Heidi Tagliavini: "The Shelling of Tskhinval Was the Trigger That Led to the Invasion"

Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, after the conclusion of the active phase of the August 2008 war, led a special EU commission to investigate the circumstances of the armed conflict. In an exclusive interview with Radio Liberty’s Georgian Service journalist, Vazha Tavberidze, she shared her current thoughts on the findings of her commission in the "Tagliavini Report" (International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia –Ed.) and how Russia's invasion of Ukraine has influenced her assessment of those events as a diplomat who represented the OSCE in the Minsk negotiations. This interview has been translated from Russian.

— Let’s start with a predictable question. Fifteen years have passed since the Tagliavini Report. How would you evaluate its legacy and significance today?

— The report was based on the information available at the time it was written, that is, 15 years ago. It brought transparency to a dark chapter in the history of the conflicts in Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it established new international standards in the fields of international law, humanitarian law, and human rights, and it helped to diffuse a highly tense situation both within and beyond Georgia. Most importantly, the report was accepted by both parties, the Russian Federation and Georgia, and it continues to be referenced even today, 15 years later.

— Similarly, I would like to ask about the legacy and significance of the 2008 war: has your perspective on it changed after 15 years? How do you assess the events today, knowing what unfolded afterwards?

— From today’s perspective, I would say that the August 2008 war in Georgia somewhat resembled a dress rehearsal for what was later to occur in Ukraine. Looking back, I believe the report has aged very well; it remains relevant, especially in the field of law. As I mentioned earlier, it set international standards. Let me provide a few examples. For instance, it thoroughly examines the legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, delving deeply into the right to self-determination and secession. It was also the first to address another crucial issue—the so-called passportisation. And, of course, there is the most important chapter—on the use of force: who had the right to use it? After detailed investigation, we concluded that neither side had that right.

— Fifteen years is quite a long time. Is there anything in the report that you would view differently today and perhaps wish to change? Any corrections, new information that may have emerged since then...

— Frankly speaking, no. I wouldn’t change anything—no revisions or new conclusions. The text remains valid and relevant. The only thing I would perhaps point out today is that the conclusions we should have drawn from the report were not heeded. In 2009, some countries, especially those in Eastern Europe, warned the European Union about who would be next. This warning was not heard. When the war ended and peace returned, what typically happens in politics took place—relations resumed. It’s a normal political practice.

'Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia' - p.19

— When the report was published, the already heated information war reached a boiling point. It’s believed that both sides tried to use the report as a tool to prove that they were right in this conflict. In your opinion, who succeeded in this? Who won or lost, according to the Tagliavini Report? Or, more precisely, who benefited more from it?

— When the report was published, I said that there were no winners in this war. Today, I might be more cautious because it appears that in the long run, the only winner was Russia; everyone else lost.

However, while working on the report, we dealt with a massive, uncontrollable swirl of speculation, and ultimately came to the conclusion that you can’t prevent people from writing what they want, regardless of the facts, but you can minimise it.

The report was initiated by the European Union—it was a concern for the European Union, Europe, and European citizens. They wanted to understand what happened in August 2008. The speculation surrounding the report was mostly observed in Georgia and Russia; in Europe, there were no such questions.

8 August 2008: Before changing his story, Saakashvili gave a victory speech on television on the first day of the war.

+ Georgia fired first shot, say UK monitors | Times Online, 9 Nov. 2008

+ Saakashvili: ‘Most of S.Ossetia Under Tbilisi’s Control’  | Civil Georgia, 8 Aug 2008

+ Saakashvili Appeals for Peace in Televised Address | Civil Georgia, 8 Aug 2008

+ Christopher Langton (Deputy Commander of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)): "I remain convinced that the Georgians attacked Tskhinvali before Russian units moved from N. Ossetia into S. Ossetia."

— It’s one thing to discuss who won and who lost, but let’s delve into the second part of the question—despite your efforts to remain as neutral as possible, who benefited more from the Tagliavini Report in the information war?

