended for publication in PRAVDA: "Tell this latter-day 'Dante' that he can stop writing." In August 1938 the poet was expelled from the party, and then from the Writers Union. The doors of the editor's offices of all newspapers and journals were closed to him until the very start of the war.

During that time many people personally close to Lenin were subjected to repressions. N. A. Yemelyanov, a Petrograd worker who hid Lenin in a hut beside Razliv and helped save his life, was arrested back in 1935.

Yemelyanov was already retired. According to Snegov's testimony, with her tears Krupskaya was able to extract a promise from Stalin not to execute this oldest of the Bolsheviks. However, he was not released—he was held in confinement and exile for almost 20 years. Yemelyanov's wife and his sons Kondratiy, Nikolay and Aleksandr were arrested. In 1917, when they were still boys, they helped hide Lenin in Razliv.

A. V. Shotman, an old Bolshevik who led the famous "Obukhov defense" in 1901—one of the first massive rebellions of the Russian proletariat—died during the years of terror. In summer 1917 Shotman was the sole liaison between Lenin and the party Central Committee. The party instructed Shotman not only to protect Lenin in the underground, but also to organize his move from Razliv to Finland.

Frits Platten, a famous Swiss socialist, and subsequently a communist and an official of the international workers movement, was arrested. In 1917 Platten did an inestimable service to the Russian revolution by organizing the journey by Lenin and other Russian emigrants through Germany to Russia. He accompanied Lenin on this trip, and then actively participated in the revolutionary struggle in Russia. In January 1918, when Lenin was returning from a soldiers' meeting, Platten, who was riding together with him in the car, covered the latter from terrorist bullets, and was wounded. Platten resided permanently in Soviet Russia from 1923; it became his second motherland. In 1937 he and his wife, who worked in the Comintern, were arrested. Platten served time in the prisons of czarist Russia and boyarist Romania, in a Kaunas hard-labor prison, in the torture chambers of Petlyura, and in Swiss prisons. He died in the "Kargopollag" camp for the disabled, where he quarried shingles and weaved baskets.

One other very close associate of Lenin—Ya. S. Ganetskiy, formerly a prominent official of the Russian and international workers movement whom Lenin personally recommended for party membership—was executed in 1937. Ganetskiy was the one who obtained the release of Lenin after his arrest in August 1914 in Austria on the charge of espionage in Russia's behalf. This was an act of tyranny on the part of local authorities, but with World War I just starting, the affair may have ended poorly for Lenin. Ganetskiy helped Lenin on his trip through Germany, he met him in Sweden, and assisted his subsequent travel to revolutionary Petrograd. In the last years of his life Ganetskiy was director of the Museum of the Revolution in Moscow.

S. I. Kanatchikov, who was a member of the "Union for the Struggle for Liberation of the Working Class," founded by Lenin in 1895, perished. Eyno Rakhya, a party Central Committee liaison who protected Lenin in October 1917, perished. It was Rakhya who escorted Lenin from a secret address to Smolnyy in the decisive night prior to the beginning of the October armed rebellion. Cadets detained Lenin twice along the way, but Rakhya's resourcefulness saved him from arrest. He also provided protection to Lenin in early October, when the latter was illegally returning from Finland to Petrograd. In the mid-1930s Rakhya, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Finland, was doing political work in the Red Army.

Stalin was unmerciful not only with those who had long retired due age and illness-for example N. F. Dobrokhotov, a participant of many party congresses who retired in the 1920s, was arrested. Stalin was also unmerciful to the dead. Some of them were proclaimed to be "enemies of the people" posthumously, while others were cast into unjust oblivion. As an example P. I. Stuchka, the peoples commissar of justice in the first Soviet government, was subjected to unfounded criticism. In late 1918 Stuchka was the leader of the government in Soviet Latvia, and following the fall of Soviet

rule in the Baltic republics he worked in Moscow at important posts. He died back in 1932, and he was buried in Red Square; several years later was accused of being the bearer of a hostile ideology in legal science.

Stalin also expressed extreme hostility toward S. I. Gusev, a major state and party official and a very close associate of Lenin. He was buried with military honors at Red Square in 1933. But soon after, Gusev's name was stricken from the party history and from the history of the civil war; many of his relatives and friends were arrested.

The name of the famous underground Bolshevik Kamo (S. A. Ter-Petrosyan), who died in 1922, ceased to circulate. The modest monument on Kamo's grave in the center of Tbilisi was removed, and Kamo's sister was arrested. Ya. M. Sverdlova's brother—V. M. Sverdlov—was arrested, after which he died. Prominent Bolsheviks such as L. B. Krasin, V. P. Nogin, G. V. Chicherin, A. V. Lunacharskiy and many others were cast into oblivion. Avenir Nozdrin suffered a more tragic fate. Chairman of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk General City Soviet of Workers Deputies, the first in Russia, he was killed at an age of 76 years while in confinement.

2

The terrible wave of repressions rolled over all of the oblasts and republics in 1937-1938. Up to 90 percent of the oblast party committees and oblast executive committees as well as most of the city, okrug and rayon party and soviet organizations in the RSFSR were devastated. Sometimes a succession of several oblast party committees would be arrested as they were elected. Among the tens of thousands of arrested and ruined workers of the party and soviet apparatus there were many widely known party officials and VKP(b) Central Committee members and candidates: oblast party committee secretaries L. I. Kartvelishvili, I. M. Vareykis, I. P. Nosov, N. N. Kolotilov, A. I. Krinitskiy, A. I. Ugarov, F. G. Leonov, V. V. Ptukha, I. D. Kabakov, K. V. Ryndin, D. A. Bulatov, P. I. Smorodin, V. P. Shubrikov, B. P. Sheboldayev, E. K. Pramnek, M. I. Razumnov, I. V. Slinkin, I. P. Rumyantsev, M. S. Chudov, M. Ye. Mikhaylov, N. M. Osmov, P. A. Irklis, A. S. Kalygina, Ya. G. Soyfer, G. Baytuni, I. I. Ivanov, N. D. Akilinushkin, B. P. Bekker, Ye. I. Ryabinin, G. P. Rakov, P. M. Tonigin, S. P. Korshunov, V. Ya. Simochkin, A. Ya. Stolyar, S. M. Sobolev, S. M. Savinov, V. Ya. Simyakin and many others. Oblast executive committee chairmen G. M. Krutov, N. I. Pakhomov, P. I. Struppe, Yan Poluyan, F. I. Andrianov, S. B. Ageyev, M. L. Volkov, N. I. Zhuravlev, V. V. Ivanov, I. F. Novikov, A. N. Burov, D. A. Orlov, I. N. Pivovarov, G. D. Rakitov, I. I. Reshchikov, A. A. Shpilman, I. F. Gusikhin and I. Ya. Smirnov and Leningrad City Soviet chairman I. F. Kodatskiy perished together with them.

The arrest of an oblast committee secretary or an oblast executive committee chairman was accompanied usually by the complete devastation of executive personnel. Thus in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, oblast and city party committee secretaries A. N. Bogomolov, T. A. Bratanovskiy, Ye. S. Kogan, N. V. Margolin, N. I. Dedikov, V. S. Yegorov, M. M. Kulkov and S. Z. Korytnyy, chairman of the Moscow Oblast Executive Committee N. A. Filatov and his deputy S. Ye. Guberman, Moscow City Soviet chairman I. I. Sidorov and many others were arrested and executed. By mid-1939, out of 136 rayon party committee secretaries in Moscow and Moscow Oblast,[5] only seven remained at their previous posts. Almost all who were arrested, including V. P. Tarkhanov, N. Ye. Volovik, I. Levinshteyn, B. Ye. Treyvas, S. Ye. Gorbulskiy, Ye. Pershman and dozens of others, were executed.

In 1937 the entire Gorkiy Party City Committee headed by city committee secretary L. I. Pugachevskiy and the entire city soviet headed by A. P. Grachev, as well as the secretaries of nine city rayon party committees and other officials of the city and oblast, were confined in a special wing of Gorkiy Prison. During the oblast party conference in 1938 the chief of the oblast NKVD administration declared that the "entire horde of counterrevolutionaries was destroyed" in Gorkiy Oblast.

Almost all executives were exterminated in Leningrad and in many other large cities of the RSFSR.

Officials of all autonomous republics of the RSFSR were destroyed. Gustav Rovio, the first secretary of the Karelian Oblast Committee, a former "Red police chief" of Helsingfors, who helped to hide Lenin in 1917, was arrested in Karelia, and perished. E. Gyulling, chairman of the Karelian Council of Peoples Commissars, was killed. N. V. Arkhipov, chairman of the Karelian Central Executive Committee, perished. Almost the entire leadership of Buryat-Mongolia headed by oblast committee first secretary M. N. Yerbanov, one of the organizers of Soviet government in this area, was annihilated. Tatar Oblast Party Committee secretary A. K. Lepa, Tatar Central Executive Committee chairman G. G. Baychurin, the republic's Council of Peoples Commissars chairmen K. A. Abramov and A. M. Novoselov, their deputies, dozens of rayon and city committee secretaries, and S. Said-Galiyev, the first chairman of the Tatar Council of Peoples Commissars and a prominent official of the revolutionary movement in Russia who criticized Stalin when he was peoples commissar of nationalities, became the victims of repressions in the Tatar ASSR.

Betal Kalmykov, first secretary of the Kabardino-Balkar Oblast Party Committee, Jewish Autonomous Oblast committee secretaries G. N. Sukharev and M. P. Khavkin, Crimean ASSR Council of Peoples Commissars chairmen M. Ibragimov and A. Sameidov, Bashkir government head Z. P. Bulashev, Mari Oblast Party Committee secretary Ch. I. Vrublevskiy, leaders of the Volga German Republic Ye. E. Freshner and D. G. Rozenberg, and many thousands of other workers of these republics perished.

The party organizations of Dagestan and Osetia, of Chechen-Ingush and Chuvash ASSR, Mordovian and Udmurt ASSR, and Yakut and Karachayevo- Cherkessia suffered an enormous loss. In northern Osetia, for example, nine of 11 oblast committee members were arrested. Four oblast committee first secretaries were replaced within 2 years. Even in as small a republic as the Komi ASSR, so distant from the country's centers, the repressions affected a fourth of all party members headed by oblast committee secretaries A. A. Semichev and F. I. Bulashev.

Ukrainian leaders Chubar, Postyshev and Kosior perished. Almost all executives in Kiev and in the provinces were arrested in 1937, including V. P. Zatonskiy, I. Ye. Klimenko, K. V. Sukhomlin, M. M. Khatayevich, V. I. Chernyavskiy, Ye. I. Veger, F. I. Golub, S. A. Zeger, S. A. Kudryavtsev, A. S. Yegorov, O. V. Pilatskaya, V. D. Yeremenko, A. V. Osipov, A. K. Serbichenko, N. I. Golub, G. I. Staryy and M. I. Kondakov. Ukrainian Council of Peoples Commissars chairman A. P. Lyubchenko, who would not wait for his arrest, shot his wife and son, and then shot himself.

Almost the entire family of P. K. Zaporozhets, an associate of Lenin, was arrested. Yu. M. Kotsyubinskiy, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan, a hero of the civil war and the son of a prominent Ukrainian revolutionary and democratic writer, perished. When N. S. Khrushchev, who was appointed first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) was to convene a republic party congress in 1938 in order to restore party leadership, it was revealed that the number of communists had decreased here: In 1934 there were 453,500 of them, and now there were 286,000.

The Belorussian organization decreased by more than half. As early as in 1937, oftentimes there was simply no one who could do any work in the central committee of the republic's Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and in many of the oblast committees. The staffs of several successive party and soviet organs were destroyed. Almost all leaders among Belrussian Bolsheviks perished: N. M. Goloded, A. G. Chervyakov (according to newspaper reports he committed suicide "due to family strife"), M. O. Skakun, S. D. Kamenshteyn, A. M. Levitskiy, D. I. Volkovich and A. F. Kovelev, civil war hero of countrywide fame N. F. Gikalo, Ya. I. Zavodnik, A. I. Khatskevich and hundreds of other prominent workers. Of those who enjoyed well-earned fame in the 1930s, only a few persons survived, including the poets Yakub Kolas and Yanka Kupala.

M. D. Bagirov, one of Stalin's proteges, led the mass repressions in Azerbaijan. G. M. Musabekov, one of the chairmen of the USSR Central Executive Committee and a member of the Comintern Executive Committee, was executed here. Azerbaijan Council of Peoples Commissars chairman Guseyn Rakhmanov, Azerbaijan Central Executive Committee chairman S. M. Efendiyev, and prominent party and soviet workers M. D. Guseynov, A. P. Akopov, R. Ali-Ogly Akhundov, D. Buniztzade, M. Tserafibekov, A. G. Karayev, M. Kuliyev, M. A. Narimanov, G. Sultanov and A. Sultanova perished.

The Georgian party organizations suffered heavy losses. Those who were executed or who died in confinement included, among others, Mikha Kakhiani, Levan Gogoberidze, Yason Mamuliya, Soso Buachidze, Petr and Levan Agniashvili and Ivan Bolkvadze. Mamiya Orakhelashvili, one of the founders of the Bolshevik organization in the Transcaucasus and for a long time the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Kray Committee of the VKP(b), perished. The same fate was also suffered by his wife Mariya, an active official of the women's movement.

Georgian Council of Peoples Commissars chairmen G. Mshaloloblishvili and L. Sukhishvili, most of the republic's peoples commissars, the leaders of many institutions and enterprises, and VUZ instructors were arrested one after the other. N. A. Lakoba, the leader of Abkhaz Bolsheviks and a friend of Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, Dzerzhinskiy and Kalinin in whom even Stalin himself often expressed a liking, perished. Abkhaz Oblast Committee first secretary A. S. Agrba was executed. Abkhaz Oblast Committee Buro member M. A. Lakoba perished.

Of 644 delegates to the 10th Georgian Party Congress, held in May 1937, 425 were soon arrested.

The repressions began early in Armenia. Back on 9 July 1936 the buro of the Transcaucasian Kray Committee entertained a report from the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic NKVD titled "On Exposure of a Counterrevolutionary Terrorist Group in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia." At this buro, Armenian communist leader Khandzhyan was charged with losing vigilance. In the evening following the buro meeting, Khandzhyan perished. According to some information he committed suicide. According to other more plausible testimony (A. N. Shelepin, S. O. Gazaryan, O. G. Shatunovskaya, A. Ivanova) he was shot by Beria.

The new Armenian leaders—Beria proteges G. Amatuni and S. Akopov—initiated terror against the republic's executives under the guise of a struggle against "Dashnak nationalism and counterrrevolution." Their victims included veterans of the revolution Armenian party Central Committee secretaries S. Srapionyan (Lukashin), A. Ionnisyan, G. Ovsepyan and A. Kostanyan, former Council of Peoples Commissars chairman S. Ter-Gabriyelyan, Central Executive Committee chairman S. Martikyan, Party Control Committee chairman P. M. Kuznetsov (Darbinyan), peoples commissars N. Stepanyan, A. Yerzinkyan, V. Yeremyan, A. Yesayan, and A. Yegizaryan, and vintage communists D. Shaverdyan, A. Melikyan and A. Shakhsuvaryan. A. I. Mikoyan and G. M. Malenkov came to Armenia in September

1937, and the terror intensified even more; G. Amatuni and S. Akopov, who had recently proclaimed the republic, were arrested as well.

The repressions assumed a massive nature in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan Central Committee secretaries L. I. Mirzoyan and S. Nurpeisov, all members of the buro of the republic Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee, including the notable scientist I. Yu. Kabulov, Kazakh SSR Central Executive Committee chairman U. Kulumbetov, and Council of Peoples Commissars chairman U. D. Isayev, perished. Most members of the Central Committee, secretaries of oblast party committees, chairmen of oblast executive committees and most rayon party workers were arrested simultaneously. U. K. Dzhandosov, S. Segizbayev, Yu. Babayev, A. Rozybakiyev, A. M. Asylbekov and other active participants of the struggle for Soviet power in Kazakhstan perished.

In Tajikistan, A. Rakhimbayev, chairman of the republic's Council of Peoples Commissars who was personally known and highly valued by V. I. Lenin, and prominent party officials such as Sh. Shotermor, Kh. Bakiyev, S. Anvarov, B. Dodobayev, K. Tashev, A. T. Rediin and others were arrested.

In the Turkmen SSR, party Central Committee secretaries A. Mukhamedov and Ya. A. Popok, chairman of the republic's Council of Peoples Commissars K. Atabayev, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Central Executive Committee N. Aytakov, and prominent party and public officials such as Ch. Vellekov, Kh. Sakhatmuradov, K. Kuliyev, O. Tashiazarov, D. Mamedov, B. Atayev, Kurban Sakhatov and others were purged. Owing to the mass repressions, the buro of the Turkmen Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee was unable to function for several months.

The Uzbek Communist Party suffered heavy losses as well. I have already mentioned republic leaders A. Ikramov and F. Khodzhayev. Others perished as well—D. Tyurabekov, D. Rizayev, D. I. Manzhara, N. Israilov, R. Islamov, and hundreds of rayon and city committee secretaries and executives of soviet and administrative organizations.

The fact that the focus of the terror of the second half of the 1930s was on the party's own active members was obvious even to the ordinary citizens, who slept much more peacefully at night than did communists.

The communists who died in the 1930s were far from identical in either biographies or motives of behavior, or personal qualities or degree of responsibility for crimes and mistakes committed after the revolution or in the course of the revolution itself. Among them were many honorable and self-sacrificing people who sincerely thirsted for the creation of a just society and who believed reverently in the notion that they were participating in the creation of precisely such a society, and that they were only fighting their enemies. There were many people who erred sincerely, or were deceived. There were people who came to understand much of what was going on, but only after it was too late. There were people who were able to understand nothing to the very end. There were many thinking people who were deeply saddened by everything that was happening in the country, but who still believed in many ways in Stalin's leadership.

There were also those who did not believe in either Stalin or his propaganda, but who did not know how to change the situation. There were of course also those who were simply afraid. All of this also pertains to the *chekists*, even though their responsibility for the events of the 1930s was very high. But I cannot relate identically to Yagoda and to the well known *chekist* Artuzov, who wrote the following words in his own blood on the wall of his prison cell prior to his execution: "An honorable person must kill Stalin."

Footnotes

1. I was told these details of the trial's organization by Ye. A. Gnedin (who died in summer 1983), who was responsible in the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the activities of the diplomatic corps and foreign correspondents, for whom he acted as the chief censor at the Moscow trials.

2. Thirteen volumes of Stalin's works were published prior to his death; publication was not completed. In 1967 the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in California completed the effort, publishing volumes 14-16 in Russian in the original design. The statement by Stalin cited above was published in Volume 14.

3. From testimony by P. Aksenov, chairman of the Kazan City Soviet and member of the USSR Central Executive Committee, also arrested in Kalinin's office. The father of the writer Vasiliy Aksenov and the husband of writer Ye. S. Ginzburg, he survived 17 years' confinement.

4. A decision was made in December of 1922 during the founding of the USSR to have not one but four equal chairmen of the Central Executive Committee, each of whom was to work in this post for 3 months a year.

5. In 1936-1937 the territory of Moscow Oblast included that of present-day Ryazan, Kaluga, Kalinin and Tula oblasts.

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[Text]

3

Already long before 1937, immediately after the dismissal of M. Tomsky, they removed the former leaders from the trade unions. Under the pretext of the struggle

with the "right" they transferred them to insignificant posts in the economic or soviet organs. During 1937-1938, almost all of them, including G. Melnichansky, A. Dogadov, Ya. Yaglom, V. Mikhaylov, B. Kozelev, and V. Shmidt were repressed.

They did not touch the greater part of the new AUCCTU Secretariat in 1937. However, they arrested some. This is how Ye. N. Yegorova, an AUCCTU secretary, perished. Her signature is found on the party card issued to Lenin in 1917 by the Vyborg Party Raykom, where Yegorova was one of the secretaries; in July 1917, she helped hide Lenin. The trade union executive A. A. Korostelev also perished during the years of the terror.

During 1936-1936 they arrested many Komsomol leaders of the 1920's and 1930's, who had then transferred to party and economic work, but had maintained relations with the Komsomol. Oskar Ryukin, who was elected chairman of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (RKSM) at the First Komsomol Congress in 1918, perished. Before his arrest, he was secretary of the Krasnodarsk Party Gorkom. Lazar Shatskin perished—the first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee during 1919-1922, who in the 1930's had worked in the Comintern. They executed Petr Smorodin: On behalf of the Komsomol he made a vow of loyalty to Lenin's behests at Lenin's grave. Nikolay Chaplin, the general secretary of the Komsomol from 1924-1928, perished. Aleksandr Milchakov, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol during 1928-1929 was arrested. So that, if we are to believe the false version of the NKVD, the Komsomol, during its entire history, was headed by "enemies of the people."

Together with the veterans of the Komsomol, some of its leaders of the new generation were also arrested during 1936-1937. This seemed not enough to Stalin. According to the testimony of V. Pikina, A. Milchakov, and A. Dimentman, the secretaries of the Komsomol Central Committee were called to Stalin in June 1937. The discussion took place in the presence of Yezhov. Stalin charged Kosarev with the failure of the Komsomol to help the NKVD organs to unmask the "enemies of the people." No explanations by Kosarev were of any help. After the meeting, there was an appreciable intensification of the repressions among Komsomol officials. Arrested were the secretaries of the Komsomol Central Committee P. Gershenin and Fayberg; V. Chemodanov, a member of the ispolkom of the Communist Youth International (KIM); the Komsomol Central Committee members D. Lukyanov, G. Lebedev and A. Kurylev; B. Bubekin, the editor of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA; and the secretaries of the republic and oblast organizations—S. Andreyev, K. Tayshitov, I. Artykov, V. Aleksandrov...

In November 1938, a regular plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee took place in Moscow under the chairmanship of A. A. Andreyev, at which Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov were present. The plenum decided to remove the general secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, A. V. Kosarev, and the majority of his closest advisers from the posts they occupied. The life of many of them during the revolution and the Civil War was similar to the life of Pavel Korchagin. All of them, like thousands of others, young people full of energy, they arrested, declared "enemies of the people" and "spies"; the majority they executed or let rot in the camps.

4

At the end of the 1930's, the leadership of the Soviet Union clearly was aware of the inevitability of war with the fascist states, which had already begun their aggression in Abessinia, Spain, China, and the center of Europe. At this alarming time, Stalin and the organs of the NKVD struck a blow at the cadres of the Red Army, having destroyed tens of thousands of its best commanders and commissars in the course of 2 years.

The first arrest of the military took place at the end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937: The outstanding commanders and heroes of the Civil War, I. I. Garkavy, I. Turovsky, G. D. Gay, Yu. V. Sablin, D. M. Shmidt, and B. Kuzmich, were accused of relations with the Trotskyites.

On 11 June 1937, the press reported the bringing to trial, before the Military Collegium, of a group of the greatest commanders: M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, B. M. Feldman, A. I. Kork, R. P. Eydeman, V. M. Prmakov, and V. K. Putna. On the same day, they were sentenced to be shot.

Among the most outstanding commanders of the Red Army, a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee, Yakir, prior to his arrest, commanded the Kiev special military district. Uborevich, too, was a very outstanding military leader. In 1919, at 22 years of age, he commanded the 14th Army, which at Orel inflicted defeat on the crack divisions of Denikin, and in 1922—the army of the Far Eastern Republic, he headed the assault on Spassk and the liberation of Vladivostok. Before his arrest, he was the commander of the Belorussian Military District. A recent USSR first deputy people's commissar for defense, Tukhachevsky was, after Frunze, the most outstanding military figure.

Ya. B. Gamarnik, chief of the Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) and deputy people's commissar of defense, a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee in those days, according to the press, "having become confused in his relations with the enemies of the people," end his life by committing suicide.

All of this, however, was only the beginning. Speaking in August 1937 at a conference of army political workers, Stalin called for the extirpation of the "enemies of the people" in the army and for their denunciation. The next

day, Voroshilov and Yezhov issued an order which stated that there was an extensive network of spies in the army. All those who somehow were connected with spies were ordered to admit this, and those who knew or suspected spying activity—to inform.

In the second half of 1937 and in 1938, the organs of repressions inflicted a number of terrible blows on the basic leadership core of the Red Army—from the commanders of districts and fleets to troop and batallion commanders.

Among those who were arrested and who perished were A. I. Yegorov, the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, who in 1919 had directed the rout of Denikin, and the deputy people's commissar of defense, I. F. Fedko, a hero of the Civil War and a holder of four Orders of the Red Banner. Executed was Marshal V. K. Blyukher, commander of the Special Far Eastern Army and a hero of the Civil War. Stalin decided not to openly announce the arrest of Blyukher, who enjoyed enormous popularity in the country and in the army.

V. M. Orlov and Ya. I. Alksnis, deputies of the People's Commissariat of Defense for Naval Affairs, and A. I. Sedyakin, E. F. Appog, G. Bokis, N. N. Petin, Ya. M. Fishman, R. V. Longva, and A. I. Gekker, chiefs of departments of the people's commissariat, I. Ye. Slavin, army commissar, G. A. Osepyan and A. S. Bulin, recent deputies of Gamarnik for the Political Administration of the Red Army, and G. D. Bazilevich, secretary of the Defense Committee of the USSR Council of People's Commissars.

They executed almost all of the commanders of the military districts—heroes of the Civil War: P. Ye. Dybenko, N. V. Kuybyshev, S. Ye. Gribov, N. D. Kashirin, M. D. Velikanov, I. P. Belov, I. K. Gryaznov, Ya. P. Gaylit, and I. N. Dubovy.

The corps and army commanders, A. N. Borisenko, M. K. Levandovsky, V. V. Khripin, A. Ya. Lapin, and Ye. I. Kovtyukh—the hero of the Tamanskiy Campaign, described by Serafimovich in the novel "Zheleznyy potok" ["Iron Production Line"], and I. I. Vatsetis, former commander of the renowned Latvian division and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the RSFSR, perished. The heroes of the Civil War I. S. Kutyakov, who replaced Chapayev in the post of commander of the 25th Division, D. F. Serdich, I. Ya. Strod, B. S. Gorbachev, and V. M. Molin, were executed.

G. Kh. Eykhe, who in the past had commanded the 5th Army of the Easter Front and near Irkutsk had defeated the main forces of Kolchak, was arrested. (Eykhe is one of the few commanders who lived in confinement for many years until rehabilitation).

The flag officers, admirals and vice-admirals commanding fleets, flotillas, and special units, M. V. Viktorov, I. K. Kozhanov, K. I. Dushenov, A. K. Bekman, A. S. Grishin, D. G. Duplitsky, G. P. Kireyev, I. M. Ludri, G. S. Okunev, V. M. Smirnov, E. S. Pantserzhansky, and S. P. Stavitsky, perished.

Almost all military academies of the Red Army were subject to devastation. Their heads, S. A. Pugachev, B. M. Ippo, M. Ya. Germanovich, D. A. Kuchinsky, A. Ya. Sazontov, A. I. Todorsky, as well as hundreds of teachers and even students, were arrested. In so doing, the prominent representatives of military science, P. I. Bakulich, I. A. Verkhovsky, A. V. Pavlov, A. A. Svechin, and others perished.

All leading political workers of the army and navy, as well as members of the Military Councils and heads of the political administrations of almost all military districts—M. P. Amelin, L. A. Aronshtam, G. I. Veklichev, G. D. Khakhanyan, A. M. Vitte, and A. I. Mezis, were physically destroyed.

Among the heroes of the Civil War who perished during the years of repression and already were no longer serving in the army, are the secretary of the USSR Central Executive Committee I. S. Unshlikht, who previously headed the Administration of the Air Force, as well as R. I. Berzin, who during 1918-1920 commanded the 3rd and 9th armies and later worked in the military industry. D. P. Zhloba, the commander of the renowned "Steel Division," who had transferred to economic work in the Kuban, was arrested.

Stalin also did not spare many former military commanders who already no longer had the possibility of working. Thus, V. I. Shorin was executed, who had commanded armies and fronts during the Civil War. In 1925 he went into retirement because of age and the state of his health. In the order of the Revolutionary Military Council apropos of this, the enormous services of Shorin to Soviet power was noted. For the first time in the history of the Red Army, the Revolutionary-Military Council decided to leave the name of Shorin in its list forever. Stalin erased his name from the army lists and sanctioned the execution of the 68-year old hero.

During the pre-war years, 3 of 5 marshals of the USSR were arrested, 15 of 16 army commanders, all corps and almost all division and brigade commanders, about half of the troop commanders, all army commissars, almost all corps, division and brigade commissars, as well as many, many representatives of the middle and younger command staff. There were equally heavy losses in the Navy. Not in any other war has any army ever incurred such losses in the command staff as the Red Army incurred during the pre-war years.

The work of the military academies of many, many years on cadre training was reduced to nought. The fall check in 1940 showed that not one of the 225 troop commanders enlisted in the muster had an academic education, only 25 had been graduated from military school, and the remaining 200—courses for second lieutenants. At

the beginning of 1940, 70 percent of the division and troop commanders had occupied these posts for only about 1 year. And this in anticipation of war!

In making plans for the attack on the USSR, Hitler took into account that the best cadres of the Red Army had been destroyed. "The first-class staff of Soviet higher military cadres was exterminated by Stalin in 1937," Hitler told General Keitel. "Thus, the necessary minds in the rising replacements are still absent." And at the conference of the highest Nazi generals apropos of the preparation of the attack on the USSR on 9 January 1941, he declared: "They do not have good military leaders."

5

It is difficult to speak of the majority of officials of the punitive and the court and investigation organs as honest people. They took an active part in the repression campaigns of the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1030's and prepared the first large trial against the former leader of the opposition. However, the degeneration and political disintegration among the NKVD leadership did not go as quickly as it was necessary to Stalin. In ordering to direct the edge of the repressions against the core of the party and the state, Stalin decided to bring about a fundamental change in the composition of the punitive organs as well. Moreover, these people knew "too much," and tyrants do not like witnesses to their crimes.

Soon after the arrest of Yagoda, his deputies and closest assistants—V. A. Balitsky, Ya. S. Agranov, G. A. Molchanov, L. G. Mironov, M. I. Gay, A. M. Shanin, and Z. B. Katsnelson were arrested and executed, and the chief of the Foreign Departments of the NKVD, A. A. Slutsky, was poisoned. Stalin sanctioned the execution of one of those whom he trusted especially—the chief of the Operational Department of the NKVD, the commander of the Kremlin and the de facto chief of Kremlin security, K. V. Pauker.

Having participated in the organization of the trial of the "industrial party," Y. G. Yevdokimov in 1936 transferred to party work in Rostov Oblast and labored quite a lot over its "purification" of "enemies of the people." In 1937 they executed him. T. D. Deribas, the leader of the "organs" in the Far East, perished. According to the testimony of P. I. Shabalkin, Deribas objected to unfounded repressions. During 1936-1937, the well-known Chekists M. Latsis, S. Messing, N. Bystrykh, S. Styrne, A. Artuzov, G. Blagonravov, S. Arshakuni, A. Pillir, V. P. Dombrovsky, M. V. Slonimsky, N. G. Krapivyansky, G. Ye. Prokofyev, L. B. Zalin, T. Lordkipanidze, and B. A. Zak perished. As the former Chekists and Old Bolsheviks S. O. Gazaryan, M. V. Ostrogradsky, and M. M. Ishov testify, in the majority these NKVD workers were subjectively honest people and did not want to take part in the destruction of party cadres. Thus, Artuzov, speaking at the NKVD aktiv in 1937, said: "In the presence of the sergeant-major style of leadership that was established after the death of Menzhinsky, some Chekists and even whole links of our organizations entered upon a most dangerous path of transformation into simple technicians of the apparatus of the internal departments, with all its shortcomings, placing us on one plank with the despised security organs of the capitalists."

After this appearance, they arrested Artuzov and soon executed him. V. N. Mantsev, a personal friend of Dzerzhinsky, was executed. For refusal to apply the "new methods" of investigation, the Belorussian people's commissar of internal affairs, I. M. Leplevsky, was executed. The honored Chekist F. T. Fomin was arrested. The well-known Chekist and pedagogue M. S. Pogrebinsky, the organizer and leader of children's communes, ended his life with suicide. Pogrebinsky, who had been appointed head of the Gorki Oblast Administration of the NKVD, as indicated in a letter written before his death, did not want to carry out the criminal orders of the "center." Kursky, an investigator for especially important cases, also took his own life, having not long before this been decorated with the Order of Lenin for the "successful preparation of the trial of the "parallel center." True, the reason for his suicide was sooner fear than pangs of conscience.

In 1937 the organizer of the first camps in Kolyma, the former commander of the Latvian Rifle Division, E. P. Berzin, was executed. The members of the collegium of the NKVD, I. D. Kashirin, G. I. Boky, and Ya. Kh. Peters, the former adviser of Dzerzhinsky, perished.

In his memoirs "Eto ne dolzhno povtoritsya" [This Must Not be Repeated], published recently, the old Chekist S. O. Gazaryan, who was arrested in 1937 and survived the years of confinement, described in detail on the example of Georgia, the terrible situation of the terror, which took shape at that time in the NKVD. The staff members of Georgia's NKVD were arrested and tortured by their former colleagues and subordinates. At the same time, the stooges of Beria—Kobulov and Khazan, Krimyan and Savitsky, Dekanozov and Merkulov, Golidze and Milshteyn, were promoted to leading posts, at first in the NKVD of Georgia and then in the NKVD of the USSR.

Soviet intelligence suffered seriously—both along the line of the NKVD and along the line of People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO). Many important intelligence officers and residents were called to Moscow for a "report" or for "rest"—and here they were arrested and shot. Quite a few intelligence officers and diplomats refused to return to certain death. For reprisal against those who did not return from all departments, a special sector was set up in the structure of the NKVD. Its staff members tracked down and killed Ignatiy Reys, Walter Krivitsky, as well as the former resident of the Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU) in Turkey, Agabekov, who broke with his department already in 1929 and lived in Belgium.

The founder and head of the Soviet military intelligence, Ya. K. Berzin, who in 1937 was appointed chief adviser of the Spanish republican government, was called to Moscow in 1938 and executed. S. P. Uritsky, who had replaced Berzin in the post of head of the Intelligence Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense, also perished. The large and superbly organized intelligence system was destroyed.

The organs of the court and the procuracy were subjected to a savage purge. After the destruction of the USSR People's Commissariat of Justice, N. V. Krylenko was transferred to another post and later the general procurator of the USSR, I. A. Akulov, the oldest leading figure in the party, was arrested. Also arrested were N. M. Nemtsev, the chairman of the Moscow City Court, A. V. Medvedev, a member of the USSR Supreme Court, V. A. Degot, the procurator of the RSFSR, R. P. Katanyan and M. V. Ostrogorsky, outstanding officials of the USSR Procuracy. N. N. Gomerov, Yu. A. Dzervit, Ye. L. Perfilyev, and L. Ya. Plavnik, military procurators and men in charge of military tribunals. The deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, P. A. Krasikov, who, together with Lenin and Plekhanov, belonged to the buro of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), was removed from work.

In the 1920's they called Aron Solts, the former member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee, the conscience of the party. He would not be silent when the campaign of mass repressions unleashed by Stalin began in 1937. They began to remove him from matters. He did not yield. In October 1937 he spoke at a conference of the Sverdlovsk party aktiv, criticizing Vyshinsky and demanding the creation of a special commission to investigate the entire activity of this man. A part of those sitting in the hall were frozen in horror, but many shouted: "Down," "Away from the platform!" "A wolf in sheep's clothing!" Solts continued to speak. Several men ran up to the old man and pulled him off the platform. It is difficult to say why Stalin did not simply settle accounts with Solts, that is did not arrest him. In February 1938 he was finally dismissed from work in the procuracy. He tried without result to be received by Stalin, with whom he had worked in the St. Petersburg underground during 1912-1913 and repeatedly at that time had slept in one bunk. Solts went on a hunger strike, and they put him away in a psychiatric hospital. He came out of there completely broken and soon died, alone, sick, and forgotten by all.

To replace those like Solts, unscrupulous, cruel people, ready for anything, came into justice, the likes of I. O. Matulevich, G. V. Lipov, S. Ya. Ulyanova and A. A. Batner.

6

In the mid-1930's, the majority of foreign communist parties found themselves in the underground and, in order for them to keep their leadership safe, a significant part of the members of the central committees of these communist parties worked in Moscow, as well as the basic central organs of the Comintern, the Communist Youth International, the Peasant International, the Trade Union International, the International Organization for Assistance to the Fighters in the Revolution or International Red Aid (MOPR), and other organizations of the international communist movement. The terror of 1937-1938 could not but affect them.

First of all, the Soviet staff members of international organizations suffered. I. A. Pyatnitsky, the secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (IKKI) and member of the VKP(b) Central Committee, in the past one of the closest comrades-in-arms of V. I. Lenin, was arrested and perished. They executed Rafael Khitarov, who for many years headed the Communist Youth International. Pavel Mif, the rector of the University imeni Sun Yatsen, a leading scholar and China specialist, a Comintern leader, perished. G. Alikhanov (Alikhanyan), the chief of the the cadres department of the Comintern and one of the founders of the Armenian Communist Party, and K. I. Smolyansky, G. Safarov, B. A. Vasilyev, and P. L. Lapinsky, Comintern executives, perished. The NKVD organs executed M. A. Trilisser, who in the 1920's was deputy chairman of the OGPU and then headed the Special Department of the Comintern. He had been given extraordinary authority to "purge" the Comintern of "enemies of the people," but he soon became a victim of this brutal purge.

Along with Soviet officials, ;many leaders of foreign communist parties fell under the blow of the NKVD. Bela Kun, one of the founders of the Hungarian Communist Party and the de facto leader of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, was executed. Together with him perished outstanding figures of the Hungarian Communist Party—F. Karikash, D. Bokani, F. Gabor, and L. Madyar. Twelve people's commissars of the Hungarian Soviet Republic ended their life in the torture chambers of the NKVD.

The Polish Communist Party suffered especially heavy losses: Practically all of its leaders and almost all rank and file members who were in the USSR were arrested. Yulian Leshchinsky-Lensky, the general secretary of the Polish Communist Party Central Committee and member of the Comintern Executive Committee, was executed; also executed were: The 70-year old A. Varsky, one of the founders of the Social Democratic, and later also the Communist, Party of Poland; Vera Kostsheva (Maria Koshutskaya), who had given more than 40 years to the workers' movement of Poland; Edvard Prukhnyak and Bronkovsky, members of the party's Central Committee; G. Genrikhovsky and Yezhi Ryng, members of the Polish CP Politburo, who were lured from Poland allegedly for "consultation." The leaders of the communist parties of the Western Ukraine and Belorussia—R. D. Volf, I. K. Loginovich, M. S. Maysky, N. P. Maslovsky, and others—were also arrested. Not only Polish communists were repressed, but also many Polish

emigrants who lived mainly in the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the summer of 1938, when the development of the anti-fascist movement began in Poland, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted a decision concerning the dismissal of the Polish Communist Party, as well as the communist parties of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, the Polish Komsomol and all communist organizations in Poland. The decision was justified with the "penetration" of the Polish Communist Party by Polish intelligence agents. All this produced an oppressive impression on the communists in Poland itself, a significant part of whom were in confinement there, and demoralized many who were sympathetic to the communists.

