The Abkhaz Principality in the Second Decade of the Nineteenth Century, by D. G. Tarba

This article examines the political structure and power dynamics of the Abkhaz Principality during the 1810s, analysing the limitations of Safarbey’s authority, internal elite divisions, and the competing pressures exerted by the Russian Empire and the Ottoman state in the aftermath of Abkhazia’s incorporation into Russia. Translated by AbkhazWorld.

Aamtaq’a / Vremena: Historical and Cultural Almanac
Research Centre Abkhazian Encyclopaedia; Abkhazian Historical Society
Editor-in-Chief: A. F. Avidzba
No. 3–4 (2024), pp. 78–82
Sukhum: House of Print

After the incorporation of the Principality of Abkhazia into the Russian Empire in 1810, during the initial period the ruling prince Safarbey relied on Rabia-khanum (the widow of Keleshbey) and her sons Hasanbey and Batalbey. In order to secure Hasanbey’s support, Safarbey “gave his son to him for upbringing (atalychestvo)” [1] (1811). It should be noted that during Safarbey’s absence from Abkhazia, Hasanbey fulfilled his duties.

Particularly noteworthy is the account of Paul Gibal, who observed that when a popular assembly of influential Abkhaz princes and nobles was held, and Prince Safarbey appeared accompanied by his brother Hasanbey, it was precisely Prince Hasanbey who would proceed to the large linden tree and take his place beneath it, where “certain elders would approach him one by one, leaving their retinue behind, and address him in a very respectful manner… Each of them, having spoken with the prince, would immediately return, and soon he would be surrounded by other nobles approaching in turn to converse with the prince…” [2]. This fact once again testifies to the preference shown by Abkhaz princes and nobles towards Prince Hasanbey and the weight accorded to his opinion.

It should be noted that the ruler of Mingrelia, Nina Dadiani, exerted influence over the policy pursued by the Russian Empire in Abkhazia. Thus, in 1811 the ruler of Mingrelia displayed considerable interest in events unfolding in Abkhazia. General Simanovich learned from the Mingrelian ruler that “during her stay in Abkhazia she met with Sefer-Ali-bey’s stepmother, Rabia-khanum, who, being the sister of the first Tsebelda prince Marshania, exerts great influence over the said people and promised to incline both her brother and the people to agree to become our subjects. At that time, the ruler brought Sefer-Ali-bey’s brothers, Soslan-bey and Ali-bey, and the most notable of those subject to them, to swear allegiance to us, taking hostages both from the former and the latter” [3].

The Russian command attempted to reach an agreement with the western Abkhaz communities; however, only the Tsandripsh prince Levan Tsanba, through the efforts of the Mingrelian ruler and Safarbey, “voluntarily submitted himself to the All-Russian Empire together with all those subject to him.” General A. P. Tormasov requested a salary and the rank of lieutenant colonel for the new loyal subject. According to the Tsarist authorities, this “would serve as an example to other independent societies likewise to seek the protection and allegiance of His Imperial Majesty and gradually unite the entire Abkhaz people under a single authority” [4].

In order to safeguard Abkhazia from attacks from the north-west by the restless Dzhigets, Safarbey even betrothed his second son, the future ruler of Abkhazia, Mikhail, to the daughter of the prince of the powerful Dzhiget tribe Art–Beslangur, Art-bey [5].

From a letter by General A. P. Tormasov to the ruler of Mingrelia, Levan Dadiani, it is evident that the Russian command sought to utilise Safarbey in establishing contacts with the Gelendzhik ruler Mamed Kalabat-ogly, who controlled the bay and was fortifying the coastline with artillery. According to the documents, the Tsarist generals wished “through the Abkhaz prince George Shervashidze to incline the owner of the Gelendzhik Bay to enter, together with his people, into the allegiance of the All-Russian Empire” [6].

Also noteworthy is the letter of the ruling prince of Abkhazia, Safarbey, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus, Marquis O. F. Paulucci (who replaced General A. P. Tormasov), dated 8 January 1812. In it, the ruler reminded the new official of the services he had already rendered to Emperor Alexander I and pointed to additional advantages. In particular, he noted that in the possession of Levan Tsanubay (Tsanba) “there is an excellent harbour… ships may anchor and take shelter there; secondly, in those places there grows an abundance of shipbuilding timber at no cost; and thirdly, if the Sovereign’s troops… are stationed here, it will be possible to attract and subdue the entire Dzhiget society” [7].

