Ivanishvili's Apology and Militaristic Heroism, by Giorgi Khasaia

The following article, written by Giorgi Khasaia and originally published on the publika.ge website, analyses Bidzina Ivanishvili's suggested apology to the Ossetians, which the author interprets as including the Abkhazians. The article delves into the broader political implications of this statement in the context of Georgian militaristic sentiments. The article has been translated from Georgian.

They say Ivanishvili has apologised [Ivanishvili suggested that the Georgian people may eventually apologise to the Ossetians for the suffering they endured under Saakashvili and his government ―Ed.] to the Ossetians and Abkhazians. This apology is needed to create a pre-election illusion, suggesting he has some plans regarding Abkhazia and Samachablo (South Ossetia). We don't have many options—this "something" is either a pre-election fraud, similar to the "Gareji is Georgia" campaign, or the Russians, together with the Russified Abkhaz elites, are winking at Ivanishvili.

Generally speaking, two attitudes towards the Abkhazians and Ossetians are currently clashing in Georgia: one says we should apologise to the Abkhazians to reconcile; the other claims we have nothing to apologise for—in fact, the ethnic cleansing of Georgians should not go unpunished, and the return of Abkhazia is only possible through legal and military means.

The politics of apology, in which left-liberal self-blame and cowardly conservatism are strangely intertwined, has its sincere followers (e.g., see Nana Janelidze's film), but Ivanishvili is not among them. Militaristic sentiments, on the other hand, are the offspring of liberal nationalism, and in its shared imagination, Georgia should be as strong as Israel, while the Abkhazians, logically, take the place of the Palestinians. (Hence the sympathy for Israel from this nationalist perspective, and the indifference—and often disdain—towards the Palestinians.)

For me, as a displaced person from Abkhazia and an advocate of reconciliation, Ivanishvili's apology works in reverse. This apology is laughable and unserious to a significant portion of Abkhazians. It has no practical dimension at all—after so many years, the Ossetians and especially the Abkhazians are likely interested in what practical offers the Georgians can make to them. The situation of the Abkhazians is now very difficult. For 30 years, the Abkhazians have stubbornly maintained a 'neither here nor there' situation—neither internationally recognised nor integrated with Georgia, let alone Russia—but this now appears to be nearing its end. It so happened that the political aspirations of the Abkhazians (towards independence) were linked from the beginning to land and real estate. They inscribed land as the main guarantee of existence in their constitution. Later, they added a ban on selling apartments to foreigners. These two events are connected to the Abkhazians' two main fears: that others might seize resources (through land) and that they might become an ethnic minority (as had happened after the Muhajirism [the mass exile of the Abkhazians following the Russo-Caucasian War (1864) and the Russo-Ottoman War (1877–78) ―Ed.] and later during the Soviet era [During the Soviet era, there was a mass resettlement of Georgians, particularly Mingrelians, to Abkhazia. ―Ed.]. Russia has targeted exactly these two—Aslan Bzhania's comprador team, on the orders of the Russians, is trying to break both resistances. The Abkhazians endured the transfer of the best part of Bichvinta (Pitsunda) to the Russian Federation for 50 years but could not tolerate the law on apartments—which, in their opinion, would gradually turn the Abkhazians into an ethnic minority. "No to Russification"—such a slogan was frequently seen or heard at protests against the law on apartments. This is the backdrop against which we must consider any reconciliation policy with the Abkhazians.

+ Abkhazia’s MFA Comments on Ivanishvili’s Apology Statement

+ It's necessary to find a way out! (Letter of 37 | 1997)

+ Why I Apologize To Abkhaz People, by Ucha Nanuashvili

+ Thirty Years of Peace-negotiations, by Charlotte Hille

+ Thirty-Year Struggle: Georgia and Abkhazia's Lost Opportunities for Dialogue

In this context, Ivanishvili's apology looks ridiculous. Against the backdrop of the Abkhazians' fears, what value can there be in the apology of someone who handed over a territory the size of the Ochamchira district (forest and land) for a lari to Khidasheli to arrange a hunting ground? Do we remember the stories of the Racha forests?

If we recall the public offers made to the Abkhazians by the "Dream" party, the most absurd still seems to be Garibashvili's (Ivanishvili's) promise that Abkhazia will become Monaco, and Sokhumi the second Monte Carlo.

It's worth paying attention to another recent fear of the Abkhazians, which is increasing in Abkhazia along with the warming of relations between Georgia and Russia. "We are afraid the Russians will sell us out to the Georgians"—this is how this fear is expressed, and it's not entirely unfounded. Of course, the owners of big money, on both sides of the Enguri, will inevitably have their plan to turn Abkhazia into a source of profit. But any plan to buy Abkhazia is doomed to failure. Implementing such a plan will probably be difficult, but even if it is implemented, it cannot be a way to resolve the conflict. The bourgeoisie always has the illusion that if they settle matters among themselves, the problem will be solved. This illusion is dissipated like smoke by the noise of people taking to the streets.

Let's return again to the useless apology and militaristic attitudes regarding Abkhazia. Ivanishvili's harmful apology and harmful militaristic sentiments are twins. They deserve each other; they sustain each other. Both belong to yesterday—one with nostalgic dishonour, the other with hopeless revanchism. Behind the first hides a fraudulent plan to buy Abkhazia in some form, while the second cannot conceal the desire for revenge. Both the illusion of revenge and the temptation to submit reappear like phantoms from the past, but neither is what we need.

As for the people, more interesting phenomena are emerging. The war 30 years ago was for territorial integrity for Georgians, and a patriotic war for Abkhazians. In any case, this war revolved around land, territory, and also resources, although the latter is almost unseen. Georgians and Abkhazians, 30 years after the war, are still defending land and resources, but not from each other. I don't know whether this or something else has created spontaneous, cautious, but pleasant solidarities on both sides of the Enguri. Some Abkhazians sympathised with the May protests in Tbilisi, apparently due to anti-Russian sentiments, and compliments were also heard from Tbilisi when the "law on apartments" was halted by popular resistance in Abkhazia.

Georgians will have to acknowledge that the Abkhazians are not an appendage of the Russians and will have to see them as subjects moved by their own aspirations, fears, and hopes, just as the Abkhazians will have to acknowledge that they were not defending the land only from Georgians. Any plan related to Abkhazia that does not envisage rapprochement between the peoples is stillborn. Such is Ivanishvili's apology and militaristic heroism.

The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of AbkhazWorld.