The following became victims of the repressions: The members of the central committees of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian communist parties—Kh. Pegelman, Yan Anvelt, Ya. Berzin (Znemelis), Ya. Lentsmanis, E. Apine, Ya. Krumin (Pilat), Rudolf Endrup, Ye. Taukayte, N. Yanson, F. Deglav, R. Mirring, O. Ryastas, I. Kyaspert, R. Vakman, E. Zandreyter, F. Pauzer, O. Dzenis, and many others. The activity of the central committees of the communist parties of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, was stopped for a number of years, the ties of these parties with the Comintern were broken, and even a numnber of city party committees ceased to work. Thousands of political emigres from the Baltic were arrested and the Latvian Department of the Pedagogical Institute imeni Gertsen in Leningrad was closed. The House of Culture of the Latvians and the Estonian Club were closed, and Latvian and Estonian newspapers ceased to be published in the USSR.

Numerous arrests were carried out among the communists of Bessarabia, Iran, Turkey, and Romania, who were in emigration in the Soviet Union. A. Sultan-Zade, the leader of the Iranian Communist Party, perished during these years, and the leader of the Mexican Communist Party, Gomez, was arrested.

Havoc was visited on the leading cadres of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Filipp Boshkovich, one of its founders, perished. Milan Gorkich (Iosip Chizhinski), general secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and member of the VKP(b), who had worked in Moscow in 1932, was executed. Vladimir Chopik, one of the commanders of the International Brigades, who had returned from Spain, perished. S. Tsviich, D. Tsviich, Forvatin, Tsiliga, Popovich, and Novakovich, outstanding figures of the party, were arrested. According to the testimony of Tito, the question of disbanding the Yugoslav Communist Party was discussed since practically all its leaders and activists, who were in the USSR, had been arrested. "I was alone," said Tito. The Comintern nevertheless allowed him to form a new Central Committee, and Tito hastened to transfer the leadership of the party to Yugoslavia. In the Yugoslav underground he felt more assured than in the Hotel Lyuks in Moscow. In all more than 100 activists of the Yugoslav Communist Party perished in the torture chambers of the NKVD.

The cadres of the Bulgarian Communist Party suffered significantly. Its representatives in the Comintern, Iskrov and Stomonyakov, were arrested. They also arrested Popov and Tanev, whom together with G. Dimitrov, they tried at the famous Leipzig Trial in 1934. After the fascist court was forced to vindicate the defendants, the USSR granted Soviet citizenship to Dimitrov, Tanev and Popov. After 3 years, Popov and Tanev were sentenced on the basis of slanderous accusations (Popov lived until the 20th CPSU Congress). M. L. Stoyanov, I. Pavlov, G. Lambov and many others—outstanding figures in the Bulgarian Communist Party—were arrested. Hundreds of emigre communists from Bulgaria perished—they lived and worked mainly in Odessa Oblast, closer to their homeland. And although G. Dmitrov succeeded in saving a few Bulgarians from the repressions, he not only had to be silent when he found out about the arrests of comrades, but even had to sanction the arrests in the Comintern on the basis of a falsified dossier delivered to him from the NKVD which he could not verify. A special dossier was also set up on Dimitrov himself.

The representative of China in the Comintern, Go Shaotan, was arrested, as were a number of other Chinese communists. The leaders of the Indian Communist Party—Mukerdzhi, Chattapadkhyaya and Lokhani were exterminated. The Korean section of the Comintern in the USSR was completely liquidated.

Hitler unleashed a bloody terror against the German Communist Party—the largest of the communist parties at the beginning of the 1930's in Western Europe. No less brutal a terror came down on the German anti-fascists who had emigrated to the USSR. The JOURNAL DE MOSCOU, in the issue No 19 of 12 April 1938, wrote: "It would not be an exaggeration in any case to say that every Japanese living abroad is a spy, and that every German living abroad is an agent of the Gestapo." By the end of April 1938, the representatives of Germany in the Executive Committee of the Comintern registered 842 German anti-fascists arrested by the NKVD. In reality there were more of them. Many of them were arrested directly in the House of the Political Emigrant, which existed at that time in Moscow. Among the German communists who were arrested and perished were three members of the Politburo of the German Communist Party—Hermann Remmele, Fritz Schuldtke, and Hermann Schuberg, as well as members of the German Communist Party Central Committee—Hans Kannenberger (the leader of the illegal military apparatus of the Central Committee), Hugo Eberlein (a participant of the First Comintern Congress), Werner Hirsch (the secretary of Thaelmann), and others. They excluded from the party one of the best foreign Comintern workers, Willi Muenzenberg, who had refused to come to

Moscow from Paris for certain death. In 1940 Muenzenberg was killed in France under unexplained circumstances.

Several hundred participants of the February anti-fascist armed action in Austria escaped to the USSR. They accepted the Schutzbund members as heroes, but in 1937-1938 almost all of them turned out to be in prison.

After the conclusion, in September 1939, of an agreement on friendship with Germany, Stalin committed an unprecedented crime: A large group of German anti-fascists, including Jews, was handed over to the Gestapo. The Gestapo also handed over to the NKVD a number of people about whom I do not have any information. Almost all those who were handed over from the USSR to the Gestapo lived to the end of the war. Almost all the German anti-fascists who remained in the USSR perished. From the fall of 1939, Soviet borders were closed for refugees from fascist-enslaved Europe.

Many Italian communists perished, among them Edmondo Peluzo, who had carried out responsible instructions of the Comintern. P. Robotti, the brother-in-law of Togliatti, was arrested and subjected to torture, but survived. After Stalin's death, the names of communists who perished during the time of the Stalinist terror were published in Italy.

Among those arrested during 1937-1938 were Belgian (M. Willems), Turkish (Salikh), English (Charley Johnson), Romanian (M. Pauker, A. Dobrogeanu[-Gherea], as well as Mongolian, Czechoslovakian, French, American, Finnish, Spanish, and even Brazilian communists. At the end of the 1930's, all schools of the Comintern had to be closed: There was no one in them to study and no one to teach.

Not only communists suffered, but also foreign citizens who lived permanently in the USSR. For example, many of the specialists and members of their families, who had come to the USSR on the basis of agreements already during the years of the first five-year plan but decided to stay, were arrested. From Leningrad they sent into exile even elderly French lady teachers who had come to Russia already before the Revolution. (The French Embassy paid its aged citizens in Russia a small pension).

Already at the beginning of the 1920's, long before mass collectivization, groups of enthusiasts from various countries came to the USSR, and, with the assistance of the central and local authorities, established kolkhozes and communes on vacant lands. Well equipped with machines, these farms were, in the majority of cases, model farms. By the end of the 1930's, all kolkhozes and communes organized by "foreign citizens" were liquidated. Thus, according to the testimony of V. I. Volgin, in the vicinity of Rostov-na-Donu they liquidated the highly-efficient Seyatel Commune, where mainly communists from the United States had worked. The majority of them were arrested and deported.

7

The atmosphere of universal suspiciousness and terror that developed in 1936-1938, could not but affect the scientific and technical intelligentsia. Thousands of scientists, engineers and managers perished. Disputes and discussions that had begun at conferences or in the pages of the press frequently ended with tortures and executions in the torture chambers of the NKVD.

The discussion in the field of history, for example, which had lasted a number of years, ended tragically. The critique of some mistakes of M. N. Pokrovsky and his school grew into a pogrom campaign. Many followers and students of Pokrovsky were arrested.

Yu. M. Steklov, an outstanding historian and revolutionary, one of the first editors of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, became a victim of the terror. The well-known historian V. G. Sorin, the author of a biography of Lenin, the editor of the first "Collected Works" of Lenin, and the deputy director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, perished. V. G. Knorin, a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee, a figure in the international workers' movement, director of the Institute of Red Professors, was executed. Already in 1936, Academician N. M. Lukin, director of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was arrested and perished. Academician M. A. Savelyev, an active participant of the revolutionary movement, the editor of the journal PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, and the chairman of the Presidium of the Communist Academy, perished, as did the historian N. N. Popov (secretary of the Ukrainian KP(b) Central Committee), N. N. Vanag, S. A. Piontkovsky, S. Bantke, G. S. Fridlyand, E. Veys, V. M. Dalin, Yu. T. Tevosyan, and S. K. Korshunov. The historian M. Keldysh, the brother of the future president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, died in confinement. The historian S. Lotte, S. M. Dubrovsky, and P. F. Preobrazhensky were arrested, but lived until rehabilitation.

The struggle on the philosophical front assumed extremely ugly forms. The basic discussions between the various groups and currents in philosophy ended in 1932. At that time, a group of comparatively young, extremely active Stalinist philosophers carried the day, who pushed into the background the other trends, which were demagogically designated as "Menshevik idealists," "mechanists," or "vulgar mechanists." In 1936-1937, the "victors", having occupied the leading places in the philosophical press and in scientific institutions, decided to utilize the situation in the country for the physical extermination of their recent opponents. The accusations of philosophical errors of one sort or another were replaced in the pages of the journal POD ZNAMENEM MARKSIZMA by accusations of sabotage

and even terrorist activity. A pogrom campaign, the active organizers of which were M. B. Mitin, P. F. Yudin, F. V. Konstantinov, and B. A. Chagin, led to the fact that A. I. Varyash, I. K. Luppol, V. Milyutin, I. Razumovsky, N. Karev, V. Rudash, S. Pichugin, G. Tymyansky, M. Furshchik, G. Dmitriyev, and many other philosophers found themselves in prison. The majority of them perished, including my father, A. R. Medvedev.

The bitter fate did not pass by the philosopher and party worker Yan Sten. In his memoirs, his friend, Ye. N. Frolov, wrote: "Hardly anyone knew Stalin better than Sten. It is well known that Stalin did not receive a systematic education. Philosophical questions, too, he did not understand very well. And so he called Yan Sten, the most important Marxist philosopher of that time, to guide his studies of the Hegelian dialectic. Sten composed a program of studies and in the most conscientious manner twice a week tried to make his shining student understand Hegelian subtleties. . . . His meetings with Stalin, his conversations with him during his studies of philosophical subjects, in which Sten always referred to the political problems of the present, increasingly opened his eyes to the real person of Stalin, to his aspiration to autocracy, and to his insidious schemes. . . . Already in 1928, in the narrow circle of his personal friends, Sten said: "Koba will organize such things that the Dreyfus and Beylis trials will fade." This was his answer to the request of his comrades to give a prognosis of the development of Stalin's leadership for 10 years. Thus, Sten did not err, either in his characterization of Stalin's rule, or in the time periods of the realization of his bloody schemes." In 1937 Stalin Sten was arrested on the direct order of Stalin and executed in Lefortovo Prison.

A dramatic situation developed in pedagogical science and in the sphere of public education. After the arrest of Bubnov, many of his deputies and collegium members perished, including M. S. Epshteyn and M. A. Aleksinsky, important methodologists, and the scholars and organizers of public education A. P. Pinkevich, S. M. Kamenev, A. P. Shokhin, M. M. Pistrak, S. A. Gaysinovich, and M. V. Krupenin.

In 1937-1938, the people's commissariats of education in almost all union and autonomous republics were devastated. Not only the officials of the people's commissariats were arrested, but also tens of thousands of rank and file teachers.

Aleksey Kapitonovich Gastev, a professional revolutionary, poet and scholar, was arrested and perished. After the revolution he was engaged in the organization of a new branch of knowledge in Russia—the pedagogy of vocational education and the scientific organization of labor. After the arrest of Gastev and his close assistants, the [Central] Institute of Labor (TsIT), which he had organized, was closed and any serious scientific work in this sphere was suspended.

Linguistics and philosophy suffered great losses. N. M. Siyak, the director of the Institute of Linguistics in Kiev, for whom V. I. Lenin vouched when he entered the party in 1919, perished. The outstanding scholar Ye. D. Polivanov and the important linguist and Orientalist N. A. Nevsky, who deciphered the Tungus hieroglyphs, were arrested. (His monograph devoted to this subject was published posthumously in 1960 and awarded a Lenin Prize).

Other sciences found many talented scientists missing. Arrested were the secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A. P. Gorbunov, in the past Lenin's personal secretary, who had directed the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense (STO); the president of the BSSR Academy of Sciences, I. Z. Surt; the academic secretary of the All-Union Geographic Society, N. F. Bogdanov; one of the editors of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, G. I. Krumin; the economist I. N. Barkhanov; the great chemist N. F. Yushkevich; and the organizer of the All-Union Arctic Institute, R. L. Samoylovich; I. A. Teodorovich, a well-known scholar and agrarian specialist, the head of the Society of Exiles and Political Convicts, perished, as did the economist and statesman A. V. Odintsov, the economist and specialist on international affairs A. Ya. Kantorovich, and the specialist on the scientific organization of labor, O. A. Yermansky. The Agrarian Institute was closed and its directors were repressed. The sad list could be continued.

The repressions, or, as the journal SOVETSKAYA NAUKA wrote, "the intensified class battles" affected all the natural sciences. Many physicists, including the future Academicians A. I. Berg, L. D. Landau, P. I. Lukirsky, and V. A. Fok, were arrested (true, they spent a comparatively short time in confinement). In 1932, the outstanding physicist and theorist M. P. Bronshteyn perished. Academician A. I. Nekrasov, a specialist on mechanics, was arrested. The great physicists V. K. Frederiks, Yu. A. Krutkov, S. P. Shubin, A. A. Vitt, and I. P. Shpilreyn did not return to their families and their work.

The outstanding chemists A. Ye. Chichibabin and N. N. Ipatyev, the geneticist N. V. Timofeyev-Rezovsky and others, afraid of the repressions, refused to return to the USSR from business abroad.

The biological and agricultural sciences turned out to be in an especially serious situation during the years of the terror. Already in 1936, the well-known geneticist I. I. Agol, an academician-secretary of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences, was arrested on a false accusation of espionage and sabotage. The greatest specialist on medical genetics, S. G. Levit, perished, and the Medical Genetics Institute directed by him was closed. The famous Darwinist Ya. M. Uranovsky was arrested. The young agronomist T. D. Lysenko, who rose at this time, unfolded a noisy campaign of slander against many leading figures

in the biological and agricultural sciences. The repressions assumed a broad scope. The president of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin (VASKHNIL), Academician A. I. Muralov, was executed. Academician G. K. Meyster, who not long before had been awarded a Lenin Prize for his contributions in science, perished. Academician N. K. Koltsov was defamed, removed from his work, and soon died. The leadership of the institutes for cotton-growing, animal husbandry, agrochemistry, plant protection, etc. was destroyed as "sabotage leadership."

One of the greatest Soviet scientists, the selectioner, geneticist, geographer and organizer of agricultural science in the country, Academician N. I. Vavilov, was arrested in 1940 and died in confinement. This was a serious loss, not only for Soviet, but also for world science. At the same time, the majority of Vavilov's students—G. D. Karpechenko, G. A. Levitsky, L. I. Govorov, N. V. Kovalev, and others were arrested and perished in the majority of cases.

The same kind of pogrom campaign was organized in agronomy by V. P. Vilyams and his followers. This led to the arrest of the opponents of the system of Vilyams in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, the USSR Gosplan, and the All-Union Institute of Fertilizer. Academician N. M. Tulaykov was arrested and perished in a camp for coming out against the grassland system of Vilyams. The agronomist Sh. P. Tsintsadze perished.

They arrested the microbiologist Academician P. F. Zdorovsky and his colleagues V. A. Barykin, O. O. Gartokh, I. L. Krichevsky, M. I. Shuster, L. A. Zilber, A. D. Sheboldayev, and G. I. Safronov. Almost all of them perished. The 73-year old Academician and microbiologist G. A. Nadson, the director of the Institute of Oceanography and Fish Industry, K. A. Mekhonoshin, an active participant of the Civil War, and the biologists I. N. Filipyev, A. V. Znamensky, and N. N. Trotsky perished. In Kolyma a guard beat to death the botanist A. A. Mikheyev.

The medical scientists also did not escape the common fate. V. S. Kholtsman, the director of the Central Institute for Problems of Tuberculosis perished. The famous surgeon K. Kh. Kokh was executed in Kolyma for failure to fulfill the gold mining plan. Of course, by far not all arrested doctors worked in the gold fields. In some hospitals of Kolyma, Vorkuta and other large "islands" of the Gulag, there were no fewer distinguished doctors than in the best hospital of Moscow.

Heavy repressions also came down on the technical intelligentsia. In contrast to the beginning of the 1930's, the NKVD organs now inflicted the main blow not on the "bourgeois" specialists, but on the most prominent representatives of the new Soviet intelligentsia; in any case, the majority of the arrested were members of the party: Their scientific-technical or economic career developed already after the revolution. They arrested, for example, a large group of workers of the Central Institute for Aerohydrodynamics, headed by one of the directors of this institute, N. M. Kharlamov. On the basis of slanderous accusations, the aircraft designers A. N. Tupolev, V. M. Petlyakov, V. M. Myasishchev, D. L. Tomoshevich, R. Bartini, K. Stsillard, and I. G. Neman—then the flower of Soviet aviation thought. In order to somehow continue the production of new airplanes, a special prison institute (TsKB-29) was created within the framework of the NKVD, where also other famous engineers and aircraft designers worked—V. L. Aleksandrov, B. S. Vakhmistrov, A. A. Yengibaryan, A. M. Izakson, M. M. Kachkaryan, D. S. Markov, S. M. Markov, S. M. Meyerson, A. V. Nadashkevich, A. I. Putilov, V. A. Chizhevsky, A. M. Cheremukhin, as well as specialists of closely-related disciplines—A. S. Faynshteyn, N. N. Bazenkov, B. A. Saukke, N. G. Nurov, A. P. Bonin, Yu. V. Kurnev, G. A. Ozerov, and Yu. V. Kalganov. A part of these engineers and scientists were freed in 1940-1942, others—soon after the war, but many were rehabilitated only posthumously in 1956.

I. Ter-Astvatsatryan and V. Chichinadze, the famous town-planners, and A. Dzhordzhavadze, the great bridge construction specialist, were arrested. Many missile specialists perished in confinement, including the leaders of a still small group of missile enthusiasts, the creators of the first rocket engines—the chief of the Scientific Research Institute for Jet Propulsion, I. T. Klymenov, and his deputy, G. E. Langemak, one of the actual inventors of the famous "Katyusha." S. P. Korolev, the future Chief Designer of Soviet rockets, was also arrested. "For our country, all of your pyrotechnics and fireworks are unnecessary and even dangerous," the investigator declared to Korolev. At first, Korolev ended up doing common work in Kolyma, and only later they transferred him to TsKB-29. He was freed only at the end of the war, when his pyrotechnics became very important for the country.

The repressions also affected the weapons designers—V. I. Bekauri, the creator of new types of weapons, V. I. Zaslavsky, the tank designer, and L. Kurchevsky, the creator of the recoilless gun, perished. In the USSR, theoretical and practical work on radar began earlier than in the United States and England. In 1937, the creator of the first radar devices, P. K. Oshchepkov, and the director of work in this sphere, N. Smirnov, as well as many of their associates, were arrested, and our army met the [Great] Patriotic War without radars; it was necessary to buy them in the United States and England. M. Leytenzen, the founder of the Society for Interplanetary Travel under the Military-Air Engineering Academy, was arrested.

The cadres of all branches of industry were devastated. Thousands of directors, chief engineers, leading specialists of plants, combines and construction projects, and railway chiefs perished. Among them the chief of Kuznetskstroy [Kuznetsk Construction Trust], S. M. Frankfurt; the director of the construction of Dneproges

[Dnepr Hydroelectric Station], V. M. Mikhaylov; the chief of the construction of Magnitogorsk Combine, Chingiz Ildrym; the director of the Solkamsk Trust, V. Ye. Tsfrinovich; the director of the Zaporozhe Metallurgical Combine, M. Lure; the director of the Kirov Plant, K. M. Ots; the director of the Rostselmash [Rostov Plant for Agricultural Machine Building], N. P. Glebov-Avilov; the director of the Kuznetsk Combine, S. P. Butenko; the director of Azovstal [Azov Steel-Smelting Plant for Ferrous Metallurgy imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze], Ya. S. Gugel; the director of the Kramatorsk Metallurgical Plant, I. P. Khrenov; the director of the Sormovskiy Motor Vehicle Plant, M. A. Surkov; the directors of the Kharkov Tractor Plant, I, P. Bondarenko and P. I. Svistun; the directors of large chemical enterprises, P. G. Arutyunyants and L. T. Strezh, and the chiefs of railways, G. K. Kavtaradze, Z. Ya. Prokofyev, and L. P. Milkh.

During the years of the first and second five-year plans the cadres of directors of industry were basically stable. Thus, in the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, during all of 1935, a total of 6 directors and chief engineers were replaced. In 1940, for the Administration of the Metallurgical Industry alone, of 151 directors of the basic enterprises, 62 had been working for less than a year, 55—from 1 to 2 years.

In 1935, the journal Bolshevik wrote with pride about the cadres of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry: "Of 200 directors of the largest machine building plants individually considered by the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, 198 are members of the party, of them 11 percent with party service before 1917, 62 percent with service from 1917 to 1920. In their overwhelming majority, these higher directors of the machine building industry are proletarians who have personally experienced the work of miners, machine operators, etc. And now they are carrying out the direction of giants, which stand in the forefront of world technology." In 1939, the majority of these captains of industry were arrested, many of them were executed or died during tortures, during transport, or in the camps.

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The first wave of repressions against writers rolled out in 1936, when B. A. Pilnyak (with whom Stalin had long-standing scores) and Galina Serebryakova were declared to be "enemies of the people." "There was in our midst such a sworn enemy as Serebryakova," said the secretary of the board of the Soviet Union of Writers, V. Stavsky. "We met with her. . . and we did not recognize her as an enemy. We excluded such people as Serebryakova. But who will guarantee that among us there are not still other sworn enemies of the working class?" No one, however, could guarantee this, and the arrests of writers began to assume an increasingly broad scope.

It is difficult to enumerate all those who were arrested in 1936-1939. I. E. Babel perished. Bruno Yasensky died in confinement. In 1938 O. Mandelshtam was arrested for the second time and died of hunger. The following perished: Artem Vesely, V. I. Narbut, S. M. Tretyakov, A. Zorich, I. I. Katayev, I. M. Bespalov, B. P. Kornilov, G. K. Nikiforov, N. A. Klyuyev, V. P. Kin, A. I. Tarasov-Rodionov, M. P. Loskutov, Volf Erlikh, G. O. Kuklin, M. P. Gerasimov, N. K. Guber, V. T. Kirillov, N. N. Zarudin, P. N. Vasilyev, G. Ye. Gorbachev, V. M. Kirshon, L. L. Averbakh, A. Ya. Arosev, and A. K. Voronsky. The following were arrested, but survived difficult trials lasting for many years: A. K. Lebedenko, A. Kosterin, A. S. Gorelov, S. D. Spassky, N. Zabolotsky, I. M. Gronsky, V. T. Shalamov, Ye. Ya. Drabkina, and the literary critic Yu. G. Oksman. They kept O. Berggolts in prison for about 2 years. Mikhail Koltsov was executed in 1938 after his return from Spain.

The writers' organizatoins in the union and autonomous republics also did not escape the repressions. In the Ukraine, I. K. Mikitenko, G. D. Epik, V. D. Bobinsky, M. Kulish and others perished. In Belorussia, Yu. Taubin, Platon Golovach, T. Gartnyy and V. I. Golubok were arrested. In Armenia, Yegishe Charents and Aksel Bakunts perished; Gurgen Maari, Vaan Totovents, Vagram Alazan, V. Norents, and Mkrtich Armen were arrested. In Georgia, Titsian Tabidze, M. Dzhavakhishvili, N. Mitsishvili, P. Kikodze, and Benito Buachidze perished. After a few summonses to the NKVD, Paolo Yashvili shot himself. In Azerbaijan, T. Shakhbazi, V. Khuluflu, R. Akhundov, Guseyn Dzhavid, and Seyd Guseyn were arrested. In Kazakhstan, the founder of Kazakh Soviet literature, Saken Seyfullin, I. Dzhansugurov, and B. Maylin perished. The leading figures of Tatar Soviet culture, Galimdzhan Ibragimov, K. Tinchurin, and K. Nadzhmi perished. The founders of Udmurt literature, Dmitry Korepanov-Kedra and Mikhail Konovalov, perished, as did the first Circassian prose writer Magomet Dyshekov; the first Nanaian writer, B. Khodzher; the Mari writers Ipay Olyk and S. G. Chavayn; the first Buryat writers, Ts. Don and I. Dambinov; the first Chechen writer, Said Baduyev; the Bashkir writers, A. G. Amantay, S. Galimov, G. Davletshin, and I. Nasyri; and the Khakas writer V. Kubyakov. Platon Oyunsky, the father of Yakut literature and the chairman of the Yakut ASSR Central Committee, ended his life in confinement. The list of the victims of Stalin's terror in literature could be continued.

During 1937-1938, the repressions also encompassed all other creative organizations. Thus, Yelena Sokolovskaya, the artistic director of Mosfilm, who during the Civil War had headed the Odessa underground, was executed. In Leningrad, A. I. Piotrovsky, the director of the scenario department of Lenfilm, perished. A. F. Dorn, the famous creator of films and photo documentaries, who had created a photo chronicle of the revolution, was arrested. V. E. Meyerkhold perished.

The outstanding Ukrainian producer Les Kurbas and the theater figures and artists Sandro Akhmeteli, Igor Terentyev, K. Eggert, I. Pravov, L. Varpakhovsky, Mikh.

Rafalsky, Natalya Sats, O. Shcherbinskaya, Z. Smirnova, and the conductor Yevg. Mikeladze were arrested. They also arrested the artist Aleksey Diky, but they freed him in 1941; later he played Stalin himself in the moview and in the theater.

The artist V. Shukhayev, who had returned from abroad, was arrested. L. Nikitin, the noteworthy theater artist, perished. They arrested the Leningrad portrait artist Sharapov. He was summoned to Moscow to paint the portrait of the leader. After two sittings, the work was stopped: Probably Stalin did not like the first sketches reflecting his withered arm condition, which he carefully concealed throughout his life.

During 1937-1938, the majority of editors of the central, republic, and oblast newspapers perished—G. Ye. Tsypin (VECHERNAYA MOSKVA), D. V. Antoshkin (RABOCHAYA MOSKVA), Bolotnikov (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA), S. M. Zaks (LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA), D. Braginsky (ZARYA VOSTOKA), N. I. Smirnov (BEDNOTA), Y. S. Kusilman (KRASNYY KRYM), A. V. Shver (TIKHOOKEANSKAYA PRAVDA), and many others. Hundreds of journalists of the central and local press were arrested.

A thousand of the most famous names have been enumerated. But the repressions also came down on the multitude of workers of the middle and lower rank, and on all strata of the population.

Between 1936 and 1939, more than 1 million people were expelled from the party. This was almost always followed by arrest. To these must be added the people who were expelled from the party during 1933-1934—1.1 million people; very many of them, if not the majority, were arrested after a few years. Of course, the arrests were also carried out among non-party members, but usually these were relatives, friends, and colleagues of arrested communists.

The oldest party members suffered especially. If among the delegates to the 16th and 17th VKP(b) congresses about 80 percent had entered the party before 1920, at the 18th Congress—only 19 percent. The losses were also large among the young party intelligentsia and among the rank and file workers. At the Elektrozavod in Moscow, according to the testimony of L. M. Portnov, more than 1,000 workers and employees were repressed; at the Kirov Plant in Leningrad—a great many workers and employees were arrested; and in the collective of the Moscow Subway Construction (metrostroy)—hundreds of people. And this is how it was throughout the country. The NKVD organs also arrested almost all workers, employees and engineers who at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's had gone through practical experience in American and German plants.

Great were the losses of the unfortunate village. A. I. Todorsky met in confinement the lower workers of the Zagotzerno [All-Union Office for the Procurement and Marketing of Grain] system in the Northern Caucasus. He related that the night they took him they arrested almost the entire rayon aktiv—200 people. V. S. Ginzburg wrote in her memoirs about an old kolkhoz farm woman to whom they explained during her arrest that she was a "Trotskyite" [trotskistka]. Not understanding this word, the old woman argued that she was not a "tractor operator" [traktoristka] and that old people are not appointed to work on tractors in their village. "In the corner of our room, Ya. I. Dobrinsky, a party official from Belorussia, wrote in his unpublished memoirs, "there sat an old kolkhoz farmer. From every ration, he kept a small piece for his son, who was a witness for the prosecution. A healthy young peasant who could not bear the beatings and abuse, or for some other reason, he had testified that his father had talked him into killing the chairman of the kolkhoz. The old man denied it; his conscience would not let him lie. No beatings or tortures could shake him. To the confrontation with his son, he went with the firm resolve to stick to the truth. But when he saw his tortured son, with the marks of beatings on him, something snapped in the old man's spirit, and turning to the investigator and his son, he said: "It's true, I confirm it. Don't worry Ilyushka, I confirm everything you said." And right then and there he signed the protocol of the confrontation. . . . Preparing to meet his son in court, the old man put aside a part of his food every day, and when he was summoned, he broke away from the guard for a second and handed it to Ilyushka. And then Ilyushka could not stand it; he fell on his knees before the old man, tore at his shirt, howling and groaning, he shouted: "Forgive me, Pa, foregive me, I lied about you, foregive me." The old man babbled something, stroked his head and his back. . . . The guard was embarrassed and lost his composure. . . ."

We must also speak about the wave of small "open" trials, which went by in 1937-1938. Only the Moscow "open" trials involving the former leaders of the opposition are widely known. But during those years almost every republic, oblast and even rayon conducted its own "trial." These trials were not mentioned in the central press, but they were discussed in detail in the oblast and rayon papers. Here there were also reports about the closed trials of local workers (usually the indictment by the prosecutor and the verdict were published).

Thus, for example, in the second half of 1937, "open" trials took place in hundreds of rayons and dozens of oblasts. These trials were held by the special collegiums of the oblast court and the oblast procuracy—usually on the charge of "sabotage", "anti-Soviet" and "right-Troskyite" activity. Almost always the defendants included the party raykom secretary, the rayispolkom secretary, the manager of the rayon department of public health [rayzo], the MTS director, 2-3 kolkhoz chairmen, the senior agronomist, sometimes a livestock specialist, or a veterinarian, and a few kolkhoz farmers. First of all, such trials were organized in those rayons where the indicators of kolkhoz production were lower than the average for the oblast. All shortcomings in the work of

the kolkhozes and sovkhozes—the belated gathering of the harvest, the poor cultivation of the land, the cattle plague, the lack of cattle feed—were regarded as the result of sabotage and counterrevolutionary activity with the aim of provoking the discontent of the kolkhoz farmers and workers with Soviet power.

A typical trial in this regard took place at the end of 1931 in the Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon of Leningrad Oblast. The special collegium of the oblast court, with the participation of Procurator B. P. Pozern tried I. V. Vasilyevich, the raykom secretary, A. I. Dmitrichenko, the chairman of the rayispolkom, S. A. Semenov, the MTS director, A. I. Portnov, the senior land use organizer, and several other rayon officials. They were accused of the disruption of kolkhoz production "for the purpose of sabotage," of indebtedness of the local kolkhozes to the state, and extremely low wages for the kolkhoz workers. As was asserted in the indictment, all of this was done for the "restoration of capitalism in the USSR." The raykom secretary, Vasilyev, recognized the difficult situation of the rayon kolkhozes, but he firmly denied any conscious sabotage or participation in an anti-Soviet organization. But other defendants fully "acknowledged" their counterrevolutionary activity. After the procurator's speech the sentence was announced: Execution awaited all of them.

Sometimes a show trial was organized in the capital of a union republic or autonomous republic. Thus, in Minsk, in the Club of Food Industry Workers, they tried "saboteurs" from the Zagotzerno Office. In Ordzhonikidze, a special session of the Supreme Court of Northern Ossetia tried 13 kolkhoz workers and kolkhoz activists from the village of Dargavs for "sabotage" and the creation of a "kulak rebel organization." Six of them were sentenced to be executed. That sort of court of law took place in Kuybyshev, Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, and other cities.

In many oblasts and union republics, special show trials of "saboteurs" and trade officials were held. They were accused of the deliberate organization of stoppages in the supply of goods to the population for the purpose of provoking discontent with Soviet power. Especially many trials were held apropos of "sabotage" on railways. Thus, in 1937, in the city of Svobodno, the assizes of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court examined the case of "Trotskyite-espionage terrorist activity" on the Amur Railway. In this case, 46 people were sentenced to be executed. Analogous trials were held by the Military Collegium in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, where all in all more than 100 people were executed.

In some oblasts, the gone-crazy employees of the NKVD called even children to account for "counterrevolution" and "terror." For example, in the town of Leninsk-Kuznetsk, they arrested 60 children from 10-12 years old, who had allegedly created a "counterrevolutionary terrorist group." For 8 months, they kept these children in the town prison. At the same time, "cases" were instituted against 100 other children. The indignation over this was so strong in the town that it was necessary for the oblast organizations to involve themselves. They set the children free and "rehabilitated" them, and instituted court proceedings against the NKVD officials A. T. Lunkov, A. M. Savkin, A. I. Belousov, and others.

The persecutions of the church and the struggle against religious prejudice began already in the 1920's, at times assuming the character of anti-church terror. At that time, all the religious organizations and church groups suffered, but above all the Orthodox Church. The arrested and exiled many prominent and authoritarian church figures. Pavel Florensky, the greatest Russian religious thinker, was exiled in 1928, and later he was arrested and perished. In 1928-1929, all monasteries were closed which functioned during this period as model agricultural artels. Thousands of monks and nuns were exiled to Siberia. In mid-1929, a conference on anti-religious work was held in the VKP(b) Centgral Committee, and soon after the Second All-Union Congress of the Militant Atheists was held. After the Congress, the anti-religious terror intensified everywhere, especially in the village. Evidently, Stalin regarded the church as one of the chief obstacles in the matter of collectivization. After they had taken the decision on collectivization in this or that village, they usually immediately closed the local church. In so doing, they brought down the cross from the cupola of the church, and they burned the icons and the church utensils. Many rural priests were arrested, as well as peasants who tried to resist the destruction of the church. Thousands of people suffered thus not only on a social, but a religious basis.

By the beginning of 1930, the anti-church terror reached especially broad scope. The intimidated Academy of Sciences, by a special decision, removed from protection the majority of the monuments of the past connected with "religious cults." In the ancient Russian cities—Tver, Nizhniy Novgorod, Pskov, Novgorod, Samara, Vyatka, Ryazan and others, they brought down and destroyed the most precious monuments of architecture.

Moscow suffered a great deal. They destroyed the churches even in the Kremlin, although A. V. Lunacharsky and A. S. Yenukidze raised strong objections to this.

In January 1930, Pope Pius XI called on the believers for general prayer for the Christians being persecuted in Russia. The campaign of protest in the foreign countries began to threaten the political and economic interests of the USSR. This induced Stalin not only to suspend the anti-religious terror for a time, but to repudiate it as allegedly a manifestation of local arbitrariness and exaggerations. On 15 March 1930, on the day before the universal prayer announced by the Roman Pope, the newspapers published a decree on "distortions" in the party line in the kolkhoz movement. In this decree, the administrative closing of churches was recognized as a mistake of the local authorities. The decree threatened strict penalties for insulting the religious feelings of

believers. This was, undoubtedly, a concession to world public opinion. However, nothing substantial happened: The closed churches were not opened, and those exiled for religious reasons to Siberia and the North remained there. By the end of 1930, about 80 percent of all the rural churches were closed; a significant part of the clergy was among the dekulakized.

During 1937-1938, the persecutions of the church resumed with new force. Again they started to close or bring down church buildings. In Petrograd, at the beginning of the 1920's, there were 96 functioning churches, belonging to various currents of the Russian Orthodox Church; by the end of the 1930's, 7 remained. And so it was everywhere. By the beginning of the war, there were no more than 150 functioning churches throughout the country; true, to this should be added a few hundred in the territory of Bessarabia, the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and in the republics of the Baltic. Already before the beginnin of the "Yezhovshchina," about a hundred members of the higher orders of the clergy and no less than 1,000 ordinary priests were already kept in confinement. During 1936-1938 they arrested about 800 Orthodox and Renovationist members of the higher orders of clergy and many thousands of ordinary priests of all churches. They also arrested thousands of believers, including the followers of various sects (Baptists, Adventists, and others). The Catholicos of Armenia, Khoren I Muradbekyan, who was very popular among the population, was killed in 1937 in his residence. In Georgia, only 5 out of 200 bishops remained in freedom.

The enormous number of prisons built during the centuries of the czarist regime proved to be too little. In many regions they speedily built new prisons. Former monasteries, churches, hotels, and even bath houses and stables were reequipped as prisons.

After the October Revolution, many czarist prisons were converted into historical and revolutionary museums. The renowned Lefortovo Prison was such a museum; visitors could see in the cells the wax figures of its former prisoners. With the beginning of the mass repressions, they closed the museums and began to fill the cells with new prisoners. They modernized and expanded the prison.

Still more rapidly than the prisons they built concentration camps throughout the entire country, but mainly in the Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Northern European part of the USSR.

During 1936-1938 Stalin broke all records for political terror known to history. As follows from a source that deserves to be trusted, in 1936 1,116 death sentences were carried out, in 1937—353,680. The data for 1938 are not known, but with great probability one name 200,000-300,000 executed. All in all, no fewer than 5 million people were arrested for political reasons during these three years. During 1937-1938 the executions went on so intensively that in Moscow alone more than 1,000 people were shot on some days on the basis of sentences of the court and the Special Conference. In the Central Prison of the NKVD, in the Lubyanka, up to 200 shootings per 24-hour period were registered.

Rehabilitations and Repressions, 1939-1941

1

The prisons and camps were overcrowded, the personnel of the NKVD was unable to cope with the interrogations and even the guarding of the millions who were confined. The repressions had an increasingly appreciable effect on the political sentiments in the country and on its economy. The goals which Stalin pursued in unleashing the terror had been attained. In order to consolidate what had been achieved, changes were now required.

Unexpectedly, the VKP(b) Central Committee, on the suggestion of Stalin, proposed a special commission to check on the activity of the NKVD, whose membership included, in particular, L. Beria and G. Malenkov. During the discussion of this question in the Politburo, Kaganovich proposed the appointment of Beria as deputy people's commissar for internal affairs in order "to facilitate his access to all materials of the NKVD." The proposal was accepted.

Neither in the country itself, nor outside its borders did anyone pay attention to this appointment. But for Yezhov and his entourage this was an alarming signal. Beria transferred to Moscow some of his closest people from Georgia; some shifts occurred in the higher apparatus of the NKVD. At the end of September, one of Yezhov's closest assistants, I. I. Ilitsky, got into a boat, went out to the middle of the Moscow River, and having leaned overboard, shot himself in the head.

