Former Defence Minister of Georgia: On the War and the Situation Around Abkhazia (1992–1993), by Stanislav Lakoba

Editor's/Translator's Note:

Stanislav Lakoba published this article on 14 August 2012, marking the 20th anniversary of the start of Georgia's war against Abkhazia. It was first published on ApsnyPress and later republished by apsnyteka.org. It is translated into English here by AbkhazWorld.

Levan Sharashenidze (1931 to 2012) ran Georgia's Ministry of Defence in the months before the war. He later became Shevardnadze's own liaison to the Russian military, which put him right in the middle of the decisions, and the missed decisions, that shaped how the conflict played out. His memoir came out in Tbilisi in 2006, in a tiny print run. It's a rare inside account from within Georgia's own military and political leadership, and it carries real weight for one simple reason: Sharashenidze wasn't a political opponent settling scores. He was one of Shevardnadze's own loyal appointees. Lakoba leans mainly on Sharashenidze's testimony, along with the independent findings of Georgian historian Zurab Papaskiri, rather than relying only on Abkhaz sources. That's a deliberate choice. It means the case against Shevardnadze, that he bore primary responsibility for the war and was willing to trade Abkhazia for Georgia's CIS membership, comes from Georgians who sat inside the decision-making room themselves. Read alongside Shevardnadze's own pleading letter to Yeltsin from 26 September 1993, translated in full below, Sharashenidze's account gives a rare view of the war's final months from inside the losing side's own command structure.

The poet Nikolai Glazkov once put it succinctly about the twentieth century:

I view the world from beneath the table, The twentieth century — a century unlike any other. The more absorbing it is for the historian, The sadder it is for the one living through it!

Today, too, we recall events now consigned to the past, to the twentieth century, when wars, conflicts and clashes flared up across the territory of the former USSR… One of the bloodiest events of that century was the war unleashed by Georgia against Abkhazia. The Tbilisi authorities tried to blame our country's leadership for what had happened. From the very outset Shevardnadze concocted various pretexts, versions and reasons for why the State Council's troops had invaded Abkhazia, hinting all the while that his defence minister, Tengiz Kitovani, was to blame for what had happened. Yet the testimony of many Georgian military and political figures indicates that the war began above all on the personal initiative of Eduard Shevardnadze himself. Sufficiently weighty grounds for this are found in the memoirs of, for example, such generals as Z[urab]. Mamulashvili, G[ivi]. Lominadze and others, who have repeatedly been cited by Abkhaz politicians and historians.

Then, in 2006, I learned that a small book, Заметки десантника-комиссара (Notes of a Paratrooper-Commissar), had been published in Tbilisi in a minuscule print run, almost as samizdat. Its author was General Levan Sharashenidze, one of Shevardnadze's closest confidants, who headed Georgia's Ministry of Defence from January to May 1992. During this period he travelled to Sukhum on a number of occasions and held negotiations with Vladislav Ardzinba. General Sharashenidze's memoirs are, one might say, a precious source, for they set out all the emphases of this military adventure and name the person chiefly responsible for the war unleashed in 1992. Here is what he writes about the events on the eve of the invasion:

"…During this period E. A. Shevardnadze did not once meet with V. G. Ardzinba, although the latter was willing to meet, even to come to Tbilisi. I had several meetings with Ardzinba, and I can confirm this, as well as the fact that the Abkhaz leadership at that time viewed Shevardnadze's return to Georgia favourably and placed certain hopes in it. In any case, negotiations with the Abkhaz leadership could and should have been conducted by E. A. Shevardnadze himself, [but] for some reason he stalled and made his meeting conditional on certain terms. During this period, May–June 1992, I met with Ardzinba four times and can confirm all of the above. After each meeting I reported in great detail to Shevardnadze, including on Ardzinba's readiness to meet with him" [1].

It would appear that such a peacemaking minister did not suit the moment and was replaced in May 1992 by the criminal Tengiz Kitovani. It is entirely evident that Shevardnadze, with his delusions of grandeur, had already settled on his script: a forcible solution to the Abkhaz problem. At the same time he was still wary of Moscow's reaction, since he wanted, figuratively speaking, to enter Abkhazia without entering the CIS. Yet Georgia's accession to the CIS was the principal condition for Shevardnadze's return to Tbilisi, which he could only achieve with the Kremlin's military-political backing. Having taken charge of Georgia's State Council, Shevardnadze began manoeuvring and dragging out the question of CIS accession. His deputy at the time, J. Ioseliani, responding to his chief's obstinacy over the CIS, remarked prophetically:

"If Moscow sneezes, we'll get double pneumonia. What are you playing at?" Shevardnadze replied: "First we must settle matters with Abkhazia" [2].

