Transformation of the Conflict Field in Abkhazia: Contemporary Politics and Historical Context, by Sergey Markedonov

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2024, vol. 68, no. 12, pp. 111-121

Originally published in Russian [Трансформация конфликтного поля в Абхазии: современная политика и исторический контекст], this article has been translated into English by AbkhazWorld. The full article in PDF can be downloaded by clicking here.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONFLICT FIELD IN ABKHAZIA: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Sergey M. MARKEDONOV, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University, 76, Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation.

Abstract. This article proposes a new approach to examining the genesis and dynamics of conflicts in Abkhazia. In accordance with the theoretical constructs of P. Bourdieu, the author explores the Abkhaz case as a conflict field. This is presented as an interplay of interaction, competition, and confrontation among various actors from the mid-19th to the first quarter of the 21st century. In the author's view, the conflict field in Abkhazia is not synonymous with the Georgian-Abkhaz confrontation during the Soviet collapse, the disintegration of the Russian Empire, or the confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West for dominance in the South Caucasus. The author identifies several turning points in the formation of the Abkhaz conflict field. These are linked to the radical reconfiguration of the regional order, shifts in the ethno-demographic balance, national self-determination, and the competition between different state projects for dominance over Abkhaz territory. The article traces the interconnections between the changing regional order in the Caucasus in the mid- to late 19th century, the Georgian-Abkhaz ethnopolitical conflict, and the development of Abkhazia as a partially recognised entity under Russian military and political patronage.

Keywords: conflict field, Abkhazia, Russia, Georgia, nationalism, secession, Muhajirism, identity, South Caucasus, self-determination.

CAUCASIAN TURBULENCE AND ABKHAZ CONFLICT DYNAMICS

In the final years of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus became one of the most turbulent and insecure regions in Eurasia. The majority of conflicts that accompanied the collapse of the once-unified state occurred precisely in the Caucasus region [1]. It was also here that a record number of de facto entities emerged (until 2014, more than half of the total number of post-Soviet republics with "problematic" sovereignty). The ethnopolitical dynamics in the Caucasus largely became a model for other regions of the former USSR. Conflicts in various parts of the South Caucasus vividly demonstrated that the division of the "Soviet heritage" based on the principle of uti possidetis juris—that is, demarcation strictly in accordance with the borders of the union republics—is difficult to implement in practice. It was in the Caucasus region that a precedent was set for the international legitimisation of former Soviet autonomous entities [2]. However, another precedent was later established here—the elimination of a secessionist (irredentist) project and the successful restoration of a state's territorial integrity [3].

The turbulence of the South Caucasus has contributed to the active involvement of external actors in regional processes [4]. The internationalisation of the conflicts here was not limited to a local remake of the Cold War in the form of a confrontation between Russia and the West. Turkey, Iran, China, India, and other actors also articulated their interests in the Caucasus, which did not always and in every respect coincide with the approaches of Moscow, Washington, and Brussels [5]. And although the Caucasus region was overshadowed by Ukraine with the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas in 2014, the events of 2020-2023 in Nagorno-Karabakh once again raised its international significance. Today, we are witnessing the formation of a new regional status quo, where some familiar alliances (Russia-Armenia, NATO-Georgia) are experiencing crises, while others (Turkey-Azerbaijan), on the contrary, are significantly strengthening [5].

Against this backdrop, the situation in and around Abkhazia appears, at first glance, static. After Russia recognised its independence on 26 August 2008, and the republic's elites and population received reliable security guarantees and prospects for economic recovery from Moscow, the Russian Federation's influence here has strengthened considerably. Official Tbilisi has abandoned the practical implementation of revanchist ideas, that is, the "restoration of territorial integrity" through military operations. The West, although not recognising the "new normality", has, in effect, acquiesced to Abkhazia's "special status". The Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia was de facto frozen, long before the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. Thus, the military-political balance of power that emerged in this part of the Caucasus in 2008 has become thoroughly "cemented".