On 17 November 1938, the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars adopted two secret decrees:

"1. On Arrests, Procuratorial Supervision, and the Conduct of the Investigation" and "2. On the Recruitment of Honest People for Work in the Organs." In these decrees the task of simplifying the work of the punitive organs was advanced.

Already in April 1938, N. I. Yezhov was appointed, by way of holding more than one office, as USSR people's commissar of water transport. This did not call forth any false interpretations. People recalled that F. E. Dzerzhinsky was at one time, by way of holding more than one office, people's commissar of railway transportation.

On 8 December, it was briefly reported in the last pages of the central newspapers, in the section "News Items," that N. I. Yezhov had been released, in accordance with his request, from his duties as people's commissar of internal affairs, but would stay on as people's commissar

of water transport; in place of Yezhov, L. P. Beria was appointed USSR people's commissar of internal affairs.

At once a new wave of arrests and removals in the NKVD began. The heads of all large prisons and camps were arrested. All of Yezhov's closest assistants, including M. Frinovsky and L. Zakovsky, who had served already under Yagoda, were arrested. Stalin's brother-in-law, S. Redens, married to a sister of N. Alliluyeva, was arrested and soon executed. In 1937, Redens, who was then the chief of the NKVD Administration in the capital, directed the mass repressions in Moscow; then he was appointed people's commissar of internal affairs in Kazakhstan, where he headed the destruction of the republic's party apparatus.

After the removal of Yezhov, the NKVD officials were seized by panic. The old Bolsheviks A. V. Snegov, M. P. Batorgin, and P. I. Shabalkin told me about G. Lyushkov, who from the beginning of the 1920's headed a special group, in the OGPU, for the struggle against Trotskyites. In 1935 he conducted the investigation in the case of Zinoviev and Yevdokimov. In 1937, as chief of the Rostov NKVD Administration, he directed the extermination of the cadres of this oblast. Then he was appointed chief of the NKVD Administration in the Far East. Having found out about Yezhov's removal, Lyushkov, to whom all border units were subordinated, escaped to Manchuria, having taken foreign exchange and documents from NKVD safes. He gave out to the command of the Japanese Kwangtung Army the distribution of Soviet troops in the Far East and "exposed" the crimes of Stalin, in which he was a participant.

Meanwhile Yezhov remained free a few more months. On 21 January 1939, he appeared next to Stalin at the funeral meeting in the Bolshoi Theater devoted to the 15th anniversary of Lenin's death. As a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee, Yezhov was present at the 18th Party Congress and at the first sessions sat in the presidium. However, in the new composition of the VDP(b) Central Committee, his name was already missing. The stenographic report of the Congress, which appeared soon after, does not mention Yezhov. However, he continued to attend the People's Commissariat of Water Transport. His conduct indicated serious depression or even derangement of his mind. At the sessions of the collegium of the people's commissariat, he was silent, he did not intervene in anything. Sometimes he made "doves" and "airplanes" out of paper, sent them flying, then picked them up, and a times even climbed on the table and chairs for this.

There were no reports in the press about Yezhov's arrest. He simply vanished, and nothing more was mentioned in a single newspaper about this man, who, according to PRAVDA, was "a favorite of the people," who possessed "the greatest vigilance, an iron will, the most delicate proletarian feeling, an enormous organizational talent, and exceptional spirit."

According to the testimony of Snegov, Yezhov was executed in the summer of 1940. He spent the last weeks of his life in the Sukhanovsky Prison of the NKVD near Moscow, where "especially dangerous enemies of the people" were kept. Among them, the microbiologists P. F. Zdrodovsky was here in the spring of 1940. The investigator in charge of his case showed him through a window a small chapel, where "Yezhov himself" was confined. (Among the people, rumors were spread that Yezhov, they say, had lost his mind and was now in a psychiatric hospital. It is possible that they were spread deliberately since, by explaining in a sort of way the reason for the mass repressions, they served as a political lightning-rod and sowed various kinds of illusions. As of December 1938, L. P. Beria became people's commissar of internal affairs.

Beria was not a revolutionary. He began his terrible career as an inconspicuous inspector of the housing department in the Baku Soviet apparatus. From the very beginning—and this was repeatedly acknowledged by Dzerzhinsky—quite a few chance people and adventurists ended up in the organs of the VChK [Cheka]. Such an adventurist was M. A. Bagirov, who during the first years of Soviet power turned out to be the director of the Azerbaijan Cheka, and later, before the death of Stalin, headed the party organization of Azerbaijan. Bagirov involved Beria in the work of the Cheka. Soviet power in the Caucasus was not particularly strong at that time, and Beria and Bagirov, wanting to insure themselves in case of changes, maintained some sort of relations with the secret services of the Azerbaijan nationalists (Musafatists) and the Georgian Mensheviks. This information was contained in the indictment in the case of Beria, when he was arrested and brought to trial by the Military Collegium in 1953. Beria himself did not repudiate the fact of connections of that sort, but asserted that they were established as a task of the Cheka.

During the 1920's the career of Beria in the organs of the Cheka and OGPU developed extremely successfully with the support of Bagirov. If necessary, he not only went for dubious intrigues, but also crimes. Soon Beria became the chairman of the GPU of Georgia and of the entire Transcaucasian Federation.

Prior to 1931, Stalin was not personally acquainted with Beria, but, of course, knew about him, as well as about the hostile attitude of the Transcaucasian leadership to him. The first secretary of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (ZSFSR), L. Kartvelishvili, repeatedly asked Moscow to remove Beria from Tbilisi, but his request went unanswered. S. M. Kirov and Sergo Ordzhonikidze were very critical of Beria. Many prominent Bolsheviks and people from the Caucasus (S. Ordzhonikidze, G. Alikhanov, A. Khandzhyan, and others) did not greet Beria when they met him.

Stalin's personal acquaintance with Beria took place in 1931; in the fall of that year, Beria was elected first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, and

then of the entire Transcaucasian Federation. At once a massive replacement of party cadres began, with 32 chiefs of rayon administrations of the NKVD becoming party raykom first secretaries.

Beria was crude, ignorant, greedy for carnal delights, and, moreover, cunning and sly. Among the party intelligentsia they said about him that he had not read a single book "already from the time of Gutenberg," but nevertheless they were rather afraid of him. And although Stalin received many letters and reports from the Transcaucasus about the moral degradation, rudeness and even crimes of Beria, he ignored them.

There is no doubt that precisely on the advice of Stalin a number of scientific workers in Georgia quickly began to search in the archives for materials about the early years of his revolutionary activity. At the same time, the entire history of the social-democratic and Bolshevik organizations in the Transcaucasus was falsified, the role of many important Marxists and Bolsheviks was depreciated, and the role of Stalin was exaggerated. On the basis of this work, which was conducted at first secretly even from the Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, a vast report was compiled, which, no doubt, Stalin himself looked over. On 21-22 July 1935, this report was read at the meeting of the Tbilisi party aktiv by L. Beria and then published under his name in PRAVDA and in the Transcaucasian newspapers, and it soon appeared as a separate book. Already the first edition of Beria's book "K voprosu ob istorii bolshevistskikh organizatsiyakh v Zakavkaze" [Toward the Question of the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia] called forth the protest of a number of historians and well-known Bolsheviks—A. Yenukidze, Filipp Makharadze, and M. Orakhelashvili. They recalled very well the events which were discussed in the book. After the wave of terror had destroyed the majority of the most prominent figures of the Transcaucasian revolutionary movement, Beria put out the second edition of this book, where Stalin appeared already as not only the chief, but almost the only active figure.

At the Central Committee Plenum in 1937, G. Kaminsky advanced a number of serious accusations against Beria and talked about his extremely shady relations with the Musavatists, but even this did not prevent his swift career: It was precisely into the hands of Beria that Stalin turned over the leaderhip of the country's punitive organs.

It should be noted that in 1938-1939, in wide circles, Beria was little known. For this reason, many viewed the replacement of Yezhov with hope. And, as a matter of fact, at first after the appointment of Beria, the mass repressions were stopped, hundreds of thousands of cases and denunciations were put aside. The commission for checking on the activity of the NKVD—now headed by A. A. Andreyev, an active participant in the repressions of 1937-1938, continued to work. Evidently this circumstance was basic for Stalin in the appointment of the new leader of the commission.

2

At the 18th Party Congress, quite a lot was said about the rehabilitation of those innocently repressed (special hopes were raised by the speech of A. A. Zhdanov), but in reality for every 100 convicted they did not free more than two. Rehabilitation, moreover, could not be massive since hundreds of thousands of people had already been executed, and their rehabilitation would have meant the acknowledgment, by Stalin, of his crimes.

First of all, they "unloaded" some prisons in Moscow and other cities. They freed all those arrested whose preliminary investigation had not been completed. In Moscow, for example, the party official L. M. Portnov was rehabilitated, whose testimony I already had the opportunity to cite. The Austrian physicist, the communist A. Vaysberg-Tsybulsky, whose arrest had called forth the agitation of Western scientists, was freed.

At the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, a number of Red Army commanders were rehabilitated, since, during the Soviet-Finnish War, the shortage of command cadres and their incompetence became clear. Among the rehabilitated were quite a few of those who subsequently became famous in the [Great] Patriotic War—the former marshals K. K. Rokossovsky, K. A. Meretskov, and S. I. Bogdanov, the future army general A. V. Gorbatov, the future vice-admiral G. N. Kholostyakov, the future commissar of the Ukrainian partisans S. V. Rudnev, the hero of the defense of Leningrad N. Yu. Ozeryansky, and others. L. G. Petrovsky, the younger son of G. I. Petrovsky, was returned to the party and the army. Commanding a corps, he perished in August 1941. However, the majority of such capable commanders remained in the camps, and many by the beginning of 1940 had been executed or had died of hunger and work beyond their strength.

They also rehabilitated a small part of the scientists and designers. Before the war, the physicists A. Berg and L. Landau were freed. At the beginning of the war, A. Tupolev, V. Petlyakov, V. Myasishchev, N. Polikarpov and other designers and engineers received their freedom. Frightened with the danger of epidemics, Stalin allowed the release of the microbiologists L. A. Zilber and P. F. Zdrodovsky—one of the country's best specialists in the fight against epidemics.

During the rehabilitation, according to the testimony of A. V. Gorbatov, everyone had to sign and obligate himself not to make known what he had seen in the prisons and camps. Nevertheless, some of the rehabilitated, risking again to find themselves in prison, turned with verbose letters to Stalin and to the VKP(b) Central Committee. I was told that in Kiev the rehabilitated Red Army commander, having met in the street the investigator who had subjected those being investigated to

torture, shot him at once. The former executive of the People's Commissariat for Forestry, Albrekht [Albrecht], a German by nationality, was arrested in 1937 and freed in 1939. When in August 1939, Ribbentrop came to the Soviet Union, Albrekht, who had run into the German Embassy, requested political asylum. Stalin permitted Ribbentrop to take Albrekht to Germany. There he wrote two books: "The Butyrskaya Prison. Cell No 99" and "The Revolution Which They Betrayed." According to the testimony of L. Z. Kopelev, who during the war served in sub-units for counterpropaganda, these books were in every company of the Wehrmacht.

The partial rehabilitations that began in 1939 were only a diversionary maneuver. Stalin calculated that this will calm public opinion somewhat, and also explain the disappearance of Yezhov. Moreover, the small number of rehabilitations was supposed to underscore the correctness and justification of the mass repressions.

3

During 1939-1941, the repressions among the party and soviet officials, the military, and the cultural figures continued, but they already did not take on the scale as in 1937-1938. Having embarked on the path of lawlessness and terror, Stalin was unable to stop, to leave this path until the end of his life.

After the removal of Yezhov, the execution of the death sentences pronounced earlier was temporarily stopped. In the overcrowded cells of the prisoners sentenced to death, hope began to dawn. However, soon the shootings in the cellars of the NKVD prisons resumed. They did not even start to review the cases of those accused of the preparation of "terrorist acts" against Yezhov himself, as well as against Blyukher, Postyshev, Eykhe, and Kosior, that is those who were, in their turn, declared to be "an enemy of the people."

It was precisely during 1939-1940 that they arrested A. V. Kosarev, N. I. Vavilov, G. K. Karpechenko, I. E. Babel, V. E. Meyerkhold, and V. Chopich. In 1941, the poet and playwright Daniil Kharms (Yuvachev) was arrested, who soon died of hunger in a Leningrad prison.

The Old Bolshevik M. S. Kedrov, an active participant in the Civil War and a prominent OGUPU official in the past, who in 1939 was already on pension, perished at this time. One of his sons, Igor, an investigator in the central NKVD apparatus, distinguished himself by his cruelty. He took part in the preparation of the "open" trial of both Yagoda and Yezhov. However, when after the removal of Yezhov the devastation of the central NKVD apparatus began, the Kedrovs, father and son, sent Stalin a number of letters. The answer to these letters was the arrest and execution of Igor Kedrov. In April 1939 they also arrested M. S. Kedrov, but the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court acquitted him completely. Beria, however, did not permit the release of Kedrov and in October 1941 he was shot. The new sentence was registered later—after the execution.

In 1939, F. I. Goloshchekin, the oldest party figure, who at the Prague Conference in 1912 was elected to the RSDLP Central Committee, was arrested and perished. At the end of the 1930's he occupied the post of Chief Arbiter of the USSR Council of People's Commissars.

After the dismissal of M. M. Litvinov, new arrests were carried out among the diplomats and preparations got under way for the trial in the case of "enemies of the people in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs"—for some reason, it did not take place.

The failure during the first period of the Soviet-Finnish War called forth quite a few new arrests among the military. N. Ye. Varfomoleyev, the chief of staff of the Leningrad Military District, for example, disappeared without a trace. Numerous arrests were also undertaken among the military who had taken part in the Civil War in Spain. Already in 1938, V. Ye. Gorev, military attache and organizer of the defense of Madrid, was summoned to Moscow and shot—only 2 days before his arrest, M. I. Kalinin had awarded him the Order of Lenin. They shot the great commander G. M. Shtern, who had returned from Spain to replace Blyukher in the post of commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (OKDVA. Shtern was elected a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee at the 18th Party Congress and in 1940 he directed the military operations in Khalkhin-Gole. Not long before the war, they also arrested still another group of military who had returned from Spain, mainly pilots, including 22 Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among the arrested were Ya. V. Smushkevich and P. Rychagov, who, after their return from Spain, had headed the USSR Supreme Military Council, the commander of the aviation brigade, P. I. Pumpur, as well as Ye. S. Ptukhin, I. I. Proskurov, and E. Shakht. In 1941, A. D. Loktionov, candidate member of the VKP(b) Central Committee and commander of the Baltic Military District, perished. B. L. Vannikov, USSR people's commissar of arms, a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee, was arrested but released during the first months of the war.

On the territory of Bessarabia, the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and the Baltic, they arrested not only the leaders of fascist and semi-fascist organizations and officials of the local security organs who had gone underground, but also thousands of officials of the previous administrations who were not guilty of anything, members of various political groupings, and representatives of the rural and urban bourgeoisie. Hundreds of thousands of people, without having been accused of anything concrete, were resettled in the Eastern regions of the country. Thus, from the Western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, they deported to the East 200,000 soldiers and officers of the Polish Army that had been routed by the Germans, who had been

taken prisoner by the Red Army. In the Baltic, repressions distinguished by special massiveness were carried out during 13-14 June 1941—only a week after the attack of fascist Germany. These punitive actions by no means made the Soviet rear in the Baltic more stable.

Before the war, the prisons of Lvov, Kishinev, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius, Kaunas, and other Western cities were overcrowded. Not having been able, in the turmoil of the first days of the war, to evacuate the prisoners, the NKVD organs, clearly with the approval of Beria and Stalin, gave the order to shoot them. They did not succeed in taking away the bodies of the killed, and the fascist occupation authorities, having opened the prisons, allowed the local inhabitants to come here to identify their relatives and arrange their funerals. The Barbarian shooting of the prisoners, which called forth an explosion of indignation among the population, was extensively utilized by fascist and nationalist propaganda.

At the end of June 1940, a Law on Criminal Responsibility for Absenteeism and Being Regularly Late for Work was adopted. For three insignificant instances of being late and for not coming to work without a valid reason, they prosecuted. All the transports and prisons at the end of 1940 were forgotten by those confined on the basis of this law, many of them were not freed until the end of the war, although the term of their punishment had ended long ago.

4

International repercussions of the repressions of 1936-1938 were varied and contradictory, and they did not constitute too great a problem for Stalin and the NKVD. The in terms of scale incomparable repressions during the time of Brezhnev called forth greater agitation throughout the world than the repressions of the 1930's.

It goes without saying, the bourgeois press, as well as the press of the fascist countries made extensive use of the news about the political terror in the USSR for anti-communist propaganda. However, no one knew at that time the real scale of the terror, and the basic attention of the foreign press focused on the "open" political trials in Moscow. The mechanism and details of the preparation of these trials were not known at that time, but for Western observers (not to mention the Western secret services as whose agents the defendants were passed off), it was not difficult to establish that most of the testimony of the defendants was false. Nevertheless, in reporting about the terror in the USSR, the bourgeois newspapers did not express pity or sympathy for its victims. In the emigre newspapers as well, satisfaction was felt: Communists were killing other communists.

The representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, the left intelligentsia, social democracy, and the communist parties could not understand what was going on in Moscow. Some of them continued to believe Stalin, others were doubtful but were silent, and still others came out with protests.

Indicative is the position of Lion Feykhtvanger [Feuchtwanger], who came to the USSR at the beginning of 1937 and was at once received and treated with kindness by Stalin. Having been at the trial of the "parallel center," Feuchtwanger fully supported all versions of the accusation. "With the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev," he wrote, "I got acquainted through the press and the accounts of eyewitnesses. At the trial of Pyatakov and Radek, I was personnally present. During the first trial, I found myself in the atmosphere of Western Europe, during the second—in the atmosphere of Moscow. In the first case, I was influenced by the air of Europe, in the second—of Moscow, and this made it possible for me to feel especially acutely the vast difference that exists between the Soviet Union and the West. Some of my friends. . . call these trials tragicomic, barbarian, not deserving trust, monstrous, both in form and in content. Quite a number of people, who previously had belonged to the friends of the Soviet Union, became its opponents after these trials. Many who had seen in the social order of the Soviet Union the ideal of socialist humaneness, were simply nonplussed, to them it seemed that the bullets that struck Zinoviev and Kamenev also killed the new world with them. And to me, too, until then, while I was in Europe, the charges brought in the trial of Zinoviev appeared not to deserve trust. It seemed to me that the hysterical confessions of the defendants were attained through some secretive ways. The entire trial appeared to me to be some kind of theatrical dramatization put up with an unusually terrifying and utmost art. But when I was in Moscow at the second trial, when I heard Pyatakov, Radek and their friends, I felt that my doubts were dissolved, like salt in water, under the influence of the direct impression from what the defendants said and how they talked. If all this was invented or contrived, then I do not know what truth means."

All the same, Feuchtwanger noted that he did not understand everything; but here he added that he did not in any way want to discredit the conduct of the trial or its results. He even remembered the words of Socrates, who said apropos of some obscurities in Heraclitus: "That which I understand is fine. From this I conclude that the rest, which I do not understand, is also fine."

Blasphemously calling "fine" the court trials in Moscow, Feuchtwanger hurried to express his delight with Stalin, a person who is "simple and full of good-nature," who "understands humor well and does not resent criticism directed at himself." The "open" trials Feuchtwanger connects with the democratization of Soviet society, taking the view that the government of the USSR did not want the Trotskyites to make use of it.

Of course, Feuchtwanger's book, "Moscow 19937" was quickly translated into Russian and published in an enormous edition. It was put into production on 23

November 19937 and sent to press the very next day. The author received large royalties, not only for this book, but also for his novels, which were published earlier. At the same time, few Western authors received royalties for the publication of translations of their books in the USSR.

Romen Rollan, a friend of the Soviet Union, experienced the repressions of 1936-1938 with agony. He confided his thoughts only to his diary: ". . . This is an order of absolute, uncontrolled arbitrariness, without the smallest guarantee, which has abandoned the elementary freedoms and sacred rights of justice and humaneness. I feel how pain and indignation rise in me. I overcome in myself the need to speak and to write about this. I could not express the slightest condemnation of this regime without the furious enemies in France and throughout the world making use of my words as a weapon, having poisoned it with the most criminal and evil will." When Rollan had to speak, he came out in defense of the Soviet Union, seeing in it a barrier against the danger of fascism in Western Europe, and to his friends he explained that the cause is higher than Stalin and his stooges.

Joseph E. Davies, special ambassador of U.S. President F. Roosevelt, did not understand anything. In his secret cables to Secretary of State C. Hull, in letters to his daughter, and in diary entries, this diplomat, who was personally present at two Moscow trials, invariably asserted that the defendants were in fact guilty of treason and espionage and that these trials were not staged in any case. According to the assertions of Davies, such a view was also held by the majority of the diplomats accredited in Moscow.

Even such a well-informed man as Churchill was misled; he believed the misinformation which the NKVD agency spread through secret channels in order to confuse the political and public figures and the public opinion of the Western countries. In the first volume of Churchill's memoirs, "The Second World War," one can read: "Through the Soviet embassy in Prague, correspondence was carried out between important persons in Russia and the German government. This was part of the so-called conspiracy of the military and the "Old Bolsheviks" aimed at the overthrow of Stalin and the establishment of a new regime, based on a pro-German policy. Not losing time, president Benes reported everything to Stalin he was able to find out. After this, there followed a merciless, but perhaps not unnecessary military and political purge and a number of trials..."

Of course, among the intelligentsia and the politicians in the West there were quite a few who did not believe the "open" trials and condemned the repressions. Almost all of the Labour Party occupied an anti-Stalinist position.

Confused were Herbert Wells and Andre Gide. Bertold Brecht, who had written to Lion Feuchtwanger that the book "Moscow. 1937" was the best that had been written on this subject in Western literature, soon had the occasion to find out about the death of many anti-fascists with whom he was acquainted, about the disappearance of a man close to him—Karol Neer, about the execution of his teacher in Marxism and friend, the writer Tretyakov. It was precisely at that time that Brecht wrote the poem "Is the People Really Innocent?", which contains the following lines:

> My teacher Tretyakov,
> So great and so sincere,
> Was shot. The people's court sentenced him
> as a spy. His name was consigned to perdition.
> His books were burnt. And it is terrible to talk
> about him.
> Even the whisper falls silent.
> But what if he is not guilty?

To Stalin, Kalinin and Vyshinsky came letters from abroad requesting explanation.

"The signatories of this letter, friends of the Soviet Union, consider it their duty to call your attention to the following facts.

The confinement of two outstanding foreign physicists—Dr Friedrich Houtermanns, arrested 1 December 1937 in Moscow, and Aleksander Weissberg, arrested on 1 March of the same year in Kharkov, called forth great agitation in the circles of scientists in Europe and in the United States. Houtermanns and Weissberg were well known in these circles, and there was reason to fear that their long confinement will give a new occasion for the kind of political campaign which recently had already done serious damage to the prestige of the country of socialism and to joint work of the USSR and the great democracies of the West. These circumstances are aggravated by the fact that Western scientists who are well known as friends of the Soviet Union, who defended the Soviet Union against the attacks of its enemies, up to now do not anything about the fate of Houtermanns and Weissberg. This deprives us of the possibility of explaining those sorts of measures to the public of our countries." This is how three Nobel Prize winners—Irene and Frederic Joliot-Curie and Jean Perrin wrote to Moscow in June 1938.

On May 16 Albert Einstein sent a letter to Stalin. He protested against the arrest of many scientists enjoying enormous respect among their colleagues in the West. Stalin did not reply to this letter or to a letter of similar character from Nils Bor.

The newspapers of the communist parties unconditionally supported the policy of Stalin at that time and simply repeated what PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA printed. The communists said that the Soviet court is a proletarian court and it cannot be but just. All the rumors about the tortures, the communist press of the whole world rejected as malicious slander. "Marxists at that time could not believe," the American communist H. Meyer wrote in 1956, "that Stalin was capable of

ordering the extermination of innocent people, for they could not imagine that they themselves were capable of such crimes. The world saw with its own eyes the irrefutable historical achievements of socialism. . . , saw the unquestionable love and devotion of the majority of the Soviet people to its leader. . . . Reports about violations of legality in the Soviet Union were refuted as anti-Soviet inventions."

There were, of course, those who had doubts. I. Maisky, who at that time was the USSR ambassador in England, wrote later: "I remember very well how the English communists whom I happened to see in those years, with bitterness and almost with despair, asked me the question: ". . .What is happening in your country? We cannot believe that such old, meritorious and battle-tested members of the party have suddenly turned to be traitors." And they told how the events taking place in the USSR alienate the workers from the Soviet country and undermine communist influence among the proletariat. The same thing happened at that time in France, Scandinavia, Belgium, Holland, and many other countries."

The letters and declarations of a number of Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers, who refused to return to certain death in the USSR, exerted a certain influence on the public opinion of Western countries. In December 1937, the European newspapers published an "Open Letter" by V. Krivitsky, containing a sharp critique of Stalin's crimes—a letter addressed to the leadership of the communist parties of France and to the bureau of the Fourth International. An analogous letter was sent to the League of Human Rights by the former USSR ambassador in Greece, A. G. Barmine. An experience intelligence officer, Krivitsky hid from the agents of the NKVD, which organized a real hunt for him, and even was able to publish a book defending the people destroyed by Stalin. In February 1941, he was found shot in a Washington hotel room. I do not know about the fate of Barmine.

The writer and journalist F. F. Raskolnikov, the hero of the revolution and the Civil War, the leader of the Bolsheviks of Kronstadt in 1917, and commander of the the Baltic Fleet, was in diplomatic work in the 1930's. With alarm he observed the repressions and hurried to return to the USSR at the summons of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In the summer of 1939, they removed him from the post of USSR ambassador in Bulgaria and declared him to be an "enemy of the people." In response, Raskolnikov published the declaration "How They Made Me an Enemy of the People," and in September 1939 he gave to the French news agency the now famous "Open Letter to Stalin." The Second World War had already begun, and for this reason this letter was only printed by the Russian emigre press.

Illegal Methods of Investigation and Detention

1

The arrests of innocent people are only one of the links of the Stalinist terror. His goal was not only the isolation or annihilation of the unwelcome. It was necessary to break their will, to compel them to give false confessions of espionage and sabotage, to call themselves enemies of the people." This was impossible with the observance of legal methods and forms of investigation. For this reason, Stalin sanctioned the use of physical methods of influence. It goes without saying, torture did not all at once, in a day, enter the practice of the NKVD—this was a gradual, but consistent process. The beatings of prisoners, the investigation "conveyor", the deprivation of sleep, torture with heat and cold, hunger and thirst—all these methods were sufficiently widely employed in 1929-1931 in relation to the "saboteurs" and NEPmen, during the removal of gold from them, and also in relation to other "class-alien elements." However, the GPU-NKVD organs treated arrested communists more "humanely." Prior to the spring of 1937, especially selected investigators, mainly from the top NKVD leadership, tortured only some of them. Thus, during the preparation of the trials of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite" and "parallel" centers, the investigators were permitted, in any way they liked, to break the prisoner. After the February-March Plenum, the majority of investigators were granted the right to use any methods of physical and psychological influence in relation to "stubborn enemies of the people." The torture of prisoners was not abolished in 1939 when Yezhov was eliminated.

At the beginning of the 20th century, physical punishments and blows in the prisons called forth the stormy indignation of all "political" prisoners—S. R.'s, anarchists, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. As a sign of protest, they organized collective hunger strikes; even cases of collective suicide are known. The actions of the punitive organs obedient to Stalin were an outrage upon the memory of all generations of Russian revolutionaries. But the point is not only that the tortures were fundamentally unacceptable for the socialist state. Tortures are a most imperfect method of investigation, which, in the majority of cases, does not lead to the explanation, but the distortion of the truth, to slander, to the consent of the defendant to any testimony, only to put a stop to the torture. This is something which already the inquisitors of the Middle Ages knew very well, who obtained confessions of relations with the devil from the prisoners. This is something which the intelligence officers of most countries understand. And this is something which Stalin and his assistants understood in compelling their victims to give the most improbable testimony.

It is well known that even the "holy inquisition" attempted to introduce some limitations into its torture practice. For the NKVD, no limitation of any kind existed. The brutalized investigators not only beat, but also mutilated the prisoners: They put out their eyes, pulled out their finger and toe-nails, burned with scorching hot iron, broke their arms and legs, and mutilated their sexual organs.

According to the testimony of R. G. Alikhanova, the well-known party official N. Khansuvarov, during the

time of the investigation, stood in water for 10 days in succession. The wife of one of the prominent party members told Alikhanova that, not having been able to break her husband with torture, the butchers brought their 16-year old daughter to the room where the investigation was going on and raped her in front of her father. The latter signed all the "testimony" they palmed off on him, but his daughter, who was released from prison, threw herself under a train. In Butyrskaya Prison, there were cases where they tortured the husband in front of his wife, and wife—in front of her husband.

"Keep in mind," they told the microbiologist P. Zdrodovsky, who had ended up in Sukhanovskaya Prison, "everything is permitted here." In this prison, almost all the prisoners of which quite recently had belonged to the "top" of society, they frequently began the first examination with a severe thrashing, in order to degrade the individual and to break his will. "I was lucky," Zdrodovsky related, "they beat me in the face, but they did not flog me." The wife of Papuliya Ordzhonikidze they flogged to death in Sukhanovskaya Prison.

According to the testimony of A. V. Snegov, in the torture chambers of the Leningrad NKVD they seated prisoners on the cement floor and covered them with a box in which nails stuck out from four sides. Above was a grating—through it the doctor examined the prisoners once every 24 hours. With such a box, measuring a cubic meter, they covered Snegov, who was small in stature, and the large P. Ye. Dybenko. They said that this method was borrowed from the Finnish security service. Experience in tortures, the NKVD also borrowed from the Gestapo.

One of the NKVD colonels urinated into a glass and demanded that the person being interrogated drink the contents. According to the testimony of S. Gazaryan, not having obtained the necessary testimony from Soso Buachidze, the commander of the Georgian Division, they ripped his abdomen and threw him, dying, into his cell.

The majority of those subjected to cruel torture signed false investigation protocols. Their will to fight was broken, they were demoralized, they were confused, they did not understand what was going on. It is impossible to condemn these people, it is impossible to argue with General A. V. Gorbatov, who, in his memoirs published in 1964 by the journal NOVYY MIR, was indignant not so much at the investigators torturing the prisoners, as at the prisoners who did not endure the tortures. Of course, people behaved differently. Some at once started to give any sort of testimony, to slander dozens of their acquaintances, demanding their arrest. Such people became secret informers of the NKVD, "knockers" (stukachi) and denounced their neighbors in the prison cell or camp barrack. Other prisoners, after their first interrogation, smashed their heads on the cell walls and on the wash stands, flung themselves at the guards during the walks, threw themselves down the wells of staircases and windows, and opened their veins. Still others for a long time and steadfastly resisted, but nevertheless signed the false protocols. According to the testimony of S. O. Gazaryan, they tortured the well-known Georgian Bolshevik David Bagrationi 15 nights in succession—until he lost control of himself and signed everything they demanded of him. For several months, according to the testimony of I. P. Aleksakhin, the prominent official of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, I. P. Pavlunovsky, did not give testimony about his "sabotage" activity. They threw him into a cell, full of water and teeming with rats, and here he could not stand it, started to knock on the door: "Barbarians, write what you like. . . ."

Still others signed any testimonies that concerned themselves, but point-blanc refused to slander anyone else.

And finally there were those who went through the most terrible tortures and did not sign false protocols. S. P. Pisarev, an old Bolshevik, secretary of one of the Moscow party raykoms, who was subjected to torture 43 times, did not sign them. Suren Gazaryan and A. V. Gorbatov did not sign. N. S. Kuznetsov suffered the most refined tortures, but he did not slander himself or his comrades. In the first "conveyor," he stood for 8 days and nights before his investigator; on the ninth day he fell, having lost consciousness, but he did not sign anything.[1] The young and pretty wife of Nestor Kakoba, who was declared an "enemy of the people" posthumously, did not sign. Soon after the unexpected death of Lakoba, who was poisoned at Beria's house, they arrested her. According to the testimony of Nutsa Gogoberidze, who in 1937 was in the same cell with Lakoba's wife, they led this quiet and taciturn woman away for interrogation every evening, and in the morning they dragged her, bloodied and unconscious, into the cell. The unfortunate woman told that, in answer to the demand to sign forged documents to the effect that Lakoba "had betrayed Abkhazia to Turkey," she answered in a word: "I will not slander the memory of my husband." She stood firm even when they arrested her son, whom she passionately loved, a 16-year old school boy, beat him and shoved him, crying, into the office of the investigator during one of the interrogations. They said that they would kill the boy if the mother did not sign the protocol (they later carried out the threat). After one of the tortures, she died in her cell, without having signed the protocol. . . The investigation did not succeed in breaking the leaders of the Komsomol Central Committee, headed by Kosarev, in spite of the most brutal tortures. According to the testimony of V. F. Pikina, it was precisely the fortitude of Kosarev and his comrades-in-arms which prevented the NKVD from organizing an open "youth" trial.

Condemnation is deserved by the cowardly, voluntary informers, who right away slandered themselves and others. The courage of people like Pisarev, Gazaryan, Kutznetsov, the wife of Lakoba, Kosarev, and Gorbatov

commands admiration. But we do not have the right to condemn those who, like Pavlunovsky or Bagrationi, were exhausted in the unequal struggle. And for this reason one cannot agree with the assertion of Gorbatov that "these people misled the investigation" when they signed the protocols.

Having found himself to be in the same cell with the friend who had slandered him at the investigation, N. Kuznetsov embraced this man. S. Gazaryan conducted himself in the same way when he met his acquaintance, who had given false testimony in his case.

Gorbatov thought otherwise about his comrades-in-misfortune. "Through their false testimony," he declared, "you had already committed a serious crime, for which they will keep you in prison."

In 1965 the party official and philosopher P. I. Shabalkin, who had twice gone through the court and investigation during the Stalin years and spent about 20 years in prison and camps, died. At the second investigation, not having stood up to the tortures, he signed falsified protocols. In the camp, for more than 10 years, he was in charge of the dining-room, and this presupposes a significant degree of cooperation with the administration. He calmed his conscience with the fact that he did not give any privileges to the criminals and he gave additional food to some political prisoners. Before his death, he acquaited me with his diary. I took notice of the following entry:

"Why did so many people, devoted to the revolution and prepared to die for it, who went through the czarist prisons and exile and more than once looked death in the eye, why did so many of these people give and sign false protocols," which "admitted" all sorts of crimes they never committed? The reason for these "admissions" and "self-slander" lies in the following:

1) At once after the arrest begins the active processing of the arrested. At first oral processing with observance of some measure of civility, then shouting and abuse, humiliations and insults, spits in the face, light blows and taunts. "You are scum," "you are a scoundrel," "you are a traitor and spy," "you are real trash," etc., etc. They humiliate a person infinitely, they instill in him that he is a non-entity.

This is how it goes, day after day, night after night. The so-called "conveyer" is organized. The investigators change, but the prisoner stands or sits. This goes on for days and nights. Me, for example, they kept for 8 days and nights on the "conveyor." They don't let you sleep. . . . The "conveyor" is a terrible torture. And during this time they kick you, insult you, if you resist, they beat you. The task of the "conveyor" is to break a person morally, to turn him into a spineless creature.

But if you stood up to the "conveyor" and did not "break open," then physical torture follows. They bring the worn-out person to a state where everything becomes indifferent to him and he is inclined to accept everything they instill in him.

"You are a scoundrel."

"Yes, a scoundrel."

"You are a traitor."

"Yes, a traitor."

"You were an instigator."

"Yes, I was an instigator."

"You wanted to kill Stalin."

"Yes, I wanted to kill Stalin."

Etc.

At this time, they shove before the prisoner versions created by the investigator, and the arrested accepts them submissively. The investigators hurry to nail down the success they have attained. The first protocols or "hand-written testimonials" take shape.

2) The next stage is the stage of the consolidation of the "achievements" obtained. They begin to feed the arrested decently. They give him cigarettes, parcels from relatives, they even permit the reading of books and newspapers. But the work on the unfortunate continues. They instill in him that a change in direction is now impossible, that he can save himself only through "sincere repentance", that he himself must now think about what more he can report to the investigation. They supply the prisoner with paper and pencils in order for him to write his "testimony" in his cell, they suggest the subject and control the work.

Frequently vacillations arise among the victims of the processing. However, in the NKVD they devised thousands of methods to suppress these vacillations. They organize confrontations with unfortunate people like himself. "Mutual influence" takes place. Additional methods of physical influence are applied. They summon the prisoners to the "procurator," who turns out to be a disguised investigator. They organize a provocative "court" session, etc.

3) If the person under investigation must appear before a court (the absolute majority of the prisoners were convicted externally by various "troikas," the Special Conference, etc.), then additional work is done with him, a peculiar rehearsal of the court. Here there is everything—threats, suggestions, and "serious discussions": "Keep in mind, we do not simply shoot, but we will inflict pain, we will tear one part a a time, etc. To many the idea is suggested that there will be no execution, that this is only for the press, that in reality all will remain

alive and unharmed. For an example, they show the "executed" that are alive (later they executed these people all the same, but for the time being they utilize them to deceive the living). During the court, the butchers and torturers are here—before the prisoner's nose. They are a vivid reminder of what will in case of vacillation. . . .

4) A very complex system of an "individual approach" to the person being investigated was developed by the investigation. They study him preliminarily through cell informers and through the system of short summonses to the investigator (if he is in solitary confinement). The processing takes place in the cell and in the office of the investigator. One they take to frighten, a second to persuade, a third to bribe, and a fourth to apply a combination of methods. But the main thing is they devprive the prisoner at once of any possibility to defend himself.

5) And nevertheless, the chief reason that people of strong will, who repeatedly had looked death in the eye, frequently were broken in the investigation and agreed to monstrous self-slander, did not consist in the terrible cruelty of the investigation. The whole point was that these people were unexpectedly deprived of the ground on which they grew up. Here man reminds one of a plant, pulled out of the soil and thrown to the whim of the wind and bad weather, deprived of nourishment, moisture, and sun. The ideals are destroyed. Compared to you, class enemies are nothing. The people, the Soviet people, are hostile. You are "an enemy of the people." There is nothing to lean on. Man is flying into an abyss and does not understand the reasons. Why? For what? . . . .

It goes without saying there were quite a few people who surrendered without a battle. The atmosphere of the intra-prison and investigation terror created the appropriate hopeless moods. Many "freshmen" prisoners at once signed everything that was shoved before them, believing that resistance was useless and defense impossible. In so doing, a new phenomenon arose in investigation practice, where the sides peacefully agreed both about the "crimes" and the "measures of punishment." A great many military staggered me with such "softness." They said: "No, I will not allow myself to be beaten." If I am not needed by them, let them shoot. I will sign anything the want." And they did this without any struggle and without resistance. And this, too, was a peculiar protest against arbitrariness."