In 1813, the ruler of Samurzakani, Manuchar Chachba-Shervashidze, was killed, and at Safarbey’s request the Mingrelian ruler Levan Dadiani assumed guardianship over his children. He granted Levan a charter permitting him to collect tribute from Samurzakani until the children reached majority, on the condition that these revenues be used for their maintenance. In effect, Safarbey ceded Samurzakani to the Mingrelian prince, although formally it remained subordinate to the Principality of Abkhazia. This further aggravated Safarbey’s already unpopular position among the people, as he proved unable to defend Samurzakani against the claims of the Mingrelian ruler.

After the capture of Sukhum-Kale by Russian forces, a portion of the Abkhaz nobility that did not recognise Abkhazia’s incorporation into the Russian Empire, nor Safarbey as ruler, addressed a letter to Aslanbey. Aslanbey was supported by princely families such as the Maan, Lakrba, Artba, Inal-ipa, and others [8].

The first action undertaken by the Ottoman Empire after the seizure of Sukhum-Kale occurred in 1812, when an armed detachment was dispatched from Trabzon to Batum with the aim of reclaiming Imeretia, Mingrelia, Guria, and Abkhazia. This attempt proved unsuccessful. Aslanbey made several further unsuccessful efforts to retake Sukhum-Kale and restore himself as ruler of Abkhazia.

In 1813, an “extraordinary disturbance” occurred against George Shervashidze [9]. At this time, Aslanbey sought assistance from the Ottoman Sultan. Towards the end of 1813, a second offensive was launched. The Trabzon serasker Suleiman Pasha led Ottoman troops into Abkhazia in support of Aslanbey. Levan Dadiani and Mamia Gurieli joined their forces with a Russian detachment and hastened to assist Safarbey. After stubborn fighting, the serasker was repelled. A year later, a renewed attempt was undertaken: the reis-efendi Galib Pasha appealed to the Russian government [10], demanding the withdrawal of troops from Guria, Mingrelia, and Abkhazia and the transfer of these territories under the authority of the Sultan.

Abkhazia | 1763-1785: TheCaucasus around the Time of the Russian Conquests, by Arthur Tsutsiev (Map 3: 'Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus' by Arthur Tsutsiev; “Yale University Press”, 2014. 

Taking advantage of European events and the diversion of the main Russian forces towards the borders of France, the Ottoman Porte in 1815 intended to regain Transcaucasia. The Commander-in-Chief of the entire Eastern region, the Erzurum serasker Seid-Ibrahim Baba Pasha (also known as Pehlivan), in early July 1815 dispatched his official to Rtishchev with a demand to evacuate Russian troops from Imeretia, Guria, Mingrelia, and Abkhazia, and advanced with an army of 20,000 towards the borders of Georgia. From the other direction, the Trabzon serasker Seid-Suleiman Pasha advanced with a corps of 15,000 towards Guria and Mingrelia.

The Greek Metropolitan Theodosius, who was then in Erzurum and witnessed all of Pehlivan’s preparations, proved to be a reliable Russian spy. He disclosed Pehlivan’s plans to Rtishchev one and a half months before their implementation. Consequently, when Pehlivan advanced, he encountered obstacles everywhere. Moreover, at precisely that time Emperor Alexander I of Russia triumphantly entered Paris. All of this disrupted the plans of the Ottoman Porte, and the serasker, who had previously promised the Sultan to bring the Russian Black Sea coastal possessions under Turkish rule, altered his tone and hastily withdrew, avoiding a highly probable defeat [11].

Safarbey unsuccessfully attempted to use Rabia-khanum, the daughter of the influential Tsebelda prince, to influence the disobedient Tsebelda princes. In 1815, the princes Msoust, Salaur, and Zerepsu Marshania swore allegiance to the Russian Empire [12]; however, the majority of Tsebelda princes neither swore allegiance to Russia nor submitted to Safarbey.

