Outcomes of the War: Abkhazia Amid the Repartition of the World, by Stanislav Lakoba

The following article by Stanislav Lakoba examines the aftermath of the Georgian-Abkhaz war and places Abkhazia’s post-war political trajectory within the wider geopolitical reconfiguration that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. It reflects on the shifting roles of Russia, Georgia, the United States and other regional actors during a decisive period in Abkhazia’s modern history.

The article was first published in Russian in 2002 in a collection of materials from the republican conference dedicated to the ninth anniversary of the victory of the people of Abkhazia. It has been translated into English by AbkhazWorld for the benefit of our English-speaking readers.

Outcomes of the War: Abkhazia Amid the Repartition of the World

As is well known, irreversible changes have taken place in the world in recent times. These include, above all, the collapse of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia; the reunification of Germany; and the formation of a whole series of so-called independent states that have received international recognition. The arc of instability, which in its first stage stretched from the Balkans to the Caucasus, now extends from America to China.

Only after the passage of the last ten years can we begin to outline the approximate contours of the most complex and dramatic period in the modern history of Abkhazia, a period that must be viewed in the context of global upheavals. It is mistaken to approach political processes in the world exclusively from the standpoint of Abkhazia. Such a method may end in tragedy. It gives rise to unjustified illusions and to a certain romantic approach that stands in sharp contrast to the real political situation. If we wish, as far as possible, to avoid fatal errors, we must assess the situation in and around Abkhazia from the standpoint of the latest political processes and international politics.

Today it may be said that, after the collapse of the USSR, Abkhazia, like a small sailing boat in a raging ocean, passed through several extremely difficult stages amid a new repartition of the world.

I. The first stage covers the period from December 1991 to September 1994 and is closely connected with the first division of the post-Soviet space in the South Caucasus, or Transcaucasia, which in turn forms part of the global repartition. This first stage includes the following constituent elements:

— Russia’s monopolistic dominance in Transcaucasia;
— the management and manipulation of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 1992–1993;
— the practical non-interference of the United States and the countries of the European Union (EU) in Russia’s policy in its near abroad;
— the Georgian leadership’s underestimation of the geopolitical factor in 1993 and, as a consequence, Georgia’s entry into the CIS and its return to Russia’s sphere of influence during the period 1993–1996.

II. The second stage in the South Caucasus covers the period from September 1994 to the autumn of 1999 and 11 September 2001. It is characterised by a relatively peaceful period, when all conflicts in Transcaucasia were temporarily frozen. As you know, in September 1994 Western oil companies signed the “contract of the century” with the government of Azerbaijan for the supply of Caspian oil bypassing Russia. At the same time, in September 1994, the United States and the EU countries openly declared their strategic interests in Transcaucasia in connection with its large energy reserves and refused to recognise the South Caucasus as an exclusively Russian sphere of influence.

By the end of 1994, the process of political settlement of conflicts in Transcaucasia had also taken shape everywhere.

At the same time, the covert rivalry between Russia and the United States in the region continued, especially over the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; over options for transporting Caspian oil; and over the issue of the Eurasian transport corridor through Georgia, TRACECA. The Gal war of May 1998 also fits into this context.

III. From the autumn of 1999 and from 11 September 2001, a third stage began in the modern political history of Abkhazia. Together with it began the second division of the South Caucasus amid a global repartition of the world.

Simultaneously with the official collapse of the USSR on 21 December 1991, a military coup began in Georgia. It ended in January 1992 with the overthrow of the legitimate president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and the arrival in power of Eduard Shevardnadze. Following a similar pattern, Heydar Aliyev came to power in Azerbaijan in June 1993.

These coups d’état against elected presidents went unnoticed by the international community, since “the great powers were not interested in intervening” in them. The Belgian researchers Eric Remacle and Olivier Paye rightly consider that, in the cases of Georgia and Azerbaijan, unlike similar situations in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda — the UN Security Council did not apply Chapter VII of the UN Charter on peace enforcement, since “the coups against Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey were simply acceptable to the great powers, and especially to Russia”.

In one interview, Gamsakhurdia stated: “It may be said that the military coup in Georgia was carried out from across the ocean, with Baker’s personal participation and Bush’s blessing” (Free Georgia, 1 December 1992).

On the eve of and during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, the chronology of events developed very rapidly and very eloquently.

