Is it true that a crisis has arisen in Russia-Abkhazia relations? By Sergey Markedonov

In recent months, the political landscape of Abkhazia has been marked by significant developments, drawing increased attention to its relationship with Russia. The following article, authored by Sergey Markedonov, a senior research fellow at MGIMO and a renowned expert on the Caucasus and Russian foreign policy, provides a detailed analysis of the ongoing challenges and dynamics shaping Russia-Abkhazia relations.

This article was originally published in the magazine 'Профиль' (Profile) and has been translated from Russian.

In recent years, Abkhazia has rarely made the front pages of newspapers or the top stories of news agencies. Within the Russian expert and media communities, a specific tradition has formed to cover events in the post-Soviet space primarily in the context of "grand geopolitics." Last October, Volodymyr Zelensky declared Kyiv's readiness to strike Abkhazian territory if new Russian Navy facilities were to appear there. After that, the issue of expanding the geography of the Ukrainian conflict to the Caucasus region as a whole and to Abkhazia in particular became a subject of expert discussion, though the conversation didn’t last long.

In the South Caucasus, we are witnessing a radical transformation of the established regional order. Azerbaijan and Armenia are already discussing the tenth version of a peace agreement project, yet the possibility of military escalation still looms. Former alliances are gradually falling apart. Moscow's once primary strategic ally in the region, Yerevan, has frozen its participation in the CSTO (The Collective Security Treaty Organisation –Ed.) and is increasing diplomatic and military-technical contacts with the West. Meanwhile, Tbilisi, recently a key partner of Washington and Brussels in the South Caucasus, has begun adopting laws one after the other, which both Americans and Europeans describe as pro-Russian. Turkey is strengthening its influence in the region, and Iran, observing the growing alliance between Ankara, Moscow, and Baku, expresses its discontent with the reopening of Caucasus transport routes without the involvement of the Islamic Republic.

Amid this backdrop, Abkhazia might appear as an island of stability in a sea of conflict. Sixteen years ago, after Russia recognised its independence, the republic experienced both economic recovery and social support "beyond friendly bayonets." Georgia has effectively abandoned its plans to reintegrate Abkhazia through military means. In Tbilisi, there is no acceptance of what Moscow once referred to as the "new realities in the South Caucasus." This is a rare point of consensus between both the government and opposition in Georgia. In late May, the ruling "Georgian Dream" party announced its intention to join the "European family" together with the Abkhazians and South Ossetians by 2030. In August, in a special statement, they declared the "restoration of territorial integrity" as one of the country’s primary national goals. However, official Tbilisi categorically rejects even the hypothetical possibility of opening a second front against Russia for the sake of "reclaiming lands."

The United States and the European Union have significantly cooled towards this topic, especially against the backdrop of the armed conflict in Ukraine. It seems likely that the thought of Russia's defeat on the battlefield is seen as their primary goal, which, in turn, would allow them to close the Abkhazian chapter as well.

In any case, between 2008 and 2024, Moscow's influence in Abkhazia has grown. The pro-Russian consensus has also remained intact. This consensus is shared by President Aslan Bzhania, his close political allies, as well as by the sharp critics of his administration, both inside and outside parliament. The threat of Georgian revanche is discussed, but more as a formality rather than as part of the current agenda.

However, the events of late August and early September revealed that Abkhazia’s "quiet" is deceptive. It all began, as is often the case these days, with Telegram posts. The channels "Abkhaz Portal" and "Respublika" published what they claimed to be scanned copies of a protocol from negotiations between President Aslan Bzhania and Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Four points, concerning the future of Moscow-Sukhum relations in both socio-economic and socio-political spheres, attracted particular attention in these documents. This sparked a debate on Abkhaz social media about the "price" of asymmetric integration between Abkhazia and Russia. But the issue didn’t stop with online discussions among the so-called "armchair generals." The opposition grew notably more active, especially as its leaders now had additional ammunition to criticise the authorities. They argued that the president’s team was making unwarranted concessions to Moscow without involving the public in making strategically important decisions.

