The Treaty That Never Was: Forgery, Occupation and June 1918, by Stanislav Lakoba

Stanislav Lakoba on Raden Kakuba, two rival texts, and the clause that brought Georgian troops to Sukhum

In the book "Ответ историкам из Тбилиси (документы и факты)" (English: "A Response to Historians from Tbilisi: Documents and Facts"), Abkhazian historian Stanislav Lakoba addresses critical issues surrounding Georgian-Abkhazian relations. Drawing on extensive research and documentation, Lakoba examines the intricacies of historical narratives and their role in contemporary conflicts. The first response from this book was published on AW under the title "Rewriting History? A Critique of Modern Georgian Historiography on Abkhazia" (pp. 3 to 7), the second under the title "Challenging Georgian Narratives (Response 2): A Further Exploration on Abkhazia" (pp. 7 to 18), and the third under the title "Not a Hint of Autonomy: Abkhazia and Georgia, 1917 to 1918" (pp. 18 to 28).

Below, you will read the fourth response from the same book (pp. 28 to 39), which carries the account into June 1918. Lakoba argues that Raden Kakuba, head of the Abkhazian delegation in Tiflis, approved a Georgian draft on 8 June without the knowledge of the Abkhazian People's Council, that the Council adopted a different text of its own on 10 June, one that made any treaty provisional upon review by an Abkhazian National Assembly, and that Georgian historians have ever since cited whichever of the two versions suited them. Reading the direct-wire traffic between Tiflis and Sukhum alongside Simon Basaria's dissenting opinion of 10 June and the seven clauses as Georgia published them, he concludes that Tiflis wanted one clause only, the fourth, with its 'detachment of the Red Guard', that this supplied the pretext for the landing of 17 to 19 June, and that the treaty of 8 June had no existence in law at all.

The Treaty That Never Was: Forgery, Occupation and June 1918

Truly dramatic events were played out between Georgia and Abkhazia in the period from 26 May to 8 June 1918. By this time the second Abkhazian People's Council (APC) was already sitting in Abkhazia, torn by serious contradictions between the old membership of the 'highlander orientation' (Simon Basaria, Alexander Shervashidze and others) and the new one, headed by the Menshevik Varlam Shervashidze. The situation that had taken shape was reflected in the ambivalent character of certain APC documents, the ones the Abkhazian delegation brought with it to Tiflis at the beginning of June 1918: Raden Kakuba (head of the delegation), Georgy Tumanov, Vasily Gurdzhua and G. Adzhamov.

And what was the geopolitical situation taking shape by this time in Transcaucasia, and around Abkhazia in particular? What ends were Turkey and Germany pursuing here?

It is perfectly obvious that they were seeking access to Caucasian raw materials, and above all to Baku oil. At the very outset their interests coincided. But Turkey, to the detriment of military operations against England, was carried away by pan-Islamism. The views of the 'allies' came into conflict, and Germany began to 'counteract the rapid spread of the Turks in Transcaucasia', understanding that the 'old and cunning diplomats of the Ottoman school' had comprehensively outplayed the unskilled players of the Transcaucasian republic. According to Anton Denikin, the decisive part in the formation of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) and of the Georgian republic (26 May 1918) was played by 'mortal fear of a Turkish invasion'. By this time Germany too had arrived at a strategic view of Georgia. The German general and politician Erich Ludendorff, for one, observed: 'For us (the protectorate over Georgia) was a means, independently of Turkey, of gaining access to Caucasian raw materials and to the exploitation of the railways running through Tiflis. We could not trust Turkey in this respect. We could not count on Baku oil if we did not take it ourselves.'³⁷ The Baku to Batum pipeline, the railway through Tiflis, the immensely rich manganese mines, the port of Poti: all of it mattered enormously to German interests. That is why Germany halted the further advance of the Turks within the bounds of Georgia, not far from Tiflis. More than that, Germany began to indulge Georgia on the question of Abkhazia and the adjoining Black Sea territories.

Leon Trotsky, in his day, remarked quite correctly: 'A vassal union with Germany gave Georgia, for the time being, serious guarantees of inviolability, since Germany was binding Soviet Russia in the Brest-Litovsk noose, and the collapse of Soviet Russia moreover seemed inevitable...'³⁸

News of the proclamation of Georgian independence reached Sukhum only on 2 June. That same day the APC adopted a statement in which Abkhazia and Georgia were spoken of as neighbouring countries, with the emphasis placed on the inadmissibility of 'encroachments on the sovereign rights of the people by neighbours'.³⁹ It was with this document that the delegation was sent to Tiflis. The statement also declared that the parliament of Abkhazia was assuming the fullness of power, considering Abkhazia and its people 'entirely independent'. It was met, however, by a squall of disinformation about a Turkish invasion of Abkhazia allegedly in preparation. But there could have been no open Turkish intervention at that point, since by this time Abkhazia had been drawn into the sphere of military and political influence of imperial Germany, and at the beginning of June small German detachments were already stationed at Ochamchira and Sukhum.