On 7 March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Tbilisi from Moscow, having first promised to join the CIS.

On 24 March, despite the continuing war in South Ossetia, Georgia was admitted to the CSCE, later the OSCE, in violation of all norms of international law.

On 15 May 1992, the Tashkent Agreement was concluded, under which the former Soviet republics that had joined the CIS received corresponding quotas for armaments.

On 24 June 1992, the Agreement on a Ceasefire in South Ossetia was signed in Sochi, a necessary condition for Georgia’s recognition by Russia and its admission to the UN. On the same day, 24 June, the “Dagomys collusion” took place between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, and from that day a course was set for war in Abkhazia. The governments of Russia and Georgia signed a communiqué which noted that the parties had discussed the full range of “Georgian-Russian relations, paying due attention to those points which might cause complications between the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation”. This document also fixed a provision that subsequently enabled Shevardnadze to begin the war against Abkhazia. It stated: “The law-enforcement agencies of Georgia and Russia will resolutely suppress the activity of illegal military, paramilitary and self-formed detachments and groups on the territories under their jurisdiction.” The document was published in the newspaper Free Georgia on 27 June 1992.

At the same meeting, the question of transferring weapons to Shevardnadze was also discussed in particular, although Georgia was not then a member of the CIS. Yeltsin assured Shevardnadze of comprehensive support, including admission to the UN. Under various pretexts, Shevardnadze evaded joining the CIS, whereupon his deputy, Jaba Ioseliani, said: “If they sneeze in Moscow, we will get double pneumonia. What are you plotting?” Shevardnadze replied: “First we need to deal with Abkhazia.”

On 25 June 1992, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze took part in the Istanbul meeting and signed a draft project for economic cooperation among the countries of the Black Sea basin. It is obvious that in Istanbul Shevardnadze secured the support of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, and the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk.

On 18 July 1992, a meeting took place between Boris Yeltsin and Vladislav Ardzinba.

On 23 July 1992, the 1925 Constitution of Abkhazia was adopted.

On 30 July 1992, a Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Georgia was signed.

On 31 July 1992, Georgia became the 179th member of the UN. That day, Foreign Minister A. Chikvaidze addressed the General Assembly in New York. In his speech, one can already sense a readiness to wage war in Abkhazia. He noted, in particular: “To put it simply, there is not an inch of non-Georgian land in Georgia, and we will resolutely suppress any claim to Georgian land” (Free Georgia, 1 August 1992).

Late July to early August: although Georgia was not a member of the CIS, it received an enormous quantity of weapons, including several divisions of armoured vehicles, 300 artillery systems, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

On 11 August 1992, Shevardnadze’s bellicose and self-confident address to the nation was broadcast on Georgian television. He said: “Georgia is now strong, stronger than it was ten or fifteen days ago. It now has a fairly numerous armed army, it has sufficient weapons. There are every possibilities to curb evil and, once and for all, establish order on Georgian land” (Free Georgia, 13 August 1992).

On 13 August 1992, Russian servicemen in Gudauta deceitfully removed four of the five infantry fighting vehicles.

On Friday, 14 August 1992, at 5 o’clock in the morning, the advance of Georgian troops was halted as a result of the explosion of the Inguri railway bridge. According to some reports, the explosion was organised by Russian military intelligence, thanks to which the invasion plan was disrupted and Georgian troops became bogged down outside Sukhum.

On Sunday, 16 August 1992, preparations were made for a banquet at the military sanatorium in Krasnaya Polyana, with the participation of Yeltsin and Shevardnadze, to mark the successful completion of the “Abkhaz operation”, which had been approved as a result of the “Dagomys collusion” and during the Istanbul meeting. Yeltsin visited Krasnaya Polyana that day, but the feast did not take place, since the blitzkrieg in Abkhazia had failed.

On 1 September 1992, the President of Turkey, Turgut Özal, spoke in the Turkish Parliament, criticising Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and calling the State Council of Georgia “a criminal military gang”.

On 25 September 1992, Shevardnadze delivered an odious speech at the session of the UN General Assembly in New York: “Pygmies have raised a rebellion against humanity” — it was printed under this title in the official newspaper Free Georgia. At the same time, in a narrow circle, Yeltsin remarked sarcastically: “Shevardnadze has imagined himself the president of a great power, when in reality he does not even have a banana republic under him.”