From the materials presented above, it may be concluded that Safarbey’s authority in Abkhazia during the 1810s was weak. This is evidenced by Safarbey’s appeal to General Kurnatovsky: “I request that troops be given to me from the Dadiani possessions and also up to 300 mounted Imeretians, whom, joining my loyal subjects under my command, I shall compel that wild people to repent of their conduct…” [13]. At the same time, Kurnatovsky reported to General Stahl that G. Shervashidze had informed him of the “open disobedience of his people to him.” On 9 May 1818, Kurnatovsky irritably reported: “The Abkhaz ruler is in fact even weaker in governing his people than he himself writes… The principal reason for such disobedience is that the present ruler was confirmed in this title without further investigation into the loyalty of the Abkhazians to him, a mountain people, free and warlike, and difficult to govern, and who require a person possessing greater firmness and prudence” [14].

Understanding the prevailing situation, and at the same time taking into account that the incumbent ruler (according to the confirmed Charter) had the right to Russian patronage and protection, General I. Kurnatovsky deemed it necessary to satisfy Prince Safarbey’s request “regarding the provision of troops from the Mingrelians and Imeretians to establish peace and tranquillity…” [15].

In practice, Russian troops were not secure even within the Sukhum fortress. “The Abkhazians,” Captain Agarkov reported to Major-General Simonovich on 13 January 1811, “are so bold that they approach the fortress armed, sit in the bushes and fire at the soldiers, such that it is dangerous to step even 100 paces away from it” [16]. The population of Abkhazia was so agitated against the Russians that reports of Tsarist soldiers and Cossacks being killed from the forest by unknown assailants were frequent, and this continued until 1865.

In March 1818, the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus, General Yermolov, wrote to Emperor Alexander I that “to consolidate Russian rule in Abkhazia… it is necessary to bring Sukhum into a sound defensive condition and also to establish a fortification at Gagra, the occupation of which would sever Abkhazia’s communications with Anapa and the Trans-Kuban highlanders” [17]. However, this idea proved unfeasible. Even the Sukhum garrison faced serious difficulties, as the water supply had been destroyed during the storming of Sukhum-Kale in 1810. Fever broke out in the fortress, and half the soldiers perished annually.

+ The Struggle for Power in Abkhazia Between the Sons of Keleshbey Chachba (1808–1810), by D. G. Tarba

+ History: 18th Century-1917, by Stanislav Lakoba

+ On the Political and Ethnic History of Myrzakan (Samurzakano) in the 19th Century, By Denis Gopia

+ Abkhazia and The Caucasian War: 1810-1864, by George Anchabadze

By 1820, the imperial government resolved to withdraw Russian troops from Abkhazia altogether, but General Yermolov persuaded it to retain them. Explaining the importance of maintaining Russian authority, he noted that Sukhum was a Russian stronghold, “the only foothold on the eastern shore of the Black Sea.” “Abkhazia,” Yermolov further wrote to the minister, “in its present condition provides us with secure harbours, and Mingrelia is almost immune from predatory raids, for the Abkhazians are restrained by fear… The ruling princes of Mingrelia, Guria, and even the Imeretian princes, seeing the fate of Abkhazia, may in time expect the same for themselves and will in advance seek the favour of the Turks, demonstrating their devotion through endless disturbances, which the Turks, in turn, will not fail to support. With the cession of Sukhum Bay, maritime piracy will develop, and in a short time our merchant vessels will no longer dare to call at Redut-Kale; we shall lose supplies from Russia, be unable to defend our possessions, and then we shall lose not only Abkhazia” [18].

On 7 February 1821, the ruling prince of Abkhazia, Safarbey (George) Chachba-Shervashidze, died and was buried in the village of Lykhny. General F. F. Simanovich provided a revealing characterisation of him: “…George Shervashidze, who, although no less devoted to us than others, has not yet managed to acquire full strength and confidence among the Abkhaz people due to the treacherous intrigues of his brother… Arslan-bey… who seeks to achieve his aim through the patronage of the Turks…” [19].

The Abkhaz historian G. A. Dzidzaria characterised Safarbey’s rule as follows: “He was the most unpopular ruler Abkhazia has ever known.” The scholar further wrote: “…were it not for Russian assistance, Safar-bey would not have remained ruler for even nine days, let alone nine years…” [20].