— It’s difficult for me to say; I don’t live in either Georgia or Russia.

— I mean, who managed to shape international public opinion in their favour?

— I would say this: I believe that if today someone decides to delve into the subject of the August 2008 war in Georgia, they cannot ignore our report—they will have to rely on this document. There may be different speculations—you understand, history is quite malleable. Of course, there will be such attempts, but if you have to present an expert opinion, you would prefer the report or text endorsed by an international organisation like the European Union. The report’s weight is also bolstered by the fact that it was recognised by both Georgia and Russia.

— That may be so, but the Georgian side still believes that Russia benefited more from this report due to the way certain phrases were worded. Already in the third paragraph, it created the impression that Georgia was being accused of starting the war. How accurate is that argument?

— This is a kind of Rubicon—the issue of the shelling of Tskhinval/i. We worked extensively on the wording, and in the report, we referred to it as the beginning of a large-scale armed conflict, but it was merely the culmination of a long period of escalating tensions, provocations, and incidents. I believe that this wording was correct. I personally worked in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone for five years, and such periods of tension were not rare but a constant phenomenon, particularly on the South Ossetian side in 2008—every summer, we noted that clashes of varying scale occurred in South Ossetia.

Clashes are one thing. The problem arises when trying to determine when these clashes escalate into war—at what moment? This very moment became a trigger and a headache for the Georgian side, a trigger for the invasion by Russian forces, which, from a legal standpoint, had the right to rescue their peacekeepers. It was the only force that had the right to come to the aid of the peacekeepers; they should have immediately withdrawn after this, not invaded Georgia.

Unfortunately, from a legal perspective, the shelling of Tskhinval/i became the trigger that led to a full-scale invasion. Now, there can be much speculation about what would have happened if Tskhinval/i had not been shelled on that night of August 7th to 8th. But it was the key triggering moment, and therefore we could not describe it any other way.

Sergey Bagapsh (L) and Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini in Sukhum | 2 March 2009. Photo by Ibragim Chkadua.

+ The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze, by Paula Garb

+ Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Crisis of August 2008: Roots and Lessons, by George Hewitt

+ The Lessons of August (2008), by Natella Akaba

+ EU Report: Independent Experts Blame Georgia for South Ossetia War

+ Some Thoughts on the recent fighting, by John Colarusso

— Regarding the Russian peacekeepers, how can their actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia be assessed as peacekeeping at all?

— Allow me to refer you to the part of our report called "Observations." We did not draw conclusions; these were observations. And one of the most important observations was when we stated that no party to a conflict, or a party that strongly supports one side, should occupy the role of peacekeeper, as peacekeeping is based on impartiality. I think we couldn’t have put it better.

— But doesn't this call into question the legitimacy of the Russian peacekeepers? If they became a partial side, as the Georgian side claims, actively assisting the armed formations of South Ossetia and the Abkhazians, then how appropriate is it to still refer to them as peacekeepers? Accordingly, how fair is the argument in the report that if the Georgian side fired upon the Russian peacekeepers, Russia had the right to invade and rescue them?

— No, no, no, you are reasoning incorrectly. From a legal standpoint, if your peacekeepers are stationed in another country, in Georgia, regardless of whether there are questions about their neutrality or not, Russia had the right to rescue and protect them, the right to withdraw its peacekeepers from the country.

— Even when these peacekeepers themselves became a party to the conflict?

— Legally speaking, you cannot argue in that way. The report also acknowledges that there were Russian forces in Georgia that were not peacekeepers, but this was not on a large scale, and therefore it could not be classified as a Russian invasion.

— Forgive me for the ironic question, but if even one Russian tank or soldier crossed the Swiss border, would your country consider this an invasion and an act of aggression?

