The Patriotic War in Abkhazia (1992–1993), by Aslan Avidzba

Aslan F. Avidzba
Doctor of Historical Sciences
Professor, Department of History, Archaeology and Ethnology of Abkhazia

On 25 August 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty and the Resolution “On Legal Guarantees for the Protection of the Statehood of Abkhazia.” This marked the beginning of the so-called “war of laws”—a condition characteristic of relations between Abkhazia and Georgia, in which laws and resolutions adopted by one side were declared illegal and devoid of legal force on the territory of the other. This situation lasted for almost two years, until 14 August 1992. The session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia scheduled for that day, at which a draft Treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia was to be discussed, never took place. It is possible that this planned session ultimately determined the final date of the onset of aggression.

The principal factor behind the war in Abkhazia was geopolitical. In order to align with the prevailing geopolitical climate, the authorities in Tbilisi advanced a range of official pretexts for the war, from the need to protect the railway to combating so-called Muslim fundamentalism among the Abkhazians. In reality, entirely different objectives were being pursued, namely, the liquidation of Abkhaz statehood with the aim of transforming Abkhazia into one of Georgia’s provinces. That Georgia’s policy following the invasion of Abkhazia corresponded to the definition of genocide is evidenced by the following facts:

• On 25 August 1992, the commander of Georgian forces in Abkhazia, Giorgi Karkarashvili, declared that he would not spare the lives of 100,000 Georgians in order to destroy all 97,000 Abkhazians.
  
  
• On 22 October 1992, the Georgian occupation authorities carried out an act of cultural genocide: the buildings of the Abkhaz Institute of Language, Literature and History and the State Archive were deliberately burned, resulting in the complete destruction of unique documents and materials relating to the history and culture of Abkhazia.
  
  
• Subsequently, the Georgian State Minister for Abkhazian Affairs, Giorgi Khaindrava, stated in an interview with the French journal Le Monde diplomatique (April 1993) that Abkhaz resistance could be overcome by mass killing, declaring: “There are only 80,000 Abkhazians, which means that we can easily and completely destroy the genetic stock of their nation by killing 15,000 of their youth. And we are perfectly capable of doing this.”

Despite this, international organisations, represented by the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), provided one-sided support to Georgia and personally to Eduard Shevardnadze. During the war, several UN and CSCE missions visited Abkhazia. Decisions to dispatch these missions were made solely in response to requests and invitations from the Georgian side, while Abkhazia’s repeated appeals remained unanswered. An exception was the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, whose Secretary-General stated that the Abkhaz people were fighting not only for their land, but also for their survival as an ethnic group.

+ Georgian-Abkhaz War | FBIS Reports (Aug-Oct. 1992)

+ 'Absence of Will': A commentary

+ The War in Abkhazia, 1992–1993: A Critical Response to G. Zhorzholiani’s “Reliable Facts”, by Aslan Avidzba

+ Full book: 'Mobilizing in Uncertainty: Collective Identities and War in Abkhazia'

During the first period of the war (14 August–2 October 1992), Abkhazia managed to break through the information blockade. In the wartime capital of Gudauta, publication of the newspaper Republic of Abkhazia was established, along with broadcasting by Abkhaz television and radio. The special role of Supreme Council deputy Yuri N. Voronov should be noted in this regard.

One of the most significant political events of this period was the Moscow meeting of 3 September 1992. Its Final Document provided for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia and did not stipulate the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia. This was the result of collusion between the leaderships of Georgia and Russia, whereby the participants exerted pressure on Vladislav Ardzinba to compel him to sign a document fundamentally unfavourable to Abkhazia.

On 25 September 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze addressed the United Nations, appealing for assistance from the international community and accusing Russia of aggression against Georgia. On the same day, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation adopted the Resolution “On the Situation in the North Caucasus in Connection with the Events in Abkhazia.” It should be noted that all subsequent documents adopted by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation referred back to the Resolution of 25 September 1992.

The second period of the war began with the Gagra operation of the Abkhaz militia (code-named “Storm”), during which Gagra was liberated on 2 October, and by 06:40 on 6 October 1992 the entirety of north-western Abkhazia had been freed.

The Gagra operation was of crucial military significance; however, it neither did nor could bring about a decisive turning point in the war as a whole. After Gagra, the enemy retained a substantial advantage in armaments and military equipment and continued to control a significant portion of Abkhaz territory. From the conclusion of the Gagra operation until early July 1993, a period of relative stabilisation of the fronts ensued. Throughout this time, continuous positional fighting took place, and offensive operations were undertaken by both Georgian and Abkhaz forces.

Notable Abkhaz operations on the Gumista front included the First Shroma operation (November 1992), the January and March operations (1993); on the Eastern front, the Ochamchira operation (26 October 1992), the Kochar operation (November 1992), and the Labra operation (March 1993). Georgian operations on the Eastern front included the December operation (1992), the February operation (1993), as well as numerous offensive actions across various sectors of the Eastern front. However, all these operations were local in outcome and did not lead to a strategic change in the overall situation on the fronts of the Patriotic War.

On 11 October 1992, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia were established; on 17 May 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia was created.

On the night of 1–2 July 1993, with the landing of the Tamish amphibious force on the Eastern front and a diversionary manoeuvre on the Gumista front, the July operation of the Abkhaz Army commenced. During this operation, advancing forces liberated populated areas and seized the commanding heights overlooking Sukhum, forcing the Georgian side to agree to the signing on 27 July in Sochi of a document providing for the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia.

