Is This the End of the Road for Circassians in Syria? By Fehim Tastekin

This article, written by journalist and Middle East expert Fehim Taştekin, examines the challenges faced by the Circassian community in Syria amid ongoing conflict and political uncertainty. Originally published in Turkish on Gazete Duvar, it highlights the community’s struggle for security, survival, and recognition in a region marked by shifting power dynamics. This English translation has been prepared by AbkhazWorld to bring Taştekin's insightful analysis to a wider audience.

Is This the End of the Road for Circassians in Syria?

While Sunni identity is a primary determinant in the stance of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), barriers against minorities persist even among them, despite shared faith as Muslims. A new phase dominated by Sunni Islamist Arabs seems to be emerging, with the central narrative preaching the advent of a Sunni majority era in opposition to "minority dictatorship."

Sectarian factions, misleadingly propagating the notion that the Assad regime relies on minority groups, have weaponised this narrative as fuel for the war. When these factions seize power in Damascus, the fate of certain communities appears sealed.

Despite sharing the religious and sectarian beliefs of the Sunni Arab majority, Circassians are standing on fragile ground that could collapse at any moment. Their position, however, cannot be equated with that of the Alawites, who face marginalisation in this new era due to their sectarian identity. The plight of the Circassians lies elsewhere. As an ethnic minority, they lack the political clout or bargaining power, such as that held by the Kurds. Their vulnerability has long been tied to a relationship of "loyalty" with the state, a safeguard for minorities that can transform into a guillotine during regime changes.

The history of Circassians in the Middle East began with their role as "loyal elements" in the Ottoman Empire's strategy for security and control. Over time, this status evolved into a political destiny.

The Ottoman Empire established the first Circassian settlements in Syria in 1872, in Quneitra and Homs. In 1879, 10,000 Circassians were resettled in Aleppo, with 5,000 distributed across other regions. By 1910, their population had grown to 60,000. Today, they are dispersed across provinces such as Quneitra, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Latakia. Significant internal migration has also occurred. In Manbij, they were a founding population, but their presence there has now dwindled to symbolic levels. Some have assimilated into Arab society. The current Circassian population in Syria is estimated to be between 100,000 and 140,000.

During the French Mandate period, the Circassians established around 40 schools offering education in Circassian, Arabic, and French. They also published a weekly newspaper in Damascus called Marje in Circassian. However, with Syrian independence, all these institutions were shut down.

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The Circassians’ historical role in the Ottoman security bureaucracy has become a lasting label. While Sunni Arabs, who dominated trade, politics, and civil administration, often avoided military service, the military served as a livelihood for minorities struggling in rural poverty. Trust, undoubtedly, influenced recruitment decisions. However, reducing the issue solely to sectarianism reflects a sectarian bias in itself. Wealthy Sunnis frequently avoided conscription by paying bribes.

In 1947, among military officers, Sunni Arabs constituted 31.8%, followed by Kurds at 22.7%, and Christians at 18.6%. Circassians, Druze, and Alawites collectively made up 4.5%, reflecting a continuation of the composition of the French-established Eastern Army during the early years of independence.

Minorities periodically rose to prominence or were sidelined. For instance, Adib Shishakli (alternatively transliterated as Chichekli), whose father was Kurdish and mother Circassian, purged Circassian, Alawite, and Christian officers. Husni al-Za'im, whose mother was Kurdish, reportedly filled urban garrisons with minorities while deploying Arab officers to rural posts, though some contest the extent of "Kurdification" or "Circassianisation" under his rule. Another coup leader, Sami al-Hinnawi, was an ardent Arab nationalist.

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Circassians faced marginalisation by nationalist Arabs, who accused them of collaborating first with the Ottomans and later with the French. However, their heroism in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel temporarily restored some of their reputation. From the 1970s, under the Ba'ath Party's vertical power structures, Circassians began to hold more prominent positions, including key roles in the military and intelligence services.

Yet, with each regime change, the Circassians' dilemma re-emerges: to live securely, they must demonstrate unwavering loyalty to the state.

When the 2011 uprising broke out, the Circassians found themselves caught between opposing forces. One side demanded their loyalty to the state. Bashar al-Assad even recalled Brigadier General Walid Abaza, a trusted ally of his father Hafez al-Assad, to service. Abaza interrupted his retirement to organise the National Defence Forces in Quneitra, where Jabhat al-Nusra (Nusra Front) was gaining prominence. Known for chain-smoking two cigarettes simultaneously, Abaza passed away from cancer in 2017. One of his sons, Anzor, was killed by opposition forces. Another son, Khalid, who inherited his father’s influence, was appointed Governor of Latakia on 17 October 2024, but is now on the run.

(At the time when Assad closed the chapter on his governorships, the 14 governors included seven Sunni Arabs, three Alawite Arabs, one Christian Arab, one Druze Arab, one Ismaili Arab, and one Sunni Circassian.)