Shevardnadze had hardly stepped down from the UN rostrum when the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution “On the Situation in the North Caucasus in Connection with Events in Abkhazia”.

From June to September 1992, the Russian government provided Georgia with every possible support on the question of Abkhazia, hoping that Tbilisi would finally enter the CIS.

From the end of September 1992 until the end of the war, Russia, under the influence above all of the North Caucasian factor, came down on the side of Abkhazia.

At the same time, Moscow was developing its own entirely understandable geostrategic interest: to force Shevardnadze into the CIS with the help of Abkhazia and thereby restore control over Transcaucasia. Until the signing of the “contract of the century” in September 1994, Russia was the chief director in this region of the world. For more detail on this, see: Stanislav Lakoba, Abkhazia — de facto or Georgia de jure? On Russia’s Policy in Abkhazia in the Post-Soviet Period, 1991–2000, Sapporo, 2001.

It must be noted that throughout practically the entire war — after the liberation of Gagra in October 1992, and after the successful offensive operation of the Abkhaz army in July 1993, the Russian government obstructed the taking of the capital of Abkhazia under control. Its representatives said directly: “It is necessary to loom over Sukhum, but not to take the capital.” In this way, they hoped to incline Shevardnadze towards joining the CIS.

The accidental coincidence of important political events in Moscow and in Abkhazia led to favourable results. The Abkhaz offensive of 16–30 September 1993 almost exactly coincided with the Russian crisis in Moscow, from 21 September to 4 October 1993, at the White House, the shelling of parliament. Russia then had its own problems, and in that confusion, as Yeltsin fought for power, he had no time for Abkhazia and no time for Shevardnadze, who was enduring a true disaster in besieged Sukhum.

On 24 September, President Gamsakhurdia flew by helicopter from Grozny to Senaki. Moscow offered him military and financial support in the event of the creation of a buffer Megrelian state, but Gamsakhurdia declared a march on Tbilisi.

On 8–9 October 1993, Shevardnadze arrived in Moscow to bow before Yeltsin and joined the CIS. A Russian-Georgian military treaty was signed.

After the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 1993, the administration of Boris Yeltsin, from September–December 1994 until the autumn of 1999, again began to pursue towards Abkhazia a policy of the “stick”, declaring an all-round blockade against the de facto independent state, including a financial-economic and informational blockade. The government of Russia at that time, represented by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and, in part, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, decided to revise certain outcomes of the war, believing that the Abkhaz had taken too much of Abkhazia’s territory under their control. They believed that defeated Georgia and Shevardnadze needed to be rewarded for the forced entry into the CIS in October 1993, at the expense of part of Abkhazia’s territory, by placing the border Gal District under Tbilisi’s control.

To this end, under the protection of peacekeepers and armoured vehicles, a mass crossing of Georgian refugees into the Gal District was being prepared for 14 September 1994, contrary to the procedure established by the adopted documents.

On the eve of these events, on the morning of 25 August 1994, Russian paratroopers under the command of Deputy Defence Minister G. Kondratiev, and with the participation of Deputy Foreign Minister B. Pastukhov, blockaded the town of Gudauta. The Yeltsin government was demonstratively rehearsing the possibility of a military-force solution to the Abkhaz problem.

On 15 September 1994, Yeltsin received Shevardnadze, and then Ardzinba, at his Bocharov Ruchei dacha in Sochi. The situation eased somewhat.

The following day, 16 September, a meeting took place in New Athos between Ardzinba, Grachev and Shevardnadze. Thanks to the persistence of the Abkhaz leader, this meeting did not allow the existing post-war situation to be altered.

On the eve of the planned adventure in the Gal District, the defence departments of Russia and Georgia concluded an agreement on cooperation, of which UN military observers were also aware.

Moscow and Tbilisi were then preparing for large-scale events in the Caucasus, demonstrating in every way from the autumn of 1994 that their allied interests were strategic. The background to this rapprochement was simple: Georgia would support the military action in Chechnya, and Russia would help Georgia return Abkhazia with the aid of Russian peacekeepers.

Everyone knows perfectly well how the first Chechen campaign of 1994–1996 ended.

The contrived strategic partnership between Russia and Georgia came to an end. Shevardnadze pushed away from the Kremlin with all his strength.

On the eve of the second Chechen campaign, the official authorities in Tbilisi took a directly opposite position and spoke out in support of Chechnya.

