On the Question of the History of Studying Georgian-Abkhazian Relations, by Aslan F. Avidzba

In this incisive historiographical critique, Aslan Avidzba examines the methodological approach and political assumptions underlying Svetlana Chervonnaya’s Abkhazia – 1992: Post-Communist Vendée. Focusing on interpretations of the July 1989 events and the 1992–1993 war in Abkhazia, the author challenges what he regards as tendentious narratives that invert the roles of aggressor and victim. Situating the debate within broader questions of self-determination, historical responsibility, and scholarly integrity, Avidzba offers a forceful defence of the Abkhaz position and a critical reassessment of influential external scholarship.

Translated by AbkhazWorld.

On the Question of the History of Studying Georgian-Abkhazian Relations
(Some Remarks on S[vetlana]. Chervonnaya’s Work “Abkhazia – 1992: Post-Communist Vendée”)

Aslan F. Avidzba
Head of the Department of Source Studies, Abkhazian Institute for Humanitarian Studies named after D.I. Gulia, Academy of Sciences of Abkhazia; Candidate of Historical Sciences.

Аамҭақәа реиқәҿыҭра / Dialogue of Times / History. Traditions. Culture.
Historical and Cultural Almanac.
Issue No. 1.
Sukhum: AbIGI; “House of Print,” 2016.
pp. 250–256.

Long before the Patriotic War in Abkhazia (the 1992–1993 Georgian-Abkhaz War), Georgian politicians, historians, writers, and journalists had begun actively persuading both their own people and the international community that Abkhazia was an “ancient Georgian land.” In this connection, it seems appropriate to recall the recognised humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam, who was deeply concerned with the problems of war and peace. In one of his works, speaking in the voice of the persecuted “Peace,” he wrote:

“Good books make men; philosophy makes more than men; theology makes gods. I was sure that I would find rest among the learned after so many trials. But alas, a new disappointment! Here too the same war is waged, though in another form, not so bloody; yet no less senseless and irrational.”[1]

The final part of this passage is directly applicable to the book by the Russian scholar S. Chervonnaya[2], Abkhazia – 1992: Post-Communist Vendée. Any attentive reader cannot fail to notice that the author’s evaluations and conclusions are invariably tendentious: in every confrontation, the uncivilised Abkhaz are portrayed as guilty, while the educated and patriotic Georgians appear as their victims.

Already in the title of her work, the author imposes upon readers an association between the events in French Vendée[3] and the Patriotic War in Abkhazia. Yet nearly two centuries separate these events, and they differ fundamentally in character, aims, objectives, and driving forces. Through repeated clichés, the reader is led to believe that "illiterate Abkhaz," allegedly prompted by the Kremlin or some other shadowy force, sought to seize a desirable portion of Georgian land from mild and gracious Georgians. Such a construction stems from Chervonnaya’s overarching aim: to justify the policy of Georgia, which committed aggression against Abkhazia.

Any reasoning or opinion that does not conform to her conception of Georgian–Abkhaz relations is summarily dismissed as “utterly stupid” or “absurd.”

Moreover, Chervonnaya declares that the Abkhaz allegedly hired her “to provide scholarly cover for the positions of this (Abkhaz – A.A.) separatism by reference to the authority of Moscow scholars.”[4] Despite this claim, she subsequently produced a book directed against these same “separatists,” thereby presenting herself as a model of integrity and incorruptibility.

It is worth noting that Chervonnaya arrived in Abkhazia on 10 August 1992, and the book in question was published on 1 August 1993, less than a year later, and while the war was still ongoing. This fact further demonstrates the author’s intention not to present an objective account of events, but rather to “illuminate the darkness, even if only with a small ray of truth.”[5]

As a result, Georgian politicians, scholars, and writers, both contemporaneous and subsequent[6], have considered it their duty to cite Chervonnaya’s work whenever portraying the Abkhaz in an unfavourable light or accusing them of wrongdoing. During the Soviet period, Georgian public figures regarded reference to the Treaty of Georgievsk[7] as a mark of good form; today, among certain retired politicians and active writers and scholars, reference to Chervonnaya has assumed a similar function.

Her book has become not merely a characteristic work “exposing” “Abkhaz extremists,” but also a foundational source for Russian, Western, and other authors who seek, once again in history, to substantiate Abkhaz “guilt.”

The book is preceded by a brief foreword by K. Dzebisashvili, who writes:

“The book impresses with the volume of analysed material and the knowledge of the smallest details and nuances of ethnopolitical processes in Georgia and specifically in Abkhazia. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the author’s desire not to appear as an accuser of Abkhaz ethno-chauvinism, but to attempt to reveal the hidden mechanisms that led to the tragic denouement—the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict—in the region. P.S. Many thanks to the author for professionalism, objectivity, and impartiality. I recommend that all so-called ‘experts’ on the Georgian–Abkhaz problem acquaint themselves with this book.”[8]

From the outset, therefore, the author is proclaimed a source of truth unknown to the “experts”—that is, anyone who does not share Chervonnaya’s viewpoint, which coincidentally aligns with that of the then Georgian authorities.

