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## Incompatibility of Cultures

### From Scientific Concepts and Schooling to Actual Policy

*Victor Shnirelman situates issues of multiple Jewish identities in the broad context of Russian society and the ideologies that have nurtured it in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The article reveals the insidiousness of quests for overarching, essentialist theories about culture, since they are often repackaged racism in scientific clothing. When such theories permeate school textbooks, as they have begun to do in Russia, scientific debates about cultural change and “national character” harden into pragmatic concerns about latent and blatant prejudice. Russian ideologues and also some intellectuals of the war-torn regions of Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Georgia have been abusing history in particularly polarizing and dangerous ways.*

#### The legacy of Soviet science

“Organic theory,” born in the nineteenth century in the depths of German nationalism, became extraordinarily popular in science in the last few decades

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of Soviet power.<sup>1</sup> It was included in Soviet “ethnos” theory as the concept “ethnosocial organism.” The final step in rehabilitating the racial approach was taken by the historian Lev Gumilev, who endowed the ethnos with a biological origin.<sup>2</sup> This twist was an incidental consequence of the spirited discussion among Soviet academics of the problem of the relationship between the biological and the social in the individual. The groundwork was laid by social scientists who raised doubts about Stalin’s thesis that a “psychic storehouse” constituted a national trait. This problem aroused passions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While some authors warned that recognition of a “psychic type” as a national trait would make the latter a “phenomenon of nature,” others emphasized the importance of the psychic storehouse, while admitting it is hard to pin down. In the end, a nation’s psychic storehouse was recognized as an important phenomenon. However, researchers were supposed to give all their attention to the aspect called “national character.”<sup>a</sup>

In the meantime, jurists and criminologists approached the same problem from a different direction, raising questions about the psychological prerequisites of criminal behavior. Some of them rejected Caesar Lombroso’s ideas about the genetic determination of criminal behavior, while others, agreeing that there is no inborn criminality, considered it possible to emphasize the importance of biopsychological factors. The latter group pointed to anomalies in the psyche of some people and stressed the need to take into account features of the criminal personality, as some inborn inclinations may incite a person to criminal actions.<sup>3</sup> They were supported by the philosopher Ia. Iorish, who stated that some people are biologically predisposed to become criminals.<sup>4</sup> This debate took place in the pages of *Literaturnaia gazeta*, a liberal publication in the 1960s, whose editors pointed out discrepancies between the sides and supported proponents of the biological approach, suggesting that biochemical studies of criminals be conducted.

Essentially, this debate reflected mindsets engendered by contradictions of the Khrushchev thaw. On the one hand, remembering the persecution of genetics and other scientific disciplines, intellectuals were dissatisfied that Soviet ideology had obstructed the progress of scientific thought. On the other hand, accepting Soviet ideology about building a classless society, some intellectuals believed that this would put an end to the social basis of criminality. Thus the reasons for criminal behavior had to be sought not in the social sphere, but in biology.<sup>5</sup> After all, by proclaiming the victory of communist society and, at the same time, continuing to insist on the socioeconomic roots of criminality, Soviet ideology had backed itself into a corner. To get out of this dead end, it had to blame criminality on “bourgeois vestiges,” but it remained unclear why such vestiges survived.

Therefore the debates of the 1960s did not close the argument but drew

the attention of scientists in other disciplines to the problem of the relationship between the biological and the social. Biologists and geneticists soon joined the argument. The emphasis on the biological came to be seen as a challenge to Soviet orthodoxy, which had given primacy to socioeconomic factors. However, while Soviet geneticists had in mind either humanity as a whole or individual variability, some of the philosophers interested in these debates sought to extend the reach of the hypothesis and its interpretation to groups of people (“ethnoses” and “nations”). The idea followed that various races have certain differences in their abilities, and that the fates of peoples could be determined by their genetic characteristics. One philosopher even came out with the statement that among Chechens “features of the national character were fixed at the genetic level.”<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, the movement of Soviet science toward racialization of the surrounding social world had its own distinctive characteristics and found expression primarily in the idea of ethnoses as “collective bodies.” The groundwork for this was unintentionally laid by the famous Soviet philosopher Iurii Semenov, who, in his desire to adapt Marxism to the study of concrete history, introduced into Soviet science the category of a “social organism.” By this, he meant a specific individual society within which people’s real lives took place.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, he tried to delimit the concepts of a social organism and the state. His qualification that the Russians and the Chukchi are different social organisms permitted broad use of the term he had introduced for an ethnic community. The Soviet ethnographer Viktor Kozlov soon declared an ethnic community to be a “social organism.”<sup>8</sup> In the form of an “ethnosocial organism,” this idea became one of the most important principles of the Soviet theory of the ethnos developed by Academician Julian Bromlei,<sup>9</sup> although he warned against understanding a social organism in a biological sense.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, Bromlei emphasized that the problem of the relationship of the biological and the social had not been resolved. At the end of his life, he wrote, “As for the problem of the interaction of the population and an ethnic community, the lack of refinement of the part of this problem that concerns the impact of the biological on the social has apparently been affected by fears of winding up in the arms of racism or, at best, being accused of biological reductionism.”<sup>11</sup>

When making such qualifications, Soviet specialists were primarily thinking about the views of the marginalized historian Lev Gumilev, who declared himself “the father of ethnology” and included in his concept of ethnogenesis premises identifying an ethnos with a biological community. Today it seems that Gumilev’s evolution in this direction was in no way determined by more than just the intellectual searching of an unconventional mind or the desire to shed light on the scientific problems mentioned above. After

Nikolai Mitrokhin's thorough study of Russian nationalism of the 1950s–80s came out, it became clear that Gumilev only gave a pseudoscientific façade to ideas. Anti-Semitic and Nazi views were not uncommon among prisoners in the Gulag, with some criminals resorting to outright agitation, making anti-Soviet tattoos with Nazi symbols.<sup>12</sup> And at the beginning of the 1970s Gumilev was closely associated with Russian nationalists, among whom racial myths were popular. Even in the mid-1970s, Mikhail Agurskii noted that influential circles in the Soviet Union were counting on neo-Nazi racist ideology as their ticket to power.<sup>13</sup> Mitrokhin showed that by the beginning of the 1970s they suffered serious losses and were far from real power. But then their positions became reinforced in publishing houses and art journals, and they were successful in using both these resources and samizdat to promote their views.<sup>14</sup> Gumilev became familiar with these ideas, receiving publications circulating in samizdat.<sup>15</sup>

### **Post-Soviet society and the idea of the “conflict of civilizations”**

In contemporary Russia, the attitudes noted above are explicitly or implicitly inherent in the civilization approach, which on the initiative of the Russian Federation minister of education is already being taught in the general education curriculum and plays a large role in higher education.<sup>16</sup> By the early 1990s, following the discrediting of official Marxism-Leninism, the rhetoric of class struggle disappeared from the repertoire of officials, educators, and many intellectuals, including writers and scholars. Along with it, interest in social structure and social stratification dropped and was replaced by a burning desire to seek the reason for almost all social cataclysms in the ethnic factor. This was expressed, in particular, in the rhetoric of the young esoteric philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, according to whom “the ethnic (or racial) interpretation of events has always been one of the most forceful, hypnotic, and captivating.”<sup>17</sup>

While in the 1970s and 1980s ethnic problems were exclusively the purview of Soviet ethnographers, who developed individual premises of Bromlei's theory of the ethnos, in the new Russia we see a bourgeois expansion of ethnic terminology and rhetoric far beyond the confines of the ivory tower. At the same time, while academics are subjecting the theory of the ethnos to significant revision or even rejecting it completely in post-Soviet conditions,<sup>18</sup> outside of the scientific debate, on the contrary, it is being met with unprecedented enthusiasm and willingly snatched up in the most diverse circles—from bureaucrats to members of the creative intelligentsia, and from politicians to ordinary citizens.

This is happening because open discussion, during the years of perestroika,

of the Bolsheviks' bloodthirsty deeds forced many citizens to recoil from the Marxist approach that was at the foundation of the Soviet worldview. Many seek replacement in an equally all-encompassing concept capable of preserving an integral idea of the events occurring around them. Academics have not been able to put together any such profound approach, but then the cataclysms that have occurred were closely associated with the activity of ethnonational movements. Having lived for decades in conditions of strict state control that set itself up as the only "objective reality," without alternatives, people found themselves unprepared to understand the social processes that occurred when such state control was greatly diminished. Without any in-depth knowledge of social, economic, and political processes, they saw around them only "ethnic conflicts," and they got the impression that the ethnic factor was the main motivating force of history. Such a vision of current events was fostered by Gumilev's writings. With the support of Anatolii Lukianov, a prominent political figure during perestroika, these works began to be printed in larger runs and popularized by journalists and educators. Gumilev's scientific concept took the "ethnos" out of the humanities and made it an "organic community," endowing it with inexorable laws of historical development that it supposedly must follow unquestioningly. And although his concept remained poorly substantiated and was, in essence, a pseudoscientific construct based on approaches that modern science had rejected long ago,<sup>19</sup> it gave the public the simplicity of "objective scientific truth." Accustomed to thinking in positivist terms, society found in this concept a new, universal master key for understanding the world, to help reveal sources of current and past events. But if the doctrine of class struggle had previously served as such a master key, now it was replaced by the doctrine of ethnic (or racial) struggle.

One way this is expressed is by a change in phraseology: where the authors of textbooks formerly described conflict in terms of "resistance to aggressors" or "national liberation struggle," now there is frequently talk about "defending cultural identity." For example, in a popular textbook based on the civilization approach, the essence of Eastern Europe's historical development over the past 1,500 years is reduced to Slavs constantly defending their identity and "specific cultural and national character" against pressure from the "Romanogerman civilization."<sup>20</sup> In another textbook, which in other respects can be considered one of the best in contemporary Russia, the Caucasian War of 1817–64 is presented as "a conflict of two dissimilar cultures, traditions, and ways of life." Its authors try to convince schoolchildren that what the mountain people revolted against was not their loss of independence or the dictates of tsarist officials, but the introduction of "new cultural customs."<sup>21</sup> Finally, some textbook authors present the era of great geographic discoveries and subsequent European colonization as a "conflict of civilizations."<sup>22</sup> Others,

following Samuel Huntington, declare the “conflict of civilizations” to be the inevitable future of the modern world.<sup>23</sup>

By creating impassable barriers between “civilizations” and the special “mentalities” supposedly inherent in them, this approach fosters xenophobia. The problem is that scholars are distinguishing both ethnic and civilization communities according to cultural parameters, while understanding culture in this context exclusively as a closed, impervious, self-sufficient, original “distinctive culture”<sup>24</sup> with deep roots and clear boundaries. A contemporary textbook notes: “A local civilization primarily reflects the development of various national societies. Such societies are, as a rule, unique and individual, with a distinctive national and cultural identity.” Like many others, this textbook presents a civilization as a “distinctive cultural way of life,” while its authors link culture with the “national/ethnic, racially specific characteristics of various human social groups.”<sup>25</sup> This rules out any ideas about cultural hybridity, biculturalism, and amorphous cultural boundaries, not to mention the discursive nature of culture. In turn, such a vision of reality compels one to strive for “cultural purity” and insist on “cultural ecology.”

Moreover, noting the trend of a civilization toward unification and trying to describe its supposedly unified cultural codes and values, proponents of the civilization approach almost always conclude that the “civilization of Rossiia” was established on the basis of Russian culture and Russian Orthodoxy. As a result, “Russian values” are at its core, and, however much they talk about “Slav–Turk dialogue” or the inclusion in Russia of fragments of other “civilization systems,” in the end Rossiia turns out to be not a polyethnic state, but the state of the Russian people (ethnos). Sometimes such a textbook even sets for itself the goal of forming a Russian “national” (i.e., ethnic) consciousness. All this is characteristic, for example, of Igor Ionov’s textbook *Civilization of Rossiia* [Rossiiskaia tsivilizatsiia], which has gone through several editions and has been used for ten years in the upper grades.<sup>26</sup> Other textbooks have the same effect, singling out Russia as a special type of civilization associated with a “specific people and its state,”<sup>27</sup> and endowing “civilization of Rossiia” with a unified consciousness, a “consciousness of the unity of those who belong to this people, this nation.”<sup>28</sup> In some school and college textbooks, one can even find the formula “our forefathers the Slavs,”<sup>29</sup> a puzzle for students not of Slavic origin.