It is worth noting that Sharashenidze's view of the invasion of Abkhazia was in fact corroborated by the Georgian historian Zurab Papaskiri. He criticises Shevardnadze's actions during the deployment of troops into Abkhazia, where, he writes, "the situation was extremely tense" and "Georgia's leadership should have acted with the utmost caution." Papaskiri continues:

"What do we mean by this? In our view, the head of state should not have contented himself with mere telephone conversations with Ardzinba. He should have gone to Sukhumi himself, met with him in person, and obtained from him… official consent for the deployment of the Republic of Georgia's forces into Abkhazia. Unfortunately, however, none of this was done; Shevardnadze's political instincts plainly failed him, and he did not take what would, by the standards of the time, undoubtedly have been an extraordinary step" [3].

General Sharashenidze also offers his own succinct assessment of the military events: "The entry into Abkhazia began on 14 August," he writes, "and Shevardnadze, who had arrived on 7 March and thus had more than five months at his disposal — a politician and diplomat of such high standing, failed to prevent the war. This unprepared, ill-supported incursion was undertaken, of course, with the consent of E. A. Shevardnadze, from which he subsequently distanced himself" [4].

All these adventurist actions of Shevardnadze's reflected other, deeper geopolitical processes, which General Sharashenidze mentions only in passing. The principal question for Georgia at the start of 1992 remained that of CIS accession. This was, in a sense, a test for Shevardnadze. He duly promised Moscow to resolve the matter favourably, and arrived in Tbilisi on 7 March 1992. Important events had preceded this.

In January and February, Georgia's defence minister, Sharashenidze, met twice with Shevardnadze in Moscow. By this time, the choice had already been made in his favour, both in Russia and in Georgia. Thus, on 14 February 1992, the Second Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the CIS countries took place in Minsk. The Georgian delegation was led by Sharashenidze, who agreed the text of his speech with Shevardnadze by telephone during the night. "He approved it and asked me to stop in Moscow after the summit to meet with him," writes the then defence minister. In his three-minute address in Minsk, Sharashenidze stated, among other things:

"The question of Georgia's accession to the CIS will be decided by parliament once it is elected.

I wish to report that we are restoring good relations with the Transcaucasus Military District's forces stationed on Georgian territory. We have lifted their status as an occupying force. We naturally reserve the right to participate in the discussion of all questions concerning the Army and the Black Sea Fleet.

We would ask that in future the relevant Georgian officials be invited to attend CIS sessions as observers" [5].

It should be noted that Georgian representatives, whether wittingly or not, misled Russia's leadership, speaking of Georgian officials' involvement in the CIS only in an observer capacity. On returning from Minsk, Sharashenidze met with Shevardnadze in Moscow and gave him a detailed account of the CIS summit. At the same time, a further meeting was arranged at which the question of his return to Georgia was to be decided [6].

In February 1992, concurrently with the CIS summit, a detachment of Georgia's National Guard under the command of Captain G[iorgi]. Karkarashvili arrived in Sukhum, accompanied by several armoured vehicles. The Supreme Council of Abkhazia, almost unanimously (including the ethnic-Georgian deputies who supported Zviad Gamsakhurdia), demanded that this detachment leave the republic's territory immediately. Particular indignation among Abkhazia's leadership and its multi-ethnic population was aroused by the fact that weapons and several BMP infantry fighting vehicles had been handed over to the Guard by a Russian airborne assault battalion stationed in Sukhum, in the Mayak district, shortly before the collapse of the USSR [7].

Today it is evident that all this took place against the backdrop of the Minsk CIS summit, and that Russia's leadership had decided to show Georgia the "carrot" of a few BMPs.

In accordance with the arrangements made in February, very important meetings with Shevardnadze took place in Moscow on 2 March. The negotiations were conducted by Defence Minister Sharashenidze and by Tengiz Kitovani, a member of Georgia's Military Council, who, together with Prime Minister T. Sigua, was, unlike Ioseliani, in no hurry to invite the USSR's former foreign minister to Georgia as head of state. The situation changed, however, after a five-hour conversation between Shevardnadze and Kitovani. This was followed by a two-hour conversation with the Russian Federation's Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, and with Russia's Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Lukin. A further meeting was held with the head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgeny Primakov. To all these individuals Shevardnadze gave a firm promise to join the CIS in the near future. This was, in essence, the principal condition set for Eduard Shevardnadze by Russia's leadership.