— Don't compare apples to oranges. We detailed everything in our report. We did not receive any document from the Georgian side that confirmed the presence of even one tank in South Ossetia that did not belong to the peacekeepers. So, I think this question should be directed at the Georgian authorities of that time. We requested documents, but what we received did not 100% confirm that this occurred. Lawyers work with absolute, 100% evidence, and we were unable to achieve absolute clarity on this matter.

+ 'Terrible Losses Overnight': Cables Track US Diplomatic Efforts to Avert Russian-Georgian Conflict, by Uwe Klussmann

+ Embracing Georgia, U.S. Misread Signs of Rifts, by C. J. Chivers

+ What Could Have Happened in the Caucasus, by John Colarusso

+ Why Can Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili Not Emulate Willi Brandt? by Liz Fuller

— I see. Let's return to the initial question—at that time, there was a certain dogma or mantra in the West, according to which, no matter what happened, certain ties with Russia had to be maintained because the West could not afford to have Russia as an outright enemy. Do you think this dogma or sentiment influenced your report in any way?

— No, absolutely not. We had the mandate of an independent international fact-finding mission, and I can say with complete confidence that no one ever interfered in our work, no one gave us instructions, we had full independence. The only condition was that we had to take full responsibility for what we did and wrote in the report.

One of the goals at that time, in 2008–2009, was to gain more clarity about what actually happened. The conflict was surrounded by a cloud of propaganda, and within the European Union, there was no clear understanding of what we were dealing with. I was told directly that the purpose of the investigation was to understand how to resume relations with Russia and Georgia. The aim was to step back, look at what had happened, understand what we could ascertain, and then, after the report was released, decide how to continue relations. Because after a war, you cannot continue everyday relations as if nothing had happened. That was the main goal of the report.

— To summarise, the main conclusion of the report was that a certain level of blame for what happened could be attributed to all involved parties. Is that an accurate assessment?

— No, I would say that it’s only partially true. All sides made legal mistakes. As I mentioned earlier, the issue of passportisation was considered a violation of international law and, at the very least, an unfriendly act towards a neighbouring country. Supporting separatism, as we called it, does not promote peaceful coexistence. There are many other facts that could be cited. If you read the entire legal section, there’s enough to indicate where the conflict could go and how it could be triggered by an incidental event. But the responsibility is shared.

We also stated that the claims that the Georgian side committed genocide were unfounded: we couldn’t find any evidence of genocide, but we did find evidence of ethnic cleansing carried out by South Ossetians, and that Russian peacekeepers or soldiers did not prevent it.

— I am not sure if you’ve seen a clip of Putin from, if I’m not mistaken, 2015, in which he openly says that the so-called “Georgian operation” was approved by Moscow as early as 2007. In light of that and what later happened in Ukraine, doesn’t this shared responsibility between the parties, as outlined in your report, seem like an empty gesture?

— I still believe that our conclusion, that all parties bear their share of responsibility, is fair.

— Do you think we will see a similar fact-finding mission in Ukraine when the war ends, whenever that may be?

— It’s hard to say. It all depends on how the war ends. I believe that every conflict, whether large or small, should be investigated. The problem is that you need to obtain the agreement of the parties involved, although even if that is not the case, you can still conduct an investigation. You will still have a very rich body of material that you or future historians can rely on to try and establish what happened. I believe this is crucial, especially in our time, when it’s difficult to discern what is true.

— Regarding the responsibility of both sides, you’ve repeatedly emphasised during this interview that both sides—Georgia and Russia—ultimately acknowledged and accepted this report. Georgia signed the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s declaration, which was based on your report. Why do you think they did that if your report was so unacceptable to them? A few years ago, former President Saakashvili told me in an interview that he agreed to sign this declaration and accepted the findings of the Tagliavini Report because a significant amount of EU humanitarian aid (over 4 billion euros) depended on it. Can you clarify this matter?

— I have no information that the declaration adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly was based specifically on our report. I presented the report to the Council of Europe, if I’m not mistaken, in April 2010, and a discussion followed, but I don’t know what former President Saakashvili was referring to.