In propounding a simplified idea of surrounding reality where actually “pure cultures” are unknown, such approaches are rooted in the sympathies of international law for colonial peoples and ethnic minorities that base their rights on the existence of appeals to “cultural identity.” Meanwhile, as the textbooks mentioned above show, the same arguments are now used by the dominant majority, and this sharply alters the essence of the argument. Indeed,

emphasizing its distinctive identity may help an ethnic minority in its struggle against discrimination, but the dominant majority can also seek to preserve its hegemony using this same argument. Further, culturocentrism has another distinctive characteristic that resuscitates a dangerous tendency as exemplified by the Nazis. Elucidating this danger requires comparative analysis of several approaches. While the social class approach, by virtue of the social mobility that it allows, gives a person broad latitude for maneuvering, and an emphasis on religious affiliation, though sharply constricting this freedom, still leaves open a way to salvation by changing one's religion, the racial approach, insisting on "purity of blood," blocks any possibility of changing one's identity and thus leads, in conditions of state racism, to discrimination against a "lower race" or, in exceptional cases, even to genocide. It is not hard to see the place for the so-called culturological approach in this scheme. If ethnic cultures are represented as individual, integral entities with their own sharply differing values and norms that inescapably override people's will, not leaving room for deviations, if each culture sets its own rhythm and dictates its own special pattern of behavior, and if people are incapable of breaking out of this strict framework, then such an approach turns out to be akin to a racial one. That is why it is customary to call the practical consequences stemming from this approach cultural racism, with the "incompatibility of cultures" as its slogan.<sup>30</sup>

Unfortunately, fertile ground for these ideas is created by some "ideologues" that gained unjustified popularity in Russian science (especially in culturology) in the 1960s, such as "archetypes," "national character," "ethnopsychology," the "civilization factor," "national psychological code," "cultural ecology," and so forth. Even more distressing, in recent years they have begun to be widely used in the sphere of education. For example, the author of the textbook *Ethnology* [Etnologiya], published in 2002, acquaints students with "ethnic psychology" and the category of "national character," as if these concepts do not raise any doubts among specialists.<sup>31</sup> What is more, he has a weakness for Gumilev's ethnogenetic theory, and in his ethnology dictionary he even includes Gumilev's pseudoscientific concept "chimera," defining it as "a form of contact of incompatible ethnoses."<sup>32</sup> In this case, we are dealing with a phenomenon that is quite widespread among Russian professors, when someone who openly declares his antiracist views himself without realizing it makes assertions typical of contemporary racism.

Another version of such an approach is fashionable teaching about civilizations. Its proponents attribute to civilizations extraordinary resistance to change; special, imperishable cultural values and codes; and practically impassable cultural boundaries. Within the framework of this approach, civilizations can only "clash" or, at best, carry on a dialogue. They are not

permitted to build on each other or conform to common norms, and a crossflow of population from one civilization to another is perceived exclusively as an undesirable process that can have only destructive consequences.

Although the civilization approach has become a favorite field of intellectual activity for former Soviet specialists in construction of a “new historical community—the Soviet people,” today they have reoriented themselves and prefer to look not so much forward as backward. As a result, by orienting people to the past rather than the future, the civilization approach stimulates archaization, hindering further development. It also disposes students to artificial self-isolation from the external world, which seems like absolute utopia in the current conditions. Finally, by attributing to individual “civilizations” extraordinary stability that is uncharacteristic of them (for example, “a nonprogressive form of existence” according to Liubov Semennikova), this approach could attribute to individual ethnic groups harmful behavior that is supposedly inherent in them and inseparably linked with their “distinctive culture.” (As discussed below, some historians already use such culturological phraseology in relation to Chechens and Ingush.) This amounts to indoctrination of students in cultural fundamentalism,<sup>33</sup> or cultural racism.

### **Expansion of xenophobia and treatment of immigrants**

How do such mindsets affect contemporary society, and how are they embodied in actual policy? In the mid-1990s, some analysts noted with alarm that communist ideology was being replaced in Russia by a “racial and ethnic approach” that was coloring people’s interactions.<sup>34</sup> Respondents participating in a sociological survey in 1995 pointed out an enviable interest of some politicians in “purity of blood,” expressed, in particular, by emphasizing their Slavic origin.<sup>35</sup> This took place against the background of increasing self-respect and ethnic solidarity among Russians,<sup>36</sup> as shown by a nationwide survey conducted in October 1995 by the Independent Institute of Social and National Problems of Rossiia, indicating about half of the respondents (48.6 percent) believed that “nationality is given to a person by nature or God” and cannot be changed.<sup>37</sup> This was confirmed in the course of a survey conducted by the same institute in the summer of 1998: many more respondents were inclined to emphasize their ethnicity (45.4 percent) than defined themselves as “from Rossiia,” *rossiiane* (27.8 percent). In other words, ethnicity (nationality) seemed more important to them than citizenship.<sup>38</sup> It is true that in the mass consciousness the cultural-emotional factor seems much more important than “purity of blood.”<sup>39</sup> A survey conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public-Opinion Research in 1996 indicated only 12 percent of Russians [*Russkie*] defined “Russianness” in terms having “Russian ancestors,” that

is, by blood.<sup>40</sup> It follows from this that it is not the mass consciousness that is producing ideas about the “purity of blood,” rather, these ideas are being imposed by unscrupulous politicians, poorly qualified experts, and incorrect journalism.<sup>b</sup> It is no coincidence that in the mid-1990s Lev Gudkov noted “an ongoing consolidation of xenophobia and ideological nationalism” that he attributed to degradation of “the elite.”<sup>41</sup>

Emphasizing impassable cultural boundaries and the supposedly antagonistic nature of individual cultures, the civilization approach is already being realized in the words and actions of federal politicians, as well as local officials. For instance, the head of the Institute for Globalization Problems, deputy of the State Duma and former chairman of the Ideological Council of the Rodina [Homeland] party, Mikhail Deliagin, referring to the concept of civilizations, expresses a firm belief that different civilizations, as cultural and historical spheres, are incompatible and doomed to conflict.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, following Huntington, he believes that it is impossible to avoid a clash of civilizations. Similar feelings were provoked in an *Izvestia* correspondent by the UN World Conference Against Racism, held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001, where a number of delegates from Arab countries and “black Africa,” openly demonstrated their racist attitudes.<sup>43</sup> It became fashionable to talk about the clash of civilizations after a translation of Huntington’s notorious article was published in Russia.<sup>44</sup> Huntington visited Moscow and had an opportunity to speak before a receptive audience. On this occasion, his rhetoric included an argument about cultural incompatibility, actively used in Europe in the past twenty or twenty-five years by new racists. Like them, he faulted immigrants for not wanting to assimilate and for their stubborn devotion to their own cultures, as if this creates a threat of disintegration of the countries that receive them, undermining their Christian principles.<sup>45</sup> Subsequently, Russian politicians and journalists began to talk excitedly about the coming clash of civilizations.<sup>46</sup>

This trend intensified after 11 September 2001, when some experts began to call Russia a “battlefield of civilizations”<sup>47</sup> or claim that a “war of civilizations,” as a war “with a certain type of culture,” that is, a war of the West against Russia) is already under way.<sup>48</sup> After the terrorist attack at the theater in the Dubrovka area of Moscow in October 2002, some journalists began to write more passionately that “the war of civilizations” has begun.<sup>49</sup> Then this choir was joined by the famous Russian writer and former dissident Vasilii Aksenov, who much earlier, shaken by the events of 11 September, declared that “Islam is waging war on us,” albeit with the reservation that not all Muslims are participating in this war, only “implacable activists.”<sup>50</sup> Another commentator on events in Russia calls the rise of xenophobia a supposedly inevitable result of a “clash of mentalities.”<sup>51</sup>

Then the former Soviet philosopher and current deacon Andrei Kuraev hastened to speak out about the problem of terrorism. He preferred to seek the sources of terrorism in culture and raised the question of “the roots of terrorism in national tradition itself of particular mountain tribes.” However, his thoughts did not linger long on “mountain tribes”; he was quick to detect in modern terrorism a manifestation of the supposedly eternal “conflict between herders and farmers,” rooted in Sumer and Ancient Egypt. As a result, Kuraev found core evil in “the herders” and proclaimed, “The Hyksos are among us.” By “Hyksos,” he meant the “barbarians” who in Moscow “do not hesitate to demonstrate their strength, do not conceal their disdain for us natives, do not conceal their plans to turn Russia into the Moscow Caliphate.” From the context of the article, it followed that he was talking about the Chechens, against whom Russia would have to shoulder “the white man’s burden” and demonstrate its own strength. In other words, this Orthodox clergyman was eager to revive the practice of Stalinism and accuse an entire people of terrorism.<sup>52</sup> Kuraev’s voice was far from the only one. The possibility of accusing an entire people of terrorism had been raised by Aksenov a year before Kuraev.<sup>53</sup>

It is interesting that all this is not much different from what right-wing radicals had to say. For example, after the terrorist attack in Dubrovka, the head of the neo-Nazi People’s National Party, Aleksandr Ivanov (Sukharevskii), declared that the time of struggle against the “Yid–Masonic conspiracy” had passed and the time had come to “oppose Islamic expansion”: “A war between the post-Christian white world and Islam is inevitable, since they hate us.”<sup>54</sup> In other words, believers in the “clash of civilizations” can now be found on both the left and the right, among both liberals and radicals, the authorities and clergy, as well as ordinary people. This is nourishing the unprecedented xenophobia that has gripped society in Russia.

In Russia, such attitudes are directed primarily against immigrants. They are shared, for example, by some governors and Cossack atamans [headmen], as demonstrated in 2002, when a new immigration law was heatedly discussed in Russia. In October 2001, all migration services were put under the control of the Interior Ministry, and thus practical implementation of immigration policy became the concern of law enforcement agencies. However, in these agencies immigrants are viewed primarily as a negative factor disturbing the peace and threatening the customary way of life. They are accused of taking jobs from Russians and causing a rise in unemployment, tax evasion, illegal use of social benefits and pensions, as well as criminal behavior (fraud, selling drugs, murder, terrorism). In spring 2002, Interior Minister Boris Gryzov instructed his subordinates to put up a tight barrier against immigrants to solve the problem of unemployment among Russians and lead to an increase in the

birth rate. He saw refugees and forced immigrants as a burden for the state and wanted them to take care of themselves. He was silent about the point that the vast majority of immigrants take jobs that local residents do not want.<sup>55</sup>

Similar opinions were expressed by many legislators and a number of governors in Russia. For example, the [Tatar] governor of Kemerovo oblast, Aman Tuleev, who called illegal immigrants “an underground alien army,” declared, “Today’s xenophobia is the citizens’ extreme reaction to the threat that they feel uninvited foreigners present to their accustomed way of life.” Regarding Kuban, he argued that “there the authorities recently sounded the alarm about a flood of ethnoses uncharacteristic of the region, settling in the best places and displacing indigenous residents from the highest-paying sectors of the local economy. Add to that the guests’ disregard for local customs, and even attempts to foist their own way of life on their hosts, and you have fertile ground for conflict.”<sup>56</sup> The Stavropol governor, Aleksandr Chernogorov, was also concerned about changes in the ethnic composition of his region as a result of immigration. He was particularly alarmed that “the newcomers do not want to live according to the local laws and customs” (referring to immigrants from the North Caucasus, who are citizens of the Russian Federation!).<sup>57</sup> An oblast conference of educators on 24 August 2004, the prominent Russian politician Egor Stroev, governor of Orel oblast, said, “There are frequent cases when, in the center of Russia, on lands that have been Russian from time immemorial, whole enclaves appear, settled by natives of other regions, where, taking advantage of the local authorities’ inaction and connivance, they set up their own criminal regime and oppress the local population in any way they can.”<sup>58</sup> Interestingly, Lieutenant General Andrei Chernenko, who is the first deputy interior minister of the Russian Federation and head of the Federal Migration Service, upholds such views. He is convinced that “in a number of regions, immigration from outside often presents a threat to the basic principles of Russia’s national culture.”<sup>59</sup> In particular, he thinks that the attempts of Meskhetian Turks to form tight-knit settlements in Krasnodar krai “has infringed on the interests of other residents of Krasnodar krai” and led to the appearance of “ethnic enclaves,” which could have “unpredictable consequences.”<sup>60</sup>

Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin also considered it necessary to oppose immigration before enactment of new Russian laws: “immigrants by definition act more irresponsibly in a social context than do residents, and represent a risk group from the point of view of all sorts of antisocial and criminal processes.” Insisting on differentiated treatment of migrants from other ethnic groups (supporting Russians primarily), he proposed “establishing a social risk index for various ethnic and religious groups,” as well as the principle of “ethnic communities’ collective responsibility.”<sup>61</sup>

One of the first to express such views, in the 1990s, was the former governor of Krasnodar krai, Nikolai Kondratenko, who claimed that “local residents, including Cossacks, say that it is not possible to live together anymore because of deep sociocultural differences and divergence of behavioral patterns and economic orientations.”<sup>62</sup> However, the governor did not take any practical measures in this regard, although his militant talk made officials nervous. Governor Aleksandr Tkachev, who replaced Kondratenko in January 2001, proved to be more decisive and went beyond mere reproaches of Meskhetian Turks as “temporary guests” and “illegal immigrants.” First he frightened local residents by saying that “expansion of the Meskhetian Turks is a foothold for creation of an enclave of Turks in Krasnodar krai”; “we will not let our Kuban be turned into another Kosovo.” At the same time, the official Kuban press was full of accusations that Meskhetian Turks were allegedly “poisoning the Kuban land with pesticides,” “the children of Meskhetian Turks do not want to speak Russian,” and “Meskhetian Turks beat up Cossacks.” Unsubstantiated rumors circulated that Meskhetian Turks allegedly raped old men and boys. Meanwhile, the fears importunately cultivated by the governor and the local press set the population on edge and compelled them to treat Meskhetian Turks with suspicion.<sup>63</sup>

It is significant that to justify the discriminatory policy of the Kuban authorities in regard to Armenians and Meskhetian Turks, local ideologues and conflictologists primarily resorted to “culturological” arguments and talked about “the latent confrontation of various sociocultural types.” They wrote that “distinctive ethnocultural features [of Armenians—V.Sh.] provoke a reaction from the krai’s indigenous population” and explained intolerance toward Meskhetian Turks by the “incompatibility of their ways of doing business and their sociocultural type with the local population’s traditions.”<sup>64</sup> Interestingly, in the 1990s the authorities did not think that Kurds and Yazidi living there provoked the same feeling of rejection among the local Russians, even though they were distinguished by no less pronounced cultural differences. But after the change of governor, the Kurds and Yazidi also became a target of discrimination and the accompanying rhetoric. Consequently, the issue is not distinctive features and different values, but rather ethnosocial interrelations, founded on completely different bases and associated with discrimination, something many local “culturologists” prefer not to discuss. After all, as some admit, because the Meskhetian Turks do not have Russian citizenship and local officials have not allowed them to register, they cannot get a job, purchase real estate or even document legal marriages, putting them in the position of virtual social outcasts.<sup>65</sup> Thus, ideologems typical of cultural racism were heard in the constructs of local analysts.