Sharashenidze, a participant in these important negotiations in Moscow on 2 March 1992, later remarked with disappointment:

"These conversations promised many positive changes in Russian–Georgian relations. Unfortunately, reality turned out otherwise.

On 7 March, Shevardnadze arrived in Tbilisi. From his very arrival, he stressed in his public statements that Georgia would pursue a pro-Western course, that its foreign policy priorities would above all be a strategic partnership with the United States, and that Georgia would not join the CIS. It is not hard to imagine what reaction this provoked in Russia and the other CIS countries" [8] — Sharashenidze rightly concludes.

At the end of March 1992, Georgia's defence minister met in the Kremlin with Russia's Vice-President, Alexander Rutskoy, and then with the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Yevgeny Podkolzin; however, the promised assistance in building up Georgia's armed forces was suspended. The question of CIS accession remained open.

Georgia was eager to obtain the weapons it needed, but under the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992, only CIS members were entitled to a military quota. For this reason, and also because of the continuing war in South Ossetia, the Tbilisi authorities could not lay claim to 220 tanks, artillery systems, combat aircraft and helicopters.

Following the Dagomys meeting and the decision to halt hostilities in South Ossetia, together with the Communiqué of 24 June 1992 [9], Yeltsin and Shevardnadze agreed on further cooperation. As a result of this "Dagomys deal," the Russian leadership violated the Tashkent Agreement and, as an exception, supplied Georgia with tanks, aircraft and other weaponry. The transfer of military equipment and ammunition was completed in late July and early August 1992. Shevardnadze once again assured Yeltsin that he would join the CIS as soon as he had resolved the Abkhazia problem "with little bloodshed" within two or three days.

Yeltsin continued to support Georgia's leader until 25 September 1992. On that day, Shevardnadze, addressing the UN General Assembly in New York, appealed to the West for help while accusing Russia. This speech, with its insulting remarks about the Abkhaz, unsettled many in the UN assembly hall. Yeltsin was irritated, and remarked to those around him, not without a touch of malice: "Shevardnadze fancies himself president of a great power, when in fact he doesn't even have a banana republic under him…" [10].

That same day, 25 September, the opposition Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a Resolution "On the Situation in the North Caucasus in Connection with the Events in Abkhazia," demanding the immediate withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazian territory and the restoration of the legitimate organs of power.

From New York, Shevardnadze flew to Moscow, but Yeltsin received him very coldly. Russia's leadership had become convinced that the Tbilisi leader had no intention whatsoever of joining the CIS. Their underestimation of this important geopolitical factor led Yeltsin and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev to realise that Shevardnadze and Kitovani were merely trying to make use of Russian military support. Thus, from the end of September 1992, the position of Russia's leadership towards Tbilisi became less clear-cut.

After the rout of Georgian forces at Gagra in October 1992, the Abkhaz authorities took control of the north-western border with Russia along the Psou River. By this time the situation had changed fundamentally. Georgia's State Council resolved to "move to active combat operations in Abkhazia." In this connection, two months after the war began, on 22 October, General Sharashenidze sent Shevardnadze a detailed memorandum with proposals on military matters [11]. He warned Georgia's leader of the consequences that hasty and ill-considered measures might bring. I shall not set out in detail the substance of this interesting memorandum, with its realistic assessment of the new balance of forces; I shall note only that its author states that "the situation has now shifted in the enemy's favour" and that the enemy "is forming an offensive grouping." He speaks of the possible encirclement of Sukhum and a strike on Ochamchira. "The forces on the Georgian side," Sharashenidze notes, "are scattered units, hastily assembled; there is no unified command." He proposes: "Abandon the offensive planned for the next two or three days in the Gudauta and Tkvarcheli directions, and concentrate instead on the defence of Sukhumi." Among his varied recommendations are some quite unexpected ones with an environmental slant: "together with scientists from the Georgian Technical University and other research centres, urgently prepare the use of directed explosions [with the aim of] artificially triggering mudslides in the gorges (should the need arise)."

As a result, notes Sharashenidze, the "large-scale offensive" planned for the end of October 1992 "was abandoned," but the measures he had proposed were not implemented either.