It seems there is little point in commenting on the content of the materials presented, as the "Four Points of Bzhania-Kozak" have not been officially verified by anyone. However, the subsequent briefing by Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba and Secretary of the Security Council Raul Lolua showed that where there is smoke, there is fire. Statements were made that Russia had "suspended certain payments from 1 September. This affects doctors, teachers, law enforcement, and others." Shortly after, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented Moscow's official position. According to him, the suspension of social payments to Abkhazian public sector workers was not due to deteriorating relations, but rather a necessity to maintain a "balance of obligations between the parties." The minister reminded that Moscow and Sukhum had certain agreements, which had gone through all necessary procedures—from presidential approval to parliamentary ratification. The time had come to implement these decisions.

However, observant onlookers couldn’t help but notice that, for the first time in 16 years since Russia recognised Abkhazia’s independence, there was no official congratulatory message from Moscow on the anniversary. Add to this a significant shift in Georgia's foreign policy. Both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the prospects of normalising relations between Russia and Georgia are, to put it mildly, viewed without enthusiasm. In Sukhum, there is concern about a "geopolitical deal" happening behind the backs of the Abkhaz people. Therefore, the unconfirmed "Four Points of Bzhania-Kozak," the statements from Abkhazian representatives, and Sergey Lavrov’s comments have garnered substantial interest. Conspiracy theories are very popular in regions that have experienced (or are experiencing) conflicts and exist in a state of "suspended sovereignty." Therefore, any piece of information is seized upon. But is there really a basis for talking about a shift in Russian policy towards Abkhazia? And how justified are the fears of a "deal" between Moscow and Tbilisi? Even if we assume from the start that the idea of a "deal" is doomed to failure, how serious are the disagreements between Russia and Abkhazia?

+ Leaked Protocol Ignites Political Storm in Abkhazia: Sovereignty at Stake?

+ Sergey Shamba Addresses Leaked Protocol Crisis

+ Markedonov: 'Politics is the art of the possible'

+ The conflict in and over Abkhazia, by Sergey Markedonov

Political Economy, Abkhaz Style

Let’s begin by examining the systemic foundations of the Russia-Abkhazia stress test. When Russia recognised Abkhazia's independence on 26 August 2008, there was a sense of euphoria in both Moscow and Sukhum. Enthusiasm over the success in "curbing the West" in the South Caucasus and the partial international legitimisation clearly outpaced an understanding of the new realities and problems that were replacing the old ones. Meanwhile, in August 2008, alongside the "freezing" of NATO’s expansion towards the former Soviet Union, Russia and Abkhazia entered into an asymmetrical partnership. It soon became clear that the factor of Georgia for Sukhum was moving to the background. For the new generations of Abkhazians, who grew up outside the Georgian SSR and after the end of armed conflict with Tbilisi, the war came to be seen as a historical episode of the past. The choice in favour of Russia was essentially a choice for Abkhazia's future. However, it also brought to the fore the question of the cost of these integrative ties.

Gradually, inevitable contradictions emerged, considering the different weights of the partners, differing planning horizons, and varying resource potential. For Russia, Abkhazia represents not only an important military-strategic point in the Caucasus but also a region with considerable investment potential, not to mention the creation of a project that could potentially serve as a showcase of pro-Russian choices. For Abkhazia, Russia is not only a military ally but also a crucial resource for preserving its unique identity and culture, a partner helping the country move from a state of "survival" to one of development. So where is the problem, when there is clearly mutual interest and evident benefits from integration?

The answer becomes clear when we accept that any alliance is based not just on business plans and financial reports but also on the historical peculiarities of the countries involved. Over the past century and a half, the Abkhazian national project has developed under challenging conditions. It emerged amidst the imperial fault lines of Russia and Turkey's fierce struggle and later experienced two bloody collapses—first with the Russian Empire, and then with the USSR. In the 1860s–1870s, the Abkhaz experienced their first demographic trauma, when approximately 80,000 people left the territory of the present-day republic.

During the conflict with Georgia in 1992–1993, the Abkhaz lost about 3% of their population. In discussions with American Caucasus experts, the author of this article once explained that such losses, in percentage terms, would be equivalent to about 10 million US citizens. Usually, these debates would come to a halt after that. Hence, modern Abkhazian statehood is marked by a form of ethnocracy, and the issue of the "curse of 17%" (by the end of the Soviet Union, the percentage of Abkhazians in the Abkhaz ASSR was around 17%) is still relevant. Of course, this issue can be reduced to the problem of fears stemming from past upheavals. But the fact remains: in post-Soviet Abkhazia, there is an ongoing conflict between ethnic land ownership and private ownership.