Thus, from the foregoing it may be concluded that the authority of Safarbey and the Tsarist officials in Abkhazia during the 1810s was weak. Safarbey was unpopular in Abkhaz society and lacked sufficient independent resources to govern the Principality of Abkhazia in full. At the same time, Russian forces were insufficient to control the entire territory of Abkhazia. Aslanbey, the elder brother of Safarbey, continued attempts to restore his authority in Abkhazia. During the period under consideration, the Ottoman state made several attempts to recover territories lost in the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812, including Abkhazia. A portion of the Abkhaz nobility did not recognise Safarbey’s authority.

References

[1] G. A. Dzidzaria. Formirovanie dorevoliutsionnoi abkhazskoi intelligentsii (Formation of the Pre-Revolutionary Abkhaz Intelligentsia). Sukhum, 1979, p. 28.
[2] Materialy po istorii Abkhazii XIX veka (1803–1839) (Materials on the History of Abkhazia in the 19th Century (1803–1839)). Vol. 1. Sukhum, 2008, pp. 138–139.
[3] Antologiia pamiatnikov prava narodov Kavkaza. T. 30. Pamiatniki prava abkhozov (Anthology of Legal Monuments of the Peoples of the Caucasus. Vol. 30: Legal Monuments of the Abkhaz). Rostov-on-Don, 2017, p. 116.
[4] Materialy po istorii Abkhazii (1762–1859) (Materials on the History of Abkhazia (1762–1859)). Vol. 2. Sukhum, 2011, pp. 39–40.
[5] A. N. Diachkov-Tarasov. Abkhaziia i Sukhum v XIX stoletii (Abkhazia and Sukhum in the 19th Century). In: Antologiia pamiatnikov prava narodov Kavkaza. T. 30. Pamiatniki prava abkhozov (Anthology of Legal Monuments of the Peoples of the Caucasus. Vol. 30: Legal Monuments of the Abkhaz). Rostov-on-Don, 2017, p. 884.
[6] Materialy po istorii Abkhazii (1762–1859) (Materials on the History of Abkhazia (1762–1859)). Vol. 2. Sukhum, 2011, pp. 41–42.
[7] AKAK. Vol. 5. Tiflis, 1873, p. 101.
[8] Istoriia adygov v dokumentakh osmanskogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva. Vyp. 1 (History of the Adyghe in Documents of the Ottoman State Archive. Issue 1). Nalchik, 2009, p. 34.
[9] AKAK. Vol. 5. Tiflis, 1873, pp. 499–500.
[10] A. V. Fadeev. Rossiia i Kavkaz v pervoi treti XIX veka (Russia and the Caucasus in the First Third of the 19th Century). Moscow, 1960, p. 187.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Antologiia pamiatnikov prava narodov Kavkaza. T. 30. Pamiatniki prava abkhozov (Anthology of Legal Monuments of the Peoples of the Caucasus. Vol. 30: Legal Monuments of the Abkhaz). Rostov-on-Don, 2017, p. 130.
[13] AKAK. Vol. 6, Part 1. Tiflis, 1874, p. 644.
[14] Ibid.
[15] M. V. Gumba. Seferbei (Safarbey). Sukhum, 2017, p. 117.
[16] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 427.
[17] G. A. Dzidzaria. Zavoevanie Abkhazii tsarskoi Rossiei (The Conquest of Abkhazia by Tsarist Russia). Sukhum, 2014, p. 29.
[18] V. A. Potto. Utverzhdenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze (The Establishment of Russian Rule in the Caucasus). Vol. 3, Part 2. Tiflis, 1904, p. 546.
[19] V. A. Potto. Utverzhdenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze (The Establishment of Russian Rule in the Caucasus). Vol. 2. Tiflis, 1903, p. 520.
[20] AKAK. Vol. 5. Tiflis, 1873, p. 480.
[21] G. A. Dzidzaria. Zavoevanie Abkhazii tsarskoi Rossiei. In: Trudy. Vol. 3 (The Conquest of Abkhazia by Tsarist Russia. Collected Works, Vol. 3). Sukhum, 2006, p. 30.