2

Political prisoners were convicted in absentia by various "troikas" and Special Conferences. At times nevertheless trials were held, but "special" trials—no one was admitted to them, there were no defense attorneys, there was not even a procurator. Such a trial lasted for 5-10 minutes—even in complicated cases. The trial of Kosarev took 15—this was a rare exception. For many prisoners, the day of the trial became their last day, since, according to the law of 1 December 1934, the sentence had to be carried out immediately. Some of those who were sentenced to capital punishment, they kept for some reason in the cell for prisoners condemned to death for a few days or even months. The majority they executed at once after the trial: They shot them in the back of the head on a staircase or in the prison corridor, they shot them in the basements in groups. In the basement at the Lubyanka and in Lefortovo, as I was told, they started a tractor engine so that the shots could not be heard in the street. The prisoners of other Moscow prisons, they carted off to the outskirts of the city to be shot. Ye. P. Frolov wrote down the account of one of those who repeatedly escorted the condemned. They carted them off to a vacant plot of land adjacent to one of the Moscow cemeteries. There, at the cemetery wall, they shot them. Two people, who lived in a dug-out, took care of this. When they brought the convicts, a man with a hollow-cheeked face came out of the dug-out, took the documents and the prisoners, and there and then shot them. In the dug-out, where the escort went once, there were two bottles on the table—one filled with water, the other with vodka.

The shot men and women, young people and very old men, the healthy and the sick. As A. P. Spunde, an Old Bolshevik, testifies, they delivered Yu. P. Gaven, the well-known communist, to the place of execution on a stretcher. Gaven entered the RSDLP in 1902, took an active part in the revolution of 1905, spent many years at hard labor, where he was crippled and became seriously ill with tuberculosis. He occupied the post of chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean ASSR and then worked in the diplomatic service. According to the daughter of Ya. V. Smushkevich, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General and chief of the Supreme Military Council of the Red Army, he, too, was brought on a stretcher to be shot.

Long years of prisons and then camps awaited those who were not sentenced to be shot. Up to now, there is no historical description of these prisons, camps and exile, similar, for example, to M. N. Garnet's multi-volume research on the history of the czarist prison. However, fiction and memoir literature have done quite a lot. Under the heading of "Camp Literature," there are about 200 titles of manuscripts in my library, almost half of them published by foreign publishers.

The concentration camps and temporary prisons for political prisoners or hostages arose already during the years of the Civil War. However, a more or less well-organized penitentiary system began to be created only at the beginning of the 1920's. By this time, they began to develop the requisite legislation. The regime of the political prisoners at the beginning of the 1920's was comparatively mild. They kept their clothes, books, writing utensils, and knives, they could excerpt newspapers and journals, they received additions to the general food, they were exempted from forced labor, and they were not subjected to humiliating examination. In the

political isolators, self-government was permitted. The prisoners elected a starosta and through him communicated with the administration. It should be said that the "politicals" at that time included S. R.'s, Mensheviks, anarchists, and representatives of other socialist parties, who had taken part in the revolutionary struggle against czarism. The members of the bourgeois and especially the monarchist parties and the participants of the White Guard movement were designated in the NKVD documents as counterrevolutionaries and were kept together with the criminals. For them, they established a hard punitive regime, although this was a clear violation of the principles of the new power proclaimed soon after the October Revolution.

Of course, in the practice of the Cheka-OGPU of the beginning of the 1020's, there were quite a number of cases which can be classified as mockery of the prisoners, but this was the exception rather than the rule. In the Corrective Labor Code of 1924, which regulates the position of all prisoners, including the criminals and counterrevolutionaries, it is printed on p 49: ". . . the regime must be deprived of signs of torture, by no means permitting handcuffs, cells, strict solitary confinement, deprivation of food, and meetings through bars." In the majority of cases, the code was observed, and the RSFSR people's commissar of public health, N. A. Semashko, declared with good reason that a humane regime had been established in Soviet prisons, which could not be in the prisons of capitalist countries.

Gradually, however, they restricted the regime and reduced the "freedoms" of the political prisoners by trifles, and that which previously was an exception became the rule. In the 1930's, the prison regime continued to deteriorate, and now the "saboteurs" could not even dream of the prison procedures of the beginning of the 1920's. With the beginning of the mass repressions, the regime in the thousands of old and new prisons was brutalized to the limit. In cells calculated for one prison, they locked up as many as 5 people, in cells calculated for 10 prisoners—up to 50. In cells for 25 people, they put 75 to 100 of them. It was forbidden to approach the window, to lie down on the bunks during the day, and sometimes—even to talk. For the smallest reason, they threw people into the punishment cell, deprived them of their walks, correspondence and the opportunity to read.

"I found myself in cell No 47 of the internal prison with an area of about 35 meters [as published]," the Rostov agronomist V. I. Volgin recalls. "In the cell there were always 50-60 people. It was at the beginning of 19939. The heat stood in the courtyard, and it was scorching in the cell. We pressed ourselves against the crevices of the floor, in order to suck the freshness of the air from there, and we took turns in pushing toward the doors, through the crevices of which a breeze was felt. The old men did not endure, and soon they carried them out to their eternal rest."

In Kuybyshev they put many in a vast prison basement, where the central heating pipes went through. In the summer, the prisoners counted 33 types of insects in this basement, including, of course, flies, lice, fleas, bugs, and cockroaches. In the winter, because of the exhausting heat, all of the insects disappeared. The bodies of people became covered with sores. In Sukhanovskaya Prison near Moscow, they exterminated with hunger, and after 2 months a person turned into a skeleton covered with skin. This prison had in the basement, as well as in its lower and upper floors—a house of rest for NKVD officials.

According to the testimony of the old Bolshevik I. P. Gavrilov, the terrible conditions in the Barnaul City Prison called forth a mass protest of the prisoners—they even escaped from the overcrowded cells into the prison courtyard. Some people were shot after this, but the regime changed somewhat for the better.

The prisoners were treated inhumanely after prison as well—during the transports. In every compartment of the prison "Stolypin" cars, calculated for 6 people, they shoved in 20, and even 30 people each. 100 and more people they drove into a freigh car—heated goods van. In some trains, people stood for several days in succession, closely pressed to one another. For a long time, these trains went to the East, and almost every one of their stops was marked with the graves of prisoners. In her unpublished poem "Kolyma," the Leningrad writer Ye. Vladimirova, who with millions of people went through the terrible path to the East, wrote:

> ...he saw how the prisoner transit escort,
> having stripped people to the skin,
> in unceremonious, crude paws,
> twirled their decrepit bodies;
> how in echelons of two days each,
> they kept people without drink,
> feeding them with salted fish;
> he saw a cripple on crutches,
> and women, locked in railway cars,
> with infants in their arms.

Still more difficult were the conditions of the transports through the Sea of Okhotsk from Vladivostok to Kolyma. In the cramped prisons, people frequently lay one on the other, they were thrown bread through hatches, like wild animals. During the trips, the bodies of the dead were thrown directly into the sea. In case of an organized protest or riot, the escorts flooded the prisons with icy water from outside the ship. Thousands of prisoners after this perished or were seriously frostbitten.

In the majority of prisons, the "politicals" and the criminals were kept separately, they ran into each other for the first time during the prisoner transits. V. I. Volgin wrote: "The criminals robbed the politicals almost obviously, since they (i. e., the criminals) were under surveillance of the guard. To the next victim, they showed a

knife under cover and transferred their things into their hands. In most cases, a struggle with the criminals was unthinkable, since it could only be a bloodbath and not to our advantage. To the delight of the guard, we would have been cut with their evident encouragement. On the way, we found out about this terrible [aspect] of the prison transits, but no one wanted to deprive himself of his life because of rags. It was then that we found out that the prisoner transits are the most terrible thing that can happen to the politicals, and that this new torture of people is supported by the camp administration as a means of extermination.

3

For millions of people, the basic places of confinement are not prisons, but camps, a dense network of which covered the country, especially the regions of the Northwest, the Northeast, Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Far East.

The so-called "corrective-labor" camps were organized in some remote regions already at the beginning of the 1930's. In Karelia—the camps of the BBK (the White Sea-Baltic Canal), in Siberia—the camps of BAM (the Baikal-Amur Trunkline), in Central Russia camps of Dmitrovlag (the Moscow-Volga Canal). The first camps in Kolyma (Dalstroy), in the Komi ASSR, and other regions also appeared. The composition of the prisoners already there was extremely mixed—peasants, believers, and criminals predominated.

In the "corrective labor" camps of the 1930's, there were many cases of extreme brutality and arbitrariness. The banks of the Moscow-Volga and the White Sea-Baltic Sea canals are strewn with the bones of prisoners. But among the camp leadership there were quite a few people who sincerely tried to correct those who had embarked on the path of crime. The camps were not considered secret, people were released from them not only after expiration of their term, but frequently even before. In the books written about these camps with the participation of M. Gorki, V. Katayev, M. Zoshchenko, V. Inber, and B. Yasensky, a great deal was passed over in silence, a great deal was distorted, but they also contained the truth, which should also not be forgotten.

Since the nature of Kolyma is not severe, few people died in the camps of Dalstroy during 1932-1937. The prisoners were not badly fed and clothed. The work day in the winter lasted 4-6 hours, in the summer—10 hours. A system of "records" existed, which allowed the convicts sentenced to 10 years to be released already after 3 years. The wages were decent, and they made it possible to help the families, and to return home well provided for. One can read about this not only in the book of V. Vyatkin, the former chief of one of the Kolyma camps, but also in the "Kolymskiye rasskazy" [Kolyma Tales] of V. Shalamov.

In 1937 everything changed. It was announced that such liberalism is sabotage. After the arrest of the chief of Dalstroy, Berzin, and the majority of the directors of the Kolyma camps, there already did not remain a trace of the "liberal" procedures in the entire system of the Gulag that had quickly spread. The new instructions from Moscow and the new generation of Gulag chiefs quickly transformed the "corrective-labor" camps into hard labor camps, calculated not so much for the correction, as for the extermination, of prisoners.

The incredibly hard and stupefying labor, rarely 10, and more often 12, 14, and even 16 hours in a 24-hour period, the brutal struggle for existence, the hunger, the arbitrariness of the criminals and the guards, the clothing that offered poor protection for the body, and the bad medical service—all this became a norm. All sorts of penal, "specialized," "special" camps, the gold mines of Kolyma, and the tree fellings became extermination camps. In the gold mines of Kolyma, a healthy person, after 1.5 to 2 months, and even after 1 month, was turned into a "physical wreck" ["dokhodyag"], eaten away and unable to work. In a year, a brigade changed its composition several times: Some prisoners perished, others were transferred to lighter work in some camp centers, and still others ended up in hospitals. Usually only the orderly, the brigade leader, and someone among his personal friends stayed alive.

In particular, the regime of the majority of Kolyma and other northern camps was consciously calculated for the extermination of the prisoners. Stalin and his entourage did not want the repressed to return, they had to disappear. And the majority of prisoners quickly became convinced that they were brought to the camps for their certain death.

Incidentally, over the entrance to all camp center divisions of Kolyma hung the motto prescribed by the camp statute: "Labor is a matter of honor, valor and heroism." We remember the inscription on the gates of Auschwitz: "Work makes free" [Arbeit macht frei].

The conflict between the "politicals" and the criminals, which began during the prison transits, continued in the camps as well. The administration consciously stirred up the criminals against other prisoners. "On every convenient occasion," G. Minayev, a former criminal wrote in one of the newspapers, "they tried to give us, the thieves, to understand that we, for all that, are not yet lost for the fatherland, that though prodigal sons, we are nevertheless sons. But for the "fascists" and the "counterrevolutionaries" (i. e., the politicals, R. M.), there is no place on this transient earth—and there will not be for all time. . . . And if we are thieves, then our place is at the stove, but that of the "trendy chaps" and any others—at the door and in the corners..."

Not only the criminals, but also all the big and little bosses scoffed at the politicals. In 1938 a weave of open mass terror rolled through the camps: On the basis of

accusation of sabotage, or an attempt at an uprising, or on the basis of lists received from the center, thousands of prisoners were shot without a trial and an investigation. Thus, according to the testimony of A. I. Todorsky, in the northern camps commissions sent from the center sentenced to execution politicals who had received 5-year and 10-year terms already at the beginning of the 1930's—basically participants of various oppositions. One of those commissions, which included Kashketin, a staff member of the Special Department of the NKVD, Grigorishin, the chief of the Special Department of the Gulag, and Chuchelov, the chief of the 3rd Operational Department of the NKVD, sentenced a large number of prisoners in the Ukhtinsky Camp of the Komi ASSR to be shot. A special platoon carried out the sentences. This Kashketin Commission, under the pretext of the existence, in the Vorkuta camps, of a counterrevolutionary organization, preparing, as it were, an uprising, exterminated thousands of prisoners. A. Pergament, a collaborator of Trotsky at the beginning of the 1920's, and a former Vorkuta inmate who miraculously stayed alive, told me that in Vorkuta they transferred prisoners not suspecting anything to the Brick Factory, kept them for some time in hastily put-up tents, then announced their transfer to another camp center, and on the way shot them with machine guns. After Kashketin and his commission had carried out their brutal mission, they themselves were shot. "During that year," M. Baytalsky wrote in his memoirs, "special prisoner transits, composed on the basis of special lists, came to Vorkuta from camp centers located down the river—from Kachemas, Sivaya Maska, and other places. They came being driven by an escort. But it proved to be impossible for the escorts to transport some across the river, which had overflowed, and people did not quickly recognize why there was such a hurry. They hurried to kill them. And those whom they succeeded in bringing in time, they shot. That year, a man raged in the Vorkuta camps whose name they pronounced glancing back. Later, in the Kotlasskaya Prison, they heard shouts from a window: "Tell people that I am Kashketin! I am the one who shot all the enemies of the people in Vorkuta! Tell people!" These shouts were heard that year, but they told people many years later. The platoon of guards who carried out the sentences also disappeared."

The local camp authorities also did not lag behind the commissions sent from the center. They had the right to kill prisoners without agreement from Moscow. The chief of Dalstroy, Pavlov, and his assistant, Garanin, together with their helpmates, executed in Kolyma no fewer than 40,000 prisoners, having accused them of sabotage. Colonel Garanin behaved with particular brutality. Arriving in a camp, he ordered to line up those who refused to work—usually these were the sick and the physicalwrecks. The infuriated Garanin passed along the column and shot people point-blanc. Behind him went two guards who took turns loading the revolvers for him. The bodies of those who had been shot were frequently piled next to the gates of the guard with a frame like a well, and the brigades being sent to work were told: "The same thing will happen to you if you refuse to work."

In 1939 Garanin was shot on the basis of an accusation of "espionage" and "sabotage," and many camp chiefs were removed or executed. This was the result of the changes in the NKVD leadership after the removal of Yezhov. The situation of the prisoners was mitigated for a short time. With the beginning of the [Great] Patriotic War, the work day was increased almost everywhere and the, as it is, scanty ration was further cut. According to the testimony of P. I. Negretov, in the Komi ASSR in some camp centers in the tree-felling the registered composition in 1942 died out after 100-150 days. The total number of prisoners in 1941-1942, according to my calculations, can approximately be compared with the number of the fighters of the front-line forces. And the losses of people during this time in the West and in the East were approximately equal.

It should be noted that almost all those who escaped extermination in the camps, survived the burden of confinement, and then described them in accounts, stories, novels, and memoirs, for the larger part of their term were not in general work, but occupied the posts of storekeeper, librarian, cook, medical orderly, brigade leader, etc. And the conduct of these people can be judged only depending on whether they tried to help others survive, of whether, on the contrary, they themselves joined the terrible machinery of extermination.

4

The NKVD officials created and set going the terror machine conceived by Stalin. These were different people, and they behaved differently.

The rank and file soldiers and junior commanders of the NKVD escort troops, which carried out the external protection of the camps, had almost no contact with the prisoners and did not know that these were not so much criminals as people who were not guilty of anything.

There were also those in the NKVD who, in the depth of their soul, recognized that the people before them were not enemies, but people who suffered innocently and had been slandered. They could not of did not want to investigate what had happened, but in many cases they tried to help these or those prisoners.

The majority of NKVD officials during the time of Yezhov and Beria understood whom they were serving and against they were fighting. Among the investigators were also those who believed the versions which they were ordered to beat out at any price. However, the main part of the investigators knew that before them were people who had never committed the crimes of which they were accused. This by no means weakened the zeal and sadistic refinement of the investigators. Most often

they themselves thought up the versions which served as the basis for the accusation and then drummed them into the heads of the prisoners.

N. S. Khrushchev, too, spoke of the conscious falsification of the facts of investigations at the 20th Party Congress. After this congress, we learned about the innumerable and frequently absurd "cases" fabricated in the NKVD organs. According to the testimony of S. Gazaryan, they accused the old teacher A. Afanasyev of having created, already during the years of the Civil War, a terrorist group in Barnaul, which was supposed to kill Lenin if he should come there. The authorities did not confirm this patently invented case, and the investigator then declared Afanasyev to a Japanese spy. They again did not confirm the case, since it did not indicate through whom the defendant transmitted secret information to Japan. They hurriedly started to search for "accomplices in espionage," and they even "discovered" the "resident of Japanese intelligence."

M. F. Pozigun, a member of the party since 1920, told Ime about Fritz Platten—they were together in a prison hospital. Platten, who had covered Lenin with his body against the bullets of terrorists, was at first declared to be a German spy. No matter how they tortured him, he refused to sign the indictment. "If you declare me to be a Germany spy," he told the investigator, "this casts a shadow on Lenin, and I will never go for this." The investigators went for "compromises" and registered Platten as a spy of another state. (Pozigun forgot precisely which one.)

According to the testimony of V. I. Volgin, in Rostov-na-Donu, they accused one of the captains of the river fleet of having sunk the torpedo-boat Buryy with his tanker Smelyy. The captain burst out laughing and asked the investigator whether he knew what a tanker is. "A tanker, a tank," the investigator started to mutter, "is a military vessel." "It is an oil-tanker," the captain explained, "which cannot sink a torpedo-boat." "Well, to hell with you," the investigator said peaceably, "you sign, as is necessary there, and you'll leave for a camp with fresh air, but here you'll disappear." In the same cell, 27 men signed testimony about arson in the Rostov mill "for diversionary purposes," 13 "confessed" that they had blown up a railway bridge. But the mill and the bridge stood unharmed, they even survived the war.

One of the commanders in the Belorussian Military District, Povarov, "confessed" that he created a counterrevolutionary organization of 40 people, named their surnames and posts. With this testimony, they brought the case to court, and Povarov was convicted. The testimony was not verified. The investigators did not knowthat the people indicated in the protocol did not exist at all. But they knew very well that those who were named in the investigation would not run away anywhere, and that, for the time being, one can wait with them—the "plan" for arrests was already fulfilled.

Plans and "control figures" for arrests actually did exist. An enciphered telegram from Moscow informed an oblast administration of the NKVD: "In your oblast, according to the investigation organs of the center, there are so and so many terrorists and fascists. They are to be arrested and tried. . . . And the organs of the oblast NKVD had to fulfill the "task" and wait for new "control figures" for the following month or quarter.

Usually the operational groups of the NKVD carried out searches among "enemies of the people" extremely carelessly. They took papers from the desk. They took gold and other valuable things, but they did not make any entry about this in the protocol of the search. They did not search for "hiding places," they did not open up the floor, and they did not thrash the mattresses. They knew from experience that they would not find any documents about "subversive work," and they did not want to expend time for nothing. No one, in essence, analyzed the papers that were removed; after cursory examination, they most often burnt them. And who knows ho many very valuable materials perished. All the papers of Vavilov, for example, and of other scientists disappeared without a trace; for the transport, they sometimes had to call for a truck. The manuscripts of hundreds of writers and poets, memoirs, diaries, and letters of many outstanding party and state figures disappeared. No one regarded the materials and documents removed to the NKVD as pieces of evidence, with the help of which it would be possible to "expose" the criminal. The playwright A. K. Gladkov told me that from one writer they took three authentic letters of Kant, constituting a great historical-cultural value. It would seem that letters in German should have attracted the special attention of the investigator. However, they did not even translate them into Russian and burnt them together with the other materials. In the dossier they showed the writer after his rehabilitation, they are listed as "letters from an unknown author in a foreign language."

The judges, who after 5-10 minutes sentenced people to long terms of confinement or to execution, the procurators who sanctioned the arrest—all of them knew very well that they were dealing out arbitrariness. But for them it was more preferable to deal out arbitrariness than to to become its victims. "Without a trembling grieving the soul," wrote the former military procurator Ishov in his memoirs, it is impossible to remember Sonya Ulyanova, who worked in the Second Department of the Main Military Procuracy. All the cases fabricated in the NKVD against honest Soviet people went through the bloody hands of this woman, who was ready to step over mountains of bodies of honest communists in the name of the preservation of her own insignificant life."

Having a sufficiently clear conception of the people they were dealing with, almost all of the camp chiefs and the majority of the officer staff treated the prisoners with extraordinary and even accentuated brutality. What transformed NKVD officials (although not all of them) into sadists? What compelled them to step over all the

laws and norms of humanity? You see, many of them in their time were not bad people, and it was not by vocation, but through the schedule of duty in the party or Komsomol that they ended up in the NKVD organs! There were several reasons. And, perhaps, the chief one was the fear to be themselves in the position of the prisoners. This fear choked out all other feelings. "If many of the arrested," said one very well-informed interlocutor to me, "out of fear of execution or torture almost without resistance gave any testimony at the investigation, thus entering into cooperation with the NKVD organs, this fear also chained the majority of NKVD workers." Besides, a special selection into the NKVD organs took place: Those who were a little more intelligent and humane than the others, they screened out, the worst and the most ignorant they left.

It should be noted that during the time of Stalin they trained workers especially for the NKVD who were capable of carrying out any order, even a criminal order. It is known, for example, that, in the "brigades" that tortured the arrested on orders of the investigator, they included usually not only hardened butchers, but also 18-20 year old students from NKVD schools—they took them to tortures like they take medical students to a dissecting room.

A part of the NKVD officials were exterminated during the time of Stalin. Some were punished during 1953-1957. But a great many got off with a light scare—they were removed from the posts they occupied and sent to other work or retired. In the majority of cases, they explained and explain their crimes by the fact that they were guided by orders from above. One can recall in this connection that the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg, whose decisions were signed by the Soviet Union, showed that orders which contradict the basic rules of morality, flout the moral commands on which human society is based, and destroy the very foundations of the human community, cannot serve as either the moral or legal justification for those who carry them out.

On the Personal Responsibility of Stalin for the Terror of 1937-1938

1

Many perceived the terror of 1937-1938 as a terrible calamity and tried to find an explanation for it, to give it some sort of version. Mostly these were not so much searches for the truth as attempts to depart from it, to find a formula which would help to preserve the belief in Stalin.

One of the most widespread versions consisted in arguing that Stalin did not know anything about the wave of terror which overwhelmed the Soviet Union, that they concealed the truth from Stalin, and that all the crimes were committed behind his back.

Of course, it is absurd to suggest that Stalin, possessing unlimited power, did not know about the arrests and executions of the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo, the people's commissars and obkom secretaries, the highest military and economic leaders, and the most important writers and scientists. But such is the peculiarity of the acknowledgment and the blind faith in some higher essence. Such an acknowledgment has its own logic: Everything good is linked with the deity, and everything bad—with Satan. It is precisely with these peculiarities of religious consciousness that one can explain the development of the version of the ignorance of Stalin.

"We thought," I. G. Ehrenburg wrote in his memoirs "Lyudi. Gody. Zhizn" [People. Years. Life] (probably because we wanted to think so), "that Stalin does not know about the senseless reprisal against the communists, against the Soviet intelligentsia." Ehrenburg tells about a meeting with Pasternak, who gesticulated among snow-drifts and repeated: "If only someone would tell Stalin about all this!. . . ." Meyerhold also repeated: "They are concealing things from Stalin."

Typical for this time was a conversation between the commissar of the 29th Rifle Division, F. A. Stebnev, and the commander of the Vyazemskiy Military District, A. Ya. Vedenin, the future commandant of the Kremlin: "What is going on, Andrei Yakovlevich?" Stebnev asked me. "What is going on?" He walked nervously about the room. "I don't believe there are so many enemies in the party. I don't believe it. Can it be that in some high link of the party, in the security organs, there are not our people? It is as if they are deliberately destroying the party's cadres. I would bet my head that Iosif Vissarionovich does not know about this. Warnings, complaints and protests are being intercepted and do not get through to him. We must see to it that Stalin is informed about this. Otherwise, there will be disaster. Tomorrow they will take you, and after you me. We cannot keep quiet."[2]

The philosopher A. Kolman was arrested already a few years after the war. In prison he found himself in one cell with Marshal of Aviation, G. A. VorG. A. Vorozheykin, a participant of the First World War, the Civil War, and the [Great] Patriotic War. Occupying important posts, Vorozheykin often met with Stalin and it was precisely him whom he accused of the mass repressions. In his memoirs, A. Kolman wrote: "I tried to convince Vorozheykin that he is deeply mistaken. He is completely blinded by an understandable feeling of personal injury, all the stronger the greater his, Vorozheykin's merits. He looks at all these terrible things subjectively, but not from the only correct point of view, as a historical process called forth by class struggle. It is not the personality of Stalin which is at issue. Stalin is a brilliant theorist and revolutionary leader. He is the same kind of follower of the cause of Lenin, as Lenin was the continuer of the cause of Marx and Engels. But Stalin, in the same way as we, has become a victim of the

fifth column. The imperialists, having become convinced of the failure of their attempts to finish the Soviet Union from the outside, through intervention and war, are trying to destroy it from within, through its agents, such as Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria."

This navie conviction of Stalin's ignorance of the tragic events in the country was also reflected in the word Yezhovshchina, which is what they called the terror of 1937-1938. The unexpected removal and disappearance of Yezhov seemed to confirm this version. Although Stalin's name was on everyone's lips, little was known about his activity at the end of the 1930's. Secretive and secluded, he tried to direct events from behind the scenes, many matters were decided by him alone or within the circle of a few aides. He rarely addressed meetings, he never advertised his part in the repressions, he preferred to put others into the spotlight. Morover, many of the speeches and actions of Stalin gave the impression that he was not too well informed about the true scale of the repressions. At the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, Stalin demanded not to subject to repressions the Trotskyites and Zinovievites who long ago had broken all ties with Trotsky and had condemned their oppositional activity. But meanwhile they continued to arrest them throughout the country. Stalin also scoffed at those at the Plenum "who considered it a trifle to expel tens of thousands from the party." But meanwhile, at this very time they expelled and repressed not tens, but hundreds of thousands of communists.

At one of the receptions, Stalin raised a toast to D. F. Serdich, whom he had known already in connection with the defense of Tsaritsyn in 1918, went up to him and suggested that they drink to Bruederschaft. But soon Serdich was arrested.

Just a few days before the arrest of Blyukher, Stalin spoke very warmly of him at a meeting. According to the testimony of the artist M. Saryan, giving a reception for an Armenian delegation in Moscow, Stalin inquired in detail about the poet Ye. Charents and said that this poet must be spared. A few months later, Charents was arrested and killed.

When the deputy people's commissar of heavy industry, A. Serebrovsky, was in the hospital in 1937, his wife received an unexpected phone call from Stalin: "I hear that you are going about on foot. That's no good. People might think what they shouldn't. I will send you a car if yours is being repaired." And, indeed, the next morning a car from the Kremlin garage arrived for Mrs. Serebrovsky's use. But only two days later Serebrovsky was taken to prison directly from the hospital.

Stalin's former deputy people's commissar for nationality, G. I. Broydo, when they knocked on his door during the night, before opening it, called Stalin on a direct line: "Koba, they have come after me." "Nonsense," answered Stalin. "Who can accuse you? Go calmly to the NKVD and help them establish the truth." Broydo nevertheless "was lucky": In 1940 he was freed.

After N. V. Krylenko was removed from his post as USSR people's commissar of justice and had turned over his affairs to the new people's commissar, N. M. Rychkov, he went to his dacha on the outskirts of Moscow, where he assembled his whole family. Unexpectedly Stalin called from Moscow. "Don't be upset," he said. "We trust you. Continue the work on the new law code with which you have been entrusted." That same night, an operational group of the NKVD surrounded the dacha. Krylenko and almost all members of his family were arrested.

According to the testimony of A. V. Snegov, the Gosbank director L. Ye. Maryasin, at a meeting with Stalin, expressed fears concerning his fate. Stalin embraced Maryasin with the words: "You are not an oppositionist. You are our red banker. What do you have to be afraid of?" After a week, Maryasin was arrested. According to the testimony of I. P. Aleksakhin, the famous publicist and historian, Yu. Steklov, disturbed by all the arrests, phoned Stalin, whom he knew very well, and asked for an appointment. "Of course, come on over," said Stalin, and during the meeting declared: "The party knows and trusts you; you have nothing to worry about." During that same night they arrested Steklov. In 1937 A. Milchakov, who worked in the administration of the gold mining industry was unexpectedly removed from his work and expelled from the party. Several days after this, the worried party organizer of the administration found him: "Let's go to the Kremlin. Stalin is calling you." In the Kremlin office they were received by Stalin and Kaganovich. "What have they come to, that such people as Mailchakov are expelled," said Stalin. "We are appointing you deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Gold and Platinum Industry [Glavzoloto]. Go, carry out your duties." After 2-3 weeks, when they arrested Serebrovsky, Milchakov had already become chief of Glavzoloto. But after another 2 months, they arrested him, and he returned to Moscow after 16 years.

The decisive participation of Stalin in the activity of the punitive organs was discussed in many party aktivs during 1937-1938. Kaganovich, A. A. Andreyev, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Shkiryatov and others, who came to the provinces to direct the repressions, invariably mentioned that they were acting on the instructions of Stalin. However, their speeches were not published. Only after the removal of Yezhov and on the eve of the 18th VKP(b) Congress, the press began to underscore the decisive role of Stalin in the defeat of the "enemies of the people." At the congress itself, many delegates talked about this. ". . . The work of cleansing the ranks of the party of the enemies that had stolen their way into it was directed by comrade Stalin," said Shkiryatov. "Comrade Stalin teaches us how the new saboteurs must be fought in a new way, he teaches us how to do away with these hostile elements quickly and decisively." The delegates cited quite a number of details on this account.

Moreover, later, too, Stalin continued to conceal his crimes. In the book "Tsel zhizni" [The Goal of Life], the aircraft designer A. S. Yakovklev wrote that, at the very beginning of the war, in a conversation with him, Stalin said literally the following: "Yezhov is a scoundrel . . . . He killed many innocent people. We shot him for that."

Now documents have become known which prove indisputably that all the basic repressions of the 1930's were directed not only with the knowledge, but on the direct instructions, of Stalin. Here are some of those documents, read out by Z. T. Serdyuk at the 22nd CPSU Congress:

"Comrade Stalin:

I am sending for confirmation four lists of people whose cases are before the Military Collegium:

1) List No 1 (general)

2) List No 2 (former military officials)

3) List No 3 (former NKVD officials)

4) List No 4 (wives of enemies of the people).

I request approval for first-degree condemnation of all these people. Yezhov." (Condemnation of the first degree meant shooting.)

After the murder of the leaders of Armenia—A. Khandzhyan and Ter-Gabrielyan—G. Amatuni, S. Akopov and K. Mugdusi came to power here. The arrests of the Old Bolsheviks continued, but Stalin was not satisfied with their dimensions. A. Mikoyan and G. Malenkov were sent to Armenia. They read at the Plenum of the Armenian KP(b) Central Committee a personal letter of Stalin, dated 8 September 1937, in which it was noted that the national economy of the republic is supposedly collapsing, but the Trotskyite and anti-party elements are not receiving the proper rebuff. The leaders of Armenia, it seems, are protecting the enemies of the people. Ter-Gabrielyan was killed before the investigation, in order for him not to give unmasking testimony. "It cannot be permitted," it was stated in the letter, "for enemies of the Armenian people to walk about freely in Armenia." Amatuni, Akopov, and Mugdusi were expelled from the party and arrested. G. A. Arutyunyan, under whose leadership the repressions assumed an especially bloody character, became the first secretary of the Armenian VKP(b).

Stalin had as active a part in the rout of the cadres of Uzbekistan. The chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Uzbekistan, F. Khodzhayev, was arrested on his personal instruction. One of the organizers of the nationalist Young Bukhara Party (dzhadidy), Khodzhayev, after the Red Army came to Bukhara, headed the government of the democratic republic of Bukhara. He joined the party of the Bolsheviks only in 1922. After a few months, the new chairman of the republic's Council of People's Commissars, A. Karimov, was also arrested. A. Ikramov, having phoned Stalin, told him that he did not understand the actions of the NKVD, that Karimov was a man fully tested and irreproachable, who could not be mixed up in any counterrevolutionary affairs. It is not known what Stalin replied. But after this conversation, they ceased to connect Ikramov, who still remained first secretary of the Uzbek VKP(b) Central Committee and a member of the VKP(b) Central Committee, with Stalin. And soon a letter from Stalin and Molotov arrived in Tashkent. In it Ikramov was accused of political blindness with respect to bourgeois nationalists and links with Bukharin, A. P. Smirnov, I. Zelensky, and other former oppositionists already arrested in Moscow. After the reading of this letter at a special plenum of the Uzbek KP(b) Central Committee, a commission was hastily set up, which at once "established" the correctness of all the accusations advanced against Ikramov. The plenum expelled him from the party and hand over the case to the NKVD. Ikramov was immediately arrested.

Stalin not only gave instructions concerning arrests. He attentively followed the course of the investigation in the cases of the most prominent Bolsheviks and looked through the protocols of the interrogations. Sometimes he even advised precisely which tortures to apply in relation to people he knew.

When in the testimonies of those subjected to torture the names of dozens of "accomplices" appeared, Stalin, without carrying out any checks, wrote on the investigation protocols: "Arrest" or "Arrest all." In one of the regular memoranda, Yezhov reported on the arrest of a group of workers (a list was appended) and at the same time informed Stalin that information had been received concerning other persons, which was not being checked. Stalin underscored the last words and wrote in the margin: "What is needed is not to check, but to arrest." It is well known that Stalin personally signed about 400 lists and proscriptions, containing the names of 44,000 people—party and soviet activists, military, writers, and cultural figures. Looking through these lists, Stalin sometimes crossed out someone, being not at all interested in what kinds of accusations had been raised against this person. Thus, from the list of writers, prepared on the subject of arrest, Stalin crossed out L. Brik. "We will not touch Mayakovsky's wife," he told Yezhov. Later Stalin "spared" M. Sholokhov, who had fled to Moscow from Veshenskaya, when a group of Chekists came there to arrest him. Many party leaders in the provinces, like Ikramov, turned to Stalin, protesting against the actions of the NKVD. A conversation of that kind took place in September 1937 between Stalin and the secretary of the Far East Party Kraykom, Vareykis. "What did he tell you?" Vareykis' wife asked him. "It is terrible even to say. . . . At first I thought that it was not Stalin at the phone, but someone else. But it was he. . . . Yes, he. Stalin shouted: "It's none of your business. Don't get mixed up in things where you should not be involved.

The NKVD knows what it is doing." Then he said that only an enemy of Soviet power could defend Tukhachevsky and the others, and slammed down the receiver. After a few days, Vareykis was urgently summoned to Moscow and arrested there, and a few days later they arrested his wife in Khabarovsk. After the replacement of Yezhov, the leaders of the local party organizations began to openly condemn the NKVD officials for using torture on the arrested. Having found out about this, Stalin sent a telegram to the secretaries of obkoms, kraykoms, the central committees of the national communist parties, and the chiefs of the NKVD administrations: "The VKP(b) Central Committee explains that the use of physical influence in the practice of the NKVD was allowed from 1937 on with permission of the VKP(b) Central Committee. It is well known that all bourgeois intelligence agencies use physical influence against representatives of the socialist proletariat and, moreover, use it in the most hideous forms. Why should the socialist intelligence agency be more humane in relation to the inveterate agents of the bourgeoisie, the sworn enemies of the working class and collective farmers? The VKP(b) Central Committee believes that in the future, too, the method of physical influence must be used without fail, as an exception, against obvious and and stubborn enemies of the people, as a completely correct and expedient method."

Stalin also knew very well about the inhuman conditions in the "corrective-labor" camps. Having received from Kolyma a telegram complaining about the arbitrariness caused by the new chief of Dalstroy, Pavlov, and his aide Garanin, Stalin replied: "To Nagayevo. The newspaper SOVETSKAYA KOLYMA. To Osmakov, Romashev, Yagnenkov. Copy to Pavlov, Dalstroy. Received long telegram of Osmakov, Romashev, and Yagnenko with complaint about the regime in Dalstroy and shortcomings in the work of Pavlov. I consider the telegram demagogical and unfounded. The newspaper should help Pavlov, and not throw a wrench in the works. Stalin."

Of course, Stalin could not know about all the lawlessness that was going on during those years, but the directives and the dimensions of the repressions came precisely from him. In one of the camps, P. I. Shabalkin met with a former Chekist from Stalin's personal guard. This man related that during, 1937-1938, Yezhov almost every day came to Stalin with a thick folder and the two met for 3-4 hours. So that the chief culprit of the "great terror" was, indeed, Stalin, which, of course, does not remove the guilt from all of his accomplices.

"It is sometimes asserted," said M. S. Gorbachev, "that Stalin did not know about the cases of lawlessness. Documents at our disposal indicate that this is not so. The guilt of Stalin and his closest entourage before the party and the people for the mass repressions and lawlessness they permitted are enormous and unforgivable. This is a lesson for all generations."

From the great work of Colonel-General D. A. Volkogonov "Triumf i tragediya" [Triumph and Tragedy], we have found out that in 1937 the deputy chairman of the Supreme Court, V. V. Ulrikh and A. Ya. Vyshinsky every month reported to Stalin and to Molotov and Yezhov, who were usually present for this, on all the trials and sentences. Ulrikh regularly presented to Stalin a summary of the total number of persons sentenced "for espionage and terrorist activity", and Stalin read these summaries together with the summaries on the gathering of the harvest, the mining of coal, and the smelting of steel.

2

The contrast between the image of Stalin, which had established itself in the consciousness of the people, and the reality, which was opened up after the 20th CPSU Congress, was so striking that in many people there arose the aspiration to somehow soften the moral shock that cannot be avoided by a person who has found out the evil deeds of his father, his best friend, his favorite teacher. This aspiration has frequently been combined with the aspiration to soften the criticism aimed at oneself. This is precisely what explains the appearance of an extremely primitive version of the tragedy of the "deceived" Stalin.