As is known, the Ceasefire Agreement was signed in Sochi on 27 July 1993. Sharashenidze took part in this meeting as chief military adviser to Georgia's Ministry of Defence. "I wish to draw attention to the fact," he writes, "that Shevardnadze then let slip a major chance to use Russian forces to prevent the loss of Abkhazia" [12].

What chance, in July 1993, is General Sharashenidze referring to?

It turns out that the Russian side had proposed at the time to station two Russian regiments in Sukhum, transfer the headquarters of the Joint Control Commission from Sochi to Sukhum, and bring a reinforced battalion with thirty BMPs into the city. In the general's view, these were realistic measures that could have saved Sukhum. The Georgian side, however, rejected these proposals. "Shevardnadze should not have allowed this," Sharashenidze concludes [13].

The general considered the events of the second half of September 1993 to be Shevardnadze's next tragic error. Judging by this eloquent testimony, one can see just how close to the abyss Abkhazia then stood. Behind our backs, a blatant trade-off was under way: Georgia was again being offered CIS accession in exchange for Abkhazia. It was only by a stroke of luck that the behind-the-scenes struggle and backroom games of the great powers failed to achieve their desired result. Objective circumstances proved stronger than certain subjective ambitions. Judge for yourselves, though. I give here, almost in full, the testimony of an eyewitness to those turbulent events:

"And here is another of his (Shevardnadze's — S. L.) major errors," notes Sharashenidze. "On 16 September, together with Defence Minister G. Karkarashvili, I was in Moscow with Russia's Defence Minister, P. S. Grachev. The meeting went well. Grachev promised weapons, equipment and every kind of assistance in ensuring the Abkhaz side fulfilled the terms of the ceasefire. That evening Karkarashvili flew back to Tbilisi, while I stayed in Moscow to work with Colonel-General Galkin on drawing up the regulation on the status of Russian forces in Georgia. By this time I had been appointed Deputy Minister of Defence for relations with the Russian Army.

On 17 September, the Abkhaz side, treacherously violating the Sochi truce agreements," Sharashenidze continues, "began combat operations in the Ochamchira direction, and a day later in the Sukhumi direction…

Shevardnadze telephoned me in Moscow and asked me to contact Grachev in order to have measures taken and the Abkhaz side halted. That day Grachev was in hospital, but late in the evening he flew to Adler together with the head of the Main Operational Directorate, and on 18 September he met there with Shevardnadze, Defence Minister Karkarashvili and Security Minister I. Batiashvili, at which meeting Grachev proposed bringing two Airborne Divisions — the Pskov and the Tula — into Georgia, with one of them subsequently to be deployed to Azerbaijan, for which they had the Azerbaijani side's agreement.

Karkarashvili reacted very painfully to this proposal, declaring that it would amount to a new occupation of Georgia and that he would resign, while Shevardnadze said nothing, thereby withholding his consent to the deployment of Russian forces. This is what Grachev himself told me, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, M. P. Kolesnikov, on his return from Adler," notes Sharashenidze. "…I telephoned Shevardnadze at once and reported this to him; he proposed that I fly immediately to Sukhumi with the draft status we had prepared for Russian forces in Transcaucasia.

Late at night on 19 September I flew into the besieged city, where street fighting was under way on the outskirts. There was no unified command…

Past midnight I reached Shevardnadze and reported to him the draft status of Russian forces in Georgia, agreed with the Russian side, and asked him to accept Grachev's proposal to bring in the two divisions and to agree to CIS accession. Let's wait a couple of days, Shevardnadze replied.

Three days passed; on 23 September Shevardnadze announced his agreement to bring the airborne divisions into Abkhazia and asked me to telephone Grachev urgently and inform him of this. As for CIS accession, he said, we'll wait a little longer.

It was late, and I could not get through to Grachev; I reached the Chief of the General Staff, M. P. Kolesnikov, instead, who, having heard me out, said 'that train has left the station, we cannot move a single soldier anywhere,' since on 21 September the well-known events at the White House had begun — the Khasbulatov–Yeltsin confrontation… Thus another chance to avoid losing Abkhazia, and thousands of lives, was missed.

On the 24th, with the draft status of Russian forces in Georgia agreed with Shevardnadze, I flew to Moscow, and that same day met with the Chief of the General Staff, M. P. Kolesnikov, and handed him a letter addressed to Grachev" [14].