Chervonnaya treats Gamsakhurdia with the same hostility as Shevardnadze[9], yet when discussing Gamsakhurdia’s confrontation with the Abkhaz, she portrays him as a fighter for justice. It would seem that for Chervonnaya, all who oppose the Abkhaz are commendable. It is perplexing that a scholar who has written extensively on the right of peoples to self-determination should adopt the opposite stance in the case of the Abkhaz.

She fails to recognise that the realisation of the Abkhaz people’s right to self-determination was essential not merely for dignified existence, but for survival itself. If she understood this and nevertheless opposed it, then she was not mistaken but effectively supported the idea of their physical extermination, an assertion she herself dismisses as absurd and fabricated.

Georgian writers R. Miminoshvili and G. Pandjikidze, preparing a response to the "Abkhaz separatists" regarding the Lykhny Appeal "on behalf and by instruction" of the Georgian Writers' Union, called the events of 15–16 July in Sukhum a "well-thought-out and planned action," which, "to the shame of the entire Abkhaz people, was masterfully and not-so-covertly directed by Abkhaz party workers, writers, scholars, and representatives of the intelligentsia."[10] Developing the idea of these Georgian writers, Chervonnaya asserts that the July events marked the beginning of war by the Abkhaz. She writes: "After this, apparently, a carefully developed plan of military action was to come into force, calculated for prolonged, exhausting confrontation. And it began to be implemented. Impassive border guards recorded: '...during the day of 16 July and the night of 17 July 1989 in the city of Gudauta, unimpeded loading onto pleasure boats was organised of persons armed with cold steel, firearms, including combat automatic weapons, as well as bottles with incendiary mixture... clubs, metal rods, etc. On six pleasure boats from the city of Gudauta, approximately 900 people were dispatched to the city of Ochamchira.'"[11] Yet this interpretation ignores the factual context: at the time, Sukhum and the coastal strip were effectively controlled by Georgian informal formations, and Abkhaz civilians could not safely move through these territories. Transport by sea was a defensive necessity, not preparation for aggression.

The People’s Forum of Abkhazia, in its appeal of 20 July to the Commander of the USSR Internal Troops, Y. Shatalin, stated plainly that “a clearly planned action to destroy the Abkhaz people is underway.”[12]

Chervonnaya also defends General G. Lominadze as a democrat committed to legality[13]. However, the Parliament of Abkhazia had repeatedly declared his performance unsatisfactory. Lominadze contributed to the politicisation and fragmentation of law enforcement bodies along ethnic lines and failed to restrain unlawful armed formations. He himself later acknowledged that he did not obstruct the introduction of Georgian troops, despite foreseeing the consequences.[19]

Chervonnaya claims that V. Ardzinba and his supporters provoked the war.[14] Yet the historical fact remains: on 14 August 1992, Georgian troops entered Abkhazia and were halted near the Abkhaz capital. Abkhaz formations did not invade Georgian territory.

As G. Lominadze himself admitted:

“I agreed to the introduction of troops because Abkhazia was already lost. But the army should not have entered in such a manner. … I knew what kind of army we had. But I did not think we would be so shameless. … It was horror. Everyone was carrying off what they had looted, whether guardsman or Mkhedrioni.”[19]

Thus, it was E. Shevardnadze and his political associates who initiated the war, not V. Ardzinba.

Chervonnaya’s reasoning further reveals its inconsistency: the overthrow of the legally elected Gamsakhurdia is deemed acceptable, yet Ardzinba’s attempt to defend his people from forced assimilation and physical disappearance is condemned. By her logic, Shevardnadze is a great democrat, while Ardzinba—whom she calls “the greatest national-separatist”—is an adventurist and militarist.

In reality, V. Ardzinba was the Abkhaz response to a historical challenge: a figure who appeared at the necessary time and place, who became the embodiment of a national liberation movement, and who preserved his small country in an indifferent international environment, bearing with dignity the banner of his people’s honour.

+ Review of Svetlana Chervonnaya: Conflict in the Caucasus. Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow, by George Hewitt

+ Mobilizing in Uncertainty: Collective Identities and War in Abkhazia, by Anastasia Shesterinina

+ 'Absence of Will': A commentary, by Metin Sonmez

+ The Georgian–Abkhaz War of 1992–1993: Recognition, Agency, and the Politics of Narrative Power

+ The Hand of Moscow and the Sterility of Geneva, by Izida Chania

Postscript

In 1999, a small work by S. M. Chervonnaya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia – 1999: Election of the Head of the Republic, was published in Moscow under the imprint of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In the biographical note preceding the text, alongside her status as Honorary Professor of Tbilisi State University, it is stated that she is a “Laureate of the State Prize of the Republic of Abkhazia.”[20]

This biographical "fact" does not correspond to reality.

It appears to have been included to demonstrate her supposed standing in Abkhaz academic circles and thereby mislead the scholarly community. This episode serves as further evidence of the author’s lack of academic scrupulousness and her willingness to distort, even falsify, facts.