The adherents of this version do not deny the personal participation of Stalin in the repressions of the 1930's. However, they believe that Stalin did not act out of malicious intent, but was deceived by adventurists, careerists, and even agents of hostile intelligence services, who had stolen their way into the NKVD organs and wanted to weaking and demoralize the USSR and the VKP(b). "The key to the understanding of the events," A.-L. Strong, for example, wrote in the book "The Stalin Era, "most probably must be sought in the really extensive penetration of the Nazi fifth column into the organs of the GPU, in many real conspiracies, as well as in the influence which these conspiracies had on an exceptionally suspicious man. He saw that his assassination was being planned, and he believed that, by carrying out a savage purge, he would save the revolution.""

This version can be found also in books which were published after the 22nd CPSU Congress. Thus, I. Verkhovtsev wrote: "The crudeness and sickly suspiciousness of Stalin played into the hands of the foreign intelligence services, as well as careerists, adventurists, and hostile elements, which had wormed their way into the Soviet security organs and began, on a mass scale, to fabricate one case after another of treason and betrayal of leading party officials."

Approximately the same version of the "deceived" Stalin was defended by his daughter Svetlana, who escaped from the USSR, in her book "Twenty Letters to a Friend."

The version of the "deceived" Stalin is now also being supported by some writers and cultural figures, diligently trying to erase and restore the image of the "great leader of the peoples." The author of the novel "Moskva. 41-y" [Moscow, 1941], I. Stadnyuk, who in his novel "Voyna" [War] hinted at the guilt of Tukhachevsky and Yakir, later wrote about K. Rokossovsky: "It happened that misfortune burst into the usual and bustling course of life, astounding in its unexpectedness and in its essence. This is what happened in 1937. Unfounded arrest, absurd accusations of espionage for foreign intelligence, concocted by hidden enemies of the October Revolution, who dreamed of the return of the old orders, about finding the lost riches, and with this goal in mind did everything possible to weaking the command staff of the Red Army, to introduce discord into the ranks of the party and its leadership. They inflicted great misfortunes on the Soviet people. . . . But Konstantin Rokossovsky, they did not break, they did not engender anger and resentment in his heart. . . ."

The facts cited in my essays refute this primitive version. Of course, Stalin was suspicious and in many respects extremely limited; at his "court", as in the entourage of every one of the tyrants of the past, all kinds of intrigues were spun, and a struggle for influence and power was going on. Cut off from the people, Stalin was poorly informed about the situation in the country, and this made it possible in a number of cases to mislead him. One can be suggested that some of the people close to Stalin succeeded at times, through slander and provocation, to arouse suspicion in him in regard to those whom he previously trusted. Thus, during the trial of Beria's myrmidons in Georgia, it was established that an "attempt on the lives" of Stalin and Beria during a boat ride on the Black Sea was organized by Beria himself and did not threaten Stalin's life. Some hoodlums hired by Beria shot from the mountains into the air, and then, coming to collect their reward, were destroyed. This gave Beria the desired pretext to take vengeance on N. Lakoba, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, who was considered to be a personal friend of Stalin. I would not be surprised to find out that Stalin himself was let into the secret of this provocation: The rumors of such an assassination attempt were for him still more important than for Beria.

As is now known, foreign intelligence agencies also undertook provocations in order to deceive Stalin. According to the testimony of F. Raskolnikov, Bulgarian counterintelligence palmed off on Yezhov's agents forged documents, which caused the arrest of almost all the employees of the Soviet embassy in Sofia—from the chauffeur, M. I. Kazakov, to the military attache, V. T. Sukhorukov. But it would be a mistake to explain the repressions of the 1930's with provocations of that sort. On the contrary, it was the terror unleashed by Stalin which created the fertile soil for some of the provocations of the Western special services.

Indicative in this respect is tragic fate of M. Tukhachevsky and his comrades-in-arms. Already in the 1920's, the Western press wrote quite a lot about Tukhachevsky, emphasizing the exalted station of his descent and ascribing Bonapartist schemes to him. Sometimes they called him directly the "Red Napoleon." On the other hand, the German military and fascist leaders, preparing for war with the USSR, tried in some way to discredit Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and other great commanders of the Red Army, whom they knew and could appreciate on the basis of their joint work at the beginning of the 1920's, meetings during maneuvers, as well as in the German military academies, where the VKP(b) Central Committee in the 1920's sent the "red generals" for study.

In 1937 the Gestapo forged a "letter" of Tukhachevsky to his "friends" in Germany, revealing the intention to get rid of the tutelage of the c civilians after carrying out a coup d'etat. The Gestapo agents not only copied the handwriting of Tukhachevsky, but also his characteristic style. On the forged letter were the Abwehr stamps "top secret" and "confidential" and even Hitler's authentic resolution: To organize surveillance of the generals who supposedly were in secret contact with Tukhachevsky. In order to convey this letter to Stalin, a theft of Tukhachevsky's "dossier" was simulated from the building of the Abwehr during a fire by agents of Czechoslovak intelligence. In his memoirs, the former president of Czechoslovakia, E. Benes, testified that already in January 1937 he had received unofficial information about negotiations between Hitler and Tukhachevsky, Rykov, and others. The goal of the negotiations was the overthrow of Stalin and the establishment of a pro-German government. Benes at once informed Moscow about this through the USSR embassy in Prague.

It may thus be suggested that Stalin was, indeed, deceived, that he fell for the Gestapo's bait. But this is not so. The story of the downfall of Tukhachevsky is much more complex, and much remains still unclear. From the information published in the Western press, it is clear that the chief of the Gestapo, R. Heydrich, found out about the "conspiracy" of Tukhachevsky from the White emigre General Nik[olai] Skoblin. And Skoblin himself and his wife Nadezhda Plevitskaya were outstanding figures in the White emigration. It was Skoblin who organized the abduction of General A. P. Kutepov, who after the death of Wrangel headed the White Guard Russian General Military Union (ROVS).

"Reliable information" about Tukhachevsky's "treason", so desired by him, Stalin received in January 1937, but he did not remove the deputy people's commissar for defense from his post right away. Even after the arrest of Tukhachevsky, the "dossier" transmitted from Czechoslovakia, was not presented to the Military Soviet, at whose session on 1-4 June, still before the court investigation, the question of the "treason" of Tukhachevsky and the other military commanders was examined. To the members of the Military Soviet, Yezhov distributed the "testimony" of military [officers]

previously arrested, from which it followed that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and others betrayed the Fatherland and intended to carry out a coup d'etat. As far as Tukhachevsky's "dossier" is concerned, it was used mainly for the deception of Western political figures. Through Benes, a number of French politicians found about the "dossier", including the leader of the socialists, L. Blum. In the USSR, this forgery, inspired by the NKVD, was tacked onto the Tukhachevsky case only after he had been shot.

Stalin was an extremely secretive man and did not share his intentions with anyone. In this sense—and only in this sense—he never had either trusted friends or accomplices. To the very last days of his life he continue to assert, both orally and in writing, that all the people destroyed by him were enemies of the people, although he undoubtedly knew that neither Blyukher, nor Postyshev, neither Chubar, nor Svanidze, neither Yakir, nor Bukharin, neither Rykov, nor thousands of other prominent party members, arrested on his order, were spies or traitors.

Having sanctioned the arrest of his recent comrades-in-arms and friends, Stalin attentively followed the course of the investigation, but never expressed the desire to see or to question any one of them. He knew that some of the arrested did not admit their guilt or later repudiated their testimony, but he sanctioned their execution. Now it is known that Stalin received the letters of lmany of his comrades-in-arms written before they died, requesting to receive them and to hear them out. He did not answer these letters, although he kept some of them in his safe. One such letter—in which R. Eykhe, a candidate member of the Politburo, appealed to Stalin—was read at the 22nd CPSU Congress by N. S. Khrushchev. The letter was left without attention, and on 4 February 1940 Eykhe was shot.

Another candidate member of the Politburo, Ya. Rudzutak, also completely repudiated his testimony at his trial. In the protocol of the session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court it is recorded: ". . . His only request to the court is to inform the VKP(b) Central Committee that in the NKVD organs there is a still not extirpated hotbed, which artificially creates cases, compelling completely innocent people to acknowledge their guilt. . . . The methods of investigation are such that force to invent and to slander perfectly innocent people, not to speak of the person under investigation himself. . . ."

Having read this protocol, Stalin laid it aside. Rudzutak was shot.

But, you see, both Eykhe and Rudzutak, like many others, thought that the NKVD is deceiving Stalin.

Lion Feuchtwanger wrote in his book that Stalin told him about a long letter he received from Radek, with protestations of his innocence. One can imagine the reaction of Stalin: As he told Feuchtwanger, already the day after he sent this letter, Radek confessed all of his crimes.

If we proceed from the proposition that Stalin was convinced of the guilt of those arrested on his order, then it is not clear why he took such trouble to preserve the secret of the investigation, to see to it that not a single outside glance, even the glance of the procurator, should penetrate into the torture chambers of the NKVD? Why was all due process abolished with respect to political prisoners? Why were they deprived of the right to defense? Why was the majority of political prisoners sentenced to long terms even without any legal proceedings? Why were all the arrested communists expelled from the party long before the completion of the investigation? Why was a procedure established under which the NKVD organs themselves arrested, themselves carried out the investigation, themselves brought in the verdict, and themselves carried it out?

Not being able to cope with the enormous "plans" for repressions, they simplified the investigation to the extreme. As M. M. Ishov testifies, in Novosibirsk the investigators themselves composed and themselves signed the protocols of "interrogations" which they did not conduct. The verdict was brought in in absentia, and frequently this was a sentence of capital punishment. People were not questioned, they were not tortured—they were simply shot without any explanations.

In Moscow and other large cities they tried by all means to get the prisoners to sign the falsified testimony in their own handwriting. This is explained by the aspiration not only to break and morally to destroy the person under investigation, but also to conceal the crime, to give the murder of perfectly innocent people the semblance of legal foundation. By the desire to conceal his crimes, one can explain the inhuman conditions which, on the orders of Stalin, were established in the camps and led to the death of the majority of prisoners. Sending millions of people to the extermination camps, the Hitlerites wrote on the accompanying documents: "Return undesirable." Stalin and his assistants were more hypocritical. On many cases of "enemies of the people" there appeared: "Use only for heavy physical labor." For 99 percent, this meant death.

The NKVD organs turned into a mob of all sorts of adventurists and careerists, frequently with a shady political and criminal past. Stalin knew with whom he was dealing, but it was precisely adventurists and half-educated sadists which he needed. They completely depended on him, who had given them almost unlimited power, and, without thinking and being tormented by pangs of conscience, they carried out any order. Stalin not only had a firm grip on control of the punitive organs, he constantly changed people there, destroying some and promoting others. Thus the primitive version of the "deceived" Stalin is not tenable.

Untenable is also the version of a man with weak nerves, suspicious and restless, who, having found himself at the head of the only socialist state in the world, begins to see enemies and conspirators everywhere and in the end kills his best friends and gives up the country into the power of ambitious adventurists, who were able to enter his confidence. Stalin was not such a man. He had strong nerves, a will of iron, and great endurance. And he acted one way or the other, not because he was afraid or was deceived, but fully consciously and deliberately. "It's not so easy to fool Comrade Stalin," he remarked about himself in one of his letters.

3

There exists the version of the serious mental illness of Stalin. Dm. Shostakovich and N. A. Andreyev, a member of the party since 1897, a physician by profession, for example, were deeply convinced of this. This same version was propounded by I. P. Aleksakhin, who returned home after 17 years of confinement, in his speech to the party aktiv of Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon of Moscow in November 1961. It was also defended by several foreign communists. The American communist H. Meyer wrote: ". . . The participation of Stalin in the condemnation to death of thousands of innocent people, his merciless suppression of intra-party differences and criticism, his approval of torture as a method of obtaining confessions, his pathological suspiciousness, and the creation of an atmosphere of terror by him, called forth horror. These gross violations of legality could not have been and were not called forth by historical necessity. . . . These crimes were caused by historical coincidence—the paranoia of Stalin, a factor which was outside the sphere of politics and economics, that is outside of what is accepted to be called objective historical conditions."

It should be said that this version is not totally without foundation. The conduct and actions of Stalin contain elements of pathology: Sickly suspiciousness, which became more intense with age, intolerance of criticism, rancor and vindictiveness, overestimation of his own personality bordering on megalomania, and cruelty approaching sadism. However, for all that, Stalin was undoubtedly a man of sound mind and fully aware of his actions. And no court, including the court of history, can excuse Stalin, having cited his diminished responsibility.

It is indicative that with all his suspiciousness, Stalin never struckat a victim chosen by him without well-thought out preliminary preparation—he carefully organized the victim's persecution and gradually entangled him in web of slander.

In the destruction of the soviet and party apparatus, the NKVD organs used predominantly two methods.

The first method can be conditionally called "from the top down." In a chosen oblast, republic, or people's commissariat, the complement of leaders was repressed in one blow on the basis of testimony fabricated in Moscow. Then they arrested the officials of oblast and rayon organizations, and in the central institutions in Moscow—the heads of departments and administrations, and many rank-and-file employees. It was considered self-evident that "enemies of the people" and "spies" heading an oblast or a people's commissariat had succeeded in planting their "agents" everywhere.

The second method can be conditionally called "from the bottom up. To start out, the NKVD organs, without the consulting the obkom secretary or people's commissar, arrested a number of rank-and-file employees and declared them to be "spies" or "enemies of the people." In so doing, the central newspapers published articles which expressed indignation with the leaders of the oblast or the people's commissariat, who had overlooked hostile activity. The arrests continued, and more and more people came to be included among the "enemies." They arrested some of the officials of the apparatus of the obkom or the people's commissariat and some of those who stood close to the leadership. This could be a personal chauffeur, a researcher, an editor, a technical secretary, a relative. The natural desire of the leader to protect people close and very well known to them was regarded already not simply as the loss of vigilance, but also as protection of "enemies of the people." The tone of the newspapers became more unrestrained and threatening. Materials were published which expressed open mistrust of the secretary of an obkom or the people's commissariat. Typical in this respect is the appeal in the article "It is Time for the Bolsheviks of Omsk to Speak Up" (PRAVDA, 28 September 1937): "If the leaders of the of the Omsk Obkom do nothing and protect Trotskyite-Bukharinite spies, then it is time for the Bolsheviks of Omsk to speak up and be heard."

This entire long or short campaign led to the demoralization of the leaders, engendered in them confusion and perplexity, and, on the other hand, encouraged their personal enemies and all sorts of slanderes and careerists. The campaign ended with the arrest and death of the victim selected by Stalin.

It is revealing that in many cases Stalin limited himself, at the outset, to removal of a major party figure without arrest, although he had at his disposal "compromising" testimony or denunciations. The person would be transferred to other work, sometimes even more responsible work, uprooting him in this way from his familiar environment. It happened that, for a short time, a prominent communist was transferred a number of times from one obkom to another, from one people's commissariat to another. Thus, in 1937 Dybenko was released from the command of the Privolga Military District and appointed commander of the Leningrad IMilitary District. After a few months, he was unexpectedly appointed USSR deputy people's commissar of the timber industry and sent on a business trip to the Urals, where he was arrested in April 1938. Dismissed from the leadership in the Ukraine, Kosior was transferred to Moscow and appointed deputy chairman of the USSR

Council of People's Commissars, and his closest comrades-in-arms in the leadership of the party organization of the Ukraine, V. Chubar and P. Postyshev, were sent to party work in Solikamsk and Kuybyshev, where they were arrested. Kosarev, too, who had already been declared to be an "enemy of the people", was not arrested at once after the 7th Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee. According to the testimony of Kosarev's wife, Maria Viktorovna, he was shadowed from behind every tree in the dacha district, but in the beginning they did not touch him.

All of this is indicative of the fact that Stalin was by no means a man with diminished responsibility.

Many people who had been close to Lenin, but had proved to be inconvenient to Stalin, were not touched at all, although their close relationship and friendship to "enemies of the people", who had already been arrested, was no secret. To those who have already been mentioned in this connection, one can add M. Tskhakaya, F. Makharadze, Ye. Stasova, L. Fotiyeva, and N. Semashko. Why, when destroying some representatives of the "old guard," did Stalin spare others? I think, for important political considerations: Leaving a number of genuine friends and colleagues of Lenin at liberty, Stalin, as it were, demonstrated the continuity of his cause. Many Old Bolsheviks were compelled to come forward with praise of Stalin; on his birthdays they signed collective messages of good will to "the true Leninist."

In the provocational affair on the "diversionary center" of cultural figures, in connection with which Babel and Meyerhold were tried, Pasternak and Olesha were named as accomplices. Stalin crossed their names from the lists of the "center." The outstanding writer Bulgakov was not arrested, about whose "anti-Soviet sentiments" the NKVD received many denunciations. Stalin in wrath left Shostakovich's opera "Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk". The composer found himself in protracted disgrace, moreover his friendship with Meyerhold and his acquaintance with Tukhachevsky were known. Every night Shostakovich expected to be arrested, he slept poorly, and he had prepared a "prison suitcase." But Stalin did not permit the arrest of Shostakovich, and he left Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, Pasternak and Platonov at liberty. During 1937-1939, he did not permit the arrest of a single one of the then already few prominent film directors, although "cases" against them had been prepared in the NKVD. Perhaps because he liked the cinema. Some films—"The Great Waltz," "Lights of the Big City," "Lenin in October," "Volga-Volga," "The Kuban Cossacks"—he himself saw 50 times and more, and he forced his entourage to watch them, too.

The careful calculation behind the crimes committed by Stalin, and by no means his diminished responsibility, is also indicated by the fact that, in a number of cases, for the purpose of blackmail, he ordered the arrest of the wife or other close relative of one of the prominent party or state leaders. The leader himself continued to work in his job, and Stalin continued to meet him both officially and unofficially. Thus, in different years, the wives of Kalinin, Molotov, A. V. Khrulev, and Poskrobyshev, and the wife and son of Kuusinen, two of Mikoyan's sons, the brother of Ordzhonikidze, and Khrushchev's daughter-in-law were arrested. Accused of belonging to the "fascist center," the elder brother of L. M. Kaganovich—M. M. Kaganovich—committed suicide.

Sometimes, as a "favor," Stalin allowed the release of one of the relatives of someone in his entourage. At the request of Kalinin, his wife was released a few weeks before the death of the All-Union starosta. In a conversation with Kuusinen one day, Stalin asked him why he did not try to get his son released. "Evidently, there were serious reasons for his arrest," Kuusinen repolied. Stalin grinned, and Kuusinen's son was soon released.

Poskrobyshev's wife was the sister of the wife of Sedov—the son of Trotsky. However, this did not prevent him from becoming one of Stalin's most trusted people. And even when Stalin later ordered the arrest of Poskrobyshev's wife, the latter remained his most important personal secretary. He was dismissed only a few months before Stalin's death, but he was not arrested.

All of this indicates Stalin's contempt for his close colleagues, but not his fear of them, and it does not square with the version of his diminished responsibility.

To divine how Stalin would decide the fate of the people he knew very well was impossible. Sergei Ivanovich Kavtaradze, during the years of the underground, had rendered many services to Stalin. On one occasion, risking his own personal security, he had helped Stalin hide from agents of the Okhrana. During the 1920's Kavtaradze joined the Trotskyites, and, as a former Trotskyite, he was exiled to Kazan after the murder of Kirov. From there he wrote Stalin that he had not been working against the party for a long time. Stalin brought him back from exile. Soon the central newspapers published the reminiscenses of Kavtaradze about one of the episodes of their joint underground work. Stalin liked these reminiscenses, but Kavtaradze did not write any more on this subject and did not even become reinstated in the party, living without drawing attention. At the end of 1936, Kavtaradze and his wife were arrested and, after brutal tortures, sentenced to be shot. Kavtaradze, in particular, was accused of planning the assassination of Stalin with Budu Mdivani. Mdivani was shot, but Kavtaradze was for a long time kept in the cell for prisoners condemned to death. Once he was unexpectedly called to Beria, in whose office he met his wife, who had changed beyond recognition. Both were released. They settled in a communal apartment, and started to work. It turned out that Stalin had not forgotten about Kavtaradze and even began to pay attention to him, inviting him to dinner in the Kremlin. One day he and Beria paid Kavtaradze a surprise visit in his crowded apartment. This caused excitement, one of the neighbors fainted when she saw, in her words, "the portrait of comrade

Stalin" at the threshold of the apartment. Sergei Ivanovich told that, when he had dinner with Stalin, the latter was very cheerful, himself poured the soup, joked, and reminisced the past. But then once he told his guest: "But still you wanted to kill me."

Some may see in these words of Stalin proof of his maniacal suspiciousness. But, you see, Stalin knew very well that Kavtaradze never thought about killing him. He could not admit this openly, without casting doubt on the legitimacy of the execution of Budu Mdivani and other communists. It was simpler to "forgive" Kavtaradze alone.

All of these things I learned from the translator Ye. D. Gogoberidze, who knew Sergei Ivanovich well. In 1941 Kavtaradze was appointed deputy minister of foreign affairs, he took part in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and then he was sent as ambassador to Romania. He approved the denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress and was a delegate at the 22nd Congress. Kavtaradze died in 1971 at the age of 86.

Not long before his execution, A. Svanidze was told that he would be "forgiven" if he would ask Stalin for pardon. Svanidze refused.

Actions of that sort are characteristic of a tyrant who holds people in contempt, but by no means of a man who is sick and not fully responsible.

Stalin usually turned down appeals to free people. Sometimes he had to give in. The request of Academician P. L. Kapitsa to release the young physicist L. Landau was carried out by the NKVD on Stalin's order. Stalin needed Kapitsa, so he had to give in.

Already during the war a decision was taken concerning the most rapid creation of domestic radar sets. Academician A. F Ioffe, in a special memorandum to the government, having noted the great services of the engineer and inventor P. K. Oshchepkov in this sphere, asked for his release from confined. The effort was successful.

After the Soviet-Finnish War, as well as during the first months of the [Great] Patriotic War, Stalin "allowed" the release from camps and prisons of several thousand Red Army commanders. Many of them were then promoted to responsible posts. They also released the recent people's commissar of armaments, Vannikov—he was taken directly from prison to a Politburo session. Stalin said for him to handle things, because a difficult situation had developed in the defense industry. Vannikov refused. Stalin turned to the members of the Politburo: "You see, he has taken offense at us." By decision of the Politburo, Vannikov was appointed deputy commissar of armaments, and some time later—commissar of ammunitions.

Almost simultaneously, in October 1941 and in the summer of 1942, Stalin ordered the execution of a large group of prominent Red Army commanders, who were being held in the camps and whom he considered a danger to himself in the event of an unfavorable situation on the Soviet-German front.

Such actions are by no means characteristic of a person with diminished responsibility who is suffering from persecution mania. The fact tht Stalin frequently surrounded himself with people who had an extremely shady past, such people, for example, as Beria and Abakumov, also does not agree very well with the version of the serious mental illness and persecution mania. It was not secret to Stalin that A. Ya. Vyshinsky, until 1920, was a member of the Menshevik Party and in August 1917, being the chief of the militia of the Arbat district of Moscow, had written out orders for the arrest of Bolsheviks. However, Vyshinsky was entrusted with the post of General Procurator of the USSR, and later with the post of USSR mnister of foreign affairs.

A great deal of compromising material was received by Stalin on his closest aides as well. According to the testimony of V. Shalamov, some prominent military, in giving falsified testimony, had named Voroshilov, moreover at times even under the pressure of the investigator. According to the old party member F. Zastenker, in Sverdlovsk Oblast alone several poods of testimony against Kaganovich and Molotov were "prepared." Many of the depositions against Molotov were received in Kuybyshev Oblast. By subjecting Kalinin's wife to torture, investigators obtained compromising testimony against her husband from her. For considerations known only to him, Stalin for the time being did not make use of these materials.

Of course, Stalin was not only crude, malicious, egoistic, and brutal, but also suspicious. These qualities, naturally, became intensified during the last years of his life. Having destroyed millions of people, having corrested all the legal and human laws, Stalin had sufficient reason to be afraid of his entourage, and this frequently pushed him into new crimes. But nevertheless, the repressions of the 1930's were not called forth by the persecution mania and suspiciousness of Stalin, which were characteristic of him as of any tyrand and despot. It is impossible to explain despotism itself by suspiciousness and fear.

4

Soon after the 20th Party Congress, I had the occasion to hear from a very highly-placed official a rather strange version of the bloody purges of the 1930's:

"Yes, Stalin knew very well that the people, whom he condemned to death, were not spies and saboteurs. These accusations were fabricated to facilitate the repressions. Of course, from the standpoint of moral or legal norms, Stalin's actions were illegal. But all the same, they were necessary for the further development of

the revolution in our country. The people whom Stalin eliminated were powerful and were very popular. Like Stalin, they had taken part in the revolution. For this reason, it was impossible to simply remove them from their jobs or to expel them from the party. They had to be accused of some monstrous crimes, of the attempt to restore capitalism, of espionage, of sabotage, and then, after the masses had been deceived, to be destroyed."

"But why was it necessary for the Revolution to get rid of its active participants?" I asked.

"Such is the logic of all revolutions. The point is that most of the former revolutionaries who were eliminated by Stalin by the mid 1930's had ceased to be revolutionaries, they had degenerated into functionaries (chinovniki) and bureaucrats. These people were pushing the our party and state no longer toward socialism, they were not moving forward, but backward. Therefore, Stalin was confronted with the question of eliminating those who were interfering with the further development of the socialist revolution and of promoting young officials who were capable of leading our revolution forward."

Later on I became convinced that this version had wide currency among some retired party figures, who had been promoted in the 1930's and 1940's. As a rule, this is not argued publicly, but "confidentially." It cannot be excluded that the source of the legend of the "permanent" revolution is to be found in the statements of Stalin himself.

Approximately the same point of view is adhered to by a number of foreign authors. Thus, Isaac Deutscher, in his book "The Prophet Outcast," discussing the reasons for the Stalinist "purges", attempts to show that Stalin was afraid, that bureaucracy will turn into a new class, and therefore, under the pretext of his struggle against the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, he came out against his own bureaucacy. Deutscher suggests that it was precisely the Stalinist terror which prevented the transformation of the ruling groups into a new social class. "This was," he writes, "one of the darkest, least discussed, but very important aspects of the permanent terror. . . . This terror not only destroyed the guard of Bolsheviks, but kept the bureaucracy in a state of instability, constantly renewing its composition. In the same way in which Stalin, in his own, autocratic and barbarian manner liquidated the kulak, so he constantly liquidated the embryo of the new class."

What can be said about this version, which is very similar to the official version of the Chinese "Cultural" Revolution of 1965-1969, with its appeal to "open fire on "headquarters" and to overthrown those "who are in power but are following the road to capitalism?"

Of course, the degeneration of part of the party and state cadres during the post-revolutionary period did not affect only those who joined the revolution in its later stages, but also some of the professional revolutionaries of the Leninist party guard. But this did not with fatal inevitability have to lead to the degeneration of the party and state power. In the process of the energetic struggle against bureaucratism and careerism, which what begun under Lenin, a significant stratum of young, talented, and energetic officials grew up in the party and the Komsomol in the 1920's and during the years of the 1st Five-Year Plan, who were completely devoted to Soviet power and the ideals of socialism.

Could it be that Stalin was not satisfied with the dimensions of the struggle against bureaucratism and wanted to expand it with the help of his barbaric methods, as I. Deutscher thinks? This suggestion does not stand up to criticism.

First of all, besides the leaders who had become really bureaucratized and corrupt, which could be called the "embryo" of a new ruling class, the repressions of 1936-1939 encompassed a multitude of talented party and Soviet officials, military commanders, engineers, scientists, and cultural figures who were devoted to the people. Not only the top leaders in the 45-60 year age range perished, but also officials of the middle echelon of the party and state leadership (and Komsomol leaders) who were 30-45 years old. Also subjected to the repressions was the most educated part of the party intelligentsia, to whose training a great deal of attention had been devoted earlier.

Secondly, in the majority of cases, the place of those destroyed by Stalin was taken by people less experienced, less stable, and frequently less educated. Not only in the composition of the VKP(b) Central Committee, but also in all higher echelons of the party, state and economic apparatus there began to be fewer descendants of intelligentsia families and families of proletarians; on the other hand, there was an increase in the number of descendants from the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Such people as Molotov, Beria, Kaganovich, Mekhlis, Malenkov, Bagirov, Voroshilov, Shkiryatov, Vyshinsky, and others, who first of all can be called degenerates, incapable of giving impetus to the further development of the revolution and the revolutionary possibilities of the Soviet state, were promoted into the immediate entourage of Stalin.

Another version was advanced by the former Soviet senior official, M. Voslensky, in his book "Nomenklatura," which appeared in Paris in 1980. In contrast to Deutscher, who believed that Stalin, with the aid of the terror, liquidated the "embryo" of the new class, M. Voslensky tries to show that, having destroyed the old Bolshevik guard, Stalin, on the contrary, began to create the basis of "a new class—the nomenklatura." Within the framework of the Soviet ruling stratum, there arose, by the mid-1930's, a large group of young, ambitious, and extremely aggressive rulers, who were united among themselves (P. Pospelov, M. Mitin, P. Yudin, A. Zhdanov, A. Shcherbakov, and others), a group which exactly constituted the embryo of a new class, supported

Stalin, and pushed him into brutal terror. Moreover, these people were not only officials promoted by Stalin, but they also promoted him as their leader and therefore were able to influence his decisions.

This version is also completely untenable. Stalin carried out not someone else's, but his own will, and he based himself on both the young "Stalinists" and on the recent "Leninists"—Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Krylenko, and Kalinin. In so doing, he soon also destroyed the "Stalinists" who not long ago helped him—for example, Yezhov, and those "Leninists", who extended all the assistance they could, as, for example, Krylenko. The new entourage of Stalin was made up of both the young, and of Old Bolsheviks—it is not age which is important.

The colossal dimensions of the repressions led to a colossal shortage of cadres. New people had to be pushed into executive work "from below." Thousands of workers were appointed at the end of the 1930's as heads of shops and directors of enterprises. Recent rank-and-file workers became the commanders of platoons and companies, the commanders of companies and platoons—the commanders of batallions and regiments, the commanders of batallions and regiments—the commanders of corps and divisions. Recent rank-and-file scientific staff members headed laboratories and and departments, the directors of laboratories—important institutes. In short, this was a time when hundreds of thousands of people all at once found themselves in the kinds of posts about which they had not even been able to think. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these were honest people; they had an enormous respect both for Lenin and for Stalin, worked with great energy, but had a poor understanding of what was happening in the country.

There are no reasons to welcome such forced "renewal" of cadres: The situation that had developed after the repressions of the 1930's was already a different one than the one before the beginning of the "great terror." And it is not surprising that many of the officials [vydvizhentsy = literally: people pushed up] promoted even from the midst of rank-and-file workers, peasants, and employees, began to degenerate and "to become corrupt" from their contact with power.

The bureaucracy of the 1970's felt itself more untrammeled and stronger than the bureaucracy of the 1930's, but it, too, did not become a "new class." Many of the pecularities of the conduct of the bureaucrats were called forth precisely by the fact that they do not feel themselves as a new class and understand the extreme fragility of their situation. Their privileges are not as great as it seems, and they are not fortified either by traditions, descent, or legal norms, and moreover they are not inherited.

The administrative apparatus has become intermingled and has changed already several times, but classes take shape in centuries. One can speak of a ruling elite and the peculiarities of the psychology of functionaries, but all of this also exists in other professional and social groups.

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[Text]

5

The repressions of the 1930's were the culmination of a long-planned and gradually implemented usurpation of power within the country and the party by Stalin. As early at the late 1920's he was with certain justification being called a dictator. Stalin's completely unrestricted personal dictatorship which took shape in the late 1930's was without precedent in history. For the next 15 years of his life Stalin wielded more power than any of the Russian czars or any dictator of the past millennium. Stalin possessed not only total political and military power, he could also dispose of all the country's physical resources at will and personally made all decisions pertaining to foreign policy and the country's internal affairs, even decisions affecting science, literature and the arts. As a party leader Stalin destroyed all previously established party standards and traditions one by one until at last they were completely abandoned.

Until quite recently not only Western Sovietologists and emigres but also historians in the USSR asserted that no particular changes occurred in the Soviet system during the 1930's, that Leninism and socialism continued to develop during those years.

"The cult of personality... could not change the nature of the socialist system, could not shake the party's Leninist foundations," we read in a party history handbook. "The party and its local organs continued to have an active, independent life of their own. In the constant collision with the unhealthy tendencies bred by the cult of personality the genuinely Leninist principles upon which the party was founded inevitably prevailed."

However, quite a few Western and emigre authors have regarded and continue to regard Stalin's usurpation of power as a complete break with socialism and the Leninist revolution, as a counterrevolution, a monarchical or even a fascist coup.

By the end of the Civil War certain theoreticians in the White movement were discussing the idea that the October Revolution would, like many previous revolutions in other countries, eventually culminate in the establishment of a new monarchy. In his book "1920 god" [The Year 1920] V. Shulgin, a well-known nationalist and monarchist, records a conversation he had at the end of 1920 with a member of the Russian Embassy staff in Constantinople. Shulgin attempted to prove that as a result of objective conditions the Bolsheviks should not only restore Russia's military might and also the borders of the Russian State "to their natural limits," but should also prepare for "the advent of an all-Russian

autocrat." However, neither Lenin nor Trotsky could be that autocrat. "...both Lenin and Trotsky are incapable of renouncing socialism," said Shulgin, "for it was with the aid of socialism that they succeeded in overthrowing the old order and seizing power. They must keep on bearing this burden to the end. Then there will come a 'Someone' who will take from them their 'power of decree'... their resolve to accept responsibility for improbable decisions... But he will not take their burden from them. He will be genuinely Red in terms of his volitional power and genuinely White in regard to the objectives he will pursue. He will be a Bolshevik in energy and a nationalist in conviction. A difficult combination, I am aware... Yes, this is true... And everything that is happening now, all the horror now taking place, all the horror now hanging over Russia are merely terrible, difficult, horribly painful birth pangs. The birth bangs of an autocrat... It is not easy to give birth to a true autocrat, especially one who will rule all of Russia."

Some representatives of the right wing and Constitutional Democratic emigration regarded Stalin's usurpation of power as a kind of monarchical coup. Thus in the article "Stalinokratiya" [Stalinocracy] published in 1937 in the journal SOVREMENNYYE ZAPISKI (United States), Georgiy Fedotov wrote: "The ice has begin to move. Huge blocks which have been crushing Russia under their weight for 17 years have begun to thaw and are collapsing one after the other. This is a genuine counterrevolution carried out from above... The liquidation of communism that is taking place in Russia is hidden behind a protective veil of lies. The Marxist symbology of the revolution has not yet been abandoned; this makes it more difficult to see the facts... Stalin is the 'Red czar' that Lenin never was. His regime fully deserves to be labeled a monarchy, although this monarchy is not hereditary and has not yet found an appropriate title."

"I am happy," said an old monarchist officer who had been in prison since 1920 to M. B. Kuzenets, then a young communist sharing a cell with him. "Finally the dream of our dear Nikolay Aleksandrovich, which he was not able to realize on account of his softness, is becoming a reality. For the jails are filled with Jews and Bolsheviks. Do you realize that what is happening is the creation of a new dynasty in Russia?"

The idea that Stalin was a conscious opponent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in particular and the world communist movement in general is still sometimes expressed today. For example, publicist Valeriy Chalidze, who emigrated from the USSR to the United States, used it as the basis for his pamphlet "Pobeditel kommunizma" [Conqueror of Communism], which contains the following passage: "He fooled all of us and the whole world. Almost everyone continues to believe that Stalin created a socialist state, that his goal was to build communism. However, analysis indicates that Stalin triumphed over the socialist revolution, destroyed the Communist Party and restored the Russian Empire in a much more despotic form than existed in 1917. In the process he was forced to use Marxist phraseology and conceal his true objectives..."

Chalidze's pamphlet provides virtually no convincing analysis, and it is a well-known fact that analogies are not proof. Of course, Stalin's usurpation of power was not merely a change in the external form of the Soviet system. In essence it was a *partial* counterrevolutionary coup. However, Stalin did not intend to carry this coup through to its conclusion and would not have been able to even if he did. Stalin did not intend either to establish a new dynasty, or to bring back the landlords and capitalists who had been driven from the country, or to create some new "Soviet" aristocracy, a new ruling class. He did attempt to a certain extent to combine a new social order with an antidemocratic regime of absolute personal power. Therefore one can speak of the different variations of Stalinist barracks socialism, but not of a new absolute monarchy. Since the Stalinist regime is often labelled "Bonapartist" it would be instructive to draw certain comparisons between Stalin and Napoleon. When he came to power Napoleon had no intention whatsoever of returning the land seized by the French peasantry to its previous owners. He also preserved all the basic gains made by the bourgeoisie as well as its leading role in contemporary French society. Once he had the firm support of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry Napoleon took action openly. He was not afraid to proclaim himself dictator for life and later to crown himself emperor. By contrast, Stalin's terror and his usurpation of power in the country and the party were in no way in harmony with the interests of the proletariat and the peasantry, i.e. of those classes upon which the October Revolution and Soviet power were based. Therefore Stalin resorted to deception where Napoleon acted overtly. Where Napoleon carried things through to their conclusion Stalin stopped halfway. Yet even without any monarchical titles Stalin concentrated in his hands more power than Napoleon ever possessed or could have possessed.

6

In their struggle against Russian revolutionary parties the czarist secret police made wide use of provocateurs both from their own ranks and from among unreliable members of various parties with whom a deal could be struck.

The majority of provocateurs who had infiltrated social-democratic, socialist-revolutionary and anarchist-communist parties were exposed soon after the February Revolution. However, some secret police agents were discovered much later. Firstly, a large portion of the documents belonging to the secret police in the capital were burned by workers in the courtyard of the police department. (This was an obvious and flagrant error on the part of the revolutionaries, probably incited by someone who had a great interesting in seeing those

documents destroyed.) Secondly, the police's most valuable provocateurs were known to only one or two heads of secret police sections. Thus, for example, only in the 1920's did the truth become known concerning Serebryakova, who turned many Bolsheviks over to the police.

During the years of terror Stalin and the NKVD made much use of accusations that old, well-proven party workers allegedly had had ties to the secret police. These accusations were levelled at All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee members Pyatnitskiy, Zelenskiy and Razumov. Even Meyerkhold was accused to having ties to the secret police, who supposedly had him listed under the code name "Semenych." It is a much less well-known fact that many of Stalin's political opponents levelled similar accusations at him.

As early as the 1920's accusations of this sort were made by Noy Zhordaniya, a Georgian Menshevik, on the basis of a conversation with S. Shaumyan he had had long before.

Following the 20th Party Congress many articles on this subject were published in the West. In May 1956 A. Orlov, the author of the book "A Secret History of Stalinist Crimes," published in English in the United States in 1953, published a long article in LIFE magazine under the title "Stalin's Sensational Secret." In that article he cited materials that were not contained in his book. In the article he attempted to prove that for many years prior to the revolution Stalin had actively assisted the czarist secret police. According to Orlov, Yagoda gave a certain Shteyn, a responsible NKVD official, the task of studying czarist secret police documents in the archives. The largest collection of such documents was kept in the office of Menzhinskiy, Yagoda's predecessor. While examining them Shteyn came across a folder of papers belonging to Vissarionov, a secret police chief.