In this letter of 24 September, General Sharashenidze, acting on Shevardnadze's instructions, asked Russia's defence minister to return to the plan of 17 September 1993 previously rejected by Tbilisi, and to begin its urgent implementation by Russian army forces in order to halt the "bloodshed in Abkhazia" [15].

But the train, in truth, had already left.

Despite this, on 26 September 1993 Shevardnadze addressed a letter to Boris Yeltsin, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Pavel Grachev. In it, for the first time, Georgia's leader stated directly his readiness to join the CIS. It is worth noting that this historic document was sent from Sukhum, where Shevardnadze now found himself, in effect, a political hostage. Caught in the trap he had set for himself, he could not have imagined even in his worst nightmare that he would find himself, like a prisoner, begging Russia's leadership to save not only Georgia but his own life.

"A catastrophic situation has developed in Sukhumi, the danger of the city's fall is real," Shevardnadze reports, a day before the liberation of Abkhazia's capital. "Hand-to-hand fighting is taking place in the streets; hundreds of innocent people are dying.

The only salvation now lies in the immediate deployment, as peacekeeping forces, of airborne units stationed in Georgia.

This is the only way I can see of preventing an even greater tragedy. Speed is everything — tomorrow will be too late, for it is today, in these very hours and minutes, that the fate of the country is being decided.

In light of the above, I earnestly beg you, Boris Nikolayevich, to save Georgia.

I inform you, if it is of any significance now, that I have taken the decision for Georgia to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. We agree to bring into the conflict zone the military units proposed by General Pavel Grachev at the meeting in Sochi.

I ask you to make a decision without delay. This is my last hope, and the hope of my people.

With respect and hope,

E. Shevardnadze."

But no response came to this lament.

There is also no doubt that the course and outcome of the war would have been entirely different had Georgia joined the CIS from the outset, back in February–March 1992.

Despite various plans and circumstances, Abkhazia emerged victorious from this unequal struggle. Fortune and chance both smiled on her: the Abkhaz offensive (16–30 September 1993) coincided almost exactly with the Russian crisis (21 September–4 October), which ended in Moscow with the shelling of parliament. Russia thus had troubles of its own, and amid this turmoil, with Yeltsin fighting for power, he had no time to spare for Shevardnadze, who was enduring a genuine catastrophe in besieged Sukhum [16].

Finding himself in a hopeless position, and only after the rout in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze flew to Moscow. On 8 October 1993, a meeting took place there between Yeltsin and the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The following day, 9 October, Georgia joined the CIS, signing a Russian–Georgian agreement on Russian military bases in Georgia, including Poti. The Russian army took control of the Poti–Samtredia–Tbilisi railway [17].

"What we failed to do in good time," Sharashenidze lamented, "we did only after we had lost thousands of lives and our territorial integrity" [18].

Thus Abkhazia gained de facto independence, while Georgia, for a time, returned once more to Russia's sphere of influence.

It would be a mistake to suppose that Shevardnadze did not understand where his obstinacy over the CIS question might lead. As a politician, he was of course knowingly taking this risk. The question is, why? Because Shevardnadze had long since bound himself by serious commitments to the US leadership, which had decided on his return to Georgia after securing Moscow's support. Of such intricate schemes, the guileless General Sharashenidze apparently had no inkling. One eloquent but little-known fact deserves attention in this connection. It turns out that as early as February 1992 — the very month in which Sharashenidze spoke at the Minsk CIS summit — Shevardnadze departed urgently for the United States. During this visit he signed with the Brock Group Ltd a protocol on a strategic concept for Georgia's economic revival, which included expanding the network of oil terminals on the Black Sea, reconstructing the seaports at Poti and Batumi, and turning Batumi airport into an international one… [19].

+ Stanislav Lakoba: "If Yeltsin had been opposed, the war in Abkhazia would not have started"

+ Georgian-Abkhaz War | FBIS Reports (Aug-Oct. 1992)

+ East and West: between Hammer and Anvil, by Stanislav Lakoba

+ 'Absence of Will': A commentary

It should be particularly noted that at that point Shevardnadze was not yet Georgia's head of state at all, let alone entitled to sign any documents — still less a protocol of an international character — yet the world's behind-the-scenes powers had already resolved this problem for themselves. The former Soviet minister had succeeded in securing Washington's political and diplomatic backing. In this way, Shevardnadze became caught up in the great Western game surrounding the newly discovered, rich deposits of Azerbaijani oil. This was a prelude to the future Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which bypassed Russia and fitted the West's strategic plans to gain direct access to Caspian energy resources — a project first officially announced in 1994.