Walid Abaza’s older brother, Air Force Major General Memduh Abaza, was a close associate of Hafez al-Assad. He was killed in 1981 during a bombing at the Air Force Command in Damascus, orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood. A hospital in Baath City was later named in his honour. Another brother, Sharaf Abaza, served three terms as a Member of Parliament. He was known for his rare ability to criticise Assad openly from the parliamentary podium without repercussion. He now resides in Abkhazia, having been arrested in Istanbul during his medical studies on charges of collaborating with Syrian intelligence (Mukhabarat). He was eventually exchanged for individuals sought by Ankara. Sharaf believed the MIT had taken him hostage to pressure Syria into extraditing Turkish communists.

Meanwhile, after 2011, the opposition also pressed Circassians to join the uprising and prove they were not part of the regime. While some joined, most Circassians, particularly those in state security roles, attempted to remain neutral. However, neutrality offered no protection. In 2013, villages in Quneitra and rural Damascus were devastated. Between one-third and half of Syria’s Circassians fled the country. Most sought refuge in Türkiye, while approximately 5,000 returned to their ancestral homeland in the Caucasus. Many of these, unable to endure the Russian Federation’s stringent bureaucracy and harsh living conditions, eventually moved to Europe.

Today, Circassian villages in Quneitra, including Bir Ajam, Breika, and Mudariya, have been under Israeli occupation since 8 December 2024.

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As the Ba’ath regime crumbles, Circassians once again find themselves on unstable footing.

Accusations that they supported the Assad regime are putting the future of this minority at risk. Some of those in high-ranking positions have already left the country, including Major General Husam Luka (Yenaluka), a former intelligence chief.

Bessam Abdul-Majid Veroka, who served as Minister of the Interior from 2006 to 2009, remains in Damascus. Although apprehensive, he has not yet faced any repercussions, possibly because his tenure predated the conflict, and his role during the war was limited to diplomatic postings.

Some officials who were active during the conflict have yet to leave Syria. These individuals are reportedly seeking guarantees from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) for their safety.

Meanwhile, HTS has shown a willingness to work with experienced individuals in certain sectors, particularly in the economy. Within this framework, a small number of Circassians have been invited to collaborate.

Outside a small elite in bureaucracy, Circassians are, in fact, among the most impoverished ethnic groups in Syria, second only to the Turkmens. They are almost invisible in commerce and form a class of impoverished people who cannot openly voice their grievances. Proximity to the state has never significantly benefited the Circassians, an observation that applies to most Alawites as well, aside from a narrow elite.

+ Circassian Community in Syria Safe Amid Power Transition, Says Adyghe Khase

+ Circassians: Suspended Between Nostalgia and Harsh Reality, by Fehim Taştekin

+ Post-Assad Era and the Circassians, by Omer Aytek Kurmel

+ 467 compatriots have returned to Abkhazia from Syria

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To transition to a safer position, Circassians are attempting to establish dialogue with HTS. However, these efforts occasionally backfire. For instance, Hauti Sokhrokov, President of the International Circassian Association in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, remarked on the precariousness of the situation. He stated that they were closely monitoring developments and would appeal to Russia to facilitate the return of Circassians to the Caucasus if necessary. However, his assertion that "Most of them supported Assad" sparked outrage. Civil organisations accused him of endangering Circassians.

In response, the Adyghe Caucasus Association, established by Syrian Circassians who sought refuge in Türkiye, issued a statement framing the conflict as “a popular revolution fundamentally rooted in the Syrian people’s quest for freedom and dignity.” The association claimed that over 200 Circassians had been detained and more than 100 killed during the conflict, adding, “These figures clearly reflect the sacrifices made by Circassians and their stand against oppression.”

The newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi noted that after the fall of the regime, Circassians took to the streets to celebrate. The Circassian Charity Association in Damascus, which participated in the celebrations, described 8 December 2024 as the end of a period of injustice and oppression. They announced that Circassians were ready to contribute to the construction of a new Syria governed by the language of law, justice, and dignity.

The Circassians are now waiting for an appointment to present their demands to Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, the proposed delegation was deemed too large, and they were instructed to return with a smaller group.

The Federation of Caucasian Associations (KAFFED) also sent a delegation to Damascus. It appears that these discussions were facilitated by Türkiye’s chargé d’affaires in Damascus, Burhan Köroğlu.

According to KAFFED Secretary-General Ömer Atalar, the delegation met with two officials from HTS’s foreign affairs department. The HTS representatives assured them that public servants with no involvement in criminal activities would not face negative treatment. However, no formal commitments or guarantees were provided.

HTS’s actions remain unpredictable. Although an agreement was reportedly reached to avoid unannounced raids in Circassian neighbourhoods in Damascus, during the delegation’s visit, a member of the National Defence Forces was taken in a loud operation. People fear having their lives upended or even ended due to baseless accusations. The Circassian association has urged, “Inform us first, let us explain the situation, and don’t take innocent people.”