"While leafing through the folder," wrote A. Orlov, "Shteyn happened to find a questionnaire to which was attached a photo of Stalin as a young man. He thought that he had discovered information about the great leaders's underground revolutionary activities... Yet when he took a closer look Shteyn began to suspect that something was amiss. His elated excitement turned to fear and horror as he began to read the documents more carefully. These were reports and letters addressed to Vissarionov and signed with the dictator's signature. Shteyn realized that the file did pertain to Stalin, yet not to Stalin the revolutionary, but rather to Stalin the agent-provocateur who had worked voluntarily for the czarist secret police."

Shteyn took the folder to Balitskiy, the head of the NKVD's Ukrainian Administration, his friend and former chief. After having the documents analyzed and determining their authenticity Balitskiy showed them to Z. Katsnelson, I. Yakir and S. Kosior. Yakir in turn showed them to Tukhachevskiy, Gamarnik, Kork and some other high-ranking military commanders. Many photocopies were made, and the circle of persons privy to the information expanded constantly. The army leadership launched a conspiracy against Stalin. It was proposed that a coup be carried out with the aid of the two most loyal military subunits, if possible avoiding disturbances in the country at large.

Thus according to A. Orlov's version of events a majority of the repressions of the late 1930's were prompted by Shteyn's unexpected discovery.

The book "A Secret History of the Stalinist Repressions" was based on facts as well as rumors which did not correspond to the facts but which were in themselves interesting and indicative of time period in which the book was published. The article which appeared in LIFE three years later cannot be regarded as anything more than a conscious fabrication born of the desire to create a sensation. To begin with, in 1937 Katsnelson was neither a member nor a candidate member of the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee. The "conspirators" listed by Orlov were by no means all arrested simultaneously, and none of them attempted to flee. For example, Kosior was arrested one year after the arrest of Tukhachevskiy. If photocopies were made of the "Vissarionov file" at least one of them should have been preserved or found its way abroad, because many of the "conspirators" were fully capable of ensuring the safety of any document or transmitting it to friends abroad. Thus the hypothesis of a conspiracy by the highest-ranking military men and politicians with the objective of bringing about a military coup is completely unfounded. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that no one in the NKVD had undertaken the study of such an important archive prior to 1937. Orlov's article also contains many other discrepancies; on the whole it is a not very skillfully concocted hoax. It should be noted that the article was not included in new subsequent editions of Orlov's book.

The same issue of LIFE contained an article by Isaak don Levin, the author of one of the first biographies of Stalin to be published in the West (1931). In that article Levin produced a document which had allegedly come into his possession exposing Stalin as an agent of the czarist secret police. Later he published a short book on the same subject, "Velikaya tayna Stalina" [Stalin's Great Secret]. The fact that American Sovietologists have never once used Levin's "document" serves as further proof that here again we are dealing with a not very convincing hoax. Some of the most respected American Sovietologists have also informed me that it was a hoax.

Following the 20th CPSU Congress intimations in this regard began to be made by other old Bolsheviks as well. The following are several versions which I heard and wrote down in the 1960's:

1. When in the mid-1930's a group of historians was examining archives in the Caucasus in search of material for a book on Social Democratic organizations in the

Transcaucasus region a dossier denouncing a group of Social Democrats and signed by Iosif Dzhugashvili was supposedly discovered in Kutaisi. This denunciation was handed over to Kobulov, who gave it to Beria, his chief and friend.

2. One old Bolshevik claimed that at the turn of the century he came upon a high-ranking police officer when he unexpectedly entered Stalin's safe house in Tiflis. After he left the guest asked: "What business do you have with the police? Why did that guy come to see you?" "Uh... he is helping us among the police," replied Stalin.

3. At the end of 1916 the decision was made to induct many exiles into the army, Stalin among them. A group of exiles was transported under guard to Krasnoyarsk. Stalin asked that he be allowed to go into the city and did not return to the induction center. He went about virtually openly and the policy showed no interest in him.

4. Following the Prague Conference Ordzhonikidze undertook a trip around the cities of Russia on orders from the Central Committee. As soon as he crossed the border he was constantly followed by secret police spies. Stalin boarded the train at a small station. They talked and then went to sleep, and the next morning Stalin was not in the compartment. After the February Revolution Ordzhonikidze asked Stalin where he went that night. "I noticed that someone was following me, and I did not want to want to give you away," Stalin replied. Later a report from the spies who had followed Ordzhonikidze was found in the secret police files. It did not contain a single word about his meeting with Stalin.

All the above pieces of "evidence" that Stalin was connected with the secret police are based on indirect testimony, are very dubious and are often taken from second- or third-hand sources.

Why, for example, did Stalin not have Beria and Kobulov shot if they knew such a sinister secret from his past? Who can verify the story of the old Bolshevik who claimed to have encountered a high-ranking police officer in Stalin's apartment? And the very notion that a police official would come to a safe house in uniform is highly improbable. A denunciation to the secret police could not have been signed with a first and last name; denunciations were signed with code names which were known only to the chief of the local or central police administration. The story of Ordzhonikidze's meeting with Stalin on the train is also incompatible with the truth. Subsequently secret police records of the meeting were discovered. The spies reported that Stalin and Ordzhonikidze met in Moscow and traveled together to St. Petersburg. Colonel Zavarzin warned the chief of the Petersburg Secret Police Department about this by telegram. Three experienced spies were assigned to follow Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, who boarded the train on 9 April 1912. The train arrived in St. Petersburg on 10 April; Ordzhonikidze was arrested on 14 April and Stalin on 22 April, probably precisely because he had separated from Ordzhonikidze.

Colonel Gerasimov, chief of the St. Petersburg Secret Police Department, dealt personally with agents-provocateurs without informing his colleagues of this. As an emigre A. Gerasimov in 1934 published a long book on the Russian secret police and the informers and provocateurs who assisted it. Stalin's name is nowhere mentioned.

Of course, the secret police did possess various types of documents on Stalin, since he was repeatedly arrested, interrogated and exiled, and since he escaped from exile on several occasions. The secret police compiled dossiers on all prominent revolutionaries, and prior to the revolution Stalin was one of the leading "practitioners" of revolutionary struggle. The full police dossiers on Stalin and other prominent revolutionaries have not been published in the Soviet era. The few documents which have been published at various times or those which I have been able to obtain from archives do not substantiate the theory that Stalin had secret police connections.

It should be noted that this theory has cropped up from time to time in recent articles as well. Thus on 16 June 1988 the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA published a lengthy excerpt from the memoirs of Aleksandr Lazebnikov, a former KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent. He wrote: "As I looked at a photograph [of Stalin] for some reason I recalled a conversation I had had with Boris Ivanovich Ivanov, a party member since 1904. In 1935 or 1936 Komsomol members from Solvychegodsk skied from Solvychegodsk to Moscow. The skiers arrived at the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA offices carrying a pile of materials on Stalin's time in exile. The documents also contained references to a certain B. I. Ivanov, a baker from St. Petersburg. Later I went to talk to him; he was chairman of the central committee of the trade union for workers in the bread industry and lived in Government House. I showed him the documents and heard him say that yes, I was in exile and I lived with Dzhugashvili in Kureyka. The whole time he was there there were constant quarrels within our small colony of Bolsheviks. We decided to lay our cards on the table, to take a kind of 'Hamburg accounting.' We set a date for a meeting of Kureyka's Bolsheviks, but Dzhugashvili did not show up. The following day we found out that he had disappeared from Kureyka—he had fled, and the nearest settlement was 500 versts [approximately 330 miles] away. Such an escape could be carried out successfully only with the help of the authorities. These words stunned me; they were spoken in 1935 or 1936."

In this passage there is much that is dubious and obviously untrue. Firstly, it is hard to believe that a person like B. I. Ivanov would have report such compromising facts about Stalin to any correspondent to dropped in to see him in 1935-36. Secondly, Stalin—and this is a

well-known fact—prepared an escape from Kureyka but did not carry out his plan. And he lived with Sverdlov in Kureyka, not with Ivanov. At that time there were many political exiles in Turukhanskiy Kray, mainly Bolsheviks but also Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists. The story of Stalin's exile in Turukhanskiy Kray has been studied in detail, and an exceptional event like Stalin's escape could not have gone unnoticed and failed to become the subject of research in 1917-18, i.e. following the February and October revolutions. Incontrovertible facts indicate that Stalin remained in Kureyka until the beginning of 1917.

Thus there is no proof of any secret connections between Stalin and the czarist secret police which could have driven him to unleash mass repressions out of fear that those connections would be discovered. If Stalin was a provocateur, then it was in a completely different sense. The fact is that in the struggle for power provocation was Stalin's favorite weapon. Even in the 1920's he was inciting dissension within the party, slandering certain prominent party officials in the presence of other officials and encouraging hostility among leaders.

No matter which version of Kirov's murder one accepts one cannot fail to see that Stalin exploited that murder for purposes of provocation, turning the wrath of the Soviet people against former leaders of the opposition. As for the "open" trials of the 1930's, these were one of the most vile provocations of the 20th century, with the most serious consequences.

7

One should not ascribe overly complex motives to Stalin in regard to his reasons for unleashing the terror of 1936-37. The primary motives were excessive ambition and love of power. Of course, Stalin was driven by an all-consuming thirst for power even prior to 1936. His influence was already tremendous by the beginning of the 1930's, but he wanted unlimited power and absolute submission. He realized that this would be opposed by the party and state leaders who had been molded by years of underground activity, revolution and civil war.

Here is what Petr Chagin, one of the leading officials in the Leningrad Party Organization and a person close to Kirov, had to say. Soon after Kirov's election as first secretary of Leningrad Obkom at a dinner attended by certain Leningrad leaders as well as by Stalin and Tomskiy the conversation turned to a topic that was often discussed by Bolsheviks in those years: how to run the party without Lenin. Of course everyone said that the party should be run by a collective. At first Stalin said nothing, then he got up from the table, walked around it and said: "Do not forget that we live in Russia, the land of the czars. The Russian people like to have one person at the head of the state. Of course," added Stalin, "that person should carry out the will of a collective." No one objected, but no one thought at the time that Stalin was even entertaining the notion of nominating himself for the role of sole leader of Russia.

One can assume that Stalin was serious about his thesis that the class struggle in the USSR would intensify in proportion to progress toward socialism. Inclined toward schematization and a mechanistic understanding of reality, he was often convinced that his theoretical constructions were the sole correct ones. But one cannot believe that he was completely sincere in extending this thesis to veterans of the revolution and to the party's basic cadres as well.

Stalin feared conspiracies; he was even afraid of his inner circle. All members of the Politburo and other responsible officials were kept under surveillance. Stalin's dachas had several bedrooms, and on every bed there was a change of bed linens; he customarily made the bed himself. All the dachas had two exits; the dachas were carefully guarded year round, regardless of whether Stalin was staying in them or not.

In the late 1920's Stalin often took walks outside the Kremlin. Of course he was accompanied by guards, but these were not conspicuous. Inside the Kremlin and the party Central Committee building he moved about without any visible guard; some old Bolsheviks can recall riding in an elevator with Stalin or meeting him in a hallway. Virtually all the prominent Bolsheviks carried weapons on their person; this custom was a holdover from the Civil War years. Following Kirov's murder the rank-and-file party and Komsomol aktiv was forbidden to carry weapons. Voroshilov and Budennyy, Beria and Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze and Lyubchenko went about wearing holstered pistols. Tomskiy and Gamarnik shot themselves with their own weapons. As is well known, Bukharin and Rykov attempted to shoot themselves. Nestor Lakoba liked to practice sniper shooting with his Browning. All these "liberties" were gradually curtailed and had been eliminated before the war. At the dachas and in the Kremlin weapons were carried only by the outer guards, who did not come in contact with Stalin. The individuals he received had to hand over their weapons first if they were carrying any. Some high-ranking visitors were even frisked. This was a manifestation of the usurper's and tyrant's fear for his power and his life, not merely vigilance on the part of the leader of the world's first socialist state.

However, it was neither fear nor obsession which prompted Stalin to destroy the party's old guard. This was done consciously. Stalin had a plan to destroy party, soviet and military cadres which, as A. Todorskiy has phrased it, was similar in scale to a plan for the mobilization of a great army. This plan was carefully thought out, backed up with physical resources and masterfully executed.

From a reading of history we know that excessive ambition on the part of a ruler has not always automatically resulted in mass repressions or the murder of political

competitors, even when there were no serious obstacles to a slaughter. Therefore when speaking of the terror of the 1930's we should note not only Stalin's ambition and love of power, but also his monstrous cruelty. We should also mention the contradiction between Stalin's excessive ambition and egoism and the limited extent of his talents and services to the party and the revolution. For it was this contradiction which set Stalin against not only those whom he with some justification regarded as his opponents, but also against many old Bolsheviks who were personally devoted to him and carried out all his instructions and orders. Since very early in life Stalin had had an inferiority complex; this in combination with his early-developing ambition and egoism intensified traits acquired on account of his life in his parents' home and his studies at a religious school and seminary, traits like envy and malice. Without a sufficiently systematic and in- depth education and with no knowledge of foreign languages Stalin found himself in 1917 a member of a government which even its enemies called the best educated in Europe. Among individuals of tremendous talent and brilliant minds Stalin could not help but feel his inadequacy as a politician, military commander, theoretician and orator. But he did not want to remain in secondary roles; this fueled his malicious envy of all educated party members. In addition, Stalin wanted not only unlimited power but also unlimited glory. No one could play even an insignificant role on the stage of history alongside him. Therefore in many cases it was people's tremendous services to the party and the revolution which made them Stalin's enemies, not their struggle against the Soviet system.

Before the revolution Stalin did not belong to the main nucleus of Bolshevik leadership which had formed around Lenin. Only in 1912 was he admitted to the party's Central Committee in absentia, but his exile to Turukhanskiy Kray prevented him from continuing active party work. Stalin's role in the work of the Transcaucasus Bolshevik organization, both in Baku and, especially, in Tiflis was much more modest than the subsequent legend claimed.

However, Stalin wanted praise not only for his present activities, but also for what he had done in the past. The Stalin myth was in obvious contradiction to party history, and party history began to be fabricated shamelessly. The participants in those historical events who were still alive hampered Stalin and his legend. They knew, for example, that the newspaper BRDZOLA, so loudly praised by Beria, was in fact a small sheet which was only published four times. Therefore it was absurd to compare BRDZOLA and ISKRA. They knew that it was not Stalin who founded the famous Baku Printing Plant, as Beria claimed in his little book. This alone was sufficient reason for Stalin to wipe out the Bolsheviks whose contributions were now being ascribed to Stalin. The legends of the "two leaders" of the October Revolution and Stalin's "decisive services" in the victories of the Red Army during the Civil War were created in the same fashion.

Those who knew Stalin commented not only on his ambition, egoism and cruelty, but also his crudeness, lack of culture and low level of intelligence. However, he could be extraordinarily affable and even tender toward his guests: he complimented them and treated them to various Caucasian dishes.

Extremely rancorous, Stalin did not forgive his critics, even if they subsequently spent many years praising him. Yet he could easily "forgive" criticism or an insult from a member of his retinue; sometimes he even took pleasure in doing so.

Many memoirs note the tremendous power of Stalin's will. "Stalin's main psychological trait which gives him a decisive advantage, as strength makes the lion the king of the desert, is the extraordinary, superhuman strength of his will," wrote F. F. Raskolnikov in his diary in 1939. "He always knows what he wants and works gradually to achieve his objective, unyieldingly and implacably. 'Since power is in my hands I am a gradualist,' he once said to me. In the quiet of his office, in profound solitude, he carefully mulls over his plan of action and with careful calculation strikes an unexpected and sure blow. The strength of Stalin's will crushes and destroys the individuality of the people who fall under his influence. He easily succeeded in 'crushing beneath him' not only the soft and weak-willed M. I. Kalinin, but even such free-spirited individuals as L. M. Kaganovich. Stalin has no need of advisers, he only needs executors. Therefore he demands complete submission from his closest aides—obedience, humility and uncomplaining, slavish discipline. He does not like people who have their own opinions, and with the crudeness that is typical of him he thrusts them away from himself. He is a man of little education... He is not farsighted. Whenever he takes a step he is unable to foresee its consequences. He does not foresee events or control his surroundings as Lenin did, but rather hangs on to the tail of events, goes with the flow. Like all pseudointellectuals, who have garnered fragments of knowledge, Stalin hates genuine, cultured intellectuals, party and non- party intelligentsia alike... He is acquainted with the laws of formal logic, and his deductions flow logically from preconditions. However, against the backdrop of other more outstanding contemporaries he has never been remarkable for his mind. On the other hand, he is extraordinarily cunning... No one can compete with Stalin in the art of 'outsmarting.' When he does this he is crafty, treacherous and vengeful. For him the word 'friendship' is meaningless. He harshly cast off and sent to his death a bosom friend like Yenukidze. At home Stalin is a man with the needs of one living in an exile settlement. He lives very modestly and simply, because he disdains the good things in life with the fanaticism of an ascetic. He is simply not interested in the comforts of life or food. He does not even have any need of friends."

Raskolnikov knew Stalin well, but the portrait that he has drawn requires further comment. Yes, Stalin was a willful individual, he was unyielding and firm as he

worked to achieve his objectives. These qualities intimidated many Bolsheviks, giving Stalin a reputation as an inflexible opponent. However, it was by no means true that he destroyed some and subjugated other party leaders because he was a harder and more willful man than Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Chubar, Yakir or Dybenko. A murderer who shoots from ambush does not need to have a "stronger will" than his victim. An honest person does not not commit crimes because he or she has a "weak will." We often call someone who discards all the standards of human relationships and all rules of fair contest that are accepted among human being a strong individual. However, the majority of crimes attest not to strength of will, but rather to a weakness of moral principles and convictions on the part of the criminal.

Yes, Stalin was a strong personality. But he did not possess "superhuman strength of will." He never had firm moral convictions; he never felt either love or respect for people and did not strive to be of service to them. He did not acknowledge any rules of political struggle. By exploiting the advantages of his position and striking unexpected and perfidious blows Stalin succeeded in destroying many strong individuals. But how would he have behaved if he had been subjected to the same degradation and torture in NKVD dungeons to which he condemned his comrades-in-arms?

Raskolnikov mentions Stalin's cunning. But Stalin was not simply cunning and deceitful. He was able to don any mask.

Stalin's exceptional cruelty was manifested in his attitude toward those close to him. Z. G. Ordzhonikidze recounted to her friends that she always found it distressing to spend time with Stalin, who liked to rail at his guests, especially his secretary Poskrebyshev. Once at a meeting on New Year's Day Stalin rolled up little paper tubes, placed them on Poskrebyshev's fingers and lit them like candles. Poskrebyshev writhed in pain yet did not dare throw off the burning papers.

However, as has already been noted, Stalin could be an extremely amiable host. He brought his guests flowers that he had cut in the garden himself. Many people, especially foreigners, were taken in by this. English fantasy writer H. G. Wells wrote following his meeting with Stalin in 1934: "...I have never met a more sincere, decent and honest person; there is in him nothing sinister or dark, and it is precisely these qualities which must explain his tremendous power in Russia. I used to think that people were afraid of him. But I have determined that, on the contrary, no one is afraid of him, and everyone believes in him... His sincere orthodoxy is a guarantee of the security of his comrades-in-arms..."

When he wished to make an impression on some individual Stalin sometimes played out whole scenes. Thus one time after the war while receiving an admiral in his office Stalin interrupted the meeting to receive a stack of books on linguistics from Poskrebyshev. After listing the books he had brought, among which were some prerevolutionary works, Poskrebyshev said that he had not yet been able to get all the ones that had been requested. "The things Stalin studies!" thought his guest.

Academician Ye. Varga used to tell his friends that every time he visited Stalin a copy of Marx' "Capital" was lying on his desk.

During the war there was a widely popular story about a pilot who had just been awarded the star of a Hero of the Soviet Union; while walking home from the Kremlin along a dark street he shot down a man who had been making improper advances to a young woman. The pilot was arrested by a patrol and the incident reported to Stalin. He asked what could be done for the pilot "under Soviet law." He was told that the pilot could be released on bail until the trial. Stalin personally penned a statement to the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The pilot was temporarily allowed to return to his unit. Soon after he died in an aerial battle.

One should not make one-sided assessments of Stalin. He was not some kind of "superman," he was not merely a man driven by ambition or a sadist who took control of the party leadership through deception and intrigue. Both as a human being and as a leader Stalin is a complex and contradictory figure. Of course, he cannot be called, as has often been done and continues to be done, either a genuine Marxist or a genuine Leninist. Some authors seek in this way either to elevate Stalin or to downgrade Lenin.

In the articles he wrote Stalin used Marxist terminology but not the Marxist method.

Of course, Stalin repeated many Marxist slogans, because he had to take the party's ideology into account to a certain extent.

The doctrine of socialism, of which both Marxism and Leninism are different stages and forms, represent not only a system of concepts, but also a system of convictions and moral principles which Stalin definitely did not have. In essence he was not so much a participant as a *hanger-on* in the socialist revolution.

The political army of a revolution is composed above all of the lower classes of society. These are usually joined by individual members of the middle strata and the intelligentsia; these latter often predominate among the leadership of revolutionary parties. Some of them are drawn to the revolution by noble motivations, in an effort to realize their ideals of a just society. Others join out of personal and at times very base motivations, hoping to have a better position in the new society than the one they held previously.

Throughout history there are numerous examples of how the revolutionaries of yesterday degenerate into tyrants or the servants of tyrants—consider for instance Fouche

and Talleyrand. It is no coincidence that Stalin expressed great respect for Fouche. After reading S. Zweig's book "Joseph Fouche," published in the 1930's, Stalin said: "There was a man who outsmarted everyone, who made a fool of them all." He said roughly the same thing about Talleyrand after reading a book about him by Ye. Tarle.

Stalin never strove to restore capitalism, yet through his criminal methods and actions he did great harm to the cause of socialism: he virtually eliminated already restricted socialist democracy, undermined the leading role of the party in Soviet society and struck a blow at the unity of the working class and the peasantry.

Nonetheless while breaking down and destroying much that had been achieved following the revolution Stalin was in many cases forced to adapt to the irreversible changes that had taken place in society, to the moods and demands of the working masses. He was forced not only to promote Marxist theses in words, but also in a number of cases to behave like a Marxist. Many outstanding members of the Soviet intelligentsia were eliminated, but the Soviet State could not function without the intelligentsia. Therefore even in the 1930's various measures aimed at expanding the educational system and creating a new Soviet intelligentsia continued to be carried out.

By carrying out repressions against the Red Army and the Comintern Stalin did fascist Germany a great favor. After Germany attacked the USSR he had to proclaim both national liberation slogans and anti- fascist slogans, and this contributed not only to the military but also to the moral and political defeat of fascism in Western countries.

Stalin was obsessed with the preservation of both his power and his popularity. He was not indifferent to the opinions of his contemporaries or to the opinions of future generations. He wanted to extend his influence across decades and centuries.

Stalin did not take up the cause of revolution and socialism out of love for suffering humanity. He joined the Bolsheviks out of a thirst for power and out of vanity. For Stalin the Bolshevik Party was always merely an instrument that could be used to attain his own objectives. He was unfamiliar with simple people and did not come in contact with them; he did not visit factories, plants or kolkhozes and felt no need to do so.

It is possible that in his belief in his own exceptional nature Stalin decided that in comparison with the greatness of what he was doing the crimes that he was forced to commit were trivial, the price of progress. In fact no single enemy of the Communist Party and the October Revolution did the cause of socialism more harm than Stalin.

Conditions Which Facilitated Stalin's Usurpation of Power

1

Why was Stalin in the 1930's able to strike such a terrible blow at the party? Why did he not encounter resolute opposition from the people, the party and the party leadership?

Even K. Marx and F. Engels wrote of the possibility or even the inevitability of degeneration of a revolution that took place under conditions which did not correspond to its ideals. The young Plekhanov wrote of this on more than one occasion in his arguments with the populists. He asserted that if the people take power under incompletely developed social conditions then "the revolution could result in a political monstrosity akin to the ancient Chinese or Peruvian empires, i.e. to reestablishment of imperial despotism on a communist foundation."

Of course, in virtually every political system and situation there are different possible paths of development. The choice between them is determined by both objective and subjective factors which are at times clearly coincidental. Even Russian czarism at the beginning of the 20th century had various development options. Nor was the fragile system of bourgeois democracy that existed in the period between the February and October revolutions of 1917 fated to perish.

In this sense Stalinism does not seem inevitable at all: following the October Revolution the Soviet State had the possibility to develop in various ways.

So how did Stalin succeed, despite of the obvious monstrousness of his evil deeds, not only in maintaining his power but also increasing with each passing year the respect, confidence, devotion and even love felt for him by a majority of Soviets?

2

A wildly exaggerated cult of Stalin's personality was the main thing which helped him impose his will on the party.

"We often speak of the cult of personality," wrote I. Erenburg in his memoirs. "By the beginning of 1938 it would have been more correct simply to use the word 'cult' in its original, religious context. In the minds of millions of people Stalin had been transformed into a mythical demigod; everyone trembled when they repeated his name and believed that he alone could save the Soviet State from invasion and disintegration."

This deification of Stalin deprived the party of its ability to monitor his actions and provided justification in advance for everything he did. The personification of all the Soviet Union's achievements in Stalin paralyzed

communists' political activism, kept them from realizing what was happening and demanded blind trust in the "leader." The Stalin cult, like any cult, gave rise to a tendency to transform the party into a special church organization in which the "pastors"—the leaders, Stalin the infallible "pope" at their head—were separated from the flock—the rank-and-file party members. The Stalin cult not only covered up lawless acts and mistakes already committed, it also provided advance justification for new crimes. At the same time the cult widened the gap separating Stalin from the people and the party. The leaders in the Kremlin were to the people just as distant and incomprehensible as the gods on Mount Olympus.

In the 1930's and 1940's elements of religious perception and a religious mentality with all its illusions, autosuggestion, lack of criticism, intolerance of dissenters and fanaticism were instilled in the minds of the people. As Yu. Karyakin has correctly noted, what resulted was a secular variation of a religious consciousness. Perceptions of reality became distorted and facts and phenomena were perceived with overtones they did not actually possess. It was hard to believe the monstrous crimes ascribed to the old Bolsheviks. But it was even more difficult to believe that all these things were merely intentional provocations, that it was Stalin who was committing a terrible crime by destroying his friends and comrades in the party.

After they had deified Stalin people began to look at him through different eyes, attempting to justify things which it would have been impossible to justify using any rational line of reasoning. Similarly to the way in which believers do not lose their faith in an omnipotent and all-merciful God when they see suffering and unhappiness around them because they attribute all good things to God and all bad things to the Devil, under the Stalin cult people attributed everything good that happened in our country to him and everything bad to some evil forces, whose principal adversary was Stalin.

Of course, the Stalin cult had a different effect on people of different ages and situations. It exerted its greatest influence on young people, as was also the case 30 years later in China. Schools and institutes became the principal hotbeds of the Stalin cult. And it was not just young people between the ages of 12 and 17 who exalted Stalin and believed in him. Some prominent party and soviet officials faced the firing squad with cries of "Long live Stalin!"

This religious mentality which had gripped the masses sapped the will even of those individuals who had ceased to believe in Stalin and had begun to see the light. Why did Ordzhonikidze shoot himself instead of Stalin? Why did Stalin's 20-year history of bloody crimes not prompt a single attempt to overthrow him? Perhaps there were people who were capable of doing it, but they were stopped by fear, not so much for their own lives as by fear of not knowing what the consequences of their action might be.

Various peoples began deifying representatives of spiritual or secular power in the very earliest stages of their development. This form of religious consciousness was highly developed in the classical and feudal eras. Various forms of personality cults have often appeared in the modern era, even in very recent history. "A cult of personality," Hitler wrote plainly, "is the very best form of rule."

Unfortunately, the idea of a godlike leader and a "mass" led by him has often intruded into the revolutionary movement. However, it would seem that it was precisely the Bolsheviks who were best protected against the appearance among themselves or in the state they created of any variation of a religious mentality or cult of personality. How can one explain the longevity of the Stalin cult?

The campaign of immoderate exaltation of Stalin was to a considerable extent orchestrated and inspired by Stalin himself and by his inner circle. The Stalin cult was instilled in people's minds starting in kindergarten. In the early school years it was constantly impressed on children that they should be grateful to Stalin for everything good in life. However, this was not just a matter of propaganda. At one time attempts were also made to explain away the appearance of Christianity as primarily a deception by the church rather than a result of historical conditions at the beginning of our era.

Some Western and Soviet historians have expressed the opinion that the origin and consolidation of the Stalin cult were facilitated by the traditions and social order of czarist Russia which had been changed yet not destroyed by the revolution. The cult of the czar and emperor that had been instilled in people over a period of centuries could not disappear immediately. This opinion has a right to exist. However, one cannot fail to see that the revolution itself contained certain preconditions for the origin of a personality cult.

Within a short span of time the October Revolution destroyed a way of life that had taken shape over centuries. The changes it caused were great and unaccustomed. And in the eyes of the people those who led the revolution became something like otherworldly heroes. Evidently the desire to aggrandize leaders is manifested in every victorious revolution that has the support of the masses.

The scale of repressions in the 1930's played a major role in the origin and development of the Stalin cult. Stalin did not act alone. He involved millions of people in his crimes, not just his punitive organs. Thousands of party members sat on "troikas" and Special Meetings. Tens of thousands of activists and heads of enterprises launched attacks on "enemies of the people." As early as 1937 the

Politburo passed a resolution stating that arrests of staff members in various departments should, if possible, be sanctioned by the heads of those departments. People's commissars sanctioned the arrest of their colleagues, obkom secretaries sanctioned the arrest of obkom personnel. The head of the Writers' Union sanctioned the arrest of writers.

Hundreds of thousands of communists voted to expel "enemies of the people" from the party. At rallies and demonstrations millions of people demanded harsh reprisals against "enemies of the people." In many cases people turned over former friends for trial and execution. Of course, the majority believed Stalin and the NKVD organs. There were those who doubted, most often when specific cases were at issue, but they kept silent, too, thereby making the slaughter of party cadres easier. Even if they felt doubts and uncertainty these people did not want to regard themselves as accomplices to a crime. So they forced themselves to believe in Stalin, who supposedly knew all and was infallible. The Stalin cult helped them soothe their consciences.

The combination of contradictory emotions and sentiments that was created during the years of terror was one of the principal reasons for the longevity and stability of the Stalin cult. In other words, there was both a direct and a reciprocal cause-and-effect relationship between terror and the Stalin cult.

Naturally, under different conditions a leader's cult would not necessarily have to result in mass lawlessness and repressions. Much depends on the individual who is granted extraordinary powers. But no healthy society can exist under such conditions, where the sole guarantee of not only citizens' rights but of their very lives mainly hinges on the personal characteristics of the leader of the party and state.

3

The Bolsheviks' main newspaper was called PRAVDA [Truth]. In their struggle against czarism and later against the bourgeois Provisional Government they supported maximum glasnost and freedom to criticize. Stalin did not need glasnost and freedom to criticize in his struggle against political opponents and his intrigues and provocations. All NKVD operations in the 1930's were conducted in strictest secrecy, and any attempt to penetrate that secrecy was regarded as a criminal act in itself. The huge scale of the terror escaped Soviets' notice. This was also facilitated by the bacchanalia of continual reassignment of personnel from one oblast to another and from one job to another which was so typical of 1937-39. It was often not known whether a given party official had been arrested or simply transferred to another position. In the majority of cases even the relatives of those arrested knew nothing about their fate. Vilely deceiving relatives, NKVD organs usually did not tell them that "enemies of the people" had been shot, reporting instead that they had been exiled to remote camps "with no correspondence permitted."

In many cases Stalin and the NKVD preferred secret terror to outright repressions, for instance staging an attack by "robbers" on the apartment of some individual who had aroused their displeasure. It was in this way that Meyerkhold's wife, the actress Zinaida Raykh, was murdered while making efforts to have her husband released. According to Erinburg's account whoever attacked Raykh's apartment left many valuable objects untouched yet stole the documents which she had been preparing. Some politicians were killed at home, in hotels, while hunting or in their offices; they were thrown from windows or poisoned, and subsequently it was reported that they had died of a "heart attack" or an accident or committed suicide. Nestor Lakoba, whose body was subsequently transported from Tbilisi to Sukhumi for a ceremonial funeral, was poisoned in this way. (Later the coffin containing the body of Lakoba, who had been posthumously declared an "enemy of the people," was dug up from his grave in the center of the city and taken away somewhere.)

A. Khandzhyan, first secretary of the Armenian Central Committee, was killed by Beria himself in Tbilisi. According to the account given by A. Ivanova, a former staff member of the Party Control Commission apparatus who was sitting in a room adjoining Beria's office on the day of the murder, a shot was heard and then Khandzhyan's body was taken away to the hotel where official guests from Armenia usually stayed. Accomplices of Beria placed Khandzhyan's body on the bed and fired in the air. According to S. O. Gazaryan's account two previously prepared letters were placed in the dead man's pocket: one to his wife Roza and another to Beria. In the second letter Khandzhyan had allegedly written that he had made a mess of his affairs and intended to take his own life. After treacherously murdering Khandzhyan, Beria and his clique accused the man they themselves had killed of "shameful cowardice." In July 1936 party meetings were held throughout the Transcaucasus region condemning Khandzhyan's cowardice. Within a few months it was announced that Khandzhyan had been an "enemy of the people" and many of his "accomplices" were arrested in Armenia.

State officials in Stalin's inner circle not only engaged in political banditry, they also committed quite a few "ordinary" felonies. They erected luxurious mansions for themselves and their relatives, spending millions of rubles illegally; some of them (among them G. F. Aleksandrov, a leading "ideologue" and a prominent official in Stalin's administration) opened secret brothels. Beria would drive through the streets of Moscow looking for beautiful young women and girls and have them delivered to his mansion. And the thing that allowed Stalin and his cohorts to get away with all of this was above all the lack of glasnost.

Marx and Engels repeatedly said that complete glasnost is the most important means of countering not only intrigues by the government but also abuses within a revolutionary party itself. Lenin wrote: "...It is essential that the *entire party* work systematically, gradually and unyieldingly to *educate* the right kind of people at the center, so that the party can see like on the palm of its hand *all the activities* of each candidate for this high post, so that it can become acquainted even with their individual characteristics, their strong and weak points, their victories and 'defeats'... Light, more light!"[1]

Even today many champions of censorship quote from the Press Decree issued shortly after the revolution and signed by Lenin. This decree banned certain bourgeois newspapers, but it was only of a temporary and partial nature. However, the ensuing Civil War made it necessary to extend its validity for several years and even provide for more stringent administrative measures against the press organs of other parties. Thus in 1918 newspapers and publishing houses belonging to the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were temporarily closed. But within a few months after the end of the Civil War Lenin began insisting on expanded freedom of speech and the press, although it is clear from his correspondence with G. Myasnikov that even in 1921 he was opposed to freedom of the press for everyone "from the monarchists to the anarchists," supporting this viewpoint by citing the poverty of the RSFSR and the wealth of the world bourgeoisie, which could organize ("buy" or "pay for") more powerful propaganda and agitation. Therefore it was with the consent of Lenin and the Russian CP (Bolshevik) leadership that censorship of the press was extended, though it was slackened considerably during the initial years of the New Economic Policy.

Stalin did nothing whatsoever to continue the tendency toward expanded freedom of speech and press which was observable in the early 1920's. On the contrary, under his direct influence glasnost constantly became more circumscribed beginning in the mid-1920's, discussions of purely party-related matters or the outlook for socialist building included. It was not just the "monarchists" and "anarchists" who could not freely express their opinions, but the highest party officials as well. When Stalin achieved one-man rule in the 1930's he increased his personal control over all sources of information to an unprecedented degree. Soviets did not get any other information except what was permitted by Stalin and his aides. Not a single movie could be shown before Stalin had seen it. In many cases the lack of information (which was possessed only by Stalin) on the part of Soviets, including responsible officials, made Stalin master of the situation. It seemed to everyone that Stalin knew much more than anyone else, and that kept people from feeling confident of their own strength and correctness.

4

In the 1930's propaganda mainly focused attention on successes, invariably linking them with Stalin's name. Tragic events in the country's life were interwoven with heroic ones. This contradiction of the era—on the one hand political reaction, on the other further development of the revolution—left its mark on Stalin's actions as well. Those actions consisted not only of crimes. Stalin issued instructions on other things besides repressions and firing squads. As head of state he made decisions on many matters of economic and cultural building, foreign policy, education and health care. In these areas as well he made many mistakes which cost the Soviet people dearly. However, Stalin did to a certain extent have to take into account the party's ideology and aspirations, as well as the theses of Marxism and Leninism and the principles of socialism. Therefore the Stalin cult froze or set back the development of our society in certain areas yet could not halt the relatively rapid development of our country and our society in other areas. Even to this day this fact continues to hamper the exposure of Stalin, who was given credit in official propaganda for all the achievements of our country and its people. Few people understood what it meant that many Soviet leaders who had been declared "enemies of the people" were being arrested and killed. Yet everyone could see how the Soviet Union was developing, how new schools, plants and houses of culture were being erected everywhere. Not everyone understood what it meant that military leaders were being labelled "spies" and arrested. But everyone saw efforts by the party and the government to create a powerful modern army capable of resisting an attack by any enemy. Not everyone understood what the arrest of scientists charged with being "wreckers" meant. But everyone knew about the achievements and rapid development of the new Soviet scientific community. Not everyone understood what the arrests of writers for allegedly being "Trotskyites" meant. But people read not only books which distorted or embellished reality, but also truthful books which have since become classics. Not everyone understood what the arrest of national republic leaders branded "nationalists" meant. But everyone could see how rapid was the economic and cultural progress of backward regions in the outlying national areas, how friendship was developing between peoples who had previously been separated by a wall of oppression and hatred. These obvious successes created confidence not only in the party and the state but also in the person who was head of the party and the state.

Even the seemingly coincidental fact that the terrible year of repressions 1937 was also the best harvest year in the prewar period was of great benefit to Stalin. For Stalin struck his blow at the party during a time of upturn rather than a time of crisis and decline, and this helped him deceive the people.

Some writers of memoirs and other writers have attempted to cite fear as the main explanation for Soviets' behavior in the 1930's. In his memoirs A. Pismennyy wrote: "There was, we must admit, something animalistic in the complex and perhaps even painful process of *learning to believe*, to submit oneself to

the implacable and at the same time dubious logic of social life in the 1930's; this was probably akin to the biological instinct for self-preservation. Perhaps this was precisely the most intolerable thing. Behind all the high-flown reasoning, careful reckoning and ideological and political thought there lay hidden and inscribed itself on my consciousness a tiny imp of simple fear. It did not preach lofty principles. Nor was it inclined toward the pronouncement of empty words from podiums, as was so commonplace at the time. This tiny imp of the self-preservation instinct with it vulgar little face was naive and insightful. It did not engage in political analysis. In its reasoning there was more common sense than in dozens of learned books. Its skeptical perceptions of the world had to be concealed from others because even though they were ordinary and perhaps closer to the truth than any others they could be regarded as philistine or even reactionary."