The government of Georgia, evidently not without the behind-the-scenes involvement of Akaky Chkhenkeli, brought unprecedented pressure to bear on the head of the delegation, Raden Kakuba (he had been a deputy of the APC for Samurzakan), the aim being to get the APC to give at least verbal consent to the conclusion of a treaty in 'development and supplementation of the Agreement of 9 February 1918'.

A remark of Denikin's about Chkhenkeli's conduct in high office in the Transcaucasian republic is worth recalling here. 'Chkhenkeli the Georgian,' he wrote, 'who in general showed extraordinary compliance towards the Turks in matters touching non-Georgian territory, ordered Kars to be surrendered without a fight.'⁴⁰ On Abkhazia, though, and on its entry into Georgia, he took an irreconcilable 'patriotic' position...

Georgia's governing circles cannot but have been alarmed by a passage in Kakuba's report, in which he announced that the APC was 'shortly to convene a People's Congress of representatives of all the peoples inhabiting Abkhazia' (Menteshashvili A., p. 265), a congress which under clause 2 of the Agreement of 9 February 1918 had every right to settle the question of Abkhazia's state structure once and for all. All of this hastened the denouement.

In the situation that had arisen, Georgia demanded that the delegation's mandate be set aside and a new treaty concluded. Hopelessly entangled, and thrown off course by the Tiflis politicians, behind whose backs stood German diplomats and military men, Kakuba began sending panic-stricken reports to Sukhum by direct wire, and even declared the delegation ready to sign the proposed 'treaty' without a decision of the parliament of Abkhazia. The APC objected categorically to such unlawful acts on Kakuba's part. He nevertheless continued, as head of the delegation, to insist on his own course.

In a communication to Sukhum of 8 June 1918, Kakuba proposed the following.

From Tiflis: To draw the Council's attention to the fact that the treaty has force only until the convening of the Abkhazian National Assembly... Had we not raised the question of our mutual relations now, then the Georg. [Georgian] Government would have been content with the agreement of 9 Febr. [February] 18 pending the final settlement of the question of our mutual relations by a national congress of Abkhazia, but since we ourselves have raised this question now, and moreover in such a sense as though we wished to break off all ties with Georgia, which, I repeat, is how the Georg. Gov-t [Government] understood our mandate, it is now afraid to confine itself to the February agreement and, to avoid any misunderstandings, finds it necessary to develop that agreement somewhat, in no way going beyond its framework. As to the commonality of interests, enough has been said on this by the Georg. Gov. and it is in agreement with us, but it is convinced that the question of the external defence of the territory of Abkhazia cannot wait until the convening of the Nat. Congress [National Congress] of Abkhazia. That circumstance alone compels the Georg. Gov. to enter with us into the proposed agreement, which, as I have already said above, has force only until the convening of the Nat. Assembly [National Assembly]. For the conclusion of such an agreement, in the opinion of the G. Gov. and of the delegation as well, no summoning of any representatives of Abkhazia is required at all, and this agreement lies fully within the competence of the Gov-t of the People's Coun. [Council] now functioning... The delegation considers that there is nothing unacceptable in the treaty, and why the Peop. Council cannot express itself on the substance of it is beyond the delegation. Advise what the delegation is to do. Remain here longer or leave for Sukhum... What more must I add, except that the Georg. Gov. agrees to conclude the proposed agreement with us verbally, that is, it will be satisfied with a verbal assurance from the delegation and does not insist on the treaty being signed. Let me add further that if the People's Council is afraid to take upon itself any responsibility for the conclusion of the proposed agreement, then the delegation takes that responsibility upon itself...

From Sukhum: Tomorrow the question will again be put for discussion, and on the 10th at 6 in the evening you will receive a clear and definite answer.

From Tiflis: Waiting until the 10th does not appear possible. Your answer must be had tomorrow. Name the hour yourselves.

From Sukhum: We shall report tomorrow if possible. At the latest on the 10th at 6 o'clock.