However, it would be incorrect to equate today's Abkhaz stability with a full-fledged peaceful settlement. Firstly, Georgia does not consider the issue of Abkhazia's status to be definitively resolved against its favour. Secondly, Tbilisi's claims are still supported by the overwhelming majority of UN member states (including not only countries defined by the Russian authorities as unfriendly, but also important partners of Moscow such as China, India, and Iran). Thirdly, the diversification of Georgia's foreign policy and Tbilisi's refusal to "open a second front" against Moscow amidst the escalating confrontation between Russia and the West leave certain opportunities for Georgian-Russian normalisation. This is especially so given that Moscow, after several years of a near-complete "freeze" in bilateral relations, decided to abolish visas for Georgian citizens, resume direct flights, and remove Georgia from the list of countries not recommended for travel.

Evidently, if the Georgian-Russian "détente" gains momentum, the question of determining Abkhazia's status will inevitably become a priority topic in the dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi, and in the future, it cannot be ruled out that it will also feature in discussions between Russia and the West. Consequently, the issue of a possible geopolitical "deal" between the Russian Federation and Georgia at Abkhazia's expense, aimed at strengthening Moscow's position in the South Caucasus, could be revived.

However, conflict resolution in Abkhazia cannot be reduced to the format of Russian-Georgian relations, nor to "grand geopolitics". Within Abkhaz society and its political establishment, we are observing a serious reprioritisation. The focus of public debate is not the struggle for self-determination from Georgia, but the "price" of building an asymmetric strategic alliance between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia. The key issues are Russian access to Abkhaz resources, the formulation and adoption of political and administrative decisions on matters of mutual interest, and the equality of the allies. Within this discussion, historical subjects are also being reinterpreted (the incorporation of Abkhazia into the Russian state, the Lykhny Uprising of 1866, Muhajirism). The interest in them is dictated less by academic reasons and more by socio-political ones. Today's ethno-demographic problems are interpreted primarily as the long-term negative consequences of the Caucasian War and the many years of Russian-Turkish confrontation in the region [6].

Today, within the Abkhaz establishment (both in power and in opposition) and society, there is no competition between "geopolitical projects", and the pro-Russian choice unites even the fiercest opponents, such as President A.G. Bzhaniya and his predecessor R.D. Khajimba. However, complex collisions do exist in the relations between Russia and Abkhazia. They manifest themselves primarily in the search for and determination of optimal models for the republic's post-conflict development and concern a wide range of issues, from dual citizenship to Russian access to Abkhaz land ownership [7].

In this context, a new explanatory model of conflict dynamics in Abkhazia is urgently needed—one that extends beyond the chronological framework of the late Soviet period and the first post-Soviet years to cover the period from the mid-19th century to the present day. The large-scale socio-political transformations in the late USSR sharpened discussions about the national-state self-determination of the Georgian SSR and intensified contradictions between the leadership of Georgia and Abkhazia, and between the union centre and Tbilisi. The collapse of the unified state effectively left the Georgian and Abkhaz sides face-to-face, without a moderator in the form of a central government that had for many years maintained a fragile status quo in the region.

Meanwhile, all the main issues on the conflict agenda (language and settlement policy, ethnic representation in government, the legal status of the autonomous entity within the union republic) were formulated long before Gorbachev's perestroika, as evidenced by the regular gatherings, protest actions, and petition campaigns that took place in the 1930s-1970s in Sukhum, Tbilisi, and other settlements of the Abkhazian ASSR and the Georgian SSR [8]. But even these contradictions did not ripen overnight. Discourses of "one's own" ideal Abkhazia (radically opposite in content) were being formed as early as the beginning of the last century. The revolutionary upheavals across the Russian Empire, followed by its collapse, facilitated the transition of latent conflicts into open armed confrontations for ethno-national self-determination.