In response, in the autumn of 1999 Russia hardened its position towards Georgia. With the arrival in government first of Sergei Stepashin and then Vladimir Putin, attitudes towards Abkhazia grew warmer.

On the eve of the second war in Chechnya, Russia lifted the blockade of Abkhazia and, in practice, supported the presidential elections and the Act on the State Independence of Abkhazia adopted on 12 October 1999.

In November 1999, the question was raised of introducing a visa regime between Russia and Georgia, with the exception of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Thus, with the arrival of Vladimir Putin, the policy of the “stick” pursued by Boris Yeltsin was finally replaced in Abkhazia by a policy of the “carrot”. This was undoubtedly caused by Tbilisi’s anti-Russian behaviour on a number of military-strategic issues.

The final turn of Russian policy towards Abkhazia occurred after the tragedy of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the Kodor events of October 2001 that followed it.

The next stage was the talks between Putin and Bush in Moscow in May 2002, including on the question of Abkhazia, which led to the de facto division of Georgia.

Indirect evidence of this may be seen in the very active campaign in Abkhazia in June 2002, supported by the multinational population, for the mass acquisition of Russian citizenship.

In the summer of the current year, the intensification of Russia’s policy in Abkhazia proceeded very vigorously and demonstratively. In August, a representative Moscow-Kremlin delegation arrived here, declaring by its very presence Russia’s strategic interests in Abkhazia and designating this territory as one under its care.

The classic statement by the President of Russia on 11 September 2002 on the situation in Georgia in connection with the Pankisi Gorge, the energetic actions of the Russian ministers of defence and foreign affairs, and their meeting with President Bush effectively left Georgia with no hope. Quite recently, Tbilisi had advocated the “Bosnian variant” in Abkhazia. Yet the shadow of Bosnia suddenly loomed over Georgia itself.

At present, the United States and Russia are “forced” allies. It is obvious that the United States needs Russia’s support in Afghanistan, in India and, of course, on the Iraq question. Against this geopolitical background, Shevardnadze’s caricature-like behaviour cannot serve Washington’s interests. His attempts to set the United States and Russia against each other in Georgia, to incite them against one another, amount to recklessness and a crime against his own people.

Washington is increasingly aware that it cannot do without Russia’s global support, weakened though Russia may be, it is rapidly gaining momentum. The new Russian pragmatists seem to have finally made up their minds not only on Abkhazia and Georgia, but on Transcaucasia as a whole. Everything happening today in this part of the world resembles a grand battle for the Caucasus. Putin is trying to play the situation back in Russia’s favour, and he is doing so skilfully and subtly.

In essence, 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new, second stage in the repartition of Transcaucasia. The task of the United States is to gain a foothold in this region of Caspian oil and ensure its transportation to the West; the task of Russia is to restore its control over this territory, which is vitally important for the security of Russia’s southern flank.

Let me recall that during the upheavals of 1917–1921, Russia temporarily lost complete control over Transcaucasia, where German and Turkish troops first held sway, and then Anglo-French forces. At that time, the countries of the Entente, drawn by the very same “smell of Baku oil”, were disappointed.

And today the words of Leon Trotsky sound extremely topical. “The road to Baku lies through Batum–Tiflis,” he wrote in the 1920s. “This latter point is the strategic focus of Transcaucasia... The struggle is over oil and manganese. The oil industrialists do not care how they get their hands on the oil: through Denikin, through the Muslim party Musavat, or through the gates of ‘national self-determination’.”

It seems that Russia today stands on the threshold of 1921. It is a great pity that Comrade Shevardnadze never read Trotsky, who was once banned.

The United States will tactfully surrender Shevardnadze, reassuring him in words and sending warm letters, while Putin will arrange a new Georgia, but, of course, without Shevardnadze and, apparently, already without Abkhazia, having moved the Russian border from the River Psou to the River Inguri.

Shevardnadze’s own regime inside Georgia has become so weakened that, as it seems to him, only war can save it. This is indicated, for example, by his openly provocative Russophobic behaviour. The meaning of this tactic is to depart, on a wave of war, from impoverished Georgia in the aura of a fighter for independence and, having received the status of a political émigré and head of a Georgian government in exile, to end his days calmly and richly somewhere in the state of Georgia... All this is very reminiscent of the path once taken by Noe Zhordania, the leader of Menshevik Georgia.