From Tiflis: You are taking away the right to speak with the Georg. Gov.⁴¹

On the following day, 9 June 1918, this was sent from Sukhum to Tiflis:

The state of affairs in Abkhazia is at present so tangled that the Abkh. Peop. Council [Abkhazian People's Council] is not in a position to give an officially definite answer on the substance of your enquiry. Whatever our answer might be, the very fact of concluding a treaty will be interpreted in the most undesirable sense and may entail consequences ruinous above all for Abkhazia and dangerous for Georgia as well... Until such time as order is restored in the District, until the population returns to the normal circumstances of life, any agreement concluded by the Abkh. Peop. Coun. with Georgia, and the drawing up of a treaty, will immediately be used to the detriment of the interests of statehood, and then the threat of external intervention that hangs over us may turn into fact. The Abkh. Peop. Coun. asks the Gov. Georg. rep. [Government of the Georgian Republic] not to insist on an immediate answer, and thereby to give Abkhazia the chance to determine its own fate in more suitable circumstances.⁴²

As these highly eloquent documents show, Kakuba invested himself with extraordinary powers and, without the knowledge of the APC, approved the 'treaty' proposed by Georgia on 8 June 1918 (possibly only verbally, since the original of the 'treaty' is unknown), at a time when the APC, after long and stubborn resistance, took the decision at its session of 10 June 1918 to conclude a treaty, but in a different version. It was that text, over the signature of the APC chairman Varlam Shervashidze, that both sides were to have adopted in Tiflis on 11 June... But, I repeat, the Abkhazian delegation headed by Kakuba, contrary to the requirement of the parliament of Abkhazia, struck a bargain with the Georgian government and signed the 'treaty' behind that parliament's back as early as 8 June 1918. Kakuba's own position was far from disinterested, since he had been promised the post of minister for Abkhazian affairs in Tiflis...

The situation turned out so tangled, and so tragicomic, that even today some Georgian historians cite the text of the 'treaty' of 8 June 1918 while others cite the 'treaty' of 11 June 1918. I have, incidentally, set out the whole mechanism of this political swindle more than once, including in my History of Abkhazia (История Абхазии, 1991; 1993), yet the historians from Tbilisi pass over this crucial question in complete silence. Not only they. Even Tiflis's placeman, the APC chairman Varlam Shervashidze, had no idea that one document had been substituted for another, and in his correspondence with the Georgian government he referred to the clauses of a 'treaty' of 11 June that did not exist.⁴³ In principle this was a crude political forgery, and from a legal point of view no 'treaty' existed at all.

It must not be forgotten, all the same, that it was this political fabrication that brought Abkhazia to tragic consequences, and it came into the world in the following version:

1. under the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia there is created, on the submission of the Abkhazian People's Council, the post of minister for Abkhazian affairs;
2. internal administration and self-government in Abkhazia belong to the Abkhazian People's Council;
3. the credits and monies necessary for the administration of Abkhazia are released from the funds of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and are expended on the needs of Abkhazia by the Abkhazian People's Council;
4. for the speediest establishment of revolutionary order and the organisation of firm authority, the government sends a detachment of the Red Guard to assist the Abkhazian People's Council and to be at its disposal;
5. an international detachment is organised in Abkhazia, which is at the disposal of the Abkhazian People's Council;
6. social reforms in Abkhazia are carried out by the Abkhazian People's Council on the basis of the general laws of Georgia, with account taken of local particularities;
7. a congress of the population of Abkhazia on democratic principles is convened as soon as possible for the final settlement of questions connected with the structure of Abkhazia.⁴⁴

This text differs substantially from the version of the treaty signed on 10 June by Varlam Shervashidze, and consists of seven clauses rather than eight.⁴⁵ Article 1 of the APC document states: 'The treaty being concluded is subject to review by the Abkhazian National Assembly, which finally determines the political structure of Abkhazia and also the mutual relations between Georgia and Abkhazia.' In other words, the treaty being concluded was temporary in character and subject to review by the Abkhazian National Assembly, not only for the final determination of Abkhazia's political structure but also for the final settlement of the question of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia. In article 7 of the 'treaty' of 8 June, its apparent counterpart, the formulation offered is vague and a whole series of points of principle is left out.