However, neither the activities of the Joint Commission, which began work on 6 August in Sukhum, nor meetings between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (23 August) and Vladislav Ardzinba (24 August) were able to prevent an escalation of hostilities. Early in the morning of 16 September, the September operation began. During its course, on 27 September at 15:03, Abkhaz forces captured the Government House, the last centre of resistance of the occupiers in Sukhum. On 30 September, as the offensive developed, by 20:00 the Abkhaz army reached the Ingur River, the state border between Abkhazia and Georgia, where the State Flag of the Republic of Abkhazia was raised.

During the war in Abkhazia, combat operations took place along three strategic directions:

The Gagra Front existed from 15 August to 6 October 1992. Its territory extended from the Black Sea coast to the Main Caucasus Range, with a front length of approximately 50 km. The front ceased to exist following the Gagra operation of the Abkhaz people’s militia.

The Gumista Front ran along the Gumista River and existed from 18 August 1992 to 29 September 1993. Its length was 85 km prior to the July operation and 60 km thereafter. Formation of the front began after the retreat of Abkhaz militia from the Red Bridge in Sukhum. On 29 September 1993, fighters of the Gumista and Eastern fronts met on the Kodor River, after which the Gumista front ceased to exist.

The Eastern Front existed from 14 August 1992 to 30 September 1993, with a length exceeding 200 km. Combat operations took place primarily in the Ochamchira district (90%), as well as in the Gulripsh and Gal districts, across elevations from Mount Khodzhal and the Kodor Range to the Black Sea coast.

Among the military commanders who made a significant contribution to the formation of the Abkhaz Army and its victory over Georgian aggressors were Sultan Sosnaliyev, Sergei Dbar, Vladimir Arshba, Mushni Khvartskiya, Aslan and Astan Zantaria, Givi Agrba, Vladimir Antsupov, and others.

A total of 18,150 people participated on the Abkhaz side in the Patriotic War. Of these, 13,970 were direct participants in combat operations, while 4,180 served in rear units. Approximately 7,000 were wounded during the war, with irrecoverable losses amounting to up to 2,000 individuals.

The volunteer movement in support of Abkhazia was subjected to systematic attacks; volunteers were labelled mercenaries. At the height of hostilities, on 7 July 1993, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia approved the Regulations on Volunteers. For Abkhazia, the significance of the volunteer movement cannot be overstated; the memory of the volunteers constitutes one of the most cherished relics of the Abkhaz people. 15 August, the day the first volunteers arrived in Gudauta, is observed in Abkhazia as Volunteer Day (since 8 August 2013).

Among the organisers and leaders of the volunteer movement, particular mention should be made of Yuri Kalmykov, Musa Shanibov, and Yusup Soslambekov.

By the will of fate, the scholar Vladislav Ardzinba was destined to become a politician, a conductor of a course aimed at realising the right of the Abkhaz people to self-determination. He served as a deputy of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia (1988–1990); a People’s Deputy of the USSR and the Supreme Council of the USSR; Chairman of the Sub-Commission on the State and Legal Status of Autonomous Entities of the Supreme Council of the USSR; and a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR (1989–1991). On his initiative and with his direct participation, a number of laws and constitutional amendments were developed and adopted, securing the sovereign state status of former autonomous republics.

On 24 December 1990, Vladislav Ardzinba was elected Chairman of the 11th Convocation of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, and on 6 January 1992, Chairman of the 12th Convocation. On 14 August 1992, the day of Georgia’s armed aggression against Abkhazia, he addressed citizens with an appeal to defend the Motherland and assumed leadership of the Abkhaz resistance as Chairman of the State Defence Committee (18 August 1992) and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia (8 January 1993).

+ The Georgian Press on the Position of the Georgian Population of Abkhazia During the Georgian-Abkhazian War (1992–1993), by Daur Achugba

+ Estonian Orientalist Linnart Mäll and his role in activities of the UNPO during the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, by Aivar Jürgenson

+ On the eve of the Victory: the meeting of the Western and Eastern fronts on the Kodor bridge

+ How there was an attempt to stop the Georgian-Abkhazian war in Moscow’s 'President Hotel'?

Vladislav Ardzinba was the first President of the Republic of Abkhazia (26 November 1994–12 February 2005), elected twice (26 November 1994 and 3 October 1999). During the Ardzinba era, the foundations of the Abkhaz state and the basis for its international recognition were laid. To assess an individual’s contribution to history, it is insufficient merely to enumerate what they did; it is also necessary to understand how and under what conditions they were compelled to act. What in one context can be achieved only at the cost of one’s life may, in other circumstances, require no effort at all.

Following its defeat in Abkhazia, Georgia was forced to return to the mainstream of Russian policy and abandon its Western orientation, demonstrating the global geopolitical consequences of the Abkhaz army’s victory in September 1993. The outcomes of the war were enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, adopted on 26 November 1994.

14 August, the day marking the outbreak of the war in Abkhazia, was declared the Day of Remembrance of the Defenders of the Fatherland (29 December 1995); 30 September, the day of the expulsion of the aggressors from Abkhaz territory, was declared a state holiday, the Day of Victory and Independence (26 September 2002).

The geopolitical factor that served as the principal detonator of the processes that triggered the war in Abkhazia, and which never entirely disappeared from the main stage, has once again become salient today, thirty years after the events under review, acquiring a new dimension. The Republic of Abkhazia, like the entire region and indeed the whole world, has already entered a zone of turbulence. This poses new global challenges, and, judging by all indications, new trials lie ahead. One can only hope that Abkhazia will pass through them with dignity, without losing face or the achievements it has secured.