Yet even the aforementioned discourses did not form in a vacuum. They were significantly influenced by the end of the Russo-Ottoman rivalry for the Caucasus and the integration of the Abkhazian Principality into the Russian state. It was then, from the mid-19th to the early 20th century, that the ethnic composition of Abkhazia underwent significant changes [9]. With the collapse of the Russian Empire, which, like the USSR later, had acted as an arbiter in inter-ethnic disputes, the existing contradictions erupted into open conflict. Only the "Sovietisation" of the South Caucasus led to a new "general demarcation" in the region, which ensured a political-legal and military-political status quo for nearly seven decades. However, even this balance of power was far from satisfactory for everyone. With the weakening and subsequent disintegration of the union state, latent problems and contradictions came to the surface.

Thus, we consider it necessary to trace the relationship between the geopolitical reconfiguration of the Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century, the various phases of the Georgian-Abkhaz ethnopolitical conflict during the periods of imperial and Soviet collapse, and the modern stage of Abkhazia's national-state self-determination under Russian patronage. The main research question of our article can be formulated as follows: how and why did various interstate and inter-ethnic confrontations on the territory of modern Abkhazia—differing in nature, origin, intensity, and composition of participants—form a common conflict field? Answering this question would allow for a better understanding of the unique situation in Abkhazia in comparison with other conflicts in the South Caucasus.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH

The political history of Abkhazia and the current processes in the partially recognised republic are supported by an impressive academic historiography, not to mention numerous expert and analytical reports. At first glance, this subject seems to have been thoroughly studied, and discovering new research niches appears to be a challenging task. At the same time, the vast majority of academic works on the Abkhaz issue are distributed across various disciplinary areas (history, ethnology and ethnopolitical science, international relations and international law) or focus on narrow chronological periods. As a consequence, a research phenomenon has emerged, which the American conflict theorist J. David Singer (1925-2009) defined as the predominance of "detail" over "system", and empirics over generalisations and synthesis [10].

We can identify a number of fundamental historical studies dedicated to the incorporation of Abkhazia into the Russian state, the genesis of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and Soviet nationality policy in the Georgian SSR and the Abkhazian ASSR [8, 11, 12, 13]. Special mention must be made of the collective academic monograph The Abkhazians, specifically devoted to the ethnic history of this people, as well as the ethnopolitical processes on the territory of modern Abkhazia [14]. A separate body of work is dedicated to the genesis of post-Soviet Abkhaz de facto statehood, the prospects for its international legitimisation, and the impact of external forces on internal political processes in Abkhazia from 1991 to the present day [15, 16, 17, 18]. Consequently, the study of conflict dynamics in Abkhazia requires interdisciplinary systematisation, overcoming the chronological and disciplinary barriers that have developed in the scholarly literature.

In our article, we base our approach on the theory of the field, presented by the French thinker P. Bourdieu (1930-2002) in his research on the sociology of politics and culture. He proposed viewing the social world as a multidimensional space. According to Bourdieu, each of its dimensions (economic, political, cultural) can be represented as a specific field of interacting actors, as a particular site of relations and "a struggle aimed at transforming these relations, and therefore, a site of continuous change". The structure of a field, according to Bourdieu, is the balance of power "between the agents engaged in the struggle" [19, p. 75].

The working hypothesis of our article is based on the assumption that the conflict field in Abkhazia is not synonymous with the Georgian-Abkhaz confrontation during the Soviet collapse or the disintegration of the Russian Empire. Still less should it be interpreted as a fragment of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. The Abkhaz conflict field emerged before the nationalist discourse became established in the Caucasus; its origins should be sought in the struggle between the two largest empires of Eurasia—the Ottoman and the Russian—for dominance in the Black Sea region.

It was then that many of the problematic knots, which remain relevant today, were tied. For instance, any discussion today about Abkhaz national and foreign policy identity is built around the problems of ethno-demographic security. Hence the alarmism characteristic of many statements (the so-called "curse of eighteen per cent"). According to the last All-Union census of 1989, ethnic Abkhazians constituted about 18% of the total population of the Abkhazian ASSR within the Georgian SSR. The origins of this problem are directly linked to the change in the ethnic composition of Abkhazia after the abolition of the Abkhazian Principality (1864), the Lykhny Uprising (1866), and the beginning of active settlement and economic development of this land. All these processes, both individually and collectively, were intertwined with the establishment of irreconcilable nationalist narratives and notions of collective ethnic ownership of "one's own Abkhazia" [8, 9, 14, 16, 17].