Footnotes 

[1] Erasmus of Rotterdam. The Complaint of Peace. Translated by F. L. Mendelson. Moscow, 1991.
// http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov_Buks/Philos/erazm/galmir.Php

[2] Svetlana Mikhailovna Chervonnaya was born in 1937 in Moscow. Doctor of Historical Sciences; expert in art history and national minorities. For more than ten years, Svetlana Chervonnaya has lived in Poland. Her father, Mikhail (Mieczysław) Bonch-Tarnakovsky—a Polish prince—changed his surname and nationality, adopting as his new surname the party pseudonym “Chervonny.”

[3] Vendée is a department in France, which appeared on the map of the country in 1789. Its distinct history effectively began in March 1793. Since then, it has become customary to call “Vendée” those areas of the civil war that encompassed the territories of the departments of Vendée, Maine-et-Loire, Loire-Atlantique, and Deux-Sèvres. The Wars in the Vendée were the war of the government of France against the uprising in the western provinces of the country in the 18th century and during the Directory. They took their name from the department of Vendée—the main centre of the uprising in 1793.

[4] http://conflicts.rem33. com/images/abkhazia/Czerwonna%201.htm

[5] Kiknadze, V. “Light and Shadow of Svetlana Chervonnaya’s Book.” // 25. 09. 2012
http://rus.expertclub. ge/portal/cnid__12631/alias__Expertclub/lang__ru/tabid__2546/default. Aspx

[6] Shevardnadze, E. When the Iron Curtain Fell. Moscow, 2009; Z. Papaskiri. Abkhazia. A History Without Falsification. Tbilisi, 2010; Marshania, L. “The Truth About the Tragedy of Abkhazia.” 2006 // http://abkhazeti.info/war/2006012615534334124225. php; D. Jodzhua in his sections in the book Essays on the History of Georgia. Abkhazia. Tbilisi, 2009; and others.

[7] The Treaty of Georgievsk is a Russo–Georgian agreement. It was signed in Georgievsk on 24 July 1783. It was drawn up on the basis of three documents:

1. the petition of King Irakli dated 30 December 1771;
2. the obligation of the Kartli–Kakheti court from 1772;
3. Catherine II’s decree to Grigory Potemkin (late 1782 – early 1783).
   The treaty itself consisted of four independent documents: 13 main articles, 4 independent [articles], one additional [document], and a sample oath. They were signed separately.

[8] http://www.biblus.ru/Default.aspx?mode=op&bk=765l0a3v0&id=3496

[9] Over time, this position of hers ceased to satisfy many Georgian authors. In particular, the Director of the Ivane Javakhishvili Institute of History and Ethnology, V. Kiknadze, wrote the following in 2012:
“ The author presents herself as a clear, unwavering apologist of Eduard Shevardnadze. Svetlana Chervonnaya is convinced that only he is a democratic leader and saviour of Georgia—while she considers the supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia reactionaries and ‘neo-fascists’ … One can only regret that the author, having clearly experienced the influence of a significant part of the Georgian intelligentsia of that time, was unable to avoid in her work crude errors and assessments.”
Kiknadze, V. “Light and Shadow of Svetlana Chervonnaya’s Book.” /http:// rus. expertclub. ge/portal/cnid__12631/alias__Expertclub/lang__ru/tabid__2546/default. Aspx

[10] Miminoshvili, R.; Pandzhkidze, G. The Truth About Abkhazia. Tbilisi, 1990. p. 5.

[11] Chervonnaya, S. Abkhazia – 1992: Post-Communist Vendée //http://conflicts.rem33. com/images/abkhazia/Czerwonna%204.htm

[12] Lezhava, G. “The Political Situation in the Georgian SSR and the Abkhaz Question (1987–1992)” // http://abkhazia.narod. ru/leghava.htm

[13] Chervonnaya, S. Abkhazia – 1992… //http://conflicts.rem33. com/images/abkhazia/Czerwonna%206.htm.

[14] Chervonnaya, S. Abkhazia – 1992… //http://conflicts.rem33. com/images/abkhazia/Czerwonna%204.htm

[15] Kiknadze, V. “Light and Shadow of Svetlana Chervonnaya’s Book.” // 25. 09. 2012
http://rus.expertclub. ge/portal/cnid__12631/alias__Expertclub/lang__ru/tabid__2546/default.Aspx

[16] Aleksandrov, M. V. “Historiography of Russia’s Policy in the Georgian–Abkhaz and Georgian–Ossetian Conflicts in 1991–2006” // The Battle for the Caucasus. 2004–2088. Moscow, 2010. pp. 666–667.

[17] Khagba, V. Georgia’s Aggression and International Law. Gagra, 1995. p. 11.

[18] Chervonnaya, S. Abkhazia – 1992… // http://conflicts.rem33. com/images/abkhazia/Czerwonna%207.htm

[19] Newspaper Republic of Abkhazia, No. 25, 5–6 March 1998.

[20] Chervonnaya, S. M. Karachaevo-Cherkessia – 1999: Election of the Head of the Republic. Moscow, 1999. p. 1.