In spring 2002, the anti-immigrant ideology grew into a policy, and Gov-

ernor Tkachev announced a program to deport immigrants. This policy was based on the support of local political scientists, who described a “threshold of tolerance” and noted that “aggression could come from the minority, and the majority may have to defend itself.”<sup>66</sup> Following Kondratenko, Tkachev gave the following reasons for his readiness to combat “illegal immigration.” First, Krasnodar krai is partially on the border of the country, requiring that it be considered a border zone (but this border runs mostly through the Black Sea, and only a small segment separates the krai from Abkhazia, posing no threat to Russia. As for Wahhabites, about whom the governor was so concerned, they do not live abroad but in republics of the North Caucasus). Second, supposedly because of unfavorable demographic trends among local Russians and Adygeis, in the near future immigration threatens to change the ethnic composition radically. (Nonetheless, as the governor noted, 80 percent of the 1 million immigrants to the krai in the past ten years are Russian. Therefore, the significant relative increase in the non-Russian population—85 percent for Kurds, 64 percent for Assyrians, etc.—pertains to very small groups and will not lead to a radical change in ethnic composition. The governor did not mention that he was describing the increase since the 1989 census—over fifteen years—and that he counted as immigrants internal migrants, that is., those who changed their place of residence within Krasnodar krai). Third, illegal immigration leads to an increase in crime. (But the governor did not say what percentage of criminals are “indigenous residents” and avoided the question of how, by impeding the legalization of migrants in every way, local officials and law enforcement agencies themselves foster increased crime.) Fourth, immigrants settle in tight-knit communities; “they keep to themselves and remain aliens.” (But in conditions of discrimination against immigrants supported by the governor, there is nothing left for them to do but to rely on relatives and ethnic ties to help them survive.) Fifth, immigrants “bring into the measured life of the region unhealthy elements of competition; they try to impose their own morals and rules. (The governor seems to have forgotten that contemporary Russia lives in conditions of a market economy, which cannot exist without competition.) Sixth, “groups united by ethnicity are taking over local markets, exposing the youth to drugs, and getting young people involved in criminal business. (It is puzzling how immigrants manage to influence local youth if, as the governor says, they “keep to themselves” and “remain aliens.”) Seventh, “influential international forces have an interest in lawless migration.” (This is the most puzzling point, since the governor will not explain whom he has in mind.)

The governor reveals his cards when he declares that migrants are not in a position to improve the economy of Russia and that “Russia is raised up by patriots, not immigrants.” Note that he is talking not about “illegal immigrants”

but about immigrants in general. He does not seem to understand that in the conditions of a market economy labor incentives are not associated with a feeling of patriotism, but with ideas about the benefit and prestige of labor. Finally, the governor implies that he is not opposed to the return of “millions of our compatriots” who remain outside the borders of Russia, and for them there should be no obstacles to receiving Russian citizenship. One gets the impression that the governor does not consider Armenians, Georgians, and Meskhetian Turks—former citizens of the Soviet Union—to be his “compatriots.” Who then are these welcome compatriots? One has to think that that this is a euphemism for the Slavic population that he is willing to let into the krai without any reservations, imagining himself to be defending the interests of the “indigenous residents of Kuban,” or simply “the right of a Russian to be the master in his own land.”<sup>67</sup> (It is typical that nothing is said here about the Adygeis, longstanding inhabitants of the krai.) In 1996–97, the local immigration program included the following provision: “Non-Slavic immigrants frequently create their own community structures in the krai’s socioeconomic system and try to monopolize specific spheres of social activity.”<sup>68</sup> Therefore, one has to agree with civil rights advocates who accuse Kuban authorities of immigrantophobia, discrimination against immigrants, and racism,<sup>69</sup> although the governor denies such charges.<sup>70</sup> The situation with the Meskhetian Turks was finally resolved when, in February 2004, the American government said that it wanted to help. It offered them the opportunity to resettle in the United States, and many accepted this offer.<sup>c</sup>

Finally, the Russian sociologist Igor Beloborodov, director of the Center for Demographic Studies, stated recently that “the influx of immigrants creates a threat to interethnic balance, provokes interethnic conflicts, and in no way solves the demographic problem.”<sup>71</sup> The point regarding “disruptions of the interethnic balance” is always heard in anti-immigrant rhetoric and reflects fears about supposedly automatic erosion of the dominant population’s cultural values. This serves as a core idea of cultural racism, whose proponents hold an essentialist notion of culture. First, they believe that people imbibe strictly determined cultural codes virtually with their mother’s milk. Second, these codes, supposedly invariable, must accompany them throughout their lives without change. Third, people are the carriers of only one strictly determined culture. Such an approach ignores the phenomenon of biculturalism and denies cultural variability. It does not consider the plasticity of human nature, enabling successful adaptation to the most diverse conditions.<sup>72</sup> At the same time, by emphasizing the invariability of “cultural codes,” the idea of a supposedly inevitable conflict of cultures or civilizations naturally follows. Hence the conclusion that mass immigration is “pernicious.” In this paradigm, a person is seen primarily not as a citizen, but as a carrier of a certain culture—cultural

identity pushes civic identity to the sidelines. Such an idea about people is typical of a social system where the state takes priority over human personality and where, in the most diverse spheres of activity, personality is suppressed by the collective, identified with the cultural community.

It is interesting that these anti-immigrant attitudes are shared even by some governors and fully conform to the ideology of contemporary Russian neo-Nazis and skinheads. This is how Aleksandr Ivanov (Sukharevskii) puts it: “Moscow is full of Caucasians. They control the markets and do not allow Russian peasants bringing in goods to pass through. They control the whole drug business. They corrupt Russian girls and force them into prostitution.”<sup>73</sup> However, while the authorities of some regions react to immigrants by instituting a discriminatory regime, the skinheads resort to physical violence and pogroms. In other words, sharing a similar ideology, each acts to the extent of their strength and capabilities.

### **Return of the myth of “savage mountain men”**

Along with the myth of “labor expansion” of immigrants, in the 1990s the myth of “military expansion” of Caucasians blossomed and took hold, reminiscent of the chauvinist rhetoric of the Caucasian War in the nineteenth century.<sup>74</sup> Following the Ossetian–Ingush conflict in the fall of 1992, in March 1993 the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia adopted a resolution about the “impossibility of Ossetians and Ingush living together.”<sup>75</sup> According to a Western journalist, in the mid-1990s many Ossetians shared this position.<sup>76</sup>

The signal given by leaders of the republic was immediately picked up by one of the largest social and political movements in the republic, *Khistarty nykhas*, and disseminated by the [republic’s official] newspaper *Severnaia Osetiia*. Stalin’s lie about treason of the whole Ingush people during the Great Patriotic War was revived in the Ossetian mass media.<sup>77</sup> On 23 February 1994, the fiftieth anniversary of the deportation of the Chechens and Ingush, *Severnaia Osetiia* not only published once again NKVD [secret police] data on the scope of banditry in Chechno-Ingushetia during the Great Patriotic War, but also reminded its readers of the expulsion of the Cossacks in 1918 and the early 1920s. These publications depicted the Ingush as pathological outlaws and brigands, arousing righteous indignation.<sup>78</sup>

The “scientific” basis for this anti-Ingush campaign was the theory of the leading Ossetian historian Mark Bliev, who proclaimed their “raiding system,” as well as perfidy and cruelty, to be Ingush ethnogenetic characteristics, associated with a “certain formative stage.”<sup>79</sup> In 1983 Bliev first stated that the aggressiveness he considered characteristic of Chechens and Ingush was supposedly due to the formation of the mountain, “free” societies that only

recently had left the tribal system. In his opinion, by the early nineteenth century the mountain dwellers had only just begun to make the transition from a tribal system to feudalism, and this forced their leaders to organize plundering raids on Russian settlements, which supposedly compelled the tsarist authorities to take punitive actions. On the other hand, among inhabitants of the flatland and piedmont the historian found established feudalism. In his opinion, this not only split society apart, but also created a pro-Russian orientation among its greater part.<sup>80</sup> As one of his colleagues admitted, Bliev thereby took the question of the “anticolonial” movement off the table; the mountain men turned out to be the aggressors, and Russia was the defender<sup>81</sup> in accordance with the well-known principle of blaming the victim for aggression. In the past fifteen years, Bliev has trotted out this concept again and again in his works.<sup>82</sup>

In the 1990s, on the territorial dispute between the Ossetians and Ingush, Bliev maintained it was a question of “returning a small part of the historical territory lost in the fifteenth century (piedmont plain of the North Caucasus), to allow the Ossetians to balance demographic processes and open up new opportunities for economic progress.” In his speeches he often used the term “living space,” which the Ossetians had to preserve to avoid degradation and disappearance. He thought the Ossetians had to elevate this objective “to the level of state ideology.”<sup>83</sup> While expressing fear of “Russian fascism”<sup>84</sup> and rightly reproaching the president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia for using Nazi slogans,<sup>85</sup> Bliev was not averse to using similar phraseology.<sup>86</sup>

In the new conditions, Bliev continued to insist that the different degrees of feudalization of the peoples of the North Caucasus had a significant effect on their foreign-policy orientation in the first half of the nineteenth century. In his view, the “democratic” mountain tribes were characterized by “expansionism,” with implacable resistance to Russia, while the “aristocratic” plains societies were more well-disposed to Russia.<sup>87</sup> Although he was disturbed by the reaction of his North Caucasian colleagues to his theories,<sup>88</sup> this did not change his faith in the validity of his approach. In his 2004 book, he repeated his favorite concept about the “savagery” of the mountain men and their “plundering raids,” associated with their “national character.” Following the late-nineteenth-century French writer Gustave Le Bon, well known for his racial ideas, Bliev again draws a direct parallel between the events of the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, explaining them by the Chechen people’s “behavioral characteristics developed over the ages” and absolving the Russian authorities of blame. This supposedly gives him the right to write about the “invariability of the Chechen people’s extraordinary volitional and behavioral qualities,” expressed in raids and kidnappings in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries.<sup>89</sup> Making

ethnocultural characteristics the basis of the conflict, this concept essentially brought elements of cultural racism into Soviet and then Russian science; Bliev tried to analyze the role of Chechens in the Caucasian War from this standpoint. In the 1990s such an approach, emphasizing some cultural invariants that make it difficult for Chechens to develop normal relations with Russia, became common, but this did not make it more persuasive.<sup>90</sup>

According to his colleagues, study of the “raiding system” as the most important factor in the Caucasian War is considered one of Bliev’s main scientific achievements: “*The Caucasian War*, written by M. Bliev, was the best explanation of the Chechen events.”<sup>91</sup> In North Ossetia, the study of the “raiding system” is recognized as Bliev’s outstanding contribution to conflictology and considered key to explaining many conflicts among peoples in Russia.<sup>92</sup>

Reification of the conflict and archaization of the social structure of the Vainakh peoples became the central idea of practically all of Bliev’s works in the past twenty years.<sup>d</sup> For instance, in his journalistic work on the Ossetian–Ingush conflict, he wrote that “not long ago the contemporary Ingush *taip* [clan] still had all the characteristics of a classical Iroquois clan . . . and much of what is happening today in Ingushetia can be explained precisely by these characteristics.” The reason for the conflict, in his view, was the stage of development of Ingush society, living by laws of “military democracy” and “particularly aggressive.” He referred to Ingush raids on Cossack settlements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, without mentioning that the Cossacks took by force lands belonging to the Ingush.<sup>93</sup> All this was supposed to demonstrate that the bloody Ossetian–Ingush conflict in autumn 1992 was just a consequence of the latest Ingush “raid.”<sup>94</sup>

In his theoretical discourse Bliev limited his comments to the Chechens, insisting that the “raiding system,” closely associated with the *taip* structure, led to inevitable wars with their neighbors. Referring to the “archetype” to explain events in Chechnya in the 1990s,<sup>95</sup> he did not mention that on the eve of and during Russian colonization the Ingush and Ossetians both conducted raids often, or explain why these peoples did not participate in the Caucasian War. Further, his concept did not explain why many well-known noble Ossetians, such as the Kundukhov brothers, fought on the side of Imam Shamil against Russia.<sup>96</sup> Second, contradicting his claims about the association of the “raiding system” with traditional *taip*, he blamed Islam for the rise of this system, since “paganism condemned cruelty.”<sup>97</sup> Third, he saw in the “raiding system” an archetype that was preserved during Soviet modernization and survived unchanged to the late twentieth century.

