The Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Abkhazian Uprising, by Giorgi Anchabadze

This study by Giorgi Z. Anchabadze examines the Abkhazian uprising of 1877 within the broader geopolitical framework of the Russo-Turkish War. Drawing upon Russian military records, contemporary press accounts, and documentary sources, the article analyses the intersection of imperial strategy, Ottoman intervention, and local resistance in Abkhazia.

Particular attention is given to the military course of operations in the Sukhum Military District, the role of muhajir detachments, the shifting loyalties of regional militias, and the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. The study further evaluates the aftermath of the uprising, including mass deportations, the designation of the Abkhaz as a “guilty population”, and the imposition of restrictive administrative measures that reshaped the demographic and political landscape of Abkhazia.

Written in a measured scholarly register, this article contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the Caucasian dimension of the war and its lasting impact on Abkhaz society.

Translated by AbkhazWorld

Aamtaq’a / Vremena: Historical and Cultural Almanac
Research Centre Abkhazian Encyclopaedia; Abkhazian Historical Society
Editor-in-Chief: A. F. Avidzba
No. 3–4 (2024), pp. 83–92
Sukhum: House of Print

The Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Abkhazian Uprising[1]

Prologue

The Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878 was precipitated by the rise of the national liberation movements among the Slavic peoples living within the Ottoman Empire and by the sharpening of international contradictions in the Near East. The Russian Empire, while sympathising with the South Slavs, simultaneously pursued its own strategic interests in the Balkans and in the region of the Black Sea Straits. When the Ottoman government effectively disrupted negotiations concerning reforms in favour of its Christian subjects, St Petersburg resolved to declare war.

During the period under consideration, Abkhazia, officially designated the Sukhum Military District following the abolition of the autonomous Abkhazian Principality in 1864, stood at a critical turning point in its development. For the first time in its centuries-long history, internal administration passed into the hands of outsiders who disregarded local traditions. Moreover, as a result of the Caucasian War (in the Western Caucasus, 1830–1864) and the Abkhazian uprising of 1866, the mountainous districts and the coast west of the River Bzyb had been completely “cleansed” of their indigenous population, who were compelled, following the cessation of hostilities, to resettle in the Ottoman Empire (approximately 40,000–45,000 migrants — muhajirs).

Despite severe repression and significant demographic decline, the authorities were unable to extinguish the rebellious spirit in Abkhazia. As early as 1876, it became necessary to form a special troop grouping — the so-called Sukhum Detachment — intended primarily “to maintain order among the Abkhaz population”. At the outbreak of war with Turkey, the Sukhum Detachment numbered 4,752 bayonets and sabres, supported by four mountain guns. It was subordinated to the head of the Sukhum Military District, Major-General Kravchenko. The forces also included the local Abkhaz militia — the Sukhum Irregular Cavalry Division under Colonel Prince Grigory Shervashidze (Chachba).

War was declared on 12 April 1877. Russian forces launched offensives on two principal land theatres: the Balkan front and the Caucasian–Asia Minor front. In the Black Sea, where naval superiority rested with the Ottomans (Russia having only begun restoring its fleet following the Crimean War of 1853–1856), operations were limited to coastal defence.

On the Balkan front, the main theatre of the war, the Russian army crossed the Danube and, after overcoming determined Ottoman resistance, advanced to the outskirts of Constantinople (January 1878). Its forward units stood within 12 kilometres of the capital when Alexander II, under pressure from European powers fearful of Russian access to the Straits, rescinded the order to occupy the city.

In Asiatic Turkey, Russian forces advanced to Erzurum, blockading this major military-administrative centre. The war concluded with the Treaty of San Stefano (later partially revised at the Congress of Berlin in 1878). Russia acquired Ardahan, Kars, and Batum in Transcaucasia, as well as southern Bessarabia at the Danube delta. The Ottoman Empire recognised the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, and granted autonomy to Bulgaria.

The outbreak of war stirred the Muslim population of the Caucasus, whose memory of the recent Russo–Caucasian War remained vivid. Ottoman emissaries agitated among the mountaineers, urging revolt and promising imperial support. Such appeals fell upon fertile ground among communities burdened by taxation and administrative pressures.