People were driven by the fear of humiliation even more frequently than by the simple instinct of self-preservation. They trusted the party and Stalin, believed that they were sincerely serving the people and socialism and were afraid of being left out in the cold.

In order to understand the reasons behind the ease with which Stalin was able to deceive the party and the people and convince Soviets that a far-flung fascist underground existed in the country one must recall the harsh, calm-before-the-storm atmosphere which prevailed in the middle and late 1930's.

In the 1920's and 1930's the Soviet Union was the only socialist state on earth. Soviets were convinced that a mortal struggle against imperialism and fascism was not only inevitable but also imminent. This created both an atmosphere of euphoria and an atmosphere of alarm.

During the 1930's those who were hostile to the Soviet system founded small and uncoordinated counterrevolutionary organizations. Espionage and diversionary activity carried out by capitalist intelligence services, especially those of fascist states, was substantial in nature. Espionage directed against the USSR was not a myth, though this in no way justifies either artificial incitement of emotions, or spy mania, or mass repressions. Therefore the story that there existed a far-flung counterrevolutionary underground in the USSR could seem plausible to many, especially young people; people began to believe in the existence of a fascist "fifth column."

What was created was the kind of psychological atmosphere that Stalin needed, one which made implementation of his terroristic program considerably easier. In this atmosphere Stalin's cruelty and suspicion were perceived as positive traits. Thus even during the years of terror Stalin continued to enjoy the support of the masses he had deceived, taking advantage of their aspirations for a better future and their love of the Motherland. Stalin always concealed his deviations from the ideals of the socialist revolution behind archrevolutionary phrases, preventing the working people from seeing his true motivations. Yet this popular support, without which even Stalin could not have held on to power, did not allow him to go very far outside the bounds of the socialist social order and completely destroy the basic social attainments of the revolution. After deceiving the Soviet people Stalin went about the destruction of revolutionary veterans as "enemies of the people." But he could not openly come out in opposition to the revolution, Lenin or socialism. Stalin seriously slowed down the wheel of history but could not turn it back.

5

Long before the revolution the Bolshevik Party—and herein lies one of its most important characteristics—was based on strict centralization. From the very foundation of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party the question of the relationship between democracy and centralization within the party was a focus of discussions between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. At that time the Mensheviks protested strongly against strict centralization within the party, against greater powers for the party leadership and against the system of democratic centralism which, they felt, transformed party members into "cogs" and "screws" and so forth. Lenin always resolutely rejected this sort of reasoning and the Mensheviks' protests as a manifestation of intellectual laxity and petty bourgeois individualism. There is no doubt that fears of excessive centralism within the party were not prompted solely by "intellectual laxity." One can hardly claim that Lenin did not see at all the many dangers of excessive centralism. However, he invariably pointed out that it was precisely thanks to strict centralism and strict discipline—no less than to a correct political program—that the socialists could count on victory in the revolutionary struggle in a country like Russia.

In the first years following the October Revolution centralization of the party was not only maintained under the conditions prevailing during a bitter civil war but was even substantially tightened. This was not so much centralization as militarization of the party and the Komsomol. The new Soviet State was also founded on the principle of strict centralization. Without strict centralization and military discipline the Bolsheviks could not have mobilized all the resources of an exhausted and devastated country to fight numerous enemies. Many of the reproaches levelled by Rosa Luxembourg and even by Karl Kautsky at the "dictatorship" of the Bolsheviks were correct from a purely theoretical standpoint. But in the summer of 1918, i.e. at the very start of the Civil War, it was difficult for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who had suffered a series of major defeats and lost control of a large portion of Russia's territory, to follow any other logic than the logic of bitter military struggle. At the time intensified centralization of power and restrictions on democracy were not only natural but actually essential.

Immediately after the end of the Civil War the Russian CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee outlined a series of measures designed to weaken centralization in party and state affairs and develop intraparty and general public democracy. The 9th All-Russian Conference of the Russian CP (Bolshevik), which met in September 1920, outlined measures to expand freedom of discussion and criticism within the party.

The ban on factions and groups within the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) at the 10th Party Congress placed considerable restrictions on intraparty democracy. However, the 10th Congress also noted many negative aspects of excessive centralization of power and proposed that a number of steps be taken with the aim of developing intraparty democracy.

Of course, rejection of very strict centralization of party and state leadership was not at issue, nor could it have been. The communists never perceived of a socialist society as the sum of self-governing communities or communes not subordinate to any central leadership. The need for centralization was dictated not only by political by also by economic necessity. In such an economically weak and devastated country as Russia it would have been impossible to create modern industry, especially the various sectors of the machine industry, without a strong and authoritative central power. Only such a power was capable of achieving redistribution of savings, mobilizing resources from other sectors of the economy to create new industrial sectors and carrying out necessary measures of taxation and monopoly over foreign trade. In subsequent years as well the large and ever expanding economic system of the modern socialist society created an objective basis for centralization, for it could not function without efficient, unified, authoritative, competent and firm leadership.

Centralization was essential both in the 1920's and the 1930's. Naturally it should have been applied in moderation. It would have been possible to consider a skillful combination of centralization and local initiative, individual creative endeavor and the development of independence rather than blind, unthinking and all-encompassing centralization. To consider a reasonable combination of centralization and democracy, state discipline and personal freedom, submission to necessity and preservation of freedom of choice. Stalin did not even consider the possibility of such a combination. The work aimed at democratization of party and public life begun in the first half of the 1920's was not continued thereafter. On the contrary, by distorting the thesis of intensifying class struggle Stalin constantly insisted on greater centralization and gradually concentrated ever greater power in his own hands. As a result of the repressions of 1937-39 centralization was elevated to the level of an absolute. But it should also be borne in mind that the repressions themselves were possible only after the concentration of power in Stalin's hands had already exceeded the bounds reasonable for a socialist state.

Stalin was also greatly aided by the length of his tenure in power. In the past our country had not had any system defining an orderly transfer of power within the party and the state. This permitted Stalin to make careful preparations for the usurpation of power and gradually to eliminate all his opponents one by one.

6

Lenin never attached absolute importance to discipline within the party or regarded it as an issue separate from the issues of communist convictions and the question of how correct or erroneous was the policy pursued by party centers. Lenin never interpreted party unity as a complete and absolute ban on groups and tendencies within the party regardless of the specific historical situation and of the policy being conducted at a given time by a specific party leader.

Of course unity lends any party greater strength. However, there are cases in which the absence of debate and varying tendencies gives rise to party weakness rather than strength, in which party members all move *in the wrong direction* under the influence of some leader. Therefore Lenin resolutely rejected the dogmatic interpretation of party unity. As early as 1904, i.e. at the very earliest stages in the creation of the party, he wrote:

"...There will always be debates and struggle within the party, they must simply be conducted within the bounds of the party, and only the congress is capable of doing this... ...all our experience with struggle following the congress... teaches, in our opinion, the need to guarantee the rights of all minorities in the party charter, in order to orient permanent and irremovable sources of discontent, irritation and struggle away from banal, philistine streams of scandal and petty squabbling toward as yet unaccustomed channels of formal and dignified struggle in defense of one's convictions."[2]

When it was proposed at the 1912 Prague Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party that the struggle of groups within the party be condemned Lenin opposed the idea. He stated that one should not condemn intraparty struggle altogether, noting that we must condemn only struggle which is not properly ideologically oriented. To condemn struggle between groups altogether would also mean condemning the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Liquidators.

Various groups and factions always existed among the Bolsheviks during Lenin's lifetime, and this was considered natural and normal. Only during the period of the greatest crisis of the Soviet State in 1921 did Lenin call for a temporary halt to the factional struggle and the disbanding of all the groups and factions existing among Bolsheviks at the time. However, the resolution proposed by Lenin in regard to party unity did not revoke party members' right to criticize both particular and general aspects of party policy or their right to hold their own opinions distinct from the Central Committee's

opinion on a given issue. This resolution not only did not preclude discussion and debate within the party, it plainly stated that they were desirable.

Furthermore, Lenin specifically stressed the fact that the resolution passed by the 10th Congress of the Russian CP (Bolshevik) applied to disagreements at that point in time and could not have an expanded interpretation. When D. B. Ryazanov proposed that the ban on elections at party congresses based on various groups' platforms be extended, it was Lenin who rejected the suggestion. Specifically, he stated:

"I feel that Comrade Ryazanov's wish, sad to say, cannot be realized. We cannot deprive the party and the members of the Central Committee of the right to appeal to the party when a vital issue provokes disagreement. I cannot imagine how we could do that! This present congress cannot in any way restrict elections at the next congress: what would happen if an issue like the Brest Peace Accord were to come up?... In that case it would perhaps be necessary to vote according to platforms... If an issue evokes profound differences of opinion, can we forbid those opinions from being submitted for the whole party's scrutiny? We cannot! This is an excessive request and one which is unworkable, and I recommend that it be rejected."[3]

The 10th Congress' resolution on party unity played a positive role in the early 1920's, but subsequently it neither hindered the development of serious disagreements within the party nor the appearance of new oppositional factions. During the 1920's oppositional currents within the party were manifested openly and struggle against them was conducted openly. Of course, from the very start there were efforts to interpret the decision made by the 10th Congress in a dogmatic fashion. In the mid-1920's a majority of the party aktiv realized that in cases of serious disagreement on fundamental issues party members had a right to criticize the party's leadership and Central Committee policy, i.e. a right to opposition.

Stalin subsequently made decisive changes in the interpretation of the principle of party unity. Once he felt himself to be in control of the situation he began to struggle not only against the views of the opposition but against the very right of party members and the Central Committee to opposition. Conscious discipline was replaced by blind submission to the will of the "leader." The idea was instilled in party members that Stalin and his associates were infallible and that therefore any opposition played into the hands of petty bourgeois and bourgeois circles within the All-Union CP (Bolshevik). This distorted interpretation of the resolution passed by the 10th Congress played a fateful role. Opportunism prevailed in the upper echelons of the party; the dogmatically interpreted slogan of unity served as Stalin's principal means of reinforcing his personal dictatorship and smashing the party's Leninist nucleus. Stalin exploited the great slogan of unity between the working class and the party to bring about a de facto schism within the party and to exterminate all communists whom he found objectionable.

7

The system of one-man dictatorship created by Stalin was complex and durable. The leading role in it was played by punitive organs under Stalin's personal control.

Before the October Revolution Lenin assumed that the proletariat would be able to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance with relative ease and that only relatively short-range and limited punitive actions would be needed to suppress counterrevolution. The real situation turned out to be much more complex, and the Soviet Government was forced to establish special punitive organs soon after the revolution. The first meeting of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was held in December 1917. The VChK was particularly active during the Civil War, especially in regions near the front lines. During that period extraordinary commissions were not envisioned as judicial or investigative organs, but instead specifically as military-administrative *punitive* organs which were supposed to expose domestic enemies and either destroy or isolate them. Just as a soldier kills the enemy just because he sees him on the other side of the lines with a weapon in his hands, VChK organs were supposed to seek out counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs and eliminate them at the scene of their crimes.

The Soviet State and the Red Army could hardly have overcome their enemies without the help of the VChK, without its mass punitive actions and "Red terror." However, it was precisely the "extraordinary" and not always well-defined nature of VChK functions which often resulted in abuses and mistakes.

VChK punitive actions were not limited merely to execution by firing squad; they also included the creation of large concentration camps. Imprisonment in these camps was regarded as temporary, merely for the duration of the Civil War. Indeed, immediately after the war ended prisons and camps began to be emptied and the VChK changed the forms of its work. An order issued by the VChK leadership on 8 January 1921 stated:

"There are no more external fronts. The threat of a bourgeois coup has been eliminated. The acute phase of the Civil War is past, but it has left behind a sad legacy: overfilled prisons holding mainly workers and peasants, not members of the bourgeoisie. We must put an end to this legacy, empty the prisons and be vigilant in our efforts to ensure that only people who are truly dangerous to the Soviet State are put in them. In a frontline situation even engaging in petty speculation or crossing the front lines could present a threat to the Red Army; now those cases should be closed. In the future short

shrift should be given to bandits and malicious recidivists, but it is impermissible that crowds of workers and peasants who are in prison for petty theft or speculation should remain there..."

This was not just a change in the VChK's work style and methods. As early as 1919 virtually all uyezd-level extraordinary commissions were dissolved at Dzerzhinskiy's suggestion, as the extraordinary conditions that had called them into existence had disappeared. In peacetime "fast-acting" punitive organs were no longer needed. At Lenin's suggestion, in December 1921 a regular Congress of Soviets instructed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "to review the status of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and its organs within the shortest possible period of time with a view toward reorganizing them, circumscribing their authority and strengthening the foundations of revolutionary law and order." On 6 February 1922 a decree was issued reorganizing the VChK into the GPU (State Political Administration), which henceforth was assigned to combat only particularly dangerous state crimes: political and economic counterrevolution, espionage and banditry. In addition the GPU did not have the right to make final decisions concerning punishment of criminals. GPU organs carried out investigations; as a rule sentences were supposed to be handed down by a court.

Restructuring of VChK-GPU organs was completed by the mid-1920's, but very soon after that started again, this time in the opposite direction. Under Stalin's influence the GPU once again began to be transformed into a punitive organization: it was granted the right to imprison people in jails or camps, exile people to remote regions of the country and, later, even to execute some prisoners.

V. R. Menzhinskiy, chairman of the United State Political Administration (OGPU) following Dzerhzhinskiy's death, did not have either Dzerzhinskiy's influence or his authority. In addition, Menzhinskiy was seriously ill and seldom intervened in day-to-day OGPU operations. His deputy, G. Yagoda, became the de facto head of the OGPU; Yagoda was greatly influenced by Stalin. At the beginning of the 1930's the OGPU supervised the forced resettlement of the kulaks. Stalin relied on the OGPU in his repression of the "bourgeois" intelligentsia and technical and military specialists. By that time the practices of forging investigative documents and torturing prisoners were quite widespread. When M. P. Yakubovich said to his investigator in late 1930 that such investigative methods would have been impossible under Dzerzhinskiy, the investigator laughed and said: "Now that's a laugh! Dzerzhinskiy is a stage we have already passed in the development of our revolution."

The OGPU staff was gradually expanded and it was reorganized into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD); it was given jurisdiction over the militia and border protection. Following Menzhinskiy's death in 1934 Yagoda was appointed people's commissar of internal affairs. The NKVD's rights were greatly expanded. A Special Meeting was set up under the people's commissariat with the right to imprison people in camps and prisons or to exile them for periods of up to five years without any trial whatsoever. The Special Meeting was composed, in addition to the people's commissar of internal affairs, of his deputies, the head of the Main Militia Administration and the USSR Procurator or his deputy. Only the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee could rescind a decision by the Special Meeting, upon appeal by the USSR Procuracy.

Following Kirov's murder and in particular following the first "open" trial in 1936 Stalin and Yezhov conducted the "general purge" of NKVD organs which has already been mentioned in these essays. It is important to note that in 1937 the salaries of NKVD employees were raised all at once by a factor of four and exceeded those paid in other party and state institutions. NKVD organs were given the best apartments, health resorts and hospitals. Agents received government awards for successfully conducted operations. In 1937 the NKVD staff was further expanded and the people's commissariat transformed into a huge army with its own divisions and regiments, hundreds of thousands of agents and tens of thousands of officers. There were NKVD administrations in every oblast and rayon center. Special NKVD departments existed at all major enterprises, offices and educational institutions. All medium-sized enterprises as well as parks, libraries, railways, theaters, etc. were under NKVD control. A tremendous network of informers and stooges who worked on a volunteer basis was created throughout the country. Special dossiers were kept on tens of millions of people. Along with departments for dealing with Constitutional Democrats and monarchists, Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries as well as "additional counterrevolutionary parties," the NKVD's Fourth Administration established an All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Department which supervised and conducted surveillance of all party organizations, including the Central Committee. Secretaries of party gorkoms, raykoms and obkoms were only confirmed in their posts with the NKVD's permission. The NKVD had "special departments" which monitored the NKVD's own staff, and a further "special department" to monitor the other "special departments." The idea was instilled in NKVD workers that secret police discipline was above party discipline. The cadre training curriculum included study of the history of their trade, including the history of the Inquisition. Of course, they learned torture and many other things on the job; in theory such things were condemned. Even rayon administrations had these words by Lenin posted in a prominent place: "The smallest act of lawlessness is a hole through which counterrevolution can creep in." All this was exactly the way Stalin wanted it.

NKVD organs had extremely great powers and rights even at the beginning of the 1930's, but in the summer of

1936 the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee at Stalin's suggestion adopted a resolution granting NKVD organs "extraordinary powers" for the period of one year in order to crush the "enemies of the people" completely. At the June 1937 Central Committee Plenum these "extraordinary powers" were extended indefinitely and the NKVD's judicial and punitive functions expanded. Eighteen Central Committee members were arrested within 24 hours after the plenum.

In addition to the Special Meeting under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs a system of "troikas" was set up under all major NKVD administrations; these "troikas" handed down sentences in absentia with no consideration for the formalities or standards of jurisprudence. The punitive organs were withdrawn from party control as well as from control by the Procuracy. The procurator's sanction was merely a formality to the NKVD. In many oblasts procurators not only signed any and all sanctions retroactively but also signed blank forms which NKVD investigators could then fill in with any names they chose. This entire monstrous, overgrown punitive system was subordinate to the orders and will of just one man: Stalin. The Stalinist regime was based on its firm support. However, it also possessed a certain inertia of its own, because a significant portion of the officers in the privileged NKVD apparatus did not want to be unemployed, and their "employment" consisted of seeking out, sentencing and isolating "enemies of the people."

In this connection we should also note the "demand" for workers, requiring a huge network of labor camps, which were established virtually everywhere. In the mid-1930's prisoners were mainly used to build canals, first the White Sea-Baltic Canal and later the Moscow- Volga Canal. By the end of the 1930's the situation had changed, as the rapid expansion of the Gulag system coincided with expansion of the country's industrial construction. The Gulag's operations were included in the state plan and came to play an ever more important role in it. By the end of the 1930's the Gulag was responsible for a substantial portion of the country's timber cutting and mining of copper, gold and coal. The Gulag not only built canals but also strategic highways and industrial enterprises in remote regions of the country. By the beginning of the 1950's the Gulag was operating several mines in the Don Basin and a portion of the sewing factories, owned virtually all of the forestry industry in Arkhangelsk Oblast, built the skyscraper of Moscow University and some other buildings in the capital, sanitoria in the Crimea and Sochi, apartment buildings for NKVD workers in Orel, etc. Planning organizations often exerted pressure on the Gulag through the apparatus around Stalin in order to speed up completion of various construction projects. In this connection plans were made not only for further development of projects by the Gulag, but also for an expansion of camp populations. Prior to the start of certain major construction projects oblast NKVD organs would receive a requisition for "manpower." Thus once it was established the widespread forced labor system itself became one of the important reasons for more and more new repressions.

8

Neither Marx nor Lenin ever denied the need for violent measures in the revolutionary struggle, because violence, as Marx put it, is the midwife of the old society when it is pregnant with the new. Lenin also repeatedly stated that one does not make a revolution wearing white gloves. It was precisely firmness in struggle and the skillful combination of persuasion and violence, as well as terror in a number of cases, which assured the Bolsheviks victory in the Revolution and the Civil War. However, Marxism never supported the idea that revolutionary and humanitarian ends could justify any means in the struggle for victory in the revolution.

The idea that "the end justifies the means" was advanced in the Middle Ages and was most strongly developed in the activities of the Inquisition and the Jesuits, who took upon themselves the task of defending the Catholic Church. The cruelty that accompanies religious strife and wars in all countries is well known. However, every secular tyranny has also given its defenders prior exemption from adherence to virtually every moral standard.

Unfortunately, this idea was often transferred from the arsenal of the enemies of the revolution and progress to the arsenal of revolutionary dogmatists and fanatics, as well as those who attached themselves to the revolutionary party out of greed, vanity, ambition, blind hatred of the old society, personal malice or an inferiority complex.

An extreme lack of selectivity as to methods is typical of many participants in bourgeois-democratic revolutions. The Jacobin dictatorship and the Jacobin terror transformed France. Yet this same terror undermined the strength of the revolution when it became continual and began to occur on an ever more massive scale. Robespierre handed his opponents over to the courts on the basis of slanderous accusations. The simplification of jurisprudence which accompanied the Terror led to the execution of many honest republicans; the Jacobins responded with terror to the demands of the urban poor as well. Nor was the Russian revolutionary movement of the 19th century free from this "deviltry."

Examples of unjustified cruelty, suspicion, lynch law and outbursts of unbridled violence were common even in the revolutionary year 1917 in Russia. After the beginning of the Civil War the scale of unjustified violence grew; this only served to do great harm to the young Soviet Republic. How dearly the revolution paid for the shameful anti-Cossack campaign conducted at the beginning of 1919 by the Don Bureau of the Russian CP (Bolshevik) and the Civil Administration of the Southern Front with the support of a directive issued by Ya.

M. Sverdlov! Not only I. Stalin and L. Trotsky resorted to violence during the Civil War, but many other commanders, commissars and special representatives as well.

The practice of hostage-taking was applied excessively during the Civil War. In many cases it was possible to justify the temporary isolation of groups of people who were potentially dangerous to the Soviet State in special camps. But the hostage method assumed not only the temporary isolation but actually the physical extermination of some people for the errors and crimes of others. For example, this was spoken of unapologetically in an order issued by G. Petrovskiy, people's commissar for internal affairs, in September 1918:

"Slackness and sentimentality must be brought to an end immediately. All right wing Socialist Revolutionaries who are known to local soviets should be arrested immediately. Substantial numbers of hostages should be taken from among the bourgeoisie and the officers' corps. At the slightest attempt at resistance or the slightest movement among the White Guards unconditional mass executions should be carried out. Local guberniya ispolkoms should show particular initiative in this regard."

This order prompted mass execution of hostages. For example, issue No 5 of YEZHENEDELNIK CHREZVYCHAYNYKH KOMMISSIY noted in passing the execution by firing squad in Petrograd of 500 (five hundred) hostages. These executions merely served to make the struggle more bitter and resulted in new victims on both sides. The same issue of YEZHENEDELNIK also published suggestions by some VChK members that those arrested be subjected to "the most terrible tortures, description of which would chill the counterrevolutionaries' blood." This was going too far, and at Ya. M. Sverdlov's request YEZHENEDELNIK soon ceased publication. But the many cases of unjustified cruelty in the work of the VChK and other revolutionary organs did not cease to occur.

After the end of the Civil War even many forms of violence that had previously been partially justified became impermissible and dangerous. The Soviet Government had to take decisive measures to strengthen law and order. However, it was not easy to do so, as many soviet and party officials sincerely believed that the introduction of law and order would be tantamount to "disarming the revolution."

M. I. Kalinin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee, wrote that "war and civil strife have created a tremendous body of people whose sole law is the purposeful wielding of power. To them governing means wielding power in complete autonomy, not subject to regulating legal statutes."

Historian M. N. Pokrovskiy wrote in 1924 of communists who after returning from the fronts of the Civil War were convinced "that the methods that yielded such stunning results in the face of the threats presented by Kolchak and Denikin would help us cope with any other vestiges of the old order in any other area of life." Victory in the Civil War aroused in these people the hope that "things would proceed equally rapidly in economic building as well; one need only apply military methods."

In Marx' work "Exposure of the Cologne Trial of Communists" one can read that the proletariat needs a 10-, 20- or even 50-year period of civil war to vanquish its enemy and rid itself of its own flaws.

There is no doubt that the cruel Civil War helped the Russian proletariat and its party rid themselves of a number of shortcomings and illusions; it was a harsh school of tempering and selection. But the war also gave quite a large number of people other flaws of which they would subsequently find it very difficult to rid themselves. The transition from the way of thinking that prevailed during the Civil War to new concepts, methods and means of revolutionary work proved difficult even for V. I. Lenin, as attested to by his correspondence with D. I. Kurskiy.

There is a well-known saying by K. Marx: "Revolution is the locomotive of history."[4] Lenin said these equally well-known words: "Revolution is a holiday for the oppressed and the exploited."[5] Yet the following quote from Engels is recalled much less often. He wrote: "In any revolution many acts of stupidity are committed just as at any other time; and when people have finally calmed down to the point where they are once again capable of criticism they will invariably come to this conclusion: we did many things that it would have been better not to do, and we failed to do many things that we should have done, and that is why things went wrong."[6] Of course revolutions can differ in their nature and results, but after the experience of the 20th century it is hard to compose hymns in praise of violent revolutions. They are inevitable when outmoded, reactionary social groups and institutions leave progressive forces no other option but the use of force. However, it is difficult to regulate armed struggle between classes and even more difficult to predict its results, which can turn out to bear little resemblance to revolutionaries' original designs.

R. B. Lert, an old communist, read these essays and wrote the following to me: "Revolution was inevitable in a country like Russia, and this revolution could not occur without violence. It would have been impossible to win the Civil War without mass terror, without violence against officers and kulaks... It was truly a struggle to the death, and if the communists had not emerged victorious the Whites would have lopped off all their heads. But we as a revolutionary party made a mistake when we came to regard revolutionary violence as a feat of valor rather than an unfortunate necessity. Mass violence and terror, even if they are 'Red,' are nonetheless evil. Perhaps an evil that is necessary for a time, but still evil. Yet soon these things came to be regarded as good. We began to

think and to say that everything that was advantageous and essential to the revolution was good, was moral. But this way of evaluating events is wrong in principle. The revolution brought not only good with it, but evil as well. It was impossible to avoid violence in the revolution, but it should have been understood that this was a temporary admission of evil into our lives and our practices. By romanticizing violence we kept it alive and preserved it even to the point where it had already become completely superfluous, had become an absolute evil... Failure to resist evil with violence is not our philosophy; in many cases that only helps evil triumph. But even when applying very harsh measures we should not change our moral assessment of those acts of violence."

If abuses of violence were quite frequent while Lenin was alive, then they progressively became the norm as Stalin's leadership of the party and the state grew stronger. Long before the repressions of 1936-38 Stalin had taught the majority of soviet and party officials not to be too choosy in their choice of methods of struggle against those whom he declared enemies of the revolution. Did they give any thought to the fate of families with many children when they resettled kulaks in the North? Did they not kill kulaks and "sub-kulaks" during the period of collectivization? Did not Makar Nagulnov in "Podnyataya tselina" [New- Turned Soil] not say that you could stand thousands of old men, women and children before him and that he would, if told that it was necessary for the revolution, cut them all down with a machine gun?

Of course, Stalin was not alone in using Jesuit-like methods in his leadership of the party and the revolution; there were quite a few other like-minded individuals. This facilitated the introduction into the practices of state and especially of punitive organs the idea that it was possible to use any means "in the interests of the revolution." This made it easier for Stalin to achieve his objectives. For all that was necessary was to accuse everyone whom he found objectionable of being "enemies of the people," as such people were outside the law; thus any act of violence against them became justifiable and permissible.

Not all party and soviet officials eagerly accepted Stalinist methods during the 1929-33 period. But such individuals were told that this was necessary for the revolution and the accustomed logic of this stilled the consciences and clouded the judgment of previously honest revolutionaries, who with time were transformed into obedient tools of the Stalinist tyranny and later, more often than not, its victims.

N. V. Krylenko, an old Bolshevik, revolutionary and USSR people's commissar of justice, was in the early 1930's and even in the late 1920's a particularly zealous defender of non-court repressions. In 1930 he wrote: "To bourgeois Europe and to broad circles of the liberal intelligentsia it may seem monstrous that the Soviet State does not always deal with wreckers according to the established procedures of court trials. But every conscientious worker and peasant would agree that the Soviet State is doing the right thing."

Neither the law of 1 December 1934, which was in violation of the Constitution, nor all the repressions of 1935, 1936 and 1937 evoked any protest from Krylenko. In 1938 Krylenko was falsely accused of wrecking, arrested and soon afterwards shot, also without any legitimate trial.

B. P. Sheboldayev, first secretary of the party's Severo-Kavkazskiy Kraykom, strongly defended the policy of mass repressions in the Kuban region at the beginning of the 1930's. In November 1932 he said in Rostov-on-Don: "We have publicly announced that we will exile to the northern regions malicious saboteurs and kulaks' lackeys who do not wish to plant. Have we not exiled kulak counterrevolutionary elements from this very same Kuban in years past? We have, and a rather large number. Now, at a time when these remnants of the kulak class are attempting to organize acts of sabotage and opposing the demands of the Soviet State it would be more correct to give this fertile Kuban land to kolkhoz members who live on small parcels of poor land in other regions... We also send those who do not want to work, those who defile our land, somewhere else. That is fair. People may say to us: 'How is it that previously kulaks were exiled but now you are talking about whole villages? There are kolkhozes there, and honest individual farmers, what about them?' Yes, we must call entire villages into question, for kolkhozes and kolkhoz members and truly conscientious individual farmers are responsible for the positions taken their neighbors in the present situation. What kind of buttress of the Soviet State is a kolkhoz if next door to it there is another kolkhoz or a whole group of individual farms that are opposed to the measures taken by the Soviet State?"

Just five years later Stalin found the entire Severo-Kavkazskiy Party Obkom incapable of serving as a reliable buttress of the Soviet State. Sheboldayev was arrested and shot.

In 1936 M. O. Stakun, secretary of Gomel Party Obkom, spoke at a meeting of the party aktiv and criticized NKVD organs for their "liberalism," demanding that an old woman who had cursed the Soviet State on account of the shortage of bread be arrested. One year later the no longer so "liberal" NKVD organs arrested Stakun himself.

Literary figure L. L. Averbakh spent much time slandering all "non- proletarian writers" while he was general secretary of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers. As early as 1929 he directed a torrent of malicious criticism at Andrey Platonov. In the journal NA LITERATURNOM POSTU Averbakh wrote: "They come to us preaching humanism, as if there were anything on earth

more human than the proletariat's class hatred." Yet in 1938 Averbakh was shot as one of the proletariat's hated "enemies of the people."

V. F. Sharangovich, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, presided over the purging of party cadres in his republic in 1936-37. Following his demand that A. G. Chervyakov, chairman of the Belorussian Central Executive Committee, be removed from office the latter committed suicide. When he learned of this Sharangovich told a party congress in Minsk: "A dog's death for a dog." Yet one year later Sharangovich went to the firing squad. He was one of those convicted in the Bukharin-Rykov trial; when A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, USSR Procurator, demanded the highest punishment for Sharangovich as well he declared: "Traitors and spies who have betrayed our Motherland to the enemy should be shot like filthy curs!"

Some old Bolsheviks have declared in their memoirs that everything bad started in 1937. Ya. I. Drobinskiy thinks otherwise: "These things were prepared gradually, and even not so gradually, right before our eyes. Gradually and slowly yet systematically this poison of dishonesty was poured out in small doses and cadres trained for this operation. It accumulated in the organism and took over the whole system after the defensive mechanisms had been weakened. Preparations were being made for this when peasant families were crushed by destroying the muzhiks' familiar homes, herding them off into camps at the end of the world, labelling them sub-kulaks just because they dared to say that their friends and neighbors—working people!—had been falsely condemned as kulaks. It accumulated when they forced the peasant to turn over flax when they were quite well aware that he had not harvested any, when they issued directives that sabotage be stamped out and saboteurs convicted, again, knowing that there was no sabotage nor saboteurs, because there was no flax, it had not been grown. When they convicted these 'saboteurs' and confiscated their last cow the procurator knew that there had been no sabotage, yet sanctioned the arrest. The judges also knew that the peasant was honest, yet they convicted him. Now the procurator sanctions your arrest, and the same judges convict you. The principle remains unchanged. For it was back then that cadres were being trained for these cases, cadres of people for whom it does not matter whether you are guilty or not; all that matters for them is that they have been directed to find you guilty."

The dishonorable means employed by Bolsheviks to achieve what were supposedly revolutionary objectives are one of the favorite topics of Western political literature. Inspector Ivanov, one of the main characters in A. Koestler's "Darkness at Noon," is trying to convince himself and others of the justification for the cruel repressions of 1937. He says to Rubashov, a defendant: "Your Raskolnikov was a fool and a criminal, but not because he killed the old woman, not at all, but rather because he committed murder solely for his own personal gain. The law that 'the end justifies the means' is and will remain down through the ages the only law of political ethics; all the rest is dilettantish drivel. If your melancholy Raskolnikov had done away with the old woman on orders from the Party—in order to establish a strike assistance fund or to support the illegal press—then the logical equation would have been solved... There are two kinds of morality in this world, and they are diametrically opposed to each other. Christian, or humanistic, morality declares each individual sacred and asserts that the laws of arithmetic operations cannot be applied to human lives. Revolutionary morality definitively proves that benefit to society—the collective goal—completely justifies any means and not only permits but actually absolutely requires that each individual submit unconditionally to society as a whole, which means that if necessary each individual can without hesitation be sacrificed or even used as a guinea pig."

Ivanov's ethics have nothing in common with socialist ethics, yet they seemed perfectly correct to all Stalinists. Yu. Karyakin has written correctly that "Marxists recognize class violence, but only in one case: as long as there are oppressors it should be applied to them, and only to them. That is humane, because it means the liberation of the overwhelming majority from the oppression of a minuscule minority. Without struggle for that liberation there is no freedom for the individual, no self-improvement, merely decay. The inevitable victims that result from this path of struggle are not intended to fertilize the soil for future generations, they are the actual harvest of the future; this is not the sacrificing of lambs on the altar of some unknown god, it is a rising, an outpouring of enthusiasm by the masses who have realized their enslaved condition under capitalism, and their strength, and their ideals; it is the ever more free choice of a human being who has finally become a human being... The humanism of communists' goals also determines the humaneness of their methods; Jesuitism is a distortion of both the means and the goals of the struggle. The most correct ideas cannot fail to be converted into their exact opposites if they are defended using Jesuit-like methods."

The revolution can choose its methods from a very large arsenal, depending on the specific situation. In the history of our country and the development of the revolution there have been difficult situations when it was necessary to use very harsh means in order to save the Soviet State, means that would have been unthinkable in peacetime or even during ordinary warfare. But while we do not renounce various means of struggle in advance we also cannot declare all of them acceptable in advance. In each specific situation a revolutionary party must analyze which means will lead by the best (though not always the shortest) path to the objective with minimum losses. On the basis of this analysis it should be determined which means may not be used in a given situation and which may not be used in any situation. The revolutionary who does not feel any need to be selective as to his methods may achieve temporary or personal success. But sooner or later he will fail as a

revolutionary leader. Dishonorable means will repel the masses of the people, which in turn will also hamper the use of those methods which intensify the people's revolutionary enthusiasm. A revolution cannot always afford chivalrous nobility in the struggle, especially since such nobility is virtually never manifested by its opponents. However, dishonorable and base methods, a desire for vengeance and unjustified cruelty attest only to the weakness of a revolutionary party. The progress of a country toward socialism should not raise cynics and sadists, but instead people who are honest, devoted to the people, humane and just.

Stalin was not thinking about the future of the revolution and socialism. Unlimited personal power was his main objective, and any means of achieving it were permissible, including the most inhumane ones. This did tremendous harm to the socialist cause.

9

The confidence of a majority of Soviets in Stalin and the party leadership placed communists who were unjustly repressed in a difficult situation. Everyone considered them criminals, and only their families and a few friends knew that they were innocent. Even harder for those arrested to bear was the fact that they themselves could not understand what was happening. A collection of memoirs about Mikhail Koltsov contains the following passage: "What is happening?" Koltsov used to repeat as he paced back and forth in his office. "How can it be that we suddenly have so many enemies? These are people we have known for years, people who have worked alongside us!... Then for some reason, as soon as they are behind bars they instantly admit to being enemies of the people, spies, agents of foreign intelligence services... What is going on? I feel like I am losing my mind. On account of my position, after all I am a member of the PRAVDA editorial board, a well-known journalists and a deputy, it seems that I should be able to explain to other people the meaning of what is happening, the reason for such a large number of exposures and arrests. But in fact I, like any other man on the street, know nothing, I understand nothing; I am confused and uncertain, I grope in the darkness."

The majority thought that what had happened to them was a mistake. "I will be home tomorrow," said Armenian commissar G. Osepyan to his wife when the NKVD came for him one night. V. I. Mezhlauk, former chairman of USSR Gosplan, also experienced similar "constitutional illusions": just before he went to the firing squad he wrote an article in jail entitled "On Plan Work and Steps To Improve It." Even after being tortured many people continued to believe that everything would be cleared up, if not during the investigation then during the trial.

Incomprehension and loneliness created feelings of confusion, passivity and even fatalism among those who were awaiting arrest or were already in prison. Stalin was able to slaughter millions of people precisely because they were innocent. After Yakir was shot M. P. Amelin, one of his deputies, was summoned to Moscow. He said to his family: "I do not know whether I will return, but believe me when I say that I was never an enemy of our authorities or our country."

I. P. Belov, commander of the Belorussian Military District, also had a premonition of evil when he was unexpectedly summoned to Moscow. L. M. Sandalov, who accompanied him, tell how the commander was constantly thinking about his predecessor, I. P. Uborevich, who had also been suddenly summoned to Moscow... Belov's concern was justified. He was arrested as soon as the train pulled into Moscow.

There were cases in which people who had long waited in torment to be arrested actually felt a sense of relief once they were in prison. "Well, comrades," said the old Bolshevik Dvoretskiy to his cell mates, "tonight I will probably be able to sleep... I have been in agony for three months. Waiting for them to come for me. Every day people were taken away, yet they did not come for me. They had taken away all the people's commissars, but not me. My spirit is simply exhausted. I would think, should I not call and ask: why have you not taken me? Now they have, thank god!... Today I got a call from the NKVD. I have been bedridden for almost a year; I cannot use my legs. Well, some section chief called and said: 'Could you come by to see us for an hour or so? We need, uh, to consult with you.' 'Certainly,' I said, 'I can, just send a car around for me.'"