However, as Valery Tishkov rightly notes, only cultural fundamentalism brings a contemporary people down to the level of a “military democracy.”

Tishkov reminds us that American scholars studying the contemporary Iroquois and their integration into American society seek no support in the works of the well-known American ethnologist of the late nineteenth century, Louis Henry Morgan.<sup>98</sup> In 1991, I conducted field studies among the Tlingit Indians in Alaska. In the nineteenth century, they were known as one of the most warlike peoples in North America, and they went through a period of military democracy. They have preserved their clan system, which plays an important role in their contemporary development. However, in the twentieth century they never revolted against the American authorities and did not engage in any raids. Therefore, the explanation of differences in the behavior of Chechens and Tlingit has to be sought not in inherent cultural archetypes but in the system of government and government policy: Russia and the Soviet Union versus the United States.

Bliev avoided the question of why, if the “raiding system” was inherent in Chechen society, it did not compel General Dzokhar Dudaev to intervene in the Ossetian–Ingush conflict. Nor does he explain what motivated Moscow Chechens, during the terrorist attack at the theater in Dubrovka in October 2002, to offer themselves in exchange for women and children hostages.

Meanwhile, following Bliev, the idea has become popular among Ossetian intellectuals that “the Chechens [and the Ingush—V.Sh.] are too passionate, with their relict mentality that has preserved the level of consciousness of the ‘military democracy’ era.”<sup>99</sup> It seems that this concept has been adopted by Russian military men and journalists, who find the reason for the Caucasian War in the clash of Russia’s state interests with the mountain people’s traditional way of life [*abrechestvo*],<sup>e</sup> kidnapping, slave trade, hostage taking), supposedly “terrorizing all of the adjacent regions.”<sup>100</sup> Scholars in Moscow and Kuban took up this concept,<sup>101</sup> as did the former assistant to Patriarch Aleksii II, Deacon Kuraev. Even such a prominent democrat as one of the “superintendents of perestroika,” Gavriil Popov, tried to explain the Caucasian War in the nineteenth century by the point that Russia had begun to impose order and fight the mountain men’s “racket,” depriving them of revenue; this supposedly led to their revolt.<sup>102</sup> Bliev’s latest book, again expounding on the concept of the “raiding system” and directly correlating it with contemporary events in the North Caucasus, received favorable reviews in leading Russian historical journals.<sup>103</sup> Following Bliev, the historian Liudmila Gatagova drew a parallel between the 1992 Ossetian–Ingush conflict and nineteenth-century Ingush.<sup>104</sup> This concept is even found in federal textbooks on the history of Russia, which declare the “raiding system” to be the main culprit in the Caucasian War. The Russian empire’s aggressive policy and the exceptional cruelty of a number of Russian generals to the mountain people are not mentioned.<sup>105</sup>

Bliev’s ideas about “mountain expansion” and the “raiding system” are

espoused by authors of chauvinist works that depict Chechens as “barbarians” and argue that Russians “naturally feel fundamental incompatibility with Chechens.”<sup>106</sup> In Moscow, the predatory policy of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union in the Caucasus is granted indulgence by deputies of the State Duma in the Rodina party and by historian Nataliia Narochnitskaia. In the spirit of Stalinist historiography, she fully rehabilitates the tsarist generals and lays the responsibility for the Caucasian War on England, Persia, Turkey, and even Poland, as well as on “Chechen brigands.” As for the more recent period, she states that the Chechens were “allies of the fascists.”<sup>107</sup> Such historical constructs let Caucasians know that their ancestors once settled uninhabited lands, and the mountain people provoked the Caucasian War.<sup>108</sup>

This attitude toward the Chechens was first expressed in populist terms by the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, who declared that the Chechens are “professional bandits,”<sup>109</sup> and by the former director of the Federal Security Service, General Mikhail Barsukov, who said that they were all “murderers, bandits, or thieves.”<sup>110</sup> The same logic was expressed in openly racist reference documents issued by the Russian Federation Interior Ministry, claiming that “Chechens are, by their national characteristics, innate partisans and saboteurs.”<sup>111</sup>

The Moscow writer Vladimir Loginov, who visited North Ossetia shortly after the Ossetian–Ingush conflict, also voiced this stereotype, virtually repeating the Ossetian version of events and calling the Ingush “one of the most savage Chechen tribes,” “the most successful of all the mountain tribes at stealing, robbery, mugging, and murder.”<sup>112</sup> Loginov popularized such an attitude toward Chechens and Ingush in his journal *Shpion*, in which the Ingush culture was accused of providing moral justification for crime and banditry.<sup>113</sup> His claims about the Ingush were reprinted in *Severnaia Osetiia* (17–18 June 1993).

In the late 1990s, such views were frequently repeated by the Russian mass media<sup>114</sup> and in the popular literature.<sup>115</sup> The idea that Chechens are savages who had only recently descended from the mountains became popular after the 2002 attack in Dubrovka.<sup>116</sup> And after the inhuman seizure of the school in Beslan by terrorists on 1 September 2004, provocateurs began to incite people against the Ingush, although, as admitted by the planner of the attack, Shamil Basaev, the group was polyethnic and included two Ossetians.<sup>f</sup> As a result, relations between the Ossetians and Ingush heated up again. In Beslan, graffiti proclaiming “Death to Ingush” appeared on the walls of buildings, and it again became popular to recall the Stalinist deportation.<sup>117</sup> Only intervention by the republic’s authorities and the forces of law and order were able to prevent acts of retribution by Ossetians. Interestingly, when the former president of North Ossetia–Alania, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, spoke against xenophobia and terrorism in January 2005, he said not a word about racism. It is obvious that

Russian officials are not yet aware of this threat. The Rostov-on-Don author who does not detect any anti-Caucasian attitudes in his analysis of xenophobia in the south of Russia is also silent about this.<sup>118</sup>

It seems that the amorphous euphemism “xenophobia” suits public opinion and is used in the most diverse contexts, since this term, recently entering the Russian language, does not arouse as strong emotions as the stronger term “racism.” That is why it is hard to discuss the problem of racism in contemporary Russia today. The vast majority of the public, particularly many “spiritual leaders,” politicians, and officials, do not want to admit the presence of racist attitudes.

Meanwhile, developing Bliev’s ideas, his close colleague and coauthor Ruslan Bzarov also applied his concept to the Ingush, archaized their social order in the 1920s–30s, and on this basis declared that “Ingush society could not find its place in the Great Patriotic War.” This supposedly led to the catastrophic course of events culminating in deportation.<sup>119</sup> Correctly noting the presence of discrimination in relation to the Ingush during the final decades of Soviet power, Bzarov draws the disheartening and unfounded conclusion that the “objective” basis for the Ossetian–Ingush conflict was “the acute social and historical incompatibility of Ingush society with processes that determine the political and socioeconomic life of the surrounding peoples and the state (the Soviet Union, and then the Russian Federation) as a whole.”<sup>120</sup> Liudmila Gatagova, who is convinced of the “staunch mutual antagonism” between the Ossetians and Ingush, holds similar views.<sup>121</sup>

Such an opinion does not fit well with data obtained by Ossetian sociologists indicating that Ossetians and Ingush share identical ethnocultural values.<sup>122</sup> This conclusion can hardly be considered surprising, since the Ossetians and Ingush have lived side by side for centuries, often intermarried, and exchanged cultural accomplishments. There was no talk of permanent hostility or hatred between them.<sup>123</sup> Moreover, cultural distance by itself does not explain animosity.<sup>124</sup> Therefore, the question should not be one of ethnocultural values, but of dramatically different historical and political experience in the twentieth century in the life of Ossetians and that of Chechens and Ingush.<sup>125</sup>

Local scholars have emphasized the scientific groundlessness of Bliev’s concept, as well as its tactlessness. They have persuasively shown that he archaized the mountain people’s social system, artificially divided the North Caucasians into “peaceable” (plains) people and “expansionist” (mountain) people, incorrectly represented the participation of various groups of them in Shamil’s movement, and blamed the mountain people for starting the Caucasian War. They have spoken out against the basic postulates of Bliev’s concept, characterizing it as justification of the aggressive tsarist policy in the Caucasus.<sup>126</sup> Academician Gadzhi Gamzatov rightly perceived in this concept

fertile ground for dubious and dangerous speculation about “the genetic incompatibility of the mountain people and Russians.”<sup>127</sup> The same issue was discussed at the roundtable on “Problems of the History of the Circassian People in the Light of the Address of President of the Russian Federation Yeltsin to the Peoples of the Caucasus on the 130th Anniversary of the End of the Caucasian War,” held on 11 March 1999, by the International Circassian Association at the RF Ministry of National Policy. Here again the concept of the “raiding system” was used to justify the aggressor.<sup>128</sup>

Chechen authors have rightly classified these ideas about a “savage people” as racism,<sup>129</sup> and the Ingush parliament demanded that Russian authorities call the slanderers to account.<sup>130</sup> Contemporary Russian scholars have shown that Bliev’s concept has significant shortcomings. In particular, it does not properly take into account certain cultural characteristics that all Caucasian peoples have in common and ignores patterns of change in these characteristics over the past 150–200 years.<sup>131</sup> Specifically, critics have shown that Bliev incorrectly characterized features of the North Caucasian people’s military culture (“raiding by mounted partisans”) that have nothing to do with the Caucasian War. It is sufficient to say that Shamil’s Murids [religious followers of Shamil] opposed the war, since it was against *sharia*.<sup>8</sup> The plundering raids typical of traditional mountain societies cannot be characterized as “expansionist,” since, with rare exceptions, their purpose was not to seize territory.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, “raiding by mounted partisans” was also typical of “aristocratic” Adyg peoples, who, in Bliev’s opinion, were pro-Russian.<sup>133</sup> Bliev also did not mention that such “raiding by mounted partisans” had been known among the Ossetians.<sup>134</sup> Further, critics reproach Bliev for his distorted depiction of Islam.<sup>135</sup> But his concept has become very popular and is sometimes included in school textbooks.

Thus, in the 1990s and recent years, elements of cultural racism appeared in the rhetoric of some Ossetian authors, and the conflict was shifted from the field of politics to that of culture. The following words of an Ossetian publicist can serve as an example of cultural racism:

Ethnic psychology is a way and level of thinking established over millennia among a particular people that determine its behavioral norms, categories of morality, attitude toward social processes, and its ability and desire to assess the past and present for the sake of its own formation as a people (nation) worthy of respect by others and capable of coexisting with the peoples surrounding it. . . . However, when a people or nation ignores standards of behavior that are universally accepted in the civilized world but does not assess its own criminal behavior, when such is encouraged and becomes a symbol of moral upbringing of the nation’s successive generations, then such behavioral norms sooner or later move to its genetic level and are not amenable to correction by external impact factors.

In line with the platform of cultural racism, the author of this discourse tried to convince the reader that the Ingush cannot be helped even by more education.<sup>136</sup>

Such ideologems were not limited to the sphere of elite discourse. Sociological surveys have shown that, while in the final decades of Soviet power the public believed that political factors were the source of national insults and nationalist attitudes, by the mid-1990s people began to view aggressiveness as almost a genetic characteristic of individual ethnic groups.<sup>137</sup>

Essentially, this is about “stereotypes attributing virtues to us that are denied to others: we are civilized and even-tempered; they are barbarians and fanatics, or primitive and blind.”<sup>138</sup> Such stereotypes are frequently an important component of identity, requiring opposition of oneself to others. However, the views described above of the Chechens and Ingush as barbarians contain something more and are compatible with the racial attitudes that developed, for example, in South Africa.<sup>139</sup> Ideas about the “bioethnogenetic foundation” of individual peoples and their “ethnopsychological compatibility” or “incompatibility”<sup>140</sup> have spread in post-Soviet Russia, creating fertile ground for cultural racism.