Armed uprisings broke out in several regions of the North Caucasus — Dagestan, Chechnya, and the Trans-Kuban area. Fearing a renewed Caucasian War, the tsarist government deployed substantial forces and artillery. The insurgents were defeated despite desperate resistance. “Pacification”, as customary, was accompanied by the destruction of villages and widespread devastation. Hundreds were executed; thousands were exiled to penal labour or permanent settlement in remote regions of the Empire.

In 1877 Abkhazia also witnessed open armed resistance. Unlike the North Caucasus, however, Abkhazia experienced direct Ottoman military intervention, aggravating the situation and later providing the Russian authorities with grounds to accuse the entire Abkhaz people of treason.

The Russo–Turkish War served as the catalyst for a mass uprising that had long been maturing in Abkhazia. The Georgian writer and publicist Georgy Tsereteli (1842–1900), then a military correspondent for the St Petersburg newspaper Golos, wrote:

“I have neither seen nor known a people more legal-minded than the Abkhazians; they possess their own notions of truth and justice in many respects, but these notions are deeply rooted in Abkhaz customs; legality is sacred to them. And yet recently they have not only been offended in precisely these sentiments, but most unjustly deceived. For the Abkhazian, the land question is one of the most vital, and it was resolved unjustly… Offended and wronged, the Abkhazians had long been sharpening their knives and, of course, took up arms at the first favourable opportunity.”

Disturbances began even before the formal declaration of war. By late April Ottoman vessels appeared off the Abkhaz coast, landing detachments composed primarily of Caucasian muhajirs. Though numbering no more than two or three thousand men, their arrival alarmed Russian command, which ordered the Sukhum Detachment to withdraw inland. Thus, without battle, the authorities surrendered the coast, effectively pushing the Abkhazians into open alignment with the Ottomans.

In Gudauta, a mass assembly gathered, where Ottoman representatives read a sultanic firman calling the Abkhazians to holy war against Russia. A mullah brought forth the Qur’an, and the assembled swore allegiance to the Sultan. Contemporary testimony records that some Abkhazians removed their crosses, hung them upon nearby trees, and kissed the Qur’an while taking the oath.

Yet support for anti-Russian rebellion was not unanimous. On 30 April, at a gathering in Lykhny, the respected nobleman Husein Lakrba warned of catastrophe should Russian forces abandon the region. Major-General Kravchenko, however, alarmed by exaggerated reports, retreated to mountainous Tsebelda. Coastal Abkhazia was left defenceless.

On 2 May Ottoman ships bombarded Sukhum, after which insurgents looted the town. Soon the coast from Adler to Ochamchira fell under Ottoman and Abkhaz control.

The retreat into the mountains proved catastrophic. Civilians — Greeks, Bulgarians, and other settlers — fled alongside Russian troops. Their homes were plundered and burned. During the arduous crossing of the Kodori River near the Bagadi cliffs, artillery pieces were dismantled and carried by hand across a narrow suspension bridge suspended 20–30 metres above the torrent. During this retreat the entire archive of the Sukhum Military District was abandoned — a unique body of historical documentation irretrievably lost.

Rear-guard action under Grigory Shervashidze held off pursuing forces. The bridge was eventually destroyed under fire.

Russian official press attributed the failure entirely to Abkhaz “treachery”. The government newspaper Kavkaz (4 June 1877) declared:

“It is difficult to guard against betrayal… Neither local nor higher authorities doubted the loyalty of the Abkhaz population. All measures were taken against an external, not an internal enemy…”

Reinforcements under Major-General Ya.K. Alkhazov[2] formed the Inguri Detachment. Engagements followed along the Galidzga River.

Abkhaz forces, reinforced by muhajirs, were supplied with thousands of rifles, including Peabody–Martini models purchased from the United States, and possibly Henry–Winchester repeating rifles. In contrast, Russian forces on the Caucasian front were largely armed with outdated Krnka rifles; only select units possessed Berdan rifles. Georgian and Samurzakano militia were equipped with obsolete flintlocks until later rearmed with captured Ottoman weapons.