Such far-reaching goals, of course, were in no way compatible with Russia's project of tying Georgia to the CIS. This was so despite the fact that US Secretary of State James Baker had stated that Russia's policy in the early 1990s was following in the wake of American foreign policy. Yet Yeltsin's administration, under pressure from patriotic forces, occasionally allowed itself a degree of contrariness, particularly on the question of its "near abroad." Shevardnadze failed to take this into account; he relied too heavily on the United States and the West as a whole, and had no wish whatsoever to reckon with the Russian factor. Such ostentatious behaviour irritated Yeltsin, the military and parliament alike. As a result, Shevardnadze's self-assurance was punished, and Georgia met with disaster…

As for the coups d'état in Azerbaijan and Georgia against the elected presidents Elchibey and Gamsakhurdia, these went, as it were, unnoticed by the international community. These coups, in the view of the Belgian researchers Eric Remacle and Olivier Paye, "were simply acceptable to the great powers, and especially to Russia" [20].

In this connection, the deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia's own remark is of interest. "One might say," he declared, "that the military coup in Georgia was carried out from across the ocean, with James Baker's personal involvement and Bush's blessing" [21].

Russia's leadership, too, did not stand aside at the time, providing military-technical and financial support to the rebels [22], behind whom stood Shevardnadze together with his American friends. He had rendered them enormous services, connected above all with the break-up of the USSR, his unwarranted pliancy in surrendering the GDR and permitting German reunification, the hasty withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the ceding to the Americans of 50,000 square kilometres of the Bering Sea rich in bioresources and energy reserves, among other things. This is why Western leaders welcomed Shevardnadze's return to Tbilisi. Georgia at once emerged from international isolation: more than thirty states recognised it as an independent republic within a short period, and the United States and Canada stood ready to extend large loans. Moreover, despite the continuing war in South Ossetia, Georgia was admitted to the CSCE (now the OSCE) on 24 March 1992, and to the United Nations on 31 July — two weeks before the war against Abkhazia began. As these examples show, the leading Western powers' cynical policy of "double standards" found here its vivid embodiment.

Endnotes

[1] Sharashenidze, L., Заметки десантника-комиссара (Notes of a Paratrooper-Commissar), Tbilisi, 2006, pp. 76–77.

[2] Panorama Latvii (Panorama of Latvia), 1999, 9 October, No. 236; Lakoba, S., Абхазия – де-факто или Грузия де-юре? (Abkhazia — De Facto, or Georgia De Jure?), Sapporo, 2001, p. 25.

[3] Papaskiri, Z., Абхазия: история без фальсификаций (Abkhazia: History Without Falsification), Tbilisi, 2009, pp. 419–420.

[4] Sharashenidze, L., Notes…, p. 76.

[5] Sharashenidze, L., pp. 71–74.

[6] Ibid., p. 74.

[7] Lakoba, S., Восток и Запад: между молотом и наковальней (East and West: Between the Hammer and the Anvil). See: Республика Абхазия (Respublika Abkhazia), 1992, 29 February.

[8] Sharashenidze, L., pp. 74–75.

[9] Свободная Грузия (Svobodnaya Gruziya / Free Georgia), 1992, 27 June; Lakoba, S., Abkhazia — De Facto…, pp. 23–25.

[10] Завтра (Zavtra / Tomorrow), 2000, No. 39, p. 5.

[11] Sharashenidze, L., pp. 77–82.

[12] Ibid., p. 83.

[13] p. 87.

[14] pp. 87–89.

[15] pp. 90–91.

[16] Lakoba, S., Abkhazia — De Facto…, p. 78.

[17] Ibid., p. 83.

[18] Sharashenidze, L., p. 92.

[19] Chervonnaya, S., Абхазия – 1992: посткоммунистическая Вандея (Abkhazia 1992: A Post-Communist Vendée), Moscow, 1993.

[20] Спорные границы на Кавказе (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus), Moscow, 1996, p. 116.

[21] Свободная Грузия (Svobodnaya Gruziya), 1992, 1 December.

[22] Vasilyeva, O., Грузия как модель посткоммунистической трансформации (Georgia as a Model of Post-Communist Transformation), Moscow, 1993, p. 11.