Consequently, the Abkhaz conflict field is considerably broader, both in its composition of actors and in the number of disputes, contradictions, and confrontations that have arisen. It is, in fact, composed of several conflicts, each with its own logic. But at certain points, different conflict lines intersect and overlap. Contradictions that arose in one historical epoch, with a specific set of problems, adversaries, and allies, have a direct or indirect impact on the genesis of subsequent conflicts.

In the formation of the Abkhaz conflict field, we identify five turning points. The first is the end of Ottoman dominance in the Caucasus and the establishment of Russian hegemony, which made possible the incorporation of Abkhazia into Russia. The second is the collapse of the Russian Empire, the emergence of the first Transcaucasian nation-states, and the conflict of ethno-national self-determinations. The third is the process of Sovietisation, which dialectically combined internationalist and nationalising practices. The fourth is the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of independent nation-states from its fragments. The main problem on this path was the question of the limits of self-determination. Should it be confined to the principle of uti possidetis juris or, on the contrary, extend not only to former union republics but also to autonomous entities? The fifth is Russia's recognition of Abkhazia's independence and the emergence of a new dilemma: upholding its own distinct national statehood under Moscow's patronage or slow but steady integration into the Russian Federation.

The history of the Abkhaz conflict field is a constant succession of state sovereignties over the disputed territory, changing statuses, loyalties, identities, and political alliances. While for the Russian Empire, for several decades, the Abkhaz were a "guilty people" and the Georgian nobility and colonists were seen as allies and conductors of its influence, for today's Russian Federation, Abkhazia is a strategic partner. At the same time, throughout the post-Soviet period, relations between Moscow and Sukhum have not been a constant; they have experienced ups and downs, determined by at least three factors: security within Russia's North Caucasian republics, the dynamics of relations between Russia and Georgia, and between Russia and the West [17, 20].

However, the territory of Abkhazia has never been merely an arena for the rivalry of various external actors. Abkhaz state formations, which existed in various forms (the Abkhazian Principality, the Abkhazian ASSR, a de facto independent republic without recognition, and a partially recognised state with disputed sovereignty), have always laid claim to their own agency, defending it in various political-legal and military-political forms.

Thus, in Abkhazia, for the last century and a half, we have observed the existence of a stable conflict field. The ethnic composition of the country changes, some actors (conflicting parties) disappear and new ones appear, and different subjects of dispute and conflict arise. At the same time, newly emerging conflicts often grow out of previously unresolved problems and unhealed ethnic and national traumas. As a result, instead of resolving old conflicts, they are transformed. And for many years, this conflictual interaction has been realised outside of clearly established state borders that are accepted by all interested actors.

BETWEEN IMPERIAL FRACTURES AND THE SOVIET COLLAPSE

In our study, we take the 1860s as the starting point for the formation of the conflict field in Abkhazia. During this period, significant geopolitical reconfigurations took place in the Caucasus, which determined the development trajectories of this region for decades to come. The three-century-long dominance of the Ottoman Empire came to an end, replaced by the hegemony of Russia. After the victorious conclusion of the Caucasian War (despite all its costs), the Russian Empire managed to unite both the North and South Caucasus under its rule. For the first time in history, the Abkhaz elites and the Abkhaz people found themselves under Russian sovereignty. In the mid-1860s, "the territory of modern Abkhazia (with Samurzakani and Sukhum)" was formed [21, p. 399]. From that time on, the Russia factor (in its various forms of statehood) became one of the defining ones for Abkhazia and the Abkhaz, although at different stages, Russian-Abkhaz relations developed "in a very complicated and at times ambiguous manner" [7, p. 451]. It was Russia's actions—ranging from suppressing uprisings and imposing sanctions to providing military-political support and recognising national independence—that were decisive for the fate of Abkhazia.