Against this background, the slogan of the “impossibility of living together” is becoming more popular in Russia. In the 1990s, among the Balkars, who were disappointed by the frustration of their hopes for parity representation, dissatisfaction with the power of the dominant majority, represented by Kabards, came to a head, and the idea took shape that it was impossible to live together with Kabards and Cherkess.<sup>141</sup> In December 1994, at the initiative of Cherkess radicals, the First Congress of the Cherkess People was convened. It declared that it was impossible to stay together in the same republic with the Karachais, and a Cherkess autonomous okrug needed to be recreated in Stavropol krai. Then the Abaz and Nogais renewed their claims to autonomy. By summer 1995, these attitudes had subsided.<sup>142</sup> However, five years later the Cherkess and Abaz declared that it was impossible to live together with the Karachais.<sup>143</sup> In the late 1990s at a meeting in Rostov oblast, the impossibility of living together with Chechens was again mentioned.<sup>144</sup>

This formula is being heard more often in contemporary Russia. This is fostered by dubious culturological concepts that unfortunately have not received proper criticism.

### **Xenophobia as a social condition**

It is still customary to associate the slogan “Russia for Russians” with marginalized extremists. Recent trends show an incomparably broader phenomenon. In the past few years, the motivation for xenophobia became more emotional and irrational. According to data from the All-Russian Center for Public-

Opinion Research, people have now begun to explain their negative feelings mainly by cultural factors: non-Russians “disregard Russian customs and standards of behavior” and “do not know how to behave”; they are simply “foreign” (46 percent). No significant differences were found between large cities and small towns or urban centers and rural areas in this respect. The threat of terrorism and economic factors were mentioned much less often: 15–22 percent and 20–22 percent, respectively. Surveys by the Levada Center partly confirm these conclusions: in the opinion of one-fifth of the respondents (20 percent in 2004 and 22 percent in 2005), the behavior of newcomers has provoked Russian nationalism, although many more people were worried about terrorism (32 percent in 2004 and 33 percent in 2005).<sup>146</sup> These surveys show that 20–46 percent of those with a firm position on this matter (51 percent of the participants in the All-Russian Center for Public-Opinion Research’s survey found it hard to answer) explain their hostility to newcomers by cultural factors, and this creates fertile ground for development of cultural racism.

Sociological surveys in 1995–2005 also revealed other new trends in the development of xenophobia. While previously mostly older people (over forty) were characterized by ethnic negativism, now young people (up to twenty-four) are at the forefront. Moreover, of all social groups the most prone to anti-Caucasian phobias were civil servants and managers, who clearly pick up these attitudes from the authorities. And the most politicized groups of the population did not remain on the sidelines, displaying increased hostility to Chechens, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and gypsies, practically regardless of their own political views—whether conservative or democratic.

This trend is confirmed by annual surveys by the Levada Center: the slogan “Russia for Russians” was fully supported by 15 percent in 2000, 16 percent in 2001–4, and 19 percent in 2005. In other words, the number of hardcore proponents of the slogan “Russia for Russians” rose sharply in 1999–2000.<sup>147</sup> There were even more “mild nationalists,” who agree that this slogan should be realized “within reasonable limits”: 34 to 42 percent between 2000 and 2005, reaching a maximum in 2001 and 39 percent in 2005. Thus, in the past five years people willing to put this slogan into practice in some form amounted to over half the population (as much as 58 percent in 2001 and 2005).<sup>148</sup> It is true that Leontii Byzov from the All-Russian Center for Public-Opinion Research disputes the 58 percent figure, citing 16 percent.<sup>149</sup> However, the latter figure applies to “hardcore nationalists.” If we combine them with “mild nationalists,” then the All-Russian Center for Public-Opinion Research’s survey gives an impressive 43 percent, albeit somewhat less than what the Levada Center found.

More recently, a pilot survey of Moscow students also showed that the slogan “Russia for Russians is fairly popular in this environment.”<sup>150</sup> According to

data from the All-Russian Center for Public-Opinion Research, middle-aged people (thirty to forty years old) with a good education predominate among holders of such views.<sup>151</sup> This indicates that a new generation is entering active social life now. Its socialization took place during the stormy years of perestroika and the difficult formation of post-Soviet Russia, when the Soviet ideologue “friendship of peoples” was replaced by harsh economic, social, and political competition. Competition can be understood in ethnic terms, and when schools began to cultivate national (ethnic) identity in students.<sup>152</sup> In some ways, this is analogous to what happened in Germany in the late nineteenth century, where aggressive German nationalism was a consequence of the change of generations from the democratically oriented cohort of 1848 to a generation brought up in a chauvinist spirit after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.

The above analysis indicates what stands behind the dry sociological figures. Over the past two decades, the social-class paradigm has been replaced by an ethnocultural one in the public’s view. In this context, the historical dynamic has found a new explanation, and the main actors on the historical stage have turned out to be not workers and peasants, but ethnoses and cultures. The extraordinary popularity of the parascientific works of Gumilev, whose constructs seemed tempting for some scholars, as well as for educators and authors of textbooks, has convinced people of the reality of “ethnic incomplementarity” and “cultural incompatibility.” It has become conventional wisdom to repeat highly dubious speculation about “national character,” along with supposedly inherent distinctive characteristics, not subject to change either through socioeconomic modernization or schooling. Relaxation of requirements for scientific constructs and a drop in the level of scientific competence led to the extraordinary popularity of such views, primarily among the new Russian culturologists, who were infatuated with “civilization” constructs. In these conditions, myths about “savage peoples” and a “clash of civilizations” flourished.

At the same time, school and college textbooks that represent Russia as the “civilization of Rossiia” and endow it with exclusively Russian spiritual values are essentially turning Russia into a state of ethnic Russians. This happens even when the authors devote a few paragraphs to description of the other peoples of Russia, for the latter either come across as passive and voiceless or appear as hostile agents (such as the Tatars or Chechens) who allegedly interfere with the normal development of the Russian state. A special place is reserved for Jews, whose history within the Russian state is met with eloquent silence in the textbooks. This turns them into aliens and arouses distrust or even enmity. Even textbooks that discuss persecutions of Jews and anti-Semitism do not deal with the reasons for this. Also not included are the reasons for deportation of “punished peoples.” Focusing on what is “positive” in Russian history means

that many atrocities of the tsarist and Stalinist regimes are not subjected to moral judgment, much less thorough analysis. Some authors of federal textbooks completely avoid such problems as detrimental to patriotic upbringing.

In other words, by putting the emphasis on “civilization of Rossiia,” schools are actually training proponents of the slogan “Russia for Russians.” The same thing is done by ideologems such as “Russia and Tatarstan” or “Russia and Chechnya,” which set “Russia” in opposition to individual republics, thereby cultivating the image of “Russian territory.”<sup>153</sup> A new exhibition at the State Historical Museum in Moscow says almost nothing about the other peoples of Russia,<sup>154</sup> thereby representing it as the state of the Russian people.

The propaganda conducted by some popular political parties represented in the State Duma is in the same vein. Surprisingly, similar attitudes are shared by many officials and a number of Russian governors, who complain that immigrants are undermining the culture of “the native population.” Such mindsets essentially rely on the same parascientific idea of the “incompatibility of cultures.” Comparisons of such views, shared by the Russian elite and considerable society in Russia, with ideas current among skinheads show that they differ only in how aggressive the rhetoric is, while the basic worldview is similar. Highly indicative is the question raised by the well-known crusader against “international Zionism,” Deputy Nikolai Kondratenko, as to whether “criticism of Zionism” comes under the interpretation of “extremism,”<sup>155</sup> heard on 28 June 2006, at a session of the State Duma devoted to discussion of a draft of a new law on extremism.

Numerous long-term sociological and culturological studies have shown that it is a mistake to interpret radical mindsets as a marginal phenomenon in contemporary society in Russia. These studies find that significant segments of our society are infected with xenophobia, or new (cultural) racism. Therefore, hopes that mere clarification of laws to combat extremism will be sufficient seem naive. It would be more effective to replace the paradigm of humanities in Russia, change the educational strategy (especially in history and culturology), radically alter the mindsets of journalists and the creative intelligentsia, and broadly humanize society in Russia as a whole. This would be possible if the country’s worldview and state policy were centered on people as individuals, rather than on some collective communities, whether national, ethnic, religious, or some other type.

## Notes

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Affairs of the U.S. Department of State through the Galina Starovoitova Fellowship Program. None of these organizations are responsible for the views expressed.

2. V.A. Shnirelman, "Lev Gumilev: ot 'passionarnogo napriazheniia' do 'nesovmestimosti kul'tur,'" *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie*, 2006, no. 3, pp. 8–21.

3. N. Struchkov, "Utevsksii. Ne tak vse prosto," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 1967, no. 48.

4. Ia.S. Iorish, "Ustupka burzhuaznoi ideologii? Net, i eshche raz net!" *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 1968, no. 10. It should be recalled that the idea that criminality is associated with biological heredity was developed especially in the early twentieth century by racist-inclined members of the Monist League in Germany, who demanded the physical extermination of criminals, alcoholics, and the seriously ill, particularly the retarded. See Daniel Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2004), pp. 93, 96.

5. It is interesting that something similar was also seen in the United States, where after discriminatory laws were repealed in the late 1960s most white Americans believed that now nothing stood in the way of blacks moving up the social ladder and competing successfully. But since this did not often happen, whites were inclined to resort to cultural or biological arguments, denying the continuing practice of discrimination. See Joe Feagin, Vera Herman, and Pinar Butar, *White Racism. The Basics* (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 188–89.

6. F.Kh. Kessidi, *Filosofskie i etnicheskie problemy genetiki cheloveka: analiz diskussii* (Moscow: Martis, 1994), pp. 61, 75–76, 96. He argued that the rise of Greek culture in the fifth century B.C.E. was because the genetic heritage of the ancient Greeks made them particularly gifted. In *ibid.*, pp. 99–108.

7. Iu.I. Semenov, "Kategoriiia 'sotsial'nyi organizm' i ee znachenie dlia istoricheskoi nauki," *Voprosy istorii*, 1966, no. 8, pp. 88–106.

8. V.I. Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti narodov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), p. 56; Kozlov, *Etnicheskaiia demografiia* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), p. 21.

9. Iu.V. Bromlei, "Etnos i etnosotsial'nyi organizm," *Vestnik AN SSSR*, 1970, no. 8, pp. 48–54; Bromlei, *Etnos i etnografiia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), pp. 35–46; Bromlei, *Ocherki teorii etnosa* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), pp. 34–35, 63–82.

10. Bromlei, *Etnos i etnografiia*, p. 14; Bromlei, *Ocherki teorii etnosa*, pp. 33–34. See also Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti narodov*, p. 21.

11. Iu.V. Bromlei, "Chelovek v etnicheskoi (natsional'noi) sisteme," *Voprosy filosofii*, 1988, no. 7, p. 19.

12. D.S. Baldaev, *Tatuirovki zakliuchennykh* (St. Petersburg: Limbus Press, 2001), pp. 108–24. See also N.A. Mitrokhin, *Russakia partiia. Dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR, 1953–1985 gody* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003), pp. 53–61.

13. M. Agurskii, "Neonatsistskaia opasnost' v Sovetskom Soiuze," *Novyi Zhurnal* (New York), 1975, bk. 118, pp. 199–200.

14. Mitrokhin, *Russakia partiia*.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 472, 487.

16. V.A. Shnirelman, "Tsivilizatsionnyi podkhod, uchebniki istorii i 'novyi rasizm,'" in *Rasizm v iazyke sotsial'nykh nauk*, ed. V. Voronkov, O. Karpenko, and A. Osipov (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2002); *idem*, *Intellektual' labirinty* (Moscow, 2004), pp. 324–37.

17. A.G. Dugin, *Absolutnaia Rodina* (Moscow: Arktogeia-tsentr, 1999), p. 686. It is interesting how much this phrase has in common with the declaration made a

hundred years ago by the well-known racist Houston Chamberlain that “nothing seems so persuasive as race consciousness” [retranslated from Russian]. See Geoffrey Field, *Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 283.

18. See, for example, V.A. Tishkov, *Rekviem po etnosu* (Moscow: Nauka, 2003).

19. For criticism of Gumilev’s views, see V.A. Shnirelman, “Evraziitsy i evrei,” *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve*, 1996, no. 11, pp. 4–45; idem, “Lev Gumilev: ot ‘passionarnogo napriazheniia’ do ‘nesovmestimosti kul’tur,’” *Vestnik Evrazii*, 2006, no. 3, pp. 8–21; V.A. Shnirelman and S.A. Panarin, “Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev: otets etnologii?” *Vestnik Evrazii*, 2000, no. 2, pp. 5–37.

20. S.V. Kuleshov and A.N. Medushevskii, *Rossiia v sisteme mirovykh tsivilizatsii* (Moscow: Russkii mir, 2001), p. 46.

21. A.A. Danilov and L.G. Kosulina, *Istoriia gosudarstva i narodov Rossii. XIX v. Uchebnik dlia 8 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii* (Moscow: Novyi uchebnik, 2001), pp. 39, 93.

22. S.T. Zhukovskii and I.G. Zhukovskaia, *Rossiia v istorii mirovoi tsivilizatsii, IX–XX vv.* (Moscow: Shkol’naia pressa, 2000), p. 105.