On the night the delegation stayed, gunfire echoed all night in a neighbouring district inhabited by Alawites.

Public sector employees are too afraid to return to their jobs. There have also been calls for Türkiye to intervene and act as a protector for Circassians, a role in which Köroğlu has shown significant interest.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared, “We are the protectors of all minorities.” However, this proclamation has had limited impact in curbing negative developments on the ground.

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In summary, everything remains uncertain. HTS operates with a heavy hand, and there is still no reliable security or judicial mechanism in place. The state is effectively “nonexistent.”

What do Circassians want? First and foremost, security. Following that, they seek the minimum conditions for a sustainable life. There is no electricity and no fuel for heating, prompting some Circassian associations in Türkiye to launch aid campaigns.

If a pluralistic system is established, Circassians hope to gain recognition as an ethnic minority. They also expect legal arrangements that would allow them to preserve their culture and language. While HTS claims it will guarantee the safety of religious and sectarian minorities, this promise does not resonate with Circassians, as they are an ethnic minority already aligned with the religious and sectarian majority. HTS, which appears intent on preserving the "Arab" identity in the Syrian Arab Republic’s name, is likely to perceive minority-related demands as part of a “divisive agenda orchestrated by foreign powers with plans for Syria.”

HTS may target certain individuals and exploit professionals’ expertise. However, the overarching stance could be, “Since you’ve been loyal to the state, we are now the state. Show your allegiance.”

Although Sunni identity is a primary factor in HTS’s ideology, barriers against minorities persist even among them, despite shared faith. A new phase dominated by Sunni Islamist Arabs seems to be emerging, with a central discourse promoting the dawn of a Sunni majority era as a counterpoint to “minority dictatorship.”

For Circassians, apart from a few professionals, there is little reason for optimism. Furthermore, the growing influence of Salafi ideology within the system poses an additional threat to their already precarious position.

Whenever war breaks out or regimes are overthrown, the discussion of returning to the Caucasus resurfaces. However, the path to the Caucasus remains largely closed due to Russia’s unfavourable stance on mass returns. Even small quotas of 2,000–3,000 individuals allocated to the republics remain unfulfilled due to bureaucratic obstacles. Russia resists the return of Circassians it once exiled from the Caucasus for several reasons: the potential resurgence of Circassian nationalism, fears of renewed independence movements, and concerns about the influx of radical Islamist elements.

For many Circassians, the most viable contingency plan involves seeking refuge in Türkiye, where the diaspora is most populous. Jordan, due to the close ties between the Circassian community and the Hashemite Royal Court, is another potential destination, although opportunities for resettlement there are limited. Some have even suggested Israel as a protector, citing the two Circassian villages it maintains, Kfar Kama and Reyhaniye. These villages, supported by Israel as a way to demonstrate that “we have no issue with Muslim minorities” while perpetrating atrocities against Palestinians, have no additional capacity to accommodate newcomers. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Israel would accept such a proposal.

The idea of relocating Circassians back to their former villages in the Golan Heights, currently under Israeli occupation, has also been raised. Israel’s emerging policy of engaging with minorities to “muddy the waters” aligns with this notion, but it is improbable that Israel would allow a population transfer that might upset the demographic balance against Jews. Israel’s fundamental ethos remains: “Jews are in, others are out.” Notably, after the 1967 war, some Circassians expelled from the Golan were relocated to New Jersey by the United States, reportedly to prevent them from becoming a problem for Israel. Circassians had proven a formidable challenge to Israel during the war. While the villages of Kfar Kama and Reyhaniye are seen as exceptions, history and memory persist.

For now, however, the Circassians are not at a point where they are clamouring for open borders to escape. Instead, they are waiting for the situation to become clearer.

Fehim Taştekin graduated from Istanbul University’s Faculty of Political Science. He began his journalism career in 1994, working for Yeni Şafak, Son Çağrı, Yeni Ufuk, Tercüman, Radikal, and Hürriyet newspapers, where he served as a reporter, editor, and foreign news director. He was the founding editor-in-chief of Ajans Kafkas, focusing on studies related to the Caucasus. Until its closure, he hosted programmes such as Doğu Divanı, Dünya Hali, and Sınırsız on İMC TV. He has also contributed to foreign policy programmes on MedyascopeTV and +GerçekTV. As one of the analysts for BBC Turkish, he continues to write columns for Al-Monitor and Gazete Duvar. His fieldwork spans the Caucasus and the Middle East. Taştekin is the author of several books, including Suriye: Yıkıl Git, Diren Kal (Syria: Collapse or Resist), Rojava: Kürtlerin Zamanı (Rojava: The Time of the Kurds), and Karanlık Çöktüğünde (When Darkness Falls).