In the 1860s-1870s, a radical change occurred in the ethno-demographic situation, which had a most significant impact on the formation of the Abkhaz conflict field. About 80,000 ethnic Abkhaz left their historical homeland [12; 21, pp. 402-403]. For the Abkhaz national historico-political narrative, the events of the 1860s-1870s are comparable in their emotional and psychological impact only to the armed conflict with Georgia in 1992-1993. The tragedy of Muhajirism (the mass exile of Caucasian peoples to the Ottoman Empire) was a subject of constant reflection throughout the Soviet period, both within the party elite of Abkhazia (even the charismatic first chairman of the Abkhaz Council of People's Commissars, N.A. Lakoba (1893-1936), spoke on this topic) and among the intelligentsia. All well-known public appeals from the republic's intellectuals to Moscow (1977, 1988), alongside criticism of manifestations of "Georgian chauvinism", invariably raised the "Muhajir issue" [18, pp. 160-162]. In March 1993, while the armed conflict with Georgia had not yet ended and the Abkhaz capital Sukhum had not been liberated from Georgian troops, the State Committee of Abkhazia for Repatriation was established. And although today both pro-government and opposition Abkhaz political elites speak of Russia as a strategic ally of the republic, and its entry into the Union State of the Russian Federation and Belarus is being discussed at the highest level, the 21st of May is commemorated every year in Abkhazia as the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Caucasian War. The repatriation of Abkhaz descendants of the Muhajirs in the post-Soviet period did not become a mass phenomenon, but the issue remains a relevant political topic.

Furthermore, the sharp change in the ethno-demographic balance in Abkhazia, coinciding with the abolition of serfdom in the empire as a whole and in the Caucasus in particular, made it possible to solve the problem of land scarcity for Georgian peasants by resettling them in the deserted territories. It should be clarified at once: we do not consider the politicised nationalist view of Georgians as "outsiders" and "newcomers" in Abkhazia to be scientifically correct. They have long constituted a significant part of this country's population, especially in Samurzakani [21]. But the Georgian settlement of Abkhaz lands in the 1890s-early 1900s had a number of fundamental differences. First and foremost, it took place against the backdrop of the active spread of nationalist sentiments among the Georgian nobility and intelligentsia.

The formation of Abkhaz nationalism occurred with a certain developmental lag due to two basic reasons. First of all, the social factor played a role: the Georgian population was more urbanised and at that time had a higher level of education. It is also worth noting that the Tiflis and Kutais governorates (which became the territorial basis of the future Georgian state) ranked highest among all territories of the Russian Empire in terms of the proportion of the nobility in the population, but their economy did not provide sufficient income [8]. As a consequence, the theme of Georgian "specialness" outside the imperial project became more salient.

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, three problematic knots had been tied in the Abkhaz conflict field: the first between the Russian authorities and the Abkhaz, the second Georgian-Abkhaz, and the third Russian-Georgian. For most of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Georgian elites were the main conductors of Russia's interests in the Caucasus. However, as nationalist sentiments strengthened in their ranks, the situation began to change. On the Abkhaz front, the imperial authorities took the opposite path: a shift from discriminatory measures to integration (lifting the collective guilt from the Abkhaz, their recruitment into military service). Subsequently, these three groups of contradictions would either be actualised to the point of escalating into conflicts, or, conversely, be transformed in a positive direction. But it is they that would determine the main trends in the changing structure of the conflict field in Abkhazia right up to the present day.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, the interests of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Soviet Russia, and the "White movement" of the Russian South, led by General A.I. Denikin, clashed in Abkhazia [13]. For the first time, Abkhazia became part of a national entity rather than imperial projects, an entity in which ethnic Abkhaz were not the "state-forming" people.

The Sovietisation of the Caucasus contributed to a significant transformation of the Abkhaz conflict field. On the one hand, it led to the liquidation of the first post-imperial national state formations, but on the other hand, they were given a new political life in the form of union and autonomous republics of the USSR. And in these new realities, Georgia received a higher status compared to Abkhazia, which lost the struggle for the right to be a separate subject of the Union.