It was precisely this incomprehension, confusion and fear which allowed Stalin to usurp all power in the country with relative ease. He not only took advantage of the situation of confusion, incomprehension and lack of unity in party ranks, he also did everything he could to encourage dissension. By spreading slander about one group of Central Committee members in the name of another he was able to use other people to destroy persons he found objectionable. The ban on factions within the party did not put an end to arguments and struggle between groups and prominent state leaders on various fundamental or personal issues. Deprived of an open forum, this struggle often assumed the monstrous form of intrigue. Stalin took skillful advantage of discord and attempted to widen the cracks and sharpen the disagreements which appeared within the leadership. He manipulated both the struggle of opinions and the excessive vanity of certain leaders, and personal conflicts, and enmity, taking advantage of the worst qualities of those around him: envy, malice, ambition, stupidity. Stalin did much to ensure that relations between Politburo members became antagonistic; he encouraged the struggle between Litvinov and Krestinskiy in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, between Voroshilov and Tukhachevskiy in the People's Commissariat of Defense, between Ordzhonikidze and Pyatakov in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, etc. One year before their own death Blyukher, Belov, Alksnis and

Dybenko took part in a tribunal of the Military Board at which Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Uborevich and others were condemned to death. I. Erenburg recalls: "I remember a terrible day with Meyerkhold. We were sitting and quietly looking over a monograph on Renoir when one of Vsevolod Emilyevich's friends came by, corps commander I. P. Belov. He was very agitated. Without noticing that Lyuba and I were in the room with Meyerkhold he began to relate how Tukhachevskiy and other military men had been convicted... "They were sitting there across from us; Uborevich was looking me in the eyes..." I recall one other thing Belov said: "And tomorrow they will put me in their place."

V. Smirnov, who was appointed people's commissar of the Navy in 1938, immediately undertook a tour of the fleets to "purge" them of "enemies of the people," yet at the end of the year was himself arrested and shot.

R. Eykhe, first secretary of the party's West Siberian Kraykom, sanctioned the arrests and execution of "Trotskyites and "Bukharinites" in Siberia. Former members of the opposition were forced to make false accusations against Eykhe himself, and he was arrested as the head of the "Trotsky-Bukharin underground" in West Siberia.

P. P. Postyshev, secretary of the Ukrainian CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee, worked hard, crushing Ukrainian nationalist cadres as early as 1932-33. In 1937 he sent V. A. Balitskiy, the NKVD's representative in the Ukraine, dozens of lists bearing the names of completely innocent people. In March 1937 Postyshev was removed from his post "on account of insufficient vigilance." Still a candidate member of the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee Politburo, he was sent to fill the post of secretary in the Kuybyshevskiy Party Kraykom. During the second half of 1937 Kuybyshevskiy Kray, which at that time contained the present Mordovinskaya ASSR, was "purged" of "enemies of the people" with unprecedented cruelty. Virtually all kray-level organizations were destroyed and the heads of 110 raykoms arrested. Under Postyshev's direction an "open" trial of "wreckers" from the Kray Land Administration was held; in its wake hundreds of agricultural personnel were arrested. When given the court's sentences for review, Postyshev often demanded execution by firing squad in cases where the procurator and investigator deemed it possible to limit the sentences to 8-10 years imprisonment. After the kray had been "purged" Postyshev was removed from his job, expelled from the Politburo "for eliminating cadres" and later arrested and shot.

Of course, people behaved in various ways and do not all bear an equal measure of responsibility. Much depended on how much distance separated a given individual from the epicenter of the tragedy that was enfolding the country, and what options he had at his disposal. One cannot compare the responsibility of a people's commissar or a major writer with that of a rank-and-file party member or an ordinary worker or collective farm member. One cannot compare the responsibility of the head of a concentration camp or a prison for politicals with that of a simple soldier in the security forces. Much also depended on the extent to which an individual was able to grasp what was happening. Finally, much depended on the moral qualities of the individual, on his or her courage and honesty.

Many people served as Stalin's support and actively aided him in the commission of his crimes. They also carried out crimes of their own. These should not only have been "marked with scorn" but also paid back for their "services."

There were also many voluntary informers or people who would sign or compose any "eyewitness" accounts that were demanded of them, out of fear of being arrested themselves.

But there were also those who opposed the tyranny to whatever extent they could. These protests varied in nature. Some people resisted passively: when they learned they were to be arrested some leaders left the city where they lived, sometimes even becoming fugitives and changing their names.

Others, not only the relatives and friends of persons who had been arrested but also prominent cultural and scientific figures and state and party officials, sent letters and petitions to the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee. It is well known how P. L. Kapitsa fought to win the release of physicist L. Landau. Academician D. N. Pryanishnikov worked persistently to get N. I. Vavilov released; he was received by both Molotov and Beria, then decided to take a desperate step: he nominated the imprisoned Vavilov for the Stalin Prize. When poet David Vygodskiy was arrested a petition in his defense was signed by Yu. Tynyanov, B. Lavrenev, K. Fedin, M. Slonimskiy, M. Zoshchenko and V. Shklovskiy. When he learned that Tukhachevskiy had been arrested old Bolshevik N. N. Kulyabko, who had recommended him for party membership, immediately wrote a letter of protest to Stalin. The reply was Kulyabko's own arrest. When the physicist Bronshteyn was arrested in 1937 a letter in his defense was signed by physicists A. F. Ioffe, I. Ye. Tamm and V. A. Fok and by writers S. Ya. Marshak and K. I. Chukovskiy. This protest, like hundreds of thousands of other protests, was ignored.

There were also those who had access to investigative documents and attempted to oppose the lawlessness in a more active way. N. S. Kuznetsov, the secretary of an obkom in Kazakhstan, sanctioned the arrest of many communists in his oblast during the first months of the mass repressions; as time passed he began to have doubts about the justice of the repressions and went to the oblast prison, where he interrogated several party officials. Convinced that they were innocent, Kuznetsov sent obkom personnel to the NKVD apparatus, took control of the punitive organs' operations in his oblast and had

many of the previously arrested communists released. He categorically forbade investigative organs to use torture. After gathering a large body of material on illegal actions by the NKVD and on the use of individuals with dubious backgrounds in its organs, Kuznetsov went to Moscow and managed to arrange a meeting with Stalin. Stalin recommended that he tell everything to Malenkov. Malenkov did not want to deal with the matter, either; he advised Kuznetsov to return to Kazakhstan and send the materials from there by official courier. When he got home Kuznetsov found that he had been transferred to another obkom. A few months later he was summoned to a meeting in Alma-Ata and arrested in his hotel. All the communists released at the request of Kuznetsov were then arrested again.[7]

In 1937 the Kirghiz CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee Bureau received reports of torture of prisoners and established a special commission to investigate the operations of the republic's procuratorial and investigative organs. The work of this commission ended in tragedy: all its members fell victim to repression.

M. M. Ishov, military procurator of the West Siberian Military District, attempted to oppose the tyranny. While inspecting the work of the Tomsk NKVD Administration he discovered that investigators had tortured prisoners and deprived them of food and water for long periods of time. Many prisoners had no idea what they were accused of, since investigators wrote and signed the protocols of their "interrogations" themselves. Some prisoners were executed without a trial or an investigation. Ishov immediately arrested a group of investigators from Tomsk and sent them under guard to Novosibirsk. After compiling a large body of material on the operations of the four NKVD administrations within the West Siberian District Ishov submitted a report to Rozovskiy, USSR Chief Military Procurator, to Vyshinskiy, USSR General Procurator, and to Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich personally. Later he insisted that the matter be discussed by the party obkom bureau. Ishov managed with great difficulty to save several persons who had been arrested illegally from being shot, but he was not able to do much. His appeals to Moscow went unanswered. After examining his report the obkom bureau assigned not just anyone, but instead the chief of the Novosibirsk NKVD Administration to "rectify the situation." Informers reported to Moscow that "Military procurator Ishov is opposing NKVD organs, hampering investigation of cases involving enemies of the people, refusing to sanction their arrest, taking arbitrary actions and arresting members of the NKVD. He is undermining the authority of the organs through his actions. We request that he be removed from his post and sanction given for his arrest."

In March 1938 Ishov went to Moscow to turn over to the Main Military Procuracy additional materials on NKVD crimes in Siberia. In July 1938 he again went to Moscow and was received by Vyshinskiy. Twenty-five years later Ishov recalled: "When we entered his office Vyshinskiy offered me a seat at his desk and asked me what had prompted me to come see him. I pulled the documents out of my briefcase and asked that he hear me out. ...In addition I asked Vyshinskiy to pay particular attention to the methods being used to obtain false testimony: beatings, humiliation, application of medieval, Inquisition-like methods. When I was through Vyshinskiy said something to me which will remain deeply engraved in my memory all my life. He said: 'Comrade Ishov, since when did Bolsheviks decide to take a liberal attitude toward enemies of the people? You, Procurator Ishov, have lost your party and class sensibilities. We do not intend to handle enemies of the people with kid gloves. There is nothing wrong with us slamming enemies of the people in the face. Do not forget that Maxim Gorkiy, the great proletarian writer, said that if the enemy does not surrender he must be destroyed. We will have no pity on enemies of the people.'" Ishov attempted to show that the people in question were not enemies of the people but rather innocent people, that they were being forced with torture to slander themselves and others. Vyshinskiy coolly dismissed all these conclusions and merely for form's sake assigned Rozovskiy, who was present at the meeting, to look into the facts presented by Ishov. But no investigation took place. When Ishov returned to Novosibirsk he was arrested. The arrest order was signed by Vyshinskiy.

There are several explanations for the futility of attempts to fight the tyranny. Firstly, these attempts were uncoordinated and isolated. Secondly, by that time there was not much that could be done within the confines of the law. Stalin could have been removed from power legally in the 1920's, but after 1934 he could only be removed by force. But no one resolved to do this, out of fear of the possible consequences. Not everyone realized that Stalin had in fact carried out an overthrow of the state. Therefore people continued to use the usual forms of protest to which they had become accustomed: they wrote "to the proper authorities" and hoped for assistance "from higher up." Moreover, what was important was not merely arriving at the idea that it was necessary to struggle against tyranny, but also finding acceptable forms for carrying out that struggle. However, one should not place the blame on Stalin's contemporaries. The overwhelming majority of them worked honestly, overcame tremendous difficulties during the first five-year plans and fought bravely in the years of the Patriotic War. Soviets had no historical experience with creating a new society and a new state, and they did not know what they could use to counter the tyranny of their own leaders. The party, the people and the state were taken by surprise because the blow came from a completely unexpected quarter. World War II showed that Soviet society and the Soviet State were capable of standing up to any threat. But they proved helpless in the face of the blow from behind struck by their own leaders.

10

The development of the Stalinist cult of personality and the Stalinist regime was to a tremendous extent facilitated by the social processes which occurred in our

country after the revolution, processes that were much more complex than a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Of no less importance was the struggle between petty bourgeois and proletarian-socialist tendencies both outside of and inside the Communist Party and the Soviet State.

It would be naive to believe that the Bolshevik Party could somehow insulate itself from the petty bourgeois milieu in which it found itself, that its surroundings would not exert an influence on the party through the most diverse channels and would not have a significant effect on the composition of revolutionary cadres and on the party and state apparatus of the young Soviet Republic. Furthermore, the revolution and the civil war brought to the fore many new political and military leaders who had not gone through many years of harsh schooling in the prerevolutionary underground struggle. Both while Lenin was alive and after his death there were quite a few individuals among the leaders of the Bolshevik Party whom it would be difficult to call genuine proletarian revolutionaries without adding some caveats; this was no coincidence, nor the result of inadequate insight or a mistake. This was the natural result of proletarian revolution in a petty bourgeois country like Russia. What Lenin said about the need to build socialism using the human material left behind by capitalism was also applicable to the Russian CP (Bolshevik).

Lenin was well aware that one of the most difficult problems of proletarian revolution in Russia was to guard the cadres of the party and the Soviet State from petty bourgeois and bureaucratic degeneration and ward off ever more intense pressure by petty bourgeois elements on the proletariat and the Bolsheviks. Lenin was also well aware that the transformation of the Bolsheviks into a ruling party would intensify many times over not only the petty bourgeois and bureaucratic/careerist tendencies which had arisen among some of the old and seemingly staunch new members of the party who had now become major "bosses," but also the efforts of petty bourgeois and careerist elements outside the party to penetrate its ranks.

In all his latter works and letters Lenin devoted the greatest attention to the problem of relations between proletarian and petty bourgeois elements in society and in the state, as well as to the problem of growing bureaucracy within and degeneration of the party and state apparatus. In 1922, five years after the revolution, Lenin did not have the highest opinion of the party membership. In an open letter to the members of the party's Central Committee he commented with alarm:

"Unless we close our eyes to reality we must acknowledge that at the present time the party's proletarian policy is not being determined by its membership, but rather by the tremendous, unbounded authority of that very thin stratum which one could call the party's old guard. All it would take would be a small internal struggle within that stratum, and its authority would be if not completely undermined then at least weakened to the point that it would no longer be the decision maker."[8]

Lenin wrote even more sharply and negatively concerning the overall composition of the Soviet state apparatus:

"...We call this apparatus our own, though in fact it is thoroughly alien to us and is actually a bourgeois-czarist jumble... There is no doubt that the minuscule percentage of soviet and sovietized workers will drown in this sea of chauvinistic Great Russian riff-raff like a fly in milk."[9]

Lenin's concern for the preservation of the socialist nature of the Soviet State and the proletarian policy of the Bolshevik Party was fully justified. But Lenin was referring only to a real threat, not to the fatal inevitability of bureaucratic and petty bourgeois degeneration of the party and the state. The Civil War weakened the proletariat, but it put state power in the hands of the Bolsheviks. Through soviets, through trade unions, through the press and the schools, through anti- illiteracy groups and village reading rooms, through the Red Army and by any other means at its disposal the Bolshevik Party attempted to reinforce the ideology of socialism among the masses. And it should be noted that even within Lenin's lifetime quite a few successes were achieved. After Lenin's death this work began to slacken, as Stalin had taken over the leadership of the party; the traits and ideology of the proletarian revolutionary and the petty bourgeois careerist with a tendency toward degeneration were interwoven in his nature and his views. Yet Stalin was not the only problem.

It must be noted with regret that moral decay and bureaucratic degeneration affected to a great or lesser extent a portion of the party's old guard upon whom Lenin had pinned such great hopes and of which he spoke with such pride. Firstly, as has already been noted, the party's old guard was split by bitter ideological struggle all through the 1920's; this was at the same time a struggle for positions of leadership within the party. Secondly, major successes as well as a great deal of power turned the heads of many members of the Leninist guard within the party. This was encouraged by the ever intensifying centralization of state and party leadership, with no compensatory intensification of monitoring of the party by the masses of the people or rank-and-file party members. As a result among revolutionaries who had formerly seemed staunch and modest there began to appear symptoms of conceit and presumptuousness, intolerance of criticism and tolerance of toadyism. In terms of their material wealth, their behavior and their life styles these people became farther and farther removed from the people and did nothing to hinder the excessive adulation directed at themselves.

The story of M. Razumov, secretary of the Tatar Party Obkom, is typical in this regard. A professional party worker, he turned into a grandee right before everyone's

eyes, according to the account of Ye. S. Ginzburg, who knew him well. As late as 1930 he was still living in a single room of a communal apartment. Yet only a year later he had built the "Tatar Livadiya," with a separate cottage for himself in it.

In 1933, when the Tatar Republic was awarded the Order of Lenin for its agricultural successes, portraits of "the great brigade leader of Tatarstan" were carried through the city to the accompaniment of songs, and at an agricultural exhibition there were similar portraits done in grains, from oats to lentils. According to M. D. Baytalskiy, on May Day 1936 N. Demchenko, secretary of Kharkov Party Obkom, arranged (through third parties) to have his portrait hung on the balconies of apartment buildings and on the facades of office buildings. Large numbers of these portraits had been printed up in advance; due to the paper shortage Demchenko gave permission to use paper that had been set aside for school textbooks. By 1937 along the Kolyma there was already a genuine cult of personality surrounding Berzin, the power-mad chief of the Kolyma camps. According to his subordinates Ya. Ganetskiy, a revolutionary of long standing and one of Lenin's close comrades-in- arms, became a total bureaucrat. Equally unflattering remarks could be cited in regard to many other old party members.

The reasons for this sad phenomenon vary. People had various motives for joining the revolution. Various motives prompted people to abandon the revolution's ideals and moral standards. It is easier to comprehend the moral fall of A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, who evidently had always been unprincipled and cowardly, a man with a thirst for power and fame. It is more difficult to understand the behavior of old Bolsheviks like Yem. Yaroslavskiy and M. I. Kalinin, who submitted completely to Stalin. It proved more difficult in every respect to govern the country than it had been to struggle for power. Neither the struggle against the autocracy, nor their behavior in czarist jails, exile or penal colonies, nor the privation and adversity of the Civil War proved to be the true test of the revolutionaries. It turned out that for them a much harder test was power, i.e. how they would behave as the leaders of a great and mighty Soviet State.

Naturally following the Stalinist purges the composition of the upper levels of the party and the state worsened: unprincipled careerists who were prepared to carry out any order from Stalin often rose to positions of leadership; in carrying out those orders they gave little thought to the interests of the people or to socialism. At various levels of power there appeared a rather large contingent of party philistines who differed from "traditional" philistines only in their greater degree of hypocrisy and deception. Nevertheless, even after being promoted to party leadership these people could not act openly; they were forced to declare at least in words their devotion to the proletariat and the communist movement. These processes were especially noticeable in many union republics where there was virtually no proletariat prior to the revolution and where the revolution did not till the social soil as deeply as in the principal regions of Russia. Thus we can see that the Stalinist cult of personality was not only an ideological phenomenon, but also had a specific class content, i.e. included the bureaucratic and petty bourgeois degeneration of a portion of party and soviet cadres and broad infiltration by careerist/bureaucratic elements into positions of leadership. Stalin stood at the top of a whole pyramid of smaller dictators. He was the chief bureaucrat, presiding over hundreds of thousands of other bureaucrats.

Important and as yet little-studied processes were also taking place within the working class. On the one hand, industrialization was resulting in very rapid growth of the working class in the USSR. However, the ranks of blue- and white-collar workers were being filled primarily by petty bourgeois urban strata, as well as by millions of peasants who had been forced to flee to the cities by the dramatic transformations taking place in rural areas. At the beginning of the 1930's workers of this type, whose career at factories or plants did not exceed five or six years, was several times larger than the nucleus of the Russian working class, which had taken shape over a period of decades. Rapid change in the quantitative and qualitative composition of the working class was also reflected in the behavior of rank-and-file party members; the change encouraged degeneration of various branches of the party and state apparatus. Parallel to industrialization, which was dictated by the revolution and was vitally necessary to it, another process also began: petty bourgeois elements began to attack the proletarian social psychology and proletarian attitudes toward the individual and property.

Nevertheless, along with negative processes the 1930's and 1940's were also a time when the ideology and consciousness of huge masses were remade, though in substantially distorted forms; processes were underway in the depth of society which in the end did not weaken but rather strengthened the influence and role of socialist elements. A socialist consciousness was most intensively evident in the lower levels of society and among the new generations who had grown up and entered life in the 1920's and 1930's, as well as in the lower levels of the soviet, party and state apparatus. In the leadership of primary party and Komsomol organizations, in the leadership of individual enterprises, shops, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, among teachers, physicians, directors of clubs and sports facilities and the ordinary personnel of party raykoms the majority were not bureaucrats and careerists but instead honest and sincere people.

Naturally the distortions resulting from Stalin's tyranny and cult also affected the majority of primary party and Komsomol organizations. Many incorrect and even criminal directives were implemented with the participation of the entire party. However, there was a great deal more sincere error and "honest" self-deception in the behavior and actions of rank-and-file communists, workers, peasants and young people than there was at the

higher levels. The reason for this was that all resolutions and directives by Stalin and the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee were always framed in the most "revolutionary" spirit; they spoke of struggle against the enemies of socialism, of attention to people and the need to develop the revolutionary cause. Unaware of Stalin's true deeds and motives, the lower levels of the party and young people did not perceive in those years the disparity between their leaders' words and actions and tried to follow the political and moral standards which Stalin and those around him, who had set the standards, never regarded as applicable to themselves. Insofar as they were able rank-and-file communists and Komsomol members and the low-level apparatus staff attempted to implement socialist slogans which for many careerists and bureaucrats had become merely empty, vainly repeated words.

Of course, even at the higher levels of the party there were various groups and types of worker. Stalin was forced to recruit many young officials to lead the country and the party; these young officials supported him in every way and eagerly carried out his instructions but were not aware of his crimes. While possessing many of the shortcomings that were typical of Stalin's inner circle, these individuals wanted to serve the people, the party and socialism honestly, yet were unable to on account of their lack of the political experience required to grasp the tragic events taking place in the country. Some of these leaders were killed during the postwar period. Others outlived Stalin and to one degree or another supported the struggle against the cult of personality and efforts to restore a normal situation in party and state affairs.

11

It is claimed that it is precisely a creative attitude toward reality and toward theory that is the main advantage of Marxism and scientific socialism. However, it would be wrong to stress this creative aspect of socialist ideology and underestimate the power of dogmatism. It is naive to believe that dogmatism always repels people, whereas a creative approach, by contrast, attracts them. Unfortunately, there is a substantial group of people, lacking the necessary education and training, which most often finds dogmatism the more attractive because it relieves one of the necessity of thinking independently and creatively or constantly improving the level of one's education. Instead of studying ever changing reality one need only study a few formulas and theses. Human history in general and the history of all religions and ideologies in particular indicate the awesome power of dogmatic thinking. Creatively thinking people and innovators always have a harder time than dogmatists. And even though every revolution involves a victory of the new over the old—over an old way of life and old dogmas—nonetheless with the passage of time every revolutionary movement acquires its own dogmas. This tendency was naturally particularly strong in a country where very many participants in revolutionary transformations did not possess the necessary knowledge or training. These people did not see that Stalin was impoverishing and vulgarizing both Marxism and Leninism; they perceived scientific socialism in its simplified and schematic Stalinist interpretation, transformed from a constantly developing, creative doctrine into a kind of religion.

Therefore it would be wrong to ascribe every erroneous action by such revolutionaries to petty bourgeois degeneration. On the contrary, many of their errors can be ascribed not to changes in their previous system of views, but rather to their inability to experience change, i.e. to dogmatism. In their thinking and their mode of operation these people were consumed to an ever greater degree by doctrinaire thinking, ideological ossification, sectarian limitations and narrow-mindedness, what Thomas Mann called revolutionary conservatism. An oversimplified and narrow view of things was typical of many of these people; they continued to think in categories which were not appropriate for the postrevolutionary period. Some Bolsheviks even boasted of their lack of education. "We did not graduate from gymnasia," stated one prominent party leader to an enthusiastically cheering crowd, "but we govern guberniyas." It comes as no surprise that when they ran into difficulties, did not understand a situation or had inadequate knowledge these officials were transformed into mere executors of orders, demonstrating blind discipline and obedience. The sluggishness of their thinking and their inability to analyze and think creatively were the epistemological basis for the cult of personality. Therefore among the people who accepted and supported the cult of personality were not only degenerates and careerists, but also "honest executors" who sincerely believed that everything they were doing was necessary and beneficial for the country and the revolution. These people believed the lies about the political repressions of 1936-38, believed in the idea of intensifying class struggle and the need for mass repressions and became either willing or unwilling accomplices in Stalin's crimes, even though many of them also later fell victim to him.

"Neither force nor words can shake my loyalty to the leader and the people," wrote Ye. A. Gnedin, who had until recently worked in a responsible position at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in the conclusion of a letter to his family. He continued to repeat this "loyalty oath" to the leader even after repeated torture, beatings and humiliation in Beria's office. Gnedin wrote in his memoirs: "I gradually freed myself from the mentality of a devoted bureaucrat and dogmatist in proportion to the way my thoughts became freer through the musings and strict meditations which were the extend of my intellectual life in prisons and camps."

The extreme sluggishness and dogmatism of responsible officials' wives is attested to by a song "from the wives of enemies of the people" written in a women's prison convoy, which contains these lines:

Under strict Soviet laws
Culpable for our husbands,
We lost our honor and freedom,
Lost our beloved children.
We will not cry, though we feel sick inside,
We will survive all with firmness of will,
And into every corner of this immeasurable land
We will carry our ardent labor.
This labor will give us the right to freedom.
Once again the country will receive us like a mother.
And under the banner of Lenin and Stalin
We will give our labor to our country.

Through the system of propaganda and indoctrination many primitive dogmas and stereotypes were instilled in the masses and became their guide. Of course, mass dogmatism and sectarianism only served to aid the victory of Stalin and Stalinism.

12

The problem of the state occupied an important place in socialist literature even in the 19th century. Should the proletariat use or destroy the existing state apparatus after the revolution? Should it establish a new proletarian state, or could it do without a state? Should the proletarian state continue to exist for a long time? Would it not be transformed with the passage of time into a clique of privileged bureaucrats above the level of the people? All these questions were the subject of fierce debate among revolutionaries. Thus, the anarchists drew a sharp line of demarcation between society and the state; in their opinion the latter was the principal conservative force in any society and the most serious obstacle to development on the basis of equality and freedom. Therefore the anarchists felt that a socialist revolution meant the immediate destruction of the state, that socialism and the state were incompatible.

Both Marx and Engels strongly objected to this doctrine. Socialism, they pointed out, cannot come about in a single day. The creation of a new society requires many years of struggle and specifically the suppression of resistance by the overthrown classes. Therefore there will be a transitional period of relatively great duration between capitalist and communist society; during this period the proletariat will have need of a state. After breaking and destroying the old state machinery the proletariat must create its own state machinery, yet give it, in the words of Marx, a revolutionary and transient form.

The question arose: how to protect the proletarian state against degeneration, against its transformation from a servant of society into its master? This problem was not satisfactorily resolved in 19th- century Marxist literature. Firstly, it was difficult to give any advice due to the lack of practical experience with the creation of a new state. Marx and Engels made some recommendations in this regard only after the Paris Commune. Secondly, Marxists in the last century were assuming a simultaneous victory of the revolution in all the main capitalist countries. Therefore the existence of the state would be, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, a necessary but nonetheless short-lived stage in the development of socialist society. Engels wrote: "...In the best case the state is an evil which the proletariat will inherit following victory in the struggle for class dominion; like the Commune the victorious proletariat will be forced to sever at once the worst aspects of this evil, until such time as a generation that has grown up under new, free social conditions is able to cast off all this rubbish of a state system."[10]

In August-September 1917 Lenin wrote one of his main theoretical works: "The State and Revolution." In it we read the following:

"After the workers have won political power they will break up the old bureaucratic apparatus, smash it to its very foundations, leaving not one stone upon another and replacing it with a new apparatus comprised of blue- and white-collar workers themselves, **against** the transformation of whom into bureaucrats the measures set forth in detail by Marx and Engels will be taken: 1. not only electability, but also the possibility of replacement at any moment; 2. salaries to be no larger than the salary of a worker; 3. immediate transition to a situation in which *everyone* carries out monitoring and supervisory functions, so that *everyone* becomes a "bureaucrat" for a time so that **no one** can become a "bureaucrat."[11]

The old bureaucratic apparatus was indeed broken up and smashed to its foundations. However, the reality of postrevolutionary Russia very quickly demonstrated the unworkable and utopian nature of the measures that had been theoretically "set forth in detail." It proved impossible to create a new apparatus composed of blue- and white-collar workers themselves. In order to establish a new state apparatus it was necessary to utilize the fragments of the old apparatus, and Lenin himself soon admitted that in this czarist and bourgeois jumble sovietized workers "would drown like flies in milk." The greater portion of the country's population was comprised of various groups of the petty bourgeois with their unstable ideology, their vacillations, their unwillingness to restructure their lives according to socialist principles. Electability and the possibility of replacement "at any moment" could only lead to the rapid removal of the Bolshevik Party from power. Therefore the principle of de facto appointments "from the top down" very quickly began to predominate over the pro forma elections "from the bottom up." As early as the spring of 1918 it became necessary to introduce wages for "bourgeois specialists" which were many times greater than a worker's pay. Salary restrictions were maintained throughout the 1920's only for party members (the "party maximum"), yet even here there existed many grades, with the highest salaries exceeding the average salary of a worker by a factor of three, four or even five.

The primary monitoring apparatus which was above all state agencies was the Bolshevik Party itself. Its best officials were appointed to key state posts, and all state agencies and departments had to account to party organizations and the Russian CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee and carry out the directives they received from the party. However, party monitoring was unable to halt the process of bureaucratization of the lower levels of the state apparatus; what is more, bureaucracy began to affect the party itself. The heads of the highest party organs had more power than the heads of state organs, and this encouraged abuses. These people began to use their influence in ways that were not in the interests of the working people. Additional privileges were created for some party leaders; these privileges acquired value in and of themselves and began to dominate the thinking of vain or ambitious individuals. On the other hand, growth of the party's power lessened the significance of the representative organs that had been created by the revolution, for example the congresses of soviets. Now these congresses did not so much draft or debate new laws in principle, but rather formally approved the resolutions and directives recommended by the Central Committee and party congresses.

We know that Lenin was preparing to write a second volume of the book "The State and Revolution" after the revolution. Unfortunately this work—one of the most important and crucial tasks of scientific socialism—was not completed even after Lenin's death. Stalin cared little for the issue. On the contrary, he made skillful use of the incompleteness of theory on how to build a socialist state for his own purposes. It was precisely the lack of effective mechanisms of monitoring and prevention of abuse of power, especially on the part of the highest representatives of the party and the state, within the system of a dictatorship of the proletariat which helped Stalin usurp total power in the country and the party.

13

In any revolutionary movement it is the role played by the masses of the people which is of decisive importance in the end. It is the people who sooner or later will overthrow any tyrant or despot. Yet the masses also serve as the staunchest buttress of despotism.

It has already been noted that Stalin succeeded in deceiving the masses, and that this testified not only to his cunning as a political demagogue, but also to the people's historical experience, their lack of education and culture, the weakness of democratic traditions, etc.

Russia was prepared by its past development for revolution, but it was also prepared for a course of events which would leave the field open for the establishment of a totalitarian and despotic regime and barracks socialism, i.e. for Stalinism.

The question of the relationship and degree of continuity between Russia in the 19th century and Russia in the 20th century—between the autocracy of the Russian czars and the autocracy of Stalin—remains the subject of heated debate among various representatives of emigre thought and Western Sovietology, in official historiography and in the nationalistic currents of contemporary literature and publicistic materials. Without going into all the shades of opinion we will cite only some of the extreme statements. Thus, for example, Irina Ilovayskaya, editor of the newspaper RUSSKAYA MYSL, which is published in Paris, has written: "Our viewpoint, if one were to distill it down to its very essence, is that we completely reject the idea of parallels between the Russian and Soviet states. We reject and refute this similarity not on the basis of heritage or tradition, but instead out of the clear understanding that the communist machine which arose following the revolution is in no way, in no area, connected to Russia's historical past, is not in line with Russian cultural and spiritual traditions. This machine is not a continuation of Russia even in the worst imperial and feudal manifestations of the latter, no matter how skillfully or successfully it may exploit the basest human qualities, originating partially out of those manifestations; the quality of the evil is different... Russian history was interrupted by the Bolshevik overthrow at a time when it was already clearly headed in the direction of liberalization and democratization, toward European stability and super-European humanitarianism. It should be restored beginning at that point..."

By contrast, in his book "Russia Under the Old Regime" American historian Richard Pipes attempts to prove not only a complete analogy but actually all-round continuity between the history of Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries: "Between 1878 and 1881 Russia laid the legal and organizational foundations of a bureaucratic-police regime with totalitarian overtones, a regime which continues to exist completely intact to this day. It can be stated with confidence that the roots of present-day totalitarianism can more likely be found here than in the ideas of Rousseau, Hegel or Marx. For even though ideas can give rise to new ideas, they only result in organizational changes when they fall on soil that is ready to receive them."

I am convinced that the truth lies somewhere between these two extreme viewpoints. History cannot be interrupted even as a result of the most radical revolution, and even though the nature of socialist revolution entails a decisive break with the previous structure and system of the old society, the nature of a revolution and its consequences are tied in with the nature and specific characteristics of the old society. A revolution involves both rejection of the past and preservation of continuity; therefore it is wrong to see only the one side of this interconnection between the past and the present while ignoring the other. Both during the 60-70 years preceding the revolution and in the time since Russia has gone through various eras, one of which was the era of Stalin and Stalinism.

What was interrupted was not Russian history, but rather the history of czarist Russia, and the break occurred not on a smooth path toward "European stability," but rather at the conclusion of a merciless imperialist war which was fought over the division of the world and in order to gain colonies, not for the sake of humanitarian ideals.

The Bolsheviks noticed not only the revolutionary sentiments of the Russian working class, but also the extreme backwardness of the great mass of Russia's working people. It was precisely on account of these things, as Lenin repeatedly warned, that it was relatively easy to start a socialist revolution in Russian but much more difficult to carry it through to its conclusion, and not only in the economy but also in the minds of the people. Of course, the culture that the people could have obtained in a more highly developed bourgeois society would have been primarily bourgeois rather than socialist. Some revolutionaries did not regard the people's illiteracy as a disadvantage, seeing in it instead an advantage for revolutionary propaganda, because it was easier for the people to accept socialist ideas if they knew no others. But this was a very dubious thesis. For in the tens of thousands of anti-illiteracy groups founded after the revolution peasants and workers studied not only the Russian or Ukrainian alphabets, but also the "Alphabet of Communism"; they learned the ideology of Marxism and socialism, albeit in an extremely simplified version.

There is no doubt that Stalin took advantage not only of revolutionary enthusiasm but also of the low level of culture among the lower classes and young people as he worked to consolidate his dictatorial control. He always simplified his slogans, including slogans pertaining to the struggle against "enemies of the people."

However, the relationship between the Stalin cult and the people's level of education is not a simple one. Some historians and publicists have attempted to draw a connection between the origin of the Stalin cult and the specific characteristics of the Russian peasantry, the peasants' czarist illusions and religiosity. This explanation does not seem sufficiently convincing. The cult of the living God-Stalin did not supplant the Russian peasants' traditional religion, the influence of which was weakened in rural areas yet still remained strong. Furthermore, the Stalin cult originated mainly in the cities. This cult originated just at the most difficult time for rural areas, the time of forced collectivization, famine and exile. These things could hardly encourage the Russian peasant to love Stalin. This cult was also not that strong among the masses of the urban petty bourgeois, who had many reasons for dissatisfaction, weariness and apathy, not enthusiasm. I believe that the Stalin cult was strongest among the party stratum of the working class as well as among a large segment of the young intelligentsia, especially among workers in the party-state apparatus which took shape following the repressions of 1936-38.

The question of the masses' low level of culture and education should not be approached in a simplistic manner. Of course ignorance, crudeness, a lack of moral values, a deficit of civilization and an abundance of potentially authoritarian personality types all played a major role in the formation of the Stalinist dictatorship. "Ignorance," wrote Marx as a young man, "is a demonic force, and we fear that it will yet serve as the cause of many tragedies."[12]

However, it would be fairer to speak not so much of the ignorance and crudeness of the masses themselves as of ignorant leadership of the masses, of crudeness and a lack of culture on the part of those who fed at the trough of power during the years of the cult.

The idea that genuine socialism is impossible without a certain level of culture and morality in society is not new. In the 19th century English philosopher Herbert Spencer wrote: "The belief not only of the socialists but also of the so-called liberals... is that with the proper skill badly functioning humanity can be pressed into the molds of excellently functioning institutions. But this is nothing more than an illusion! Citizens' natural shortcomings are inevitably manifested in the poor functioning of any social structure... There is no manner of political alchemy by means of which one can obtain golden behavior from leaden instincts."

There is some measure of truth in these conclusions, but overall Marxism correctly rejects this point of view. If the people's morality and "social instincts" affect the social structure, then the social structure can also have the strongest influence on morality and "instincts."

Debates over the relationship between socialism and culture arose among the Social Democrats once again at the start of the 20th century when the focus of the revolutionary movement shifted to Russia. In these debates not only Western Social Democrats and Russian Mensheviks but also some Bolsheviks rejected the urgency of socialist revolution in Russia, which in their opinion was not yet "mature enough for socialism." We know that Lenin resolutely rejected these doubts. He wrote: "If the creation of socialism requires a certain level of culture (though no one can say precisely what this 'level of culture' is, for it varies in each of the Western European states), then why can we not first begin with the acquisition through revolution of the preconditions needed for this certain level, and *then* on the basis of workers' and peasants' power and the Soviet order strive to catch up with other peoples..."

"In order to create socialism, you may say, civilization is required. Very good. Well, why can we not first create preconditions for civilization here in our country, like expulsion of the landlords and the Russian capitalists, and then later start moving toward socialism? In which books have you read that these and similar modifications of the accustomed historical sort are impermissible or impossible?"[13]

Immediately after the October Revolution the Bolshevik Party took decisive steps to promote not only social but also cultural revolution. However, Lenin commented on more than one occasion how difficult it was for Russia to promote elements of culture and civilization not only among the working masses but also within the apparatus of workers' and peasants' power and even within the party apparatus.

There is no doubt that when Stalin came to power in the party the general level of leadership in the country declined—not just the level of political methods, but also the level of culture, morality and civilized behavior. This shortage, which was exacerbated by a poor knowledge of Marxism and lack of comprehension of the contradictions in the new social order and ways of overcoming them, predetermined the masses' one-sided political and cultural development. No serious obstacles remained to the establishment of a Stalinist autocracy.

* * *

For a long time thoughtless dogmatists, both Soviet and foreign, have attempted to trivialize Stalin's crimes, which they continue to this day to call "mistakes" or "distortions." In their opinion every major political figure makes mistakes and his actions should be judged by their overall results, which in the 1930's were allegedly positive. But Stalin's crimes were not "mistakes," they were intentional, cold-blooded murders, mainly murders of honest Soviets.

The theory of "balance" is also unacceptable to us, i.e. the notion that Stalin committed a certain number of crimes and achieved a certain number of accomplishments, and that these should be weighed against each other.

Yes, Stalin was the leader of the party and the country at a difficult time and for many years had the trust of a majority of the people and the party. During those years our country achieved many successes in economic and cultural building, as well as victory in the Patriotic War. But those successes would have been more significant if there had been no terror in the 1930's, and we would have achieved our military victory more quickly and with fewer losses. So why should we thank Stalin? Because he did not lead our country to disaster? Stalin succeeded Lenin as the leader of the party. That is true. But he did not add to the political legacy he inherited; it would be more correct to say that he squandered it. And we cannot, we have no right, to link Stalinism with Leninism, to equate it to Marxism or socialism. Stalinism is those distortions which Stalin injected into the theory and practice of socialism. Stalin's deeds belong to history, and it is hardly likely that his name will be forgotten. But it will not be one of the names in which humanity can justly take pride.

Our country has survived a serious illness and lost many of its sons. Now we know that socialism if not combined with genuine democracy cannot provide guarantees against lawlessness and crimes. We also know that not everything connected within Stalinism lies in the past. The process of purging socialism and the communist movement of the filth of Stalinism is not complete. That process must be continued consistently and persistently.

August 1962 - November 1988
Moscow

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 8, p 96.

2. Ibid., Vol 9, pp 8-10.

3. Ibid., Vol 43, p 112.

4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 7, p 86.

5. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 11, p 103.

6. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 18, p 516.

7. N. Kuznetsov was rehabilitated in 1955 and began working as a forester—far away from people.

8. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 45, pp 19-20.

9. Ibid., p 357.

10. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 22, p 201.

11. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 33 p 109.

12. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 1, p 112.

13. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 45, pp 380-381.

END

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