Can one seriously speak at all of Abkhazia having received, even then, the broadest autonomy within Georgia? It is perfectly obvious that clause 2, on internal administration and self-government, did not yet amount to the granting of autonomy, all the more so when clause 7 speaks of Abkhazia's final structure being settled in the near future. Avtandil Menteshashvili and A. Surguladze, for example, acknowledged in 1989 that the document was formal in character, noting that by the 'treaty' the government of Georgia had only promised to 'give autonomy to Abkhazia, although its practical implementation was delayed'.⁴⁶ But the years passed, and in 1999 Menteshashvili adjusted his position: '...Under the treaty of 8 June, Abkhazia was granted broad autonomy' (p. 266). Why, in that case, did Georgia need to come back to the question and adopt an 'Act on the Autonomy of Abkhazia' on 20 March 1919?

In substance, one clause alone of the 'treaty' of 8 June interested the government of Georgia: clause 4, whose ambiguous content it did not fail to exploit, bringing onto the territory of Abkhazia not a 'detachment of the Red Guard' but occupying Menshevik forces.

Even the political representative of the Georgian republic in Abkhazia, the veteran Georgian social democrat Isidor Ramishvili, did not believe in this 'broad autonomy'. A month after the so-called treaties, on 19 July, he spoke at a session of the APC in Sukhum and declared for a competent congress of the people, one that was to decide Abkhazia's further fate: whether it would attach itself 'to Georgia, to Russia or to Turkey, or would declare independence'.⁴⁷

After the Abkhazian delegation returned from Tiflis, having approved the 'treaty' of 8 June, relations among its members sharply deteriorated, since the members had begun to be accused of betraying the interests of Abkhazia. The confrontation between Kakuba on one side and Georgy Tumanov and Vasily Gurdzhua on the other grew particularly heated. Willingly or otherwise, Kakuba, prompted by the Georgian government, kept the APC constantly misinformed, and on 8 June, in secret from the Abkhazian parliament, he went in for outright political forgery. It is hardly surprising, then, that in gratitude for the 'service' it was his candidacy that was put forward, on the basis of article 1, for the post of minister for Abkhazian affairs, and that on 11 July he was invested with its powers. The very next day, 12 July, a huge popular assembly at Chernaya Rechka, with the active participation of Gurdzhua and Tumanov, demanded Kakuba's resignation for want of confidence in him. Very soon afterwards, on 17 July, Kakuba announced to the APC that he was laying down his ministerial powers. In a highly wrought state, and in the presence of Ramishvili, he spoke on 18 July 1918 at a session of the APC against the withdrawal of the Georgian troops from Abkhazia, troops that had been brought in precisely through his own fault. The Orthodox Abkhazian priest Georgy Tumanov, who had been a member of the delegation in Tiflis on 8 June, then made a sharp speech in parliament in which, on the instruction of the popular assembly of the Gudauta and Gagra Abkhaz, he set out the demand that 'Abkhazia be independent and not a province', since otherwise they were ready to 'die free on their own land'.⁴⁸ The deputy for Kodor Abkhazia, the people's teacher Andrei Chochua, also delivered a detailed criticism of the APC's leadership and work.⁴⁹

On 19 July the APC accepted Kakuba's resignation.⁵⁰ Just a week later, on 25 July 1918, parliament elected Colonel Chkhotua minister for Abkhazian affairs, and he assured the APC that his chief aim was 'the defence of the interests of Abkhazia'.⁵¹ Colonel Chkhotua stayed true to those words, but in October 1918 he was accused of attempting a 'coup d'état' and removed from his post. Tiflis abolished the post at the same time, and with it article 1 of the 'treaty' of 8 June, and the functions of minister for Abkhazian affairs were transferred to Georgia's minister of internal affairs...

The most far-sighted Abkhazian politicians foresaw that under the pretext of fighting the Bolsheviks and defending Abkhazia from Turkey, Georgia would try to use the 'treaty' being concluded to take the country into its own hands. One of those who regarded Kakuba's activity with extreme mistrust was Simon Basaria, the former chairman of the first APC, who at the parliamentary session of 10 June 1918 refused to sign the delegation's authorisation to conclude a treaty with Georgia, and set out his dissenting opinion on the question in writing that same day.