On 2 June, Abkhaz forces attacked Russian positions near Ilori. Despite artillery support from Ottoman ironclads offshore, assaults were repelled. Subsequent engagements near Pokvesh and Ochamchira resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. On 15 June alone, the Inguri Detachment lost 368 killed and wounded.

In late June, Abkhaz forces briefly crossed the Galidzga near Tkuarchal but were pushed back.

Defensive operations were politically damaging. In early July, Alkhazov launched a general offensive, issuing an ultimatum demanding surrender of arms and hostages. Only 250 persons complied.

On 15 July fierce combat ensued along the Panav Ridge. After a seven-hour engagement supported by artillery grapeshot, the insurgents were forced to withdraw. Russian troops advanced to Dzhgerda and along the Mokva valley, burning villages and severing Ottoman–Abkhaz coordination. Ottoman forces evacuated Ochamchira on 20 July.

On 2 August a three-pronged operation began toward Sukhum-Kale: the Inguri, Marukh, and Sochi detachments advanced simultaneously. Ottoman forces in Sukhum numbered approximately 6,000 regulars with 15 guns, plus around 1,500 muhajir cavalry.

Assistant Commander-in-Chief Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky instructed that punishment be severe but not require surrender of leaders, allowing the most culpable to depart with the Ottomans. Communities persisting in resistance were to be punished by force, “sparing only women and children”.

By mid-August Ottoman evacuation was underway. On 19–20 August fires engulfed Sukhum. Russian forces entering the town found ruins and thousands of slaughtered cattle. Approximately 50,000 head of cattle were seized.

Abkhaz detachments were redeployed by the Ottomans to Batum and Tsikhisdziri, as reported in the Georgian newspaper Droeba (1 September 1877).

Thus concluded the Ottoman invasion of Abkhazia and the uprising of 1877.

+ Thirty years of "guilt" (1877-1907), by Stanislav Lakoba 

+ The solitude of Abkhazia, by Douglas W. Freshfield (1896) 

+ The Russo - Turkish War: The Revolt in Transcaucasia - Coventry Times (29 Aug 1877)

+ Essays on eastern questions: The Abkhasian insurrection, by William G. Palgrave

+ Who should be settled in Abkhazia? By Jakob Gogebashvili (1877)

Epilogue

The most tragic consequence for Abkhazia was renewed mass exile [muhajirstvo]. The year 1877 exceeded previous waves (1864, 1866–1867) in scale. Contemporary press estimates range between 30,000 and 50,000 emigrants, out of a pre-war population of approximately 75,000 in the Sukhum Military District.

Repression was harsher than after 1866. Many insurgents were exiled to Siberia and northern European Russia. Abkhazians were officially designated a “guilty population” — a formal term — and threatened with total deportation for any further anti-regime action.

Restrictions prohibited settlement along the coast, in the mountains, or within 20 versts of Sukhum (with limited noble exceptions), effectively dividing the ethnic territory. Land reform provisions were revised: peasants deemed “guilty” received smaller plots for use only, not ownership; loyal nobles received reduced but hereditary allotments.

The designation of “guilty population” was lifted only in 1907.

References

[1] First published in: Nodar Shengelia 75 (Jubilee Collection dedicated to the 75th anniversary of Professor Nodar Shengelia). Tbilisi, 2008 (in Georgian).
[2] Alkhazov (Alkhazishvili), Ya.K. (1826–1896) — prominent military commander; promoted to lieutenant-general in 1877 for distinction in the Russo–Turkish War; full General of Infantry in 1891; member of the Military Council from 1894.
[3] A Turkish regular army battalion (tabur) in 1877–1878 was authorised at 774 men; an artillery battery comprised six guns and 110 personnel.
[4] At the time, a Caucasian Military District infantry battalion numbered 682 bayonets; a Cossack sotnia 128 sabres.
[5] Exact Abkhaz casualty figures cannot be determined due to lack of statistical data. Russian military sources report dozens killed even in minor engagements. Such figures, while potentially inflated, indicate substantial human losses among insurgents and also among Samurzakano units fighting under Russian command.