It should also be noted that for the third time already, the first being after the defeat in Abkhazia in 1993–1994, the second after the May 1998 events in Gal — a situation is objectively taking shape in Georgia which Western experts characterise as a “failed and unviable state”. Even earlier, they expressed the view that “in the end, Georgia may perhaps never succeed in building its own statehood”.

Georgia today is a state without territory. Without Abkhazia, without South Ossetia, with Adjara detached, with the Armenian and Azerbaijani enclaves closed off... The number of uncontrolled territories is increasing: the Pankisi Gorge, the Kodor Gorge. In reality, it is a state that exists only on paper, in the documents of various international organisations. The complete disintegration of the country and its natural division are plain to see.

As in 1993, Shevardnadze seems to have miscalculated once again: he completely failed to take account of the Russian factor and overestimated the role of certain Western countries. But the Georgian problem itself is of little significance in the most complex geopolitical game.

The United States, for example, has found itself in a difficult position over Iraq, and “Desert Storm” has turned for it into a “Storm in Europe”. Its European allies, especially the Federal Republic of Germany under Schröder and France under Chirac, have openly opposed the war in Iraq. Blair, the only loyal ally, faces serious complications in the British Parliament and difficulties with public opinion. Turkey, worried by the problem of a united Kurdistan, also fears the forthcoming operation in Iraq. As for the real position of a number of influential Arab states in connection with Israel’s military actions against the Palestinians, there is no need to speak at all. And what of a very pensive China?

In this difficult situation, Russia’s opinion is very important for the United States and may cost it very, very dearly, more dearly than a hundred Georgias.

Nor can certain secret agreements be excluded. For example: Caspian oil to Russia, Iraqi oil to the United States.

It is no secret that Russian gas and oil magnates recently held consultations in Texas, USA, where, in particular, they discussed one of the most important questions of contemporary politics: should the West switch to supplies of Russian oil and gas, abandoning the services of the Arab world? Such an approach could fundamentally alter the balance of forces, and indeed the political map of the world.

Confronted with ever-increasing difficulties on global issues, and dispersing its military-political forces and financial-economic resources across the world, the United States, as a superpower, has begun to experience significant difficulties. This state of affairs cannot but alarm the Bush administration. Of particular concern are the rapid development of China, the strength of Islamic fundamentalism and the threat of international terrorism. In this context of global world politics, Russia will increasingly be transformed from a forced ally of the United States into an ally necessary for Western civilisation. Such an approach will inevitably return Russia to the rank of a superpower.

The interaction and coordination between Russia and the United States can also be seen in the example of Transcaucasian policy. These are the coups in Georgia in December 1991–January 1992 and in Azerbaijan in June 1993. Such actions also include Russia’s active military operations against the Zviadists in Western Georgia in the autumn of 1993, with the tacit consent of the United States, in exchange for similar behaviour by Russia during the American invasion of Haiti in 1994. It is no accident that President Clinton’s administration then compared Russia’s stabilising role in its near abroad with the role of the United States in Panama and Grenada, which are considered its “back yard”.

+ Former Defence Minister of Georgia: On the War and the Situation Around Abkhazia (1992–1993), by Stanislav Lakoba

+ Stanislav Lakoba: "If Yeltsin had been opposed, the war in Abkhazia would not have started"

+ East and West: between Hammer and Anvil, by Stanislav Lakoba

The administration of the current President Bush has gone much further and has begun to cooperate on global projects: the fight against international terrorism, and the joint operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan with Russia’s decisive support. Georgia is not even a pawn on the chessboard, while its leader has begun dangerously entangling himself beneath the feet of two giants at once.

It may be stated that the situation now taking shape around Abkhazia is favourable, and that a positive development of events, with Russia’s decisive role and political will, will undoubtedly lead to a long period of stabilisation, peaceful construction and the establishment of order in all spheres of our life. As a well-known Russian politician recently said, for Abkhazia the “light at the end of the tunnel” has finally begun to glimmer.

Abkhazia is receiving a real chance to emerge from long international isolation and to break the shackles of a “geopolitical prisoner”.

Published in: Collection of Materials of the Republican Conference Dedicated to the 9th Anniversary of the Victory of the People of Abkhazia. Sukhum, 2002, pp. 43–57.