Post-Assad Era and the Circassians, by Omer Aytek Kurmel

This brief analysis examines three potential trends emerging in the aftermath of recent developments in Syria regarding the Circassian community: the deepening isolation of Syrian Circassians, the increasing influence of Israeli Circassians, and the strengthening of Circassian diaspora identity. The article was originally published in Turkish in Jineps Newspaper, a publication dedicated to covering issues, traditions, and cultures of Caucasian peoples, particularly the Circassians, and has been translated into English by AbkhazWorld.

Developments in Syria since 8 December evoke three possible trends: 1) the deepening isolation of Syrian Circassians; 2) the increasing influence of Israeli Circassians; and 3) the strengthening of the Circassian diaspora identity. These trends highlight the evolving dynamics and challenges faced by the Circassian community within and beyond Syria.

1. The Deepening Isolation of Syrian Circassians

The Circassians in Syria are once again being confined within the boundaries of the ‘Sunni majority’ framework, perpetuating their isolation. This isolation, however, is not a novel phenomenon. During the Mandate period in Syria, Circassians were similarly marginalised. At the time, they shared this predicament with Turkmen and Kurds, as all three ethnic groups were non-Arab Sunni Muslims. Due to the French administration’s policy of ‘divide and rule,’ which prioritised religious over ethnic distinctions, Circassians, Kurds, and Turkmen were not legally recognised as minorities. Consequently, they were condemned to ‘loneliness.’

Nevertheless, factors such as population potential mitigated the isolation of Kurds and Turkmen to some extent, whereas the Circassians were left entirely at the mercy of the League of Nations and France. Between 1925 and 1938, Circassians repeatedly petitioned to be recognised as an ‘ethnic minority’ de jure but to no avail.

Today, the Sunni Arab ‘majority’ dominates the largest geographical expanse of Syria. Kurds inhabit their own regions, and Turkmen benefit from the support of the Republic of Türkiye. Meanwhile, autonomous zones appear to be emerging for the Alawites and Druze. In contrast, the Circassians live along the Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus corridor, territories under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). While HTS has guaranteed the security of religious and sectarian minorities, this assurance does not extend to the Circassians, as they are an ethnic rather than a religious minority.

In Syria, many groups either enjoy the right to self-determination or are under the protection of a foreign power. Circassians, however, lack such assurances, which signals the likelihood of their isolation deepening in the post-Assad period, mirroring their earlier experience under the Mandate administration.

Under these conditions, two potential actions can be taken:

1. Diplomatic efforts could be initiated to persuade Türkiye or France to assume the role of protector for the Circassian population residing along the Aleppo-Damascus corridor.

2. Circassian diasporas in Türkiye, Jordan, Israel, Kosovo, the Gulf, Europe, and the United States could take the initiative to ensure the safety, economic well-being, and preservation of the lifestyle of their kin in Syria. By establishing a robust flow of information, Circassian diasporas can act as the ‘external voice’ of Syrian Circassians, bringing potential human rights violations to the attention of the global community.

A concrete proposal is to establish an organisation similar to the Jewish Agency [an organisation established to facilitate Jewish migration and settlement, particularly in Israel. —Ed.] , dedicated to Circassian migration, resettlement, and integration. Such an agency would serve as a mechanism to collectively evacuate, transport, and resettle Circassians wishing to leave crisis zones. Unlike the Jewish Agency, which functions as a ‘return’ organisation, the proposed Circassian Agency would not facilitate repatriation, as the doors to the Caucasus remain closed to mass return. The immediate goal would be to ensure that evacuated Circassians are settled as cohesively as possible within the borders of a single country.

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It is evident that Israel will remain a dominant and leading force in the Middle East for an extended period. Correspondingly, the influence of Israeli Circassians within the Circassian world is set to grow. Israeli Circassians, often associated with two villages and a population of approximately 5,000, will come to represent much more than this. Expectations from Israeli Circassians will rise, and their lobbying efforts will gain prominence.

One potential scenario involves the State of Israel assuming a protective role for Circassians residing along the Aleppo-Damascus corridor. Another scenario envisions the reopening of abandoned Circassian villages in the Golan Heights for resettlement, potentially establishing an autonomous ‘Circassian homeland’ in the region. These initiatives, undoubtedly, would be spearheaded by Israeli Circassians.

In the post-Assad period, the Circassian world will no longer present a unified image. The homeland and the diasporas will emerge as distinct entities rather than alternatives to one another. In fact, the fragmentation process that began in March 2011 has now become a permanent feature.

The natural outcome of this fragmentation will be the birth and strengthening of a transnational diaspora identity. This overarching identity will be shaped by the shared experience of ‘the catastrophe of exile and the victimhood of being unable to return.’ The diaspora identity will exert a long-lasting influence on the Circassian world. Even if the gates of the Caucasus were to reopen and normalcy restored, this diaspora-based solidarity will endure as a structural characteristic of Circassian sociology.