In view of the fact, it read, *that the draft treaty proposed by the Georgian Republic is ultimative in character, ruling out any possibility of considered, free discussion; in view of the fact that an act as important as the proposed treaty of Abkhazia with Georgia is being made in haste, with a limited number of members of the Abkhazian People's Council present and without the knowledge of the population of Abkhazia, which conceives of its political freedom as free of tutelage from any quarter whatsoever, I propose that the Abkhazian People's Council answer Georgia's ultimatum with a request that the population be given the opportunity to hold an Abkhazian National Congress, competent finally to determine the political structure of Abkhazia, assuring the Georgian Republic that Abkhazia, as an independent national organism, will without fail enter into good-neighbourly treaty unions and agreements with Georgia. I ask that this dissenting opinion be transmitted to the Abkhazian delegation by direct wire.*⁵²

The dissenting opinion of a man of such standing among the people, and so influential a deputy, set out on 10 June, that is at a point when the 'treaty' had already been approved in Tiflis, is of interest on several points of principle. First, the proposed 'treaty' is an ultimatum from the government of Georgia. Second, Basaria does not accept that such an 'important act' should be prepared in secret from the people of Abkhazia, with a 'limited number' of APC deputies present. Third, he stresses particularly that only the 'Abkhazian National Congress' is competent 'finally to determine the political structure of Abkhazia'. Fourth, he warns the delegation headed by Kakuba of its responsibility.

Incidentally, in giving a brief description of the occupation of Abkhazia by Georgia, General Anton Denikin refers to the 'treaty' of... 11 June 1918 (!), that is to the Abkhazian version, and not to the one adopted in Tiflis on 8 June.⁵³ So the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army did not know about the substitution of the document either.

+ Partner or Province: Abkhazia, 1917–1921

+ General Mazniashvili and the 1918 Occupation of Abkhazia

+ Georgian Policy towards Abkhazia, 1918–1921, by Vadim Mukhanov

+ Abkhazia and Georgia on the Verge of Independence (1917 - 1921), by Cem Kumuk

+ The Barn at Aatsy

Continuing the theme of the so-called autonomy, let me touch on a reproach thrown at me by the respected Avtandil Menteshashvili (p. 267), to the effect that in my works I frequently quote S. Danilov's essay The Tragedy of the Abkhazian People (Munich, 1951) but 'forget', supposedly, what my beloved author writes about 1918. Namely: 'Abkhazia received autonomy' (p. 8).

The scholar did not dare, however, to go on quoting Danilov, who, by the way, was first republished by me.⁵⁴ He merely snatched out the word 'autonomy' that he so badly needed. Yet Danilov writes about this 'autonomy' with undisguised sarcasm, and it is not hard to see it. He goes on to report that from the very first days the APC, 'wishing to take the administration of the country into its own hands', ran up against 'serious obstacles to its undertakings on the part of the Georgian authorities'. The representatives of Menshevik Georgia, Danilov continues, 'took little account of the moods and customs of other peoples', and in Abkhazia they 'pursued a policy that did not answer to the interests of the Abkhazian people'. Georgianisation was in full swing, and there were deep disagreements over the land question. The antagonism between them 'promised to turn into an open move against the authorities', and the Abkhaz then sent their representatives to the command of the Volunteer Army in order, with its help, to 'free themselves of the new conquerors'.⁵⁵ So Menteshashvili is muddying the water for nothing. Everything I have cited is given strictly according to the text, immediately after the mention of 'autonomy', on the very same page...

References

Archival references follow the Russian convention: F. (fond, collection), d. (delo, file), l. (list, folio), ll. (folios), ob. (oborot, verso). TsGAA is the Central State Archive of Abkhazia.

37. Anton Denikin, Ocherki Russkoi Smuty [Sketches of the Russian Turmoil], vol. 3. Berlin, 1924, pp. 46 to 47.
38. Leon Trotsky, Sochineniya [Works], vol. 12. Moscow [1925], p. 231.
39. Central State Archive of Abkhazia (TsGAA), F. I-39, d. 6, l. 4.
40. Anton Denikin, Ocherki, vol. 3, p. 46.
41. TsGAA, F. I-39, d. 6.
42. Ibid.
43. For more detail on this see: History of Abkhazia, pp. 295 to 296.
44. The text is given from: Literaturnaya Gruziya, 1989, no. 11, pp. 150 to 151; Avtandil Menteshashvili, Iz istorii [From the History], p. 16.
45. History of Abkhazia, pp. 295 to 296.
46. Literaturnaya Gruziya, 1989, no. 11, p. 151.
47. TsGAA, F. I-39, d. 3, l. 2.
48. Ibid., l. 4 ob.
49. Ibid., l. 26.
50. Ibid., ll. 6, 12, 14, 30.
51. Ibid., l. 18 ob.
52. TsGAA, F. I-39, d. 6, l. 11 and ob.
53. Anton Denikin, Ocherki, vol. 3, pp. 48 to 49.
54. See: Materialy po istorii Abkhazii [Materials on the History of Abkhazia], issue 1. Sukhum, 1990.
55. Ibid., pp. 8 to 9.