23. A.I. Utkin, *Rossiia i Zapad: istoriia tsivilizatsii* (Moscow: Gardariki, 2000).

24. S.S. Neretina and A.P. Ogurtsov, *Vremia kul’tury* (St. Petersburg: Russkii Khristianskii gumanitarnyi universitet, 2000).

25. V.G. Belozerova et al., *Istoriia tsivilizatsii mira. Uchebnoe posobie dlia 10–11 klassov obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii* (Moscow/Nazran: AST, 1998), pp. 3–5.

26. I.N. Ionov, *Rossiiskaia tsivilizatsiia, IX–nachalo XX vv. Uchebnik po istorii dlia 10–11 klassov* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2003). The same ideas permeate some textbooks for higher educational institutions. See, for example, G.V. Drach, ed., *Kul’turologiia*, (Rostov-on-Don: Feniks, 1999); G.V. Drach, ed., *Kul’turologiia* (Moscow: Al’fa-M, 2003); Utkin, *Rossiia i Zapad*.

27. M.V. Ruban et al., *Istoriia Rossii i mirovye tsivilizatsii* (Moscow: Rossiiskoe pedagogicheskoe agenstvo, 1997), p. 6.

28. D.F. Aiatskov et al., *Istoriia Rossii: problemy tsivilizationnogo razvitiia* (Saratov: SGSEU, 1999), p. 24.

29. V.I. Bystrenko et al., *Istoriia Rossii X–XIX vv. Kurs lektsii* (Novosibirsk: NGAeIU, 1996), p. 5; T.V. Chernikova, *Istoriia Rossii. IX–XVI veka. 6 klass. Uchebnik dlia obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchebnykh zavedenii* (Moscow: Drofa, 2000), p. 5; A.V. Kamkin, *Istoki. Sem’ chudes Rossii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia 5 klassa* (Moscow: Tekhnologicheskaiia shkola biznesa, 2001), p. 113; V.S. Porokhnia, ed., *Rossia v mirovoi istorii* (Moscow: Logos, 2003), p. 28.

30. For more details, see V.A. Shnirelman, “Rasizm: vchera i segodnia,” *Pro et Contra*, 2005, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 41–65.

31. G.T. Tavadox, *Etнологиia* (Moscow: Proekt, 2002).

32. G. Tavadox, *Etnologiia: slovar’-spravochnik* (Moscow: Sotsial’no-politicheskii zhurnal, 1998), pp. 548–49. Typically, while denying the presence of state anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, this author does not realize that it developed in the form of anti-Zionism. In his dictionary Zionism is presented as an ideology proclaiming the “exclusiveness of the Jewish people,” and its racial and cultural superiority. See Tavadox, *Etnologiia*, pp. 26, 467. That is precisely how Soviet ideologues interpreted Zionism. It is not surprising that during the Soviet years Gamlet Tavadox was a specialist in “national relations.”

33. By cultural fundamentalism we mean the idea of culture as an exceptionally stable phenomenon supposedly endowed with eternal and invariable values that not only form people's personality but also inescapably determine their behavior and ideas throughout their life. Such an idea does not recognize the interaction of cultures, their interchange, cultural changes, or the phenomenon of biculturalism and the conditionality of cultural norms and values, which only predetermine a certain direction, while actual behavior may deviate from these norms and values in one way or another.

34. R. V. Ryvkina, *Evrei v postsovetsoi Rossii—kto oni?* (Moscow: URSS, 1996), pp. 131, 137; Ryvkina, "Evreiskii vopros' v postsovetsoi Rossii," *Segodnia*, 8 May 1996.

35. Ryvkina, *Evrei v postsovetsoi Rossii*, p. 135.

36. L. D. Gudkov, "Dinamika etnicheskikh stereotipov (sравnenie zamerov 1989 i 1994 gg.);" *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvenogo mneniia*, 1995, March–April, pp. 22–26.

37. "Shovinisty li my," *Rodina*, 1996, no. 9, pp. 15–16; M. K. Gorshkov, ed., *Rossiia na rubezhe vekov* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), p. 16.

38. *Rossiia na rubezhe vekov*, pp. 192–95.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

40. Iu. Levada, "Chelovek v poiskakh identichnosti: problema sotsial'nykh kriteriev," *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvenogo mneniia*, 1997, July–August, pp. 7–12. Ten years later, this trend has grown considerably stronger. The 1997 nationwide survey showed that by that time 33 percent of the respondents were inclined to identify themselves "by blood" (see V. V. Petukhov, "Istoricheskoe samosoznanie i natsional'nyi mentalitet rossiian," *Polis*, 2008, no. 3, p. 13). And a new survey conducted in May–June 2008 in fourteen Russian cities, covering more than 7,000 respondents, reflected a further shift in this direction: two-thirds of the respondents were inclined to identify their nationality according to their parents and their ancestors as a whole, rather than according to their language or culture (see V. A. Tishkov and V. V. Stepanov, "Kem sebja schitaiut rossiiane," in *Rossiiskaia natsiia: stanovlenie i etnokul'turnoe mnogoobrazie*, ed. V. A. Tishkov (Moscow: IEA RAN, 2008), p. 21.

41. L. D. Gudkov, "Etnicheskie stereotipy naseleniia: sravnenie dvukh zamerov," *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvenogo mneniia*, 1995, May–June, p. 15; idem, "Etnicheskie fobii v strukture natsional'noi identifikatsii," *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvenogo mneniia*, 1996, September–October, p. 24.

42. M. Deliagin, "Global'naia missiia Rossii," *Nash sovremennik*, 2004, no. 9, pp. 207–10.

43. G. Bovt, "Belye kak chernye," *Izvestia*, 5 September 2001

44. S. Khantington [Huntington], "Stolknovenie tsivilizatsii?" *Polis*, 1994, no. 1, pp. 33–48. Huntington, a political scientist, is director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, and is associated with the Owen Corporation, well known in the West for its conservative position.

45. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 264, 305.

46. S. Strokan, "Griadet li zakat Evrasii," *Itogi*, 22 October 1996, p. 38.

47. V. Vorob'ev, "Rossiia—pole bitvy tsivilizatsii," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 25 September 2001.

48. S. Kara-Murza and V. Kozhemiako, "Na sovetskom pepelishche," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 8 October 2002.
49. G. Bovt and S. Novoprudskii, "Strana-zalozhnitsa," *Izvestia*, 25 October 2002; O. Osetinskii, "Za shturm," *Izvestia*, 30 September 2002.
50. V. Aksenov, "Khvatit viliat' khvostom," *Moskovskie novosti*, 2001, no. 40; Aksenov, "Nord-Ost s iuga," *Moskovskie novosti*, 2002, no. 42.
51. A. Fetisov, "Mental'nyi konflikt s letal'nym iskhodom," *Novaia politika*, 5 April 2006, [www.novopol.ru/article7165.html](http://www.novopol.ru/article7165.html).
52. A. Kuraev, "Kak borot'sia s terrorizmom bez spetsnaza," *Izvestia*, 13 November 2002.
53. Aksenov, "Khvatit viliat' khvostom,"
54. D. Bal'burov, "Torzhestvo 'natsional'noi idei," *Moskovskie novosti*, 2002, no. 42. It seems that other national patriots also embraced such a reorientation in the 1990s. In regard to Irkutsk, see V.I. Diatlov, *Sovremennye torgovyie men' shistva: faktor stabil'nosti ili konflikta?* (Moscow: Natalis, 2000), pp. 159–60.
55. V. Iakov, "Dobro pozhalovat' von!" *Novye izvestiia*, 25 April 2002; V. Chesnokov, "Ministr prizval utopaiushchikh spasat' samikh sebja," *Novye izvestiia*, 25 April 2002; N. Ziat'kov, "Kakikh gostei zhdet Rossiia," *Argumenty i fakty*, 2002, no. 15.
56. A. Tuleev, "Zachem nam chuzhie otbrosy?" *Versii*, 2002, no. 22.
57. M. Bondarenko, "Kvot na kurorty vsem ne khvataet," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 14 October 2002.
58. "Obrazovanie—dlia gosudarstva i obshchestva," speech by the governor of Orel oblast, E.S. Strov, at the oblast conference of educators, 24 August 2004, *Obrazovanie i obshchestvo*, [www.education.rekom.ru/5\\_2004/4.html](http://www.education.rekom.ru/5_2004/4.html).
59. D. Makarov, "Migrant dlia Rossii—napast' ili blago," *Argumenty i fakty*, 2002, no. 27.
60. M. Glikin, "Mestnye pravookhranitel'nye organy zachastuu poviazany s 'trudovoi mafiei,'" *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 16 August 2002.
61. A. Dugin, "Migranty vedut sebja bezotvetstvenno," *Versii*, 2002, no. 22.
62. N.I. Kondratenko, *Khodil kazak v Kremli': razmyshleniia o bylom i nastoiashchem gubernatora Krasnodarskogo kraia* (Krasnodar: Sovetskaia Kuban', 2000), p. 37.
63. I. Bederov, "Nezakonnaia familiia," *Novaia gazeta*, 2002, no. 49; A.G. Osipov, *Ideologiiia "migratsionnoi politiki" kak element konstruirovaniia etnicheskoi konflikt-nosti* (Moscow: IES RAN, 2002), p. 36.
64. V.S. Rotov and P.E. Pridus, *Kuban': odin god c Bat'koi Kondratom i ego družinoi* (Krasnodar: Sovetskaia Kuban', 1998), pp. 274, 276.
65. E.V. Kritskii and M.V. Savva, *Krasnodarskii krai. Model' etnologicheskogo monitoringa* (Moscow: IEA RAN, 1998), pp. 36–37; V.N. Petrov, V.N. Rakachev, Ia.V. Rakacheva, and V.I. Chernyi, *Migranty v Krasnodarskom krae: problemy adaptatsii i formirovaniia tolerantnoi kul'tury* (Krasnodar: Kubanskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2002), p. 78. For more about discrimination against "immigrants" in Krasnodar krai, see Osipov, *Ideologiiia "migratsionnoi politiki,"* pp. 31–34.
66. M.V. Savva, "Mifoideologemy—znamena separatizma (na primere Severnogo Kavkaza)," *Vestnik Evrazii*, 2001, no. 3, p. 97. For more about criticism of this approach, see Osipov, *Ideologiiia "migratsionnoi politiki,"* p. 16; and his "Konstruirovaniie etnicheskogo konflikta i rasistskii diskurs," in *Rasizm v iazyke sotsial'nykh nauk*, pp. 46–50.
67. N. Panchenko, "Aleksandr Tkachev: my sami navedem poriadok v svoem

dome," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 18 September 2003. See also Kondratenko, *Khodil kazak v Kremľ*, pp. 32–41.

68. Quoted in Osipov, *Ideologiia "migratsionnoi politiki"*, p. 17. Meanwhile, "ethnic niches" in employment are a widespread phenomenon typical of numerically small ethnic groups. They are found in practically all countries that have such groups and are not considered "risk factors."

69. For details about criticism of these pronouncements by Tkachev, see Osipov, *Ideologiia "migratsionnoi politiki"*, pp. 14–19, 22–27.

70. It is true that Tkachev has recently, albeit reluctantly, admitted that what he said was incorrect: "The statements [that I made—V.Sh.] were, frankly, not entirely fitting." Meanwhile, as before, he believes that "it is not altogether a good thing when a particular nationality becomes too numerous." See S. Tur'ialai and T. Vitebskaia, "Chuzhie," *Izvestia*, 13 October 2005.

71. "Rossiiane za rozhdiaemost' i protiv immigrantov," BBC Russian.com, 1 June 2006, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid\\_5037000/5037700.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5037000/5037700.stm).

72. More than half a century ago, the French anthropologist Michel Leiris wrote, "any culture . . . is, essentially, a temporary system that has great plasticity." See M. Leiri [Leiris], "Rasa i tsivilizatsiia," in *Rasovaia problema i obshchestvo*, ed. M.S. Plisetskii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Inostrannoi literatury, 1957), p. 50.

73. G. Punanov, "Skinkhedy," *Izvestia*, 20 April 2002.

74. For more details, see V.A. Shnirelman, *Byt' alanami: intellektualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze v XX v.* (Moscow: NLO, 2006), pp. 159–70.

75. In the digest *Prigorodnyi raion: vybor tseli* (Vladikavkaz: Iriston, 1997), p. 25.

76. Sebastian Smith, *Allah's Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 112.

77. "Obrashchenie pisatelei k osetinskomu narodu," *Severnaia Osetiia*, 1 April 1993; "Otkrytoe pis'mo stareishinam ingushskogo naroda," *Severnaia Osetiia*, 9 April 1993; Ia. Tamarin and V. Zemfirov, "Istoricheskaia spravka o g. Vladikavkaze i Prigorodnom raione Severo-Osetinskoi SSR," in *V tumane nad propast'iu* (Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1994), pp. 30–31.

78. Ia.-S. Patiev, *Respublike Ingushetiia—10 let (1992–2002)* (Magas: Serdalo, 2002), p. 33.

79. M.M. Bliev, ". . . Voina est' grekh i svidetel'stvo o grekhe . . .," *Severnaia Osetiia*, 13–14 April 1993.

80. Bliev, "Kavkazskaia voina: sotsial'nye istoki, sushchnost'," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1983, no. 2; Bliev, "K probleme obshchestvennogo stroia gorskikh ('vol'nykh') obshchestv Severno-vostochnogo i Severno-zapadnogo Kavkaza XVIII–pervoi poloviny XIX veka," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1989, no. 4.

81. V.V. Degoev, "Kavkazskaia voina XIX v. i ideologicheskie kon'iunktury sovetskogo i postsovetskogo vremeni," *Rossia XXI*, 1997, nos. 11–12, pp. 41–42.

82. Bliev, "O nekotorykh problemakh prisoedineniia narodov Kavkaza k Rossii," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1991, no. 6; Bliev, "Traditsionnaia struktura chechenskogo obshchestva i fenomen rossiisko-chechenskikh konfliktov," in *Natsional'nye otmoseniia i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, ed. Kh.Kh. Khadikov (Vladikavkaz: Izdatel'stvo SOGU, 1997); Bliev, *Osetiia, Kavkaz: istoriia i sovremennost'* (Vladikavkaz: SOGU, 1999), pp. 90–106, 175–209; Bliev, *Rossia i gortsy Bol'shogo Kavkaza na puti k tsivilizatsii* (Moscow: Mysl', 2004).

83. Bliev, *Osetiia, Kavkaz*, p. 322.

84. A.A. Magometov, *Samye chuvstvitel'nye nervy (mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia i internatsional'noe vospitanie: istoriia i sovremennost'* (Vladikavkaz: Izdatel'stvo SOGU, 1998), pp. 198–200.

85. Bliev, *Osetiia, Kavkaz*, pp. 248, 264–65, 327.

86. The term “living space” [*Lebensraum*] was coined by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel and fervently received by German colonizers and racists. Today this term has been taken up by Russian skinheads. See S. Belikov, *Britogolovye* (Moscow: Nezavisimoe izdatel'stvo Pik, 2003), p. 68.

87. Bliev, “O nekotorykh problemakh,” pp. 72–75. Two problems should be distinguished: the level of social development of various North Caucasian peoples and their relationship to Russia. It is possible to agree with Bliev in regard to the former: various societies of the North Caucasus really do differ from each other socially, though not quite the way it seemed to him. However, this did not automatically determine their foreign-policy orientation.

88. He wrote, “It upsets me very much; I have not offended the peoples about whom I write. The scientific truth can arouse a trigger a wave of negative emotions.” See M.M. Bliev, V.G. Gadzhiev, and A.R. Dzhenaev, “Perevernutyi mir beskonechnoi voiny,” *Rodina*, 1994, nos. 3–4, p. 22.

89. Bliev, *Rossiia i gortsy*, pp. 43–44. Contradicting himself, Bliev later puts the whole burden of responsibility on Islam, which supposedly drew the peace-loving Chechen people into a grievous war lasting many years. He seems to forget his concept of the “raiding system,” which has nothing to do with Islam. Moreover, emphasizing “the people’s behavioral characteristics,” he does not explain why some Chechen *taip* [clans] went over to the Russian side. Bliev also imposes on nineteenth-century Chechens ideas of ethnic exclusivity messianism that are characteristic of nationalism. They could not have been present among the Chechens then, based on his own assessment of their level of development. See *ibid.*, pp. 32–33, 61–62, 796.

90. For more about this, see Z.Zh. Gakaev, “Etnicheskie stereotipy v presse (na primere osveshcheniia konflikta v Chechne),” Ph.D. diss., Moscow: IEA RAN, 2003, pp. 58, 99, 111–12, 127–30, 132, 150.

91. R.S. Bzarov, “Predislovie,” in Bliev, *Osetiia, Kavkaz*, pp. 4–5.

92. A.A. Magometov, “Izuchenie proshlogo i nastoiashchego v interesakh budushchego,” in *Natsional'nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, pp. 12, 19; Bzarov, “Predislovie,” pp. 5–6; V.V. Dogoev, “Problema Kavkazskoi voiny XIX veka: istoriograficheskie itogi,” in *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 2000, vol. 2, p. 239; Vladimir Dogoev even insists that Bliev tried to “elevate the problem of the Caucasian War from the sphere of political and ideological speculation to the realm of ‘pure’ science.” See V.V. Dogoev, *Bol'shaia igra na Kavkaze: istoriia i sovremennost'* (Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2001), p. 256.

93. Even a Russian military historian recognizes this fact. See A. Petrovich, “Kazaki i Severnyi Kavkaz,” *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 4 June 1994.

94. Bliev, “Voina est' grekh i svidetel'stvo o grekhe.”

95. Bliev, “Traditsionnaia struktura chechenskogo obshchestva”; Bliev, *Rossiia i gortsy*; A. Ataev, “Segodniashnie sobytiia—prodolzhenie Kavkazskoi voiny,” *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 23 May 2002.

96. See “Kavkaz—delo tonkoe': osetiny i imam Shamil',” *Obshchekavkazkaia gazeta*, 1999, no. 28. At the end of the 1930s, Ossetian historians did not conceal this, but later it became dangerous to talk about it. See Shnirelman, *Byt' alanami*, p. 96.

97. Known facts about the role and nature of war in traditional “pagan” so-

cieties indicate the opposite. See, for example, A.I. Pershits, Iu.I. Semenov, and V.A. Shnirelman, *Voina i mir v rannei istorii chelovechestva*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1994); Vladimir Bobrovnikov also gives examples of the cruelty of the customary laws of pre-Muslim time in Dagestan. See V.O. Bobrovnikov, *Musul' mane na Severnom Kavkaze: obychai, pravo, nasilie* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2002), p. 132.

98. V.A. Tishkov, *Obshchestvo v vooruzhennom konflikte. Etnografiia chechenskoii voiny* (Moscow: Nauka, 2001), pp. 504–6; Tishkov, “Slova i obrazy v postkonfliktnoi rekonstruktsii,” in *Chechnia: ot konflikta k stabil'nosti*, ed. D.D. Gakaev and A.D. Iandarov (Moscow: IEA, 2001), pp. 64–65.

99. L.S. Gatagova, “Severnyi Kavkaz: metamorfozy istoricheskogo soznaniia,” in *Natsional'nye istorii v sovetskom i postsovetskom gosudarstvakh*, ed. K. Aimermakher and G. Bordiugov (Moscow: AIRO-KhKh, 1999), p. 260; Gatagova, “Kavkaz posle Kavkazskoi voiny: etnokonfliktnyi aspekt,” in *Rossiia i Kavkaz skvoz' dva stoletii*, ed. G.G. Lisitsyna and Ia.A. Gordin (St. Petersburg: Zhurnal Zvezda, 2001), p. 49; Tamarin and Zemfirov, “Istoricheskaiia spravka,” pp. 37–38; F.V. Totoev, “Razmyshleniia ob ingushskom vtorzenii,” in *V tumane had propast'iu*, p. 84.

100. V. Azarov and V. Marushchenko, “Kavkaz v sostave Rossii,” *Krasnaia zvezda*, 19 January 2001; I. Rotar, *Pod zelenym znamenem. Islamskie radikaly v Rossii i SNG* (Moscow: AIRO-KhKh, 2001), p. 25.

101. L.S. Gatagova, D.I. Ismail-Zade, V.I. Kotov, A.M. Nekrasov, and V.V. Trepavlov, “Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz: 400 let voiny?” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1998, no. 5, pp. 124–25; *Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz: 400 let voiny*, ed. V.V. Trepalov (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1998), pp. 10–12, note 14; *Voina i islam na Severnom Kavkaze. XIX–XX vv.*, ed. V.V. Trepalov (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2000), p. 12; A.Iu. Skakov, “Vystuplenie na kruglom stole ‘Problemy istorii cherkesskogo naroda v svete obrashcheniia prezidenta RF El'tsina k narodam Kavkaza v sviazi s 139-letiem okonchaniem Kavkazskoi voiny,’” *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, 1999, nos. 2–3; A. Abramenko, O. Matveev, and V. Ratushniak, “Kavkazskaia voina: uroki istorii i sovremennost',” *Kubanskii novosti*, 26 May 1994; V.A. Matveev, “Istoricheskie osobennosti utverzhdeniia geopoliticheskikh pozitsii Rossii na Severnom Kavkaze: diskussionnye aspekty problemy i realii epokhi,” *Rossiia XXI*, 2002, no. 6; Matveev, *Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz: istoricheskie osobennosti formirovaniia gosudarstvennogo edinstva* (Rostov-on-Don: Rostovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2006); B.V. Vinogradov, “Ob istoricheskom prednaznachenii stroitel'stva Kavkazskoi linii,” in *Nekotorye cherty i osobennosti obreteniia i obustroistva severokavkazskoi okrainy Rossii*, ed. N.N. Velikaia and B.V. Vinogradov (Armavir, 2005).

102. G.Kh. Popov, “Razdelenie Chechni,” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 17 April 2001.

103. V.V. Trepavlov, Review of M.M. Bliiev, *Rossiia i gortsy Bol'shogo Kavkaza na puti k tsivilizatsii* (Moscow, 2004), *Voprosy istorii*, 2004, no. 9; R.S. Bzarov, Review of: M.M. Bliiev, *Rossiia i gortsy Bol'shogo Kavkaza na puti k tsivilizatsii* (Moscow, 2004), *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 2005, no. 2.

104. Gatagova, *Kavkaz posle Kavkazskoi voiny*, pp. 53–54.

105. V.I. Buganov and P.N. Zyrianov, *Istoriia Rossii. Konets XVII–XIX vv. Uchebnik dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel'nykh uchrezhdenii* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1995), p. 158; P.N. Zyrianov, *Istoriia Rossii. XIX–nachala XX vv. Uchebnaia kniga dlia 8–9 klassov srednei shkoly* (Moscow: Antikva, 1999), pp. 66–68; A.N. Bokhanov, *Istoriia Rossii. XIX–nachala XX v. Uchebnik dlia 8–9 klassov* (Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 1998), pp. 105–7; Bokhanov, *Istoriia Rossii XIX v. Uchebnik dlia 8 klassa srednikh*

*obshcheobrazovatel' nykh uchebnykh zavedenii* (Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2003), pp. 89–95; A.N. Sakharov and A.N. Bokhanov, *Istoriia Rossii XVII–XIX veka. Ucheb-nik dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel' nykh uchebnykh zavedenii* (Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2003), pp. 319–20. For more about this, see V.A. Shnirelman, “‘Patrioticheskoe vospitanie’: etnicheskie konflikty i shkol'nye uchebniki istorii,” in *Rasizm v iazyke obrazovaniia*, ed. V. Voronkov, O. Karpenko, and A. Osipov (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2008), pp. 88–111.

106. A. Kol'ev (Savel'ev), *Chechenskii kapkan* (Moscow: Kongress russkikh obshchin, 1997), pp. 260–67, 280–81, 285–86.

107. N.A. Narochnitskaia, *Pravda o Chechne* (Moscow, 2003).

108. R.A. Khanakhu and O.M. Tsvetkov, “Istoricheskii fenomen v sovremennom prelomlenii,” *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 1995, no. 11, p. 61.

109. B. Gabisov, “Paradoks ‘novykh demokratov,’” *Ingushetiia*, 5 March 1997.

110. A. Minkin, “Osobo opasnyi gosudarstvennyi prestupnik, osobo glupyi gosudarstvennyi deiatel',” *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 23 January 1996; Ryvkina, *Evrei v postsovetskoi Rossii*, p. 131.

111. For more about this, see S.A. Arutiunov, “Istoricheskaiia pamiat' Chechni,” *Novoe vremia*, 1995, no. 12, p. 14; D.D. Gakaev, *Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek)* (Moscow: Chechenskii kul'turnyi tsentr, 1997), p. 196.

112. V.M. Loginov, *Ad kriminala* (Moscow: Mistikos, 1993), p. 406.

113. G. Pogrebnoy, “Voina,” *Shpion*, 1993, no. 1, pp. 3–15; “Dokumenty iz Nazrani i Vladikavkaza,” *Shpion*, 1994, no. 2, pp. 26–27.

114. For more about this, see R.G. Abdulatipov, *Natsional'nyi vopros i gosudarstvennoe obustroistvo Rossii* (Moscow: Slavianskii dialog, 2000), p. 300; Tishkov, *Obshchestvo v vooruzhennom konflikte*, pp. 186–89; V.D. Dzidzoev, *Kavkaz kontsa XX veka: tendentsii etnopoliticheskogo razvitiia* (Vladikavkaz: Severno-Osetinskii nauchnyi tsentr, 2000), p. 257.

115. G.I. Zvereva, “Chechenskaia voina v diskursakh massovoi kul'tury Rossii,” in *Obraz vraga*, comp. L.D. Gudkov (Moscow: O.G.I., 2005), pp. 307–10.

116. See, for example, D. Ol'shanskii, “My vse—agenty spetssluzhb,” *Ingushetiia-Nauka*, 1 November 2002; G. Pomerants, “Pust' zaimutsia biznesom,” *Moskovskie novosti*, 2002, no. 42.

117. One should recall that a rare bust of Stalin in North Ossetia was in Beslan. As Andrei, Zdravomyslov rightly notes, the Ossetians themselves were “a spiritual victim of Stalinism,” expressed, in particular, in their inclination to justify deportation. See A.G. Zdravomyslov, *Osetino-ingushskii konflikt* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), pp. 38–39. In December 2005, to the bust that had been put up several years ago in Beslan a new one was added, this time in Digora. According to the *Gazeta* correspondent, there is a monument to Stalin in every gorge in North Ossetia. See D. Dzhanavaeva, “Pamiatnik osetinu Dzugaevu,” *Gazeta*, 22 December 2005.

118. V.V. Chernous, “Sotsial'no-politicheskii protsess na iuge Rossii: ot vspyshki ksenofobii k regeneratsii etnokul'turnogo vzaimodeistviia i osoznannogo edinogo grazhdanstva,” in *Ksenofobiia na iuge Rossii: separatizm, konflikty i puti ikh predoleniia*, ed. V.V. Chernous (Rostov-on-Don: SKNTs VSh, 2002).

119. R.S. Bzarov, “Sotsial'no-istoricheskie i politicheskie istoki mezhetnicheskikh otnochenii v Severnoi Osetii,” *Natsional'nye i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, p. 135.

120. Bzarov, “Sotsial'no-istoricheskie i politicheskie istoki mezhetnicheskikh otnochenii v Severnoi Osetii,” p. 137.

121. Gatagova, *Kavkaz posle Kavkazskoi voiny*, pp. 53–54.

122. T.V. Dekinova, "Etnostereotipy v polietnicheskoi srede," in *Tezisy dokladov na mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii po osetinovedeniiu, posviashchennoi 200-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia A.M. Shegrena* (Vladikavkaz: Izdatel'stvo SOGU, 1994); Dekinova, "Etnicheskie stereotipy v sisteme mezhnatsional'nykh otnoshenii v polietnicheskom regione," in *Natsional'nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, p. 204; Kh.Kh. Khadikov and T.V. Dekinova. "K voprosu o psikhologicheskom analize osetino-ingushskikh otnoshenii," in *Natsional'nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, pp. 452–54.

123. A.Kh. Magometov, *Etnicheskie i kul'turno-istoricheskie sviazi alan-osetin i ingushei* (Ordzhonikidze: Ir, 1982).

124. Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 190–91.

125. Khadikov and Dekinova, "K voprosu o psikhologicheskom analize osetino-ingushskikh otnoshenii," p. 455.

126. *Dagestan v sostave Rossii: istoricheskie korni družby narodov Rossii i Dagestana*, ed. V.G. Gadzhiev (Makhachkala: Institut IIA L Dagenstanskogo filiala AN SSSR, 1990); *Narodno-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie gortsev Dagestana i Chechni v 20–50-kh godakh XIX v.*, ed. V.G. Gadzhiev (Makhachkala: Institut istorii, arkhologii i etnografii, Institut iazyka, literatury i iskusstva, 1994); I.Ia. Kutsenko, *Kubanskoe kazachestvo* (Krasnodar: Knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1993), pp. 43, 209–28; T.Kh. Kумыков, *Vyselenie adygov v Turtsiiu—posledstvie Kavkazskoi voiny* (Nal'chik: El'brus, 1994), pp. 4–5; V.D. Dzidzoev, *Natsional'nye otnosheniia na Kavkaze* (Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1995), pp. 34–35.

127. G.G. Gamzatov, "Vosstanovit' pravdu istorii," *Dagestanskaia pravda*, 19 May 1989; Gamzatov, "Vossozdat' pravdivuiu istoriiu Kavkazskoi voiny," in *Narodno-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie gortsev Dagestana i Chechni v 20–50-kh godakh XIX v.*, pp. 53–54. See also V.Kh. Akaev and S.A. Khusainov, "K voprosu o metodologicheskoj nesostoiatel'nosti versii o 'gorskom ekspansionizme' i 'tak nazyvaemoi Kavkazskoi Voiny,'" in *Narodno-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie gortsev Dagestana i Chechni v 20–50-kh godakh XIX v.*, ch. pp. 127–28.

128. "Vystupleniia Kh.Kh. Bokova i I.Ia. Kutsenko na kruglom stole 'Problemy istorii cherkesskogo naroda v svete obrashcheniia prezidenta RF El'tsina k narodam Kavkaza v sviazi s 130-letiem okonchaniia Kavkazskoi voiny,'" *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, 1999, nos. 2–3.

129. L. Usmanov, *Nepokorennaiia Chechnia* (Moscow: Parus, 1997), pp. 58, 193–96; U. Umalotov, *Chechnia glazami chechentsa* (Moscow: Edinstvo, 2001), pp. 132–33.

130. "Klevetnikov k otvetu," *Ingushetiia*, 17 February 1998.

131. A.T. Kerashev, "Adygsкое наездничество и вопрос о природе Kavkazskoi voiny," in *Narodno-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie gortsev Dagestana i Chechni v 20–50-kh godakh XIX v.*; V.O. Bobrovnikov, *Musul'mane na Severnom Kavkaze: obychai, pravo, nasilie* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2002), pp. 25–95.

132. M.A. Mamakaev, *Chechenkii taip (rod) v period ego razlozheniia* (Groznyi: Checheno-Ingushskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1973), pp. 47–53.

133. For more details about raiding by mounted partisans [naezdnichestvo], see B.Kh. Bgazhnokov, *Ocherki etnografii obshcheniia adygov* (Nal'chik: El'brus, 1983), pp. 79–86; A.S. Mirzoev, "Institut naezdnichestva 'ZekLue' u adygov (cherkessov) v XVIII–pervoi polovine XIX vekov," Ph.D. diss., Moscow, 1998.

134. For more about this, see B.A. Kaloiev, *Zapiski kavkazoveda* (Vladikavkaz: Zond, 2002), p. 406.

135. See, for example, V.Kh. Akaev, *Sufizm i vakhkhbizm na Severnom Kavkaze* (Moscow: IEA RAN [Issledovaniia po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii, no. 127], 1999), p. 21; See also Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 43–45.

136. A. Tsariev, "Slovo dokumentam ili kto est' kto," in *V tumane had propast' iu*, p. 58. See also Loginov, *Ad kriminala*, p. 406.

137. S.P. Bugaeva, "Natsional'no-etnicheskie otnosheniia v massovom soznanii rossiiian (*regional'nyi aspekt*)," in *Natsional'nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, pp. 189–90.

138. David Lowenthal, "Identity, Heritage and History," in *Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John Gillis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 46; Rupert Brown, *Prejudice: Its Social Psychology* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 98–99.

139. Andrew Spiegel, "Struggling with Tradition in South Africa: The Multivocality of Images of the Past," in *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power*, ed. George C. Bond and Angela Gilliam (London: Routledge, 1994).

140. S.I. Efendiev, "Kul'turno-istoricheskie traditsii gorskikh narodov i problema stabilizatsii mezhnatsional'nykh otnoshenii," *Natsional'nye otnosheniia i mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*, pp. 159–60.

141. S.M. Chervonnaia, "Karachaevo-balkarskii mir Severnogo Kavkaza: sovremennaia etno-politicheskaia situatsiia," *As-Alan*, 1999, no. 1, pp. 93–95.

142. T. Muzaev, *Etnicheskii separatizm v Rossii* (Moscow: Panorama, 1999), pp. 138–39; B.A. Laipanova, A.-A.A. Kecherukov, and K.I. Chomaev, "Zaiavlenie," *As-Alan*, 2001, no. 1, p. 181.

143. M. Fatullaev, "Cherkesy podaiut na razvod," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 25 September 2001.

144. L.L. Khoperskaia, *Faktory sotsial'no-politicheskoi stabil'nosti i strategii bezopasnosti na Severnom Kavkaze* (Rostov-on-Don: Izdatel'stvo Severo-Kavkazskoi akademii gosudarstvennoi sluzhby, 2000), p. 14.

145. "Rossiiane i 'inorodtsy': tolerantnost' ili ksenofobiia?" *IA Marketing i konsalting*, 16 November 2004, [www.iamik.ru/18772.html](http://www.iamik.ru/18772.html); "Za kulisami natsionalizma i ksenofobii," *IA Marketing i konsalting*, 12 August 2005, [www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=22946](http://www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=22946); D.V. Polikanov, "Srabotaet li novaia migratsionnaia politika?" *RIA Novosti*, 26 May 2005.

146. A. Golov, "Massovoe vospriiatie natsional'nykh men'shinstv: peremeny za god," *Levada-tsentri*, 14 December 2005, <http://levada.ru/press/2005121400.html>.

147. E.A. Pain, *Etnologicheskii maianik* (Moscow: Institut sotsiologii RAN, 2004), p. 185.

148. L. Gudkov, "Ksenofobiia kak problema: vchera i segodnia," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 26 December 2005.

149. L. Byzov, "Natsionalizm ostaetsia udelom marginalov," *Izvestia*, 20 September 2005.

150. L. Borduk, "Patriotizm kak ksenofobiia (Rezul'taty oprosa molodykh moskvichei)," *Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia. Dannye. Analiz. Diskussii*, 2004, no. 6, pp. 58–70; Liubov' Borysiak, "Molodye moskvichi perestaiut stydit'sia lozunga 'Rossiia dlia russkikh!'" *IATs "SOVA"*, 7 April 2005, <http://xeno.sova-center.ru/45A2A39/53CFE71/>.

151. L. Byzov, "'Russkaia tema'—dopolnenie k idee poriadka i spravedlivosti," *Novaia gazeta*, 2004, no. 75.

152. L. Gudkov and B. Dubin, "Svoeobrazie russkogo natsionalizma," *Pro et Contra*, 2005, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 18.

153. This explains why, in the public consciousness, the non-Russian peoples of Russia have recently begun to fall into the category of "foreigners." For more about this, see V.A. Shnirelman, "Ksenofobiia, novyi razizm i puti ikh preodoleniia," *Gumanitarnaia mysl' iuga Rossii*, 2005, no. 1, p. 16; G. Kozhevnikova, "Rossiiskie SMI kak instrument pooshchreniia ksenofobnykh nastroenii," in *Monitoring diskriminatsii i natsional-ekstremizma v Rossii*, comp. Iu. Bashinova and N. Taubina (Moscow: Fond Za grazhdanskoe obshchestvo, 2006), pp. 60–61.

154. In particular, a visitor now does not see a single exhibit there that mentions the Kazan Khanate. There is also nothing there on the formerly popular topic of the "reunification of Russia with Ukraine."

155. K. Veretennikova, "Ekstremizm bez granits," *Vremia novosti*, 29 June 2006.

### Editor's notes

a. "National character" retained its charm as an explanatory concept in Russia long after it had gone out of fashion in the United States. For a perceptive and humorous interpretation of this history, see Sergei Arutiunov, "Penetrating Views of Russian Culture," in M. Mead, G. Gorer, and J. Richman, *Russian Culture*, rev. ed. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001).

b. The All-Russia Center for Public-Opinion Research (VTsIOM) was founded by the late dean of sociology Yuri Levada. At the time discussed, this center was the leading independent survey research institution of the country, but during the first Vladimir Putin administration its name was taken over by a government sponsored center. In self-defense, Levada named his own organization for himself, to distinguish the two operations.

c. For more on the tragic history of this thrice-exiled "punished people," whose original homeland was in Georgia, see Donald A. Ranard, ed., *Mesketian Turks: An Introduction to Their History, Culture and Resettlement Experiences* (Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics, 2006).

d. The Vainakh peoples are Chechens and Ingush. See for contrast Nicholas Griffin, *Mountain Men and Holy Wars* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003); Matthew Evangelista *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002); James Hughes, *Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

e. For subtleties of heroic raiding in defense of one's people, see Rebecca Gould, "Transgressive Sanctity: The Abrek in Chechen Culture," *Kritika*, 2007, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 271–306. See also anthropologist Bruce Grant, *The Captive and the Gift: Cultural Histories of Sovereignty in Russia and the Caucasus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

f. For perspective, see the superb film by Jonathan Sanders for CBS: "Beslan: Three Days in September," 2005.

g. Shamil, who fought a long-term war of attrition against the Russians in the early nineteenth century in the North Caucasus, is sometimes credited as one of the first guerilla fighters in history. While many misidentify him as Chechen, he was Avar. Complexities of Shamil's politics, relations with religious followers, and legacies are constantly debated. See Austin Jersild, "The Chechen Wars in Historical Perspective,"

*Slavic Review*, 2004, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 367–77; Yuri Karpov, “Images of Violence in Modern and Recent History of the Peoples of the North Caucasus,” *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia*, 2003, vol. 41, no. 4 (Spring), pp. 8–44; Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Firouzeh Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006). For a creative, vivid perspective, see the famous novel by Paul Chavchavadze, *The Mountains of Allah* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1952).

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