This issue has been ongoing for years. As far back as 2010, during Sergey Bagapsh’s presidency, a commission was established to ensure legality in addressing the property rights of Russian citizens in Abkhazia. Over ten years of its work, 369 applications were submitted, of which 66 were approved, and 32 were settled through judicial or pre-judicial processes. Adding to this, the difficulty in the Abkhazian parliament of passing any document related to bilateral relations with Russia—from the "large" framework treaty to more narrowly focused regulatory documents—is notable. In all such cases, the economy tends to be interpreted more through a "political economy" lens.

In February 2023, the Abkhazian government website published a draft law "On regulating the legal status of apart-hotels and apartments." It contained the following provisions: "Land plots allocated for apartments remain state-owned; ownership of apartments does not grant citizenship or residency rights." Through the construction of apartments, the government intends to change the country’s image from the established "Abkhazia as a place for a poor tourist’s summer holiday" to "Abkhazia as a place for year-round holidays for wealthy tourists." However, this project sparked fierce debates between the authorities and the opposition. Critics of the government and the president saw it as an attack on Abkhazia’s national exclusivity. The development of apart-hotels began to be perceived as a potential threat to the ethno-demographic balance. The idea of "creeping Georgianisation" is also exploited (Russian citizens of Georgian nationality could enter Abkhazian socio-economic life and eventually claim political influence). Political and environmental criticisms have also been raised (fears of turning the republic into a "concrete jungle" like Greater Sochi).

"Why is it that in small Dubai, apartments are calmly sold to foreigners, and no one shouts about colonisation?" asks Aslan Bzhania. The answer is obvious: because the UAE has internationally recognised status, and its path to independence was not accompanied by upheavals comparable to those experienced by Abkhazia.

It turns out to be a situation like in the classic anecdote, where everyone is right. Moscow is tired of Abkhazia’s selective approach to partnership. And this is understandable. The attitude of "everything you give us is good, but what's ours is ours alone" is difficult to describe as constructive. A large country, especially in times of rapid polarisation, has little patience for the nuances of local history and ethno-national psychology. However, Abkhazian arguments also deserve attention—it would be more beneficial for the common cause. This small republic is unaccustomed to a rigid hierarchy; here, presidents have been replaced more than once under the influence of public protests, and the gap between the leadership and ordinary activists is small. When the issue of transferring the Pitsunda state dacha to Russia was discussed in Abkhazia, President Bzhania personally met with the leaders of the youth protest movement. While it cannot be said that full mutual understanding was reached, the fact itself is telling. Among the Abkhazian opposition and human rights activists are veterans of the war with Georgia, many of whom have been awarded the republic’s highest honour, the Order of Leon, or hold the title of Hero of Abkhazia. This at the very least underscores the necessity of considering local realities, rather than dismissing them outright.

Without investments and the expansion of Russian business presence, Abkhazia's development is problematic. Conversely, the likelihood of preserving backwardness is quite high. But it is equally important to understand that strengthening integrative ties will inevitably encounter resistance from Abkhazian society unless there is long-term, meticulous work—not just to convince people of the correctness of Russia’s approaches, but to involve them in Moscow's projects in ways that are beneficial to Abkhazia as well.

Finally, although it’s not the least significant point, the issue of Georgia is, of course, important when discussing Moscow-Sukhum relations. But it cannot replace the specific Russia-Abkhazia agenda (as with other geopolitical narratives). Today, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s team has set a course towards diversifying the country’s foreign policy. But how stable is this line? At least until the end of the elections, the answer is negative. Even among the supporters of "Georgian Dream," not to mention the party establishment, there are many advocates of the Euro-Atlantic choice. Just yesterday, they were confidently following in the wake of the West. What could a hypothetical deal with Tbilisi offer Moscow? An unfounded concession in exchange for a couple of laws primarily aimed at retaining power, rather than fostering a "great friendship" with Russia. One would assume that the Russian leadership understands this just as well as the experts. However, understanding without effective information support often fails to achieve its goal. In the Abkhazian case, considering the asymmetrical nature of the Moscow-Sukhum alliance, any clarifications would not be out of place. But this is already a separate and no less complicated issue.

The author is a senior research fellow at MGIMO and the editor-in-chief of the journal "International Analytics."