The response to the nationality policy of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was the emergence of a special version of Abkhaz nationalism, in which the struggle for "one's own land" against the encroachments of "Georgian chauvinists" was bizarrely intertwined with appeals to "internationalism". This is explained by the fact that the Abkhaz national movement lacked a strong external patron with whom it could attempt to jointly implement an irredentist project. Bolshevik Russia (and later the USSR), for all its potential costs, was seen by Abkhaz intellectuals as a guarantor of the preservation of their national identity within a republic with a different "titular nation". Subsequently, another paradox of the Abkhaz nationalist discourse was the combination of "Russophilia" (throughout the 1930s-1980s, Abkhaz elites repeatedly voiced demands for the transfer of the Abkhazian ASSR from Soviet Georgia to the RSFSR) with a rejection of the policies of the Russian Empire [14, 15, 16, 18].

During the Soviet period, the Georgian-Abkhaz confrontation moved to the centre of the conflict field in Abkhazia. However, in the new socio-economic and political-legal reality, the most acute problem here remained the ethno-demographic balance. The nationality policy in the Georgian SSR, like the Soviet course at the all-Union level, cannot be reduced to a common denominator. In Soviet Georgia, we see adherence to certain general priorities, with adjustments for local specifics. Thus, in the 1920s and early 1930s, the practices of korenizatsiya (nativisation) and attempts to rely on the interests of small peoples came to the fore, whereas from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, a tendency towards unification became more noticeable. In Abkhazia during this period, the transfer of the Abkhaz alphabet to Georgian script was recorded, as well as the introduction of teaching in Abkhaz schools in Georgian, significant toponymic changes, the "Georgianisation" of memory politics (the famous work of the philologist and historian P.I. Ingorokva (1893-1983) on the ethnogenesis of the Abkhaz), and the mass resettlement of Georgians from the regions of "core Georgia" [8, 14].

It should be noted that all these actions by the Georgian leadership were not exclusively nationalising practices. Often (especially in the case of industrialisation and the development of the agricultural sector) they were dictated by economic considerations, primarily a simple shortage of labour [8]. But in combination with discriminatory actions in the spheres of language, mnemonic policy, and education, they had a multiplying effect. Therefore, attempts to soften the harsh measures during the "Thaw" and the "Era of Stagnation" (when "excesses" in the "Abkhaz question" were officially acknowledged) failed to reverse the negative trends. And the fact that the proportion of Abkhaz fell from 80% to 18% between 1801 and 1989 (although their absolute number increased from 60,000 to 93,000 people), while the proportion of Georgians grew from 20% to 46% at the time of the collapse of the unified Soviet state, helps us to better understand the level of political radicalisation of the two communities [9; 21, p. 402]. The negative demographic trend for the Abkhaz, which had begun in the pre-revolutionary period, not only did not reverse during the Soviet era but continued.

THE CONFLICT FIELD AND THE DILEMMAS OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The collapse of the Soviet Union became a new point of transformation for the Abkhaz conflict field. The unified sovereignty over the South and North Caucasus was destroyed, and national self-determination did not proceed in accordance with the borders that had been established during the existence of the USSR. This concerned not only Georgia but also Russia. Ethno-territorial separatism within the Russian Federation became an important factor influencing Russia's approaches to the Caucasus direction in general, and to Abkhazia in particular.

The main conflict trend in post-Soviet Abkhazia was, undoubtedly, the confrontation between the new independent Georgian state and the Abkhaz movement, which attempted to carry out secession based on the power infrastructure of the former autonomy. Subsequently, the secessionist entity would transform into a stable de facto state, which would withstand several powerful stress tests, ranging from sanctions to attempts at an armed "unfreezing" of the conflict, and would receive limited international legitimisation. At the same time, post-Soviet Georgia would travel a difficult path from virtual state failure to internal stabilisation, but now without the "encumbrance" of rebellious regions.

As a result of the military confrontation in the early 1990s, the Abkhaz national movement managed, for the first time in the last century and a half, to secure an ethno-demographic balance favourable to the "titular nation". However, Georgia (and its allied states) are not prepared to recognise these realities, seeing them as manifestations of ethnocracy. Tbilisi insists on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons of Georgian nationality to their pre-war places of residence [14, 15, 21].

Russia's recognition of Abkhaz independence in August 2008 would place Moscow's "revisionism" at the centre of discussions about the post-Soviet Caucasus. It would overshadow the complexity and ambiguity of Russia's actions on the Abkhaz front in the 1990s and early 2000s. It should be noted, however, that both Sukhum (and in 1992-1993, Gudauta) and Moscow travelled a long road to overcome mutual distrust and phobias. By the time of the USSR's collapse, the Abkhaz movement perceived the leadership of the Russian Federation as an actor unwilling to play the role of mediator in relations with Tbilisi, as the union centre had done. The reason for this was the acute conflict between the leadership of the USSR and the RSFSR in 1990-1991. As a consequence, Sukhum emphasised increasing cooperation with the North Caucasian national movement within the framework of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, while the Russian Federation sought to mitigate the negative consequences of the Soviet collapse by recognising the "Belovezh" realities (demarcation based on the principle of uti possidetis juris), and thus Georgia within the borders of the GSSR.

All this led to the formation of a "multi-polar" policy by Moscow towards both Georgia and Abkhazia (support for Tbilisi from the Russian executive branch and pro-Abkhaz sentiments among the deputy corps and the military) [22, p. 209]. In many respects, these trends predetermined the imposition of Russian sanctions against Abkhazia (de facto in December 1994, de jure in January 1996; the last restrictions would be lifted only in the spring of 2008), as well as attempts at diplomatic coercion of Sukhum towards integration into the Georgian state on special terms. In this context, it is particularly important to note the "common state" project, proposed in 1997 but never implemented in practice.

However, by the early 2000s, this trend in Russian policy had undergone significant changes. Firstly, a certain stabilisation in the North Caucasus played its role. The containment of separatist threats within the Russian Federation gave Moscow a free hand on the external front. Secondly, the rapprochement between Georgia and the West had an effect, sharply intensifying after Tbilisi's unsuccessful attempts to break the status quo in Abkhazia by military means in the spring and summer of 1998. These changes contributed to a noticeable transformation of the Abkhaz conflict field. The desire of the Georgian leadership to resolve the issue of restoring "territorial integrity" within the 1989 borders of the GSSR by relying on external forces (the USA, NATO, the European Union) contributed to the strengthening of the alliance between the Russian Federation and the two de facto republics that had survived the flames of the armed confrontations of the 1990s. In the event of the West's refusal to intervene directly in the conflicts, Tbilisi had no chance of success in a one-on-one confrontation with Moscow. Therefore, attempts to "unfreeze" the confrontation with Abkhazia, undertaken in 2001 and then in 2006-2008, did not strengthen but only weakened Georgia's position in the Abkhaz conflict field.

Meanwhile, Moscow's decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia (as well as South Ossetia) was postponed for several years, even when it became clear that Georgia was increasing its contacts with NATO and the EU and setting Euro-Atlantic, rather than Eurasian, integration as a strategic goal. In many respects, this step became a kind of "last argument of kings" after Tbilisi decided to accelerate the "gathering of lands" by military means.

Moscow's actions contributed to a significant reconfiguration of the Abkhaz conflict field. Elements of armed confrontation gave way to political-legal, politico-economic, and diplomatic issues. The question of military revenge by Georgia lost its relevance. Albeit in a limited form, the process of international legitimisation of Abkhazia was launched. True, in this case, Russia itself faced difficult dilemmas. After all, if the process of recognising the republic had received additional impetus, the Russian Federation would have deprived itself of its position as the exclusive ally and, in essence, the military-political patron of Sukhum. It would have had to compete with other projects offered to the Abkhaz side. As a consequence, there was considerable scepticism regarding proposals from the European Union or Georgia for "engagement without recognition".

Since 2008, background factors have begun to exert a significant influence on the Abkhaz conflict field. The situation on the borders with Georgia was stabilised and ceased to pose any significant threat. Russia's military-political presence on the territory of the republic, as well as the process of its economic recovery, became reliable guarantees against a revision of the status quo. But the growing confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West, as well as the Ukrainian crisis, have made Abkhazia much more closely linked to (and dependent on) Moscow than it was before its recognition [23].

At first glance, such conclusions are not without certain grounds. Over the past decade and a half, Russia has increased its presence in the republic not only in the military-political sphere but also in the socio-economic one. It also plays the role of mediator during internal crises and confrontations. However, upon closer examination, we can also see the preservation of a significant degree of political autonomy. For instance, the issue of access for Russian citizens to Abkhaz real estate has still not been definitively resolved. Citizenship of the republic, unless it concerns ethnic Abkhaz (Abaza), is also not automatically granted to Russians. It is worth noting that any document concerning bilateral relations is actively discussed by politicians and public figures, and is subjected to numerous amendments and adjustments. In 2023-2024, the most heated debates in society and among political elites were caused by the draft laws "On Non-Profit Organisations and Individuals Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent", "On Regulating the Legal Status of Apart-Hotels and Apartments", and the Russian-Abkhaz investment agreement. The second of these projects was even withdrawn from parliament "in order to reduce tension and maintain stability in the republic".

Thus, in the new conditions, the "eternal question" of the Abkhaz conflict field is once again becoming relevant: how to find and maintain the ideal ethno-demographic balance. The "echoes" of the 1860s and 1990s in today's political context are not just a beautiful metaphor. Critics of the government's project point out that with the constant presence of external economic actors on the territory of the republic, there are many loopholes for obtaining an Abkhaz passport and influencing the state of affairs in Abkhazia. The idea of "creeping Georgianisation" is also exploited (citizens of the Russian Federation of Georgian nationality could enter Abkhaz socio-economic life and then claim political influence).

The draft law on apartments and apart-hotels is a specific manifestation of more general trends. A transformation of the familiar socio-economic structure of post-Soviet Abkhazia is taking place. Given its limited recognition, the "opening up" of the republic will, in essence, mean a strengthening of Russian presence and Moscow's role in internal Abkhaz processes. And here, difficult dilemmas arise. The insularity and isolation of Abkhazia without external (read: Russian) investment will only preserve its backwardness. Under such conditions, there would be no hypothetical hopes for broad recognition. Rather, the risks of state failure would increase. But a forced "open door" policy, without taking into account the specifics of the local political community and Abkhaz society as a whole, also carries significant danger.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the Abkhaz conflict field represents a complex interweaving and layering of current problems, collisions, and confrontations from the recent and distant past. Although the focus of politicians and experts in the last three decades has been on the events of the Soviet collapse and its consequences, it is not possible to limit the Abkhaz conflict field to the armed confrontation between Abkhazia and Georgia in 1992-1993 or to Russia's recognition of Abkhaz independence.

The formation of the main conflict knots, which remain relevant to this day, began in the mid-19th century, when Russian hegemony was established in the Caucasus and Abkhazia became part of Russia. Problems such as maintaining a favourable ethno-demographic balance, national self-determination, and the radical incompatibility of ethno-national projects have largely defined the political agenda on Abkhaz soil for the past century and a half.

On the conflict field, there has been a constant change of actors, spheres of influence have been redefined, some problems have become more salient while others have ceased to be priorities, yet a certain continuity of contradictions and confrontations has been preserved. Thus, the radical change in the ethnic composition of Abkhazia in the mid- to late 19th century still echoes in the current Abkhaz agenda, even after the partial recognition of the republic's national independence and the provision of guarantees for its security and socio-economic rehabilitation. For a century and a half, conflicting interests of empires, nation-states, non-state structures, and social movements have clashed in, around, and over Abkhazia. However, periods of stability that would satisfy all key actors and be accepted as a legitimate reality have been short-lived and achieved as a result of harsh confrontations rather than through compromise solutions.

And although, compared to other conflicts in the former USSR, the situation in Abkhazia seems stable and predictable, it is clearly premature to speak of the